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 This dissertation traces the evolution of the sportscast highlight form. The 
highlight form emerged as the dominant technique of sportscasts as a result of the 
technological, economic and social changes that impacted media systems. Changes in 
technologies do not provide the entire account of the highlight form’s development and 
deployment, so this study also explicates the importance of the protocols that express the 
intricate relationships between media producers, sports leagues and organizations, and 
audiences. It argues that the sportscast highlight form is not a recent development, given 
its prominent use within a news context in every medium from early news film and 
newsreels to television and new media. 
 As an example of media history, this project explicates each medium’s 
contributions, not so much as discrete phenomenon, but as the relational totality which 
the term implies. Such macro-level histories necessarily take a more long-term view of 
the processes of historical change. Additionally, this methodology utilizes intertextuality 
as an analytical strategy to question whose interests were served from the evolution and 
deployment of this form, who benefited from the narratives represented through the form, 
and whose interests were consolidated from the commodification of the form. This study 
analyzes primary and secondary sources related to sportscasts, including early sport 
films, newsreels, network and cable programming, and new media content. 
 The significance of this study stems from the prominent position sports media in 
general and sports journalism in particular occupy within the political and cultural 
economy of late capitalism. The significance of this project is also evidenced in the 
considerable impact the national and regional sports networks have had on the 
proliferation of sportscasts. Lastly, this study analyzes the impacts electronic sports 
journalists have had in influencing and reflecting trends in race, gender, and ethnic 

































EVOLUTION OF THE SPORTSCAST HIGHLIGHT FORM: FROM PEEP 




Raymond W. Gamache 
 
Dissertation submitted to the faculty of the Graduate School of the  
University of Maryland, College Park, in partial fulfillment  
of the requirements for the degree of  














 Professor Maurine Beasley, Chairperson/Advisor 
 Professor David L. Andrews 
 Professor Lee Thornton 
 Associate Professor Chris Hanson 


























© Copyright by 
































To the staff of the Philip Merrill College of Journalism for their patient and kind service. 
To the administration of the Philip Merrill College of Journalism for providing me with 
the means to accomplish my goals. 
To members of my cohort—Eric Easton, Andrew Kaplan, Shuling Huang, Wenjing Xie, 
and Rafael Lorente, who shared so many ideas and kept me tied to the mast. A special 
thanks goes to A. R. Hogan, who provided me with a wealth of materials gleaned from 
the television archives at the Library of Congress.  
To my “other” cohort in the Department of Kineseology’s Physical Cultural Studies 
program, who welcomed me and taught me to speak in a new language. 
To faculty members Haynes Johnson, who allowed me to germinate the idea for this 
work in a seminar paper; and to John Newhagen, with whom I fleshed out the initial idea. 
To my committee members, whose guidance and insights helped me through the process. 
To Dave Andrews, who challenged me to stake out my own ontological and 
epistemological ground. 
To the late Michael Gurevitch, a giant on whose shoulders so many of us have stood and 
seen new theoretical perspectives. 
To Maurine Beasley, whose tireless encouragement, consideration and attentiveness 
made the experience so rewarding.  
To my mother, Rachel, and sister, Aline, for encouraging me to set sail on this adventure 
and whose love guided me to new shores. 











TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Acknowledgements………………………………………………………………………..i 
Table of Contents…………………………………………………………………………ii      
List of Illustrations………………………...………………………………………...……iii 
Chapter 1: The Highlight Form……………………………………………………………1 
Chapter 2: Knockout Rounds and Rounding Marks……………………………………..35 
Chapter 3: The Habit of Highlights………………………………………………...……89 
Chapter 4: A Dream of Carnage and the Electronic Monster……………………..……143 
Chapter 5: The Agony of Defeat and the Ecstasy of Communication………………….191 
Chapter 6: Sports Junkies, Junk Journalism and Cathode Ray Sterilization…………...244 
Chapter 7: The Little Shop of Highlights………………………………………………298 
Chapter 8: The Real Virtuality for an Audience of One………………………………..336 
























LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 
 
2.1: Illustrations from the Police Gazette 
2.2 Edison boxing films from 1891-1892 
2.3 Photograph and drawing of the Black Maria studio 
2.4 New York Sun illustration of film projection 
2.5 Clipper advertisement 
3.1 Zev-Papyrus display advertisement 
3.2 Lewis Tewanima’s “War Dance” 
4.1 Photograph of images capture on television in the Zworykin laboratory 
4.2 Display ad for Gillette Cavalcade of Sports World Series broadcast 
4.3 NBC display ad for the Louis vs. Walcott championship fight 
4.4 Photograph of the Stratovision, a B-29 Superfortress 
4.5 A television map of the United States from 1949 
4.6 NBC letterhead design of press releases for college football broadcasts 
5.1 Ampex Corporation’s Mark IV Prototype Video Tape Recorder 
5.2 Scotch Magnetic VR Tape 
5.3 Schematic drawing of Syncom III’s synchronous orbit 






















The purpose of this study is to trace the developments that contributed to the 
evolution of the sportscast highlight as an aesthetic form. In this regard the term 
aesthetics refers to those visual and audio techniques and conventions that contribute “to 
establishing the meaning and validity of critical judgments concerning works of art, and 
the principles underlying or justifying such judgments.”1 As a form, the sportscast 
highlight has been used to communicate narratives about sporting events and the athletes 
who compete within them. In this sense, the highlight does not refer to specific content 
but to the form within which the visual images and audio commentary are presented.  
Although sportscasters use the term highlights in referring to content, that 
undifferentiated usage raises the question of what constitutes a sportscast highlight: Is it 
footage that captures an historic achievement (e.g., world’s record), or is it footage that 
captures individual or team athleticism (e.g., slam dunk), or is it an oddity that defies 
categorization? The images that largely derive their meaning from the context are 
referred to in semiotics as syntagmatic. For example, the “highlight” selected as the 
greatest in a 2007 Entertainment and Sports Programming Network (ESPN) contest of the 
“100 Greatest Highlights” was Mike Eruzione’s game-winning goal in the 1980 Lake 
Placid Olympic Games. Although the goal-scoring sequence offered neither outstanding 
athleticism, nor compelling visuals, it captured a significant sporting moment for an 
American audience, namely, victory over the highly favored hockey team from the Soviet 









images whose meaning is less dependent on the context of surrounding images are 
paradigmatic.2 For example, Lynn Swann’s acrobatic catch in Super Bowl X was a great 
individual play regardless of the game’s outcome. No context is necessary to appreciate 
the catch, and the images can be appreciated for the grace and beauty of the athleticism.  
To trace the evolution of the highlight form as it was developed and deployed 
within sportscasts, it is necessary to differentiate between the two main types of 
sportscasts: 1) the live coverage (i.e., accounts and descriptions) of a sporting event and 
2) news-oriented programming of sporting events. The former category includes all the 
national and international, professional and collegiate sporting events (e.g., Olympics, 
World Cup Football, Wimbledon, Kentucky Derby, NFL, etc.) that are disseminated live 
via an electronic delivery system.3 The latter includes all emanations of sports news—
film actualities, newsreel sports segments, televised sports news programming, Web site 
content, and content delivered via mobile devices.  
The two main sportscast genres have been communicated by a variety of delivery 
systems. While the changes in delivery systems, or technologies, constitute an important 
aspect of this study, they represent only one part, for as Henry Jenkins posits, “Delivery 
systems are simply and only technologies; media are also cultural systems.”4 Jenkins also 
points out that while delivery systems come and go, “media persist as layers within an 
ever more complicated information and entertainment stratum.”5 Those layers include not 
only the delivery systems that disseminate content, but also what Lisa Gitelman refers to 
as set protocols or social and cultural practices. “Protocols express a huge variety of 









sportscasts, as content for various media, have changed as media’s protocols have 
changed. While the conventions and the deployment of the sportscast highlight form have 
changed, what has not undergone significant change is the highlight form itself.  
Consideration of the sportscast highlight form is based on a principle that stems 
from what Raunsbjerg and Sand call the “aesthetics of the instant.”7 Deployment of the 
most exciting “highlights” constitutes a visual representation of both the aesthetic form 
and the sporting event. This project proposes that the sportscast highlight form evolved 
from the technological changes that led to refinements in audio and video techniques, 
resulting in enhancements of production values. The sportscast highlight form has been 
adapted and appropriated by news organizations, as well as sports leagues and 
organizations to capture, preserve and embellish the decisive moments of sporting events 
and athletic achievement, often referred to as the “ritual object.”8 In so doing, these 
entities have utilized the form to carry what Susan Birrell calls “ideological messages that 
empower some views and values while dismissing or obscuring others.”9  
Explicating the changes in the technologies and the protocols that have shaped 
sporting discourse, transmitted cultural values, and promoted affective economics 
necessarily involves an analysis of the visual and audio techniques that constitute the 
form’s foundation. Arguably, the most important technique is the creation of visual 
synecdoche through use of condensation and decontextualization.10 As Kenneth Burke 
explains, “Artistic representation is synecdochic, in that certain relations within the 
medium ‘stand for’ corresponding relations outside it.”11 The sportscast highlight form 









images with auditory conventions (e.g., narrative commentary and canned music) to 
generate the meaning context. The recontextualized narrative guides the viewer to the 
“correct” interpretation and feeling state, despite the fact that viewers are disparately 
positioned and rarely interpret the highlight’s meaning in the same way. 
This study argues that changes in the technologies were accompanied by changes 
in protocols for both sportscast producers and audiences. The highlight form changed the 
way sportscasters and electronic sports journalists performed their jobs. For example, 
with the introduction of in-game replays in the early 1960s, sportscasters’ accounts and 
descriptions of live sporting events became increasingly more technical and analytic, 
lending a greater scientificity to the commentary. Videotape allowed for instant replays, 
allowing montages to be used to amplify the spectacle and affect of sportscasts and in-
game promotions. The role of the sportscaster changed from one who informed to one 
who entertained. In turn, the commercial imperative reshaped institutional values and 
professional practices of electronic sports journalists. The relationship between sports 
journalists and the leagues, teams and players was characterized by marketing co-
promotion and a vested interest in protecting each other’s financial investments. 
   Technological changes also impacted the protocols of sportscast viewers. In the 
early 1890s viewers experienced the sportscast highlight form alone, looking through a 
viewer mounted on the top of kinetoscope machines. Only a few years later, projectors 
allowed for viewing in cinemas (i.e., nickelodeons), opera houses, fairgrounds and 
anywhere a screen and projector could be set up and powered with electricity. Early 









new medium by offering sportscasts to patrons. The home became the primary place to 
watch when television sets became affordable for individuals and families. The viewing 
experience for audiences changed again with the proliferation of new delivery systems. 
No longer did viewers depend exclusively on the television schedule since sportscast pay 
packages allowed for access almost anywhere and anytime. Media and sports leagues 
discovered they could generate another revenue stream by delivering sportscast content to 
an audience of one.     
To trace the development of this form necessitates a broad scope. As such, this 
project employs a historical framework whose concern “is not with particular individuals, 
moments, or events, but with the larger economic and social forces that structure their 
terrain, that shape the ground upon which events are enacted.”12 While it is important to 
acknowledge that illustrations were used in early sporting magazines like the Police 
Gazette, this project considers the development of sportscasts in the context of visual 
electronic media. Specifically, the evolution of the sportscast highlight form can be traced 
from some of the earliest Edison films, which included staged boxing matches, as well as 
actualities of live sporting events. Newsreels helped to standardize the routines utilized 
by cameramen and the sports segments created in the production offices by editors. Early 
television developed the conventions and production practices used in the presentation of 
live sporting events and sports news programming. With the technological developments 
that produced videotape in 1956, televised sportscasts were enhanced with special effects 
techniques like slow motion, instant replay and stop action.13 The emergence of cable 









half-hour sportscasts in 1979 and 1980 respectively, saturated the electronic sports media 
market and introduced the concept of the “sports junkie.”14 Lastly, new media offered yet 
another set of delivery systems and protocols that changed the ways audiences accessed 
sportscasts.  
As an example of media history, this project explicates each medium’s 
contributions, not so much as discrete phenomenon, but as the relational totality which 
the term implies.15 Put another way, this project delineates how historically and as a 
matter of fact, film, newsreels, television and new media are very closely aligned in terms 
of the technologies and protocols that contributed to the development and deployment of 
the sportscast highlight form. 
This study will answer the following research questions: 
1. What technological developments in film, newsreels, television and new 
media contributed to the sportscast highlight form? 
2. From what basic categories of generative mechanisms, which include 
style, mode of production, intertextualities, and authorship, did the 
sportscast highlight form evolve? 
3. What protocols—economic, political and social relationships—
contributed to shaping sportscasts within a commercial imperative? 
4. How has the sportscast highlight form been deployed to shape sporting 
discourse, transmit cultural and sport values, and promote affective 
economics? 









gender, national identity and ethnicity?16 
Literature Review 
A. Sport and Film History 
 
If the sportscast highlight is considered an art form, then it is important to 
consider how that form evolved from basic categories of generative mechanisms. Allen 
and Gomery argue that these mechanisms “operate within larger contexts, however, and 
their individual histories involve both aesthetic and non-aesthetic factors, including the 
economic, technological, and social contexts in which films have been made and 
received.”17 This research project argues that the development of the sportscast highlight 
form is an evolutionary process that involves aesthetic and non-aesthetic considerations. 
Like the history of film, the history of the sportscast highlight form is evolutionary: The 
film period is marked by formative concerns of production and distribution; the newsreel 
period by the refinement of visual, sound and editing techniques; the early network 
television period by imaginative story-telling and myth-making; cable television by the 
proliferation of mediated sport content; and new media by a technological synthesis of 
the other periods to produce more intense affect. As Allen and Gomery note, “One 
aesthetic development provides the impetus for the next as the aesthetic potential of the 
medium is realized by one filmmaker after another.”18 Arguably, the same impetus holds 
true for a genre within any medium. 
Several seminal works have documented the role of early filmmakers in capturing 
sporting events as content for entertainment films and actualities. Charles Musser’s 









comprehensive guide to early Edison films, as well as an insightful introduction that 
explains film production, representation and exploitation in the last decade of the 
nineteenth century. In the first volume of his History of the American Cinema, titled The 
Emergence of Cinema, Musser offers a compelling account of the social, technological 
and economic factors that contributed to the formation of early American cinema. His 
work chronicles the importance of sports as content for filmmakers. Gordon Hendricks’ 
Origins of the American Film, a compilation of three works—The Edison Motion Picture 
Myth (1961), Beginnings of the Biograph (1964), and The Kinetoscope (1966)—is 
instrumental in detailing the contributions of W. K. L. Dickson and the Latham family to 
the development of early film.  
While several histories of boxing refer to the relationship between boxing and 
film, Elliott J. Gorn’s The Manly Art: Bare-Knuckle Prize Fighting in America provides a 
rich account of the sport in the decades leading up to the emergence of film. The most 
detailed study of boxing’s relationship with film is Daniel J. Streible’s unpublished 
dissertation, titled A History of the Prizefight Film, 1894-1915. This well-researched and 
exhaustive study is an invaluable resource for anyone interested in the formation of sport 
media. Although Streibel presents a rich social history of the fight film, he offers little 
related to the formation of the sportscast highlight form.  
B. Sport Media History 
Because the highlight form has been employed within different media, it is 
important to consider the works that provide an historical account of those various media. 









comprehensive overview of the history of the American newsreel, although his analysis 
of sport focuses more on event coverage than on the routinization and standardization 
that characterized the newsreel sports segment. Fielding addresses the relationship 
between newsreels and prizefighting, as well as the Olympics, but searching for sports-
related topics is difficult because sport is not an indexed topic. Peter Baechlin and 
Maurice Muller-Strauss present an objective, world-wide survey of newsreel in 
Newsreels Across the World. In addition to data-rich charts, the authors analyze the 
problems associated with the production of actual newsreels, their projection in cinemas, 
and international organization of newsreel ownership. The authors aptly analyze the 
production of sports segments. Because of its insightful analysis of how the newsreels 
created and utilized their operational aesthetic, Nicholas Pronay’s chapter, “The 
Newsreels: the Illusion of Actuality,” in The Historian and Film, should be considered 
essential reading. Of particular interest is Pronay’s discussion of “the feel and character 
of events which was different in kind from what had lain within the powers of the news 
media before.”19  
Several works explain the importance of television in the development of sports. 
Benjamin Rader’s In Its Own Image analyzes television’s “impact on the ethos of sports; 
on the motives and behavior of athletes, owners, and spectators; and on the organization 
and management of sports.”20 Since the work, published in 1984, presents a critical 
analysis of the early years of sports telecasts, it provides almost nothing about cable 
television’s impact or the importance of the highlight form to sportscasts. Similar in style 









Published in the same year as Rader’s work, Powers’ book explores the changes 
television forced upon sports, especially in terms of economics. Roone Arledge’s Memoir 
provides anecdotal information about the development of ABC Sports by the person most 
responsible for its development. Bill Rasmussen’s Sports Junkies Rejoice! The Birth of 
ESPN offers a detailed account of his role in creating the cable network. A more 
comprehensive and detailed study of ESPN is available from Michael Freeman, whose 
ESPN: The Uncensored History is based on “more than two hundred interviews over a 
four-year period with current and former ESPN employees…company documents, 
handwritten notes, diary entries and media accounts.”21  
Several trade books concentrate on the history of a single sport or the history of 
the sport’s relationship with media. Even though Michael MacCambride’s America’s 
Game focuses on the history of the National Football League, his discussion of specific 
topics related to media—NFL Films, Monday Night Football, and blackout rules—is 
highly informative. In Reading Football, Michael Oriard shows how football became a 
series of cultural stories about power, luck, strategy, and deception. Oriard continues that 
investigation in King Football: Sport and Spectacle in the Golden Age of Radio and 
Newsreels, Movies and Magazines, the Weekly & the Daily Press. Oriard argues that 
newsreels were instrumental in popularizing football and that “newsreel football was the 
early ancestor of ESPN’s SportsCenter.”22 Curt Smith’s Voices of the Game provides a 
full-scale overview of baseball broadcasting from 1921 to the present. As Smith admits, 
judging play-by-play men must be, of necessity, arbitrary, but the work compensates with 









Stephen Wenn and Scott Martyn, tracks the history of the modern Olympic Games, 
providing considerable primary source documents related to the International Olympic 
Committee’s use of media to popularize the games. 
Several scholars have contributed chapter-length works on sport media history to 
compilations. Among these, Robert W. McChesney’s “Media Made Sport: A History of 
Sports Coverage in the United States,” argues that surges in the popularity of sport have 
always been accompanied by a dramatic increase in the media’s coverage of sport. In 
contrast with McChesney’s perspective, Jennings Bryant and Andrea M. Holt’s “A 
Historical Overview of Sports and Media in the United States” posits that many “cultural 
forces and social movements other than capitalism helped shape the complex, mutually 
interdependent relationship between sports and media”23 and that essential elements of 
the relationship were derived long before the Industrial Age. These works illustrate the 
difficulties of providing an overview to such a broad topic in a single article.            
C. Television and Film Technical Production Techniques 
Few studies have empirically engaged aesthetic processes of sports newscasts, 
although scholars have analyzed aesthetic features of news production. In “TV Sport and 
Rhetoric,” Preben Raunsbjerg and Henrik Sand utilize a genre approach to televised sport 
with a focus on form rather than content. They show how mediated sport transforms the 
sporting event into a media event on an aesthetic level, a characteristic feature of which is 
the tendency to preserve and embellish the event’s decisive moments, meaning 
highlights. In Sight Sound Motion: Applied Media Aesthetics, Herbert Zettl, analyzed 









articulation of two- and three-dimensional space, and motion within the frame.  
Of particular relevance for this study, Martin J. Medhurst’s “Propaganda 
Techniques in Documentary Film and Television: AIM vs. PBS” explicates the criteria of 
effective television and filmic propaganda techniques. Of particular significance, 
Medhurst argues that documentary film [and television], as a genre, “was anything but 
the objective, neutral, factual reporting of events as they transpired in real life.”24 
Medhurst situates the documentary film as a genre dealing with the “creative treatment of 
actuality.”25 Medhurst presents nine techniques, some unique to film, some shared with 
other media, that characterize effective propaganda works, including the 
decontextualization of sound and image, the recontextualization of sound and image, the 
use of a narrator, and the pursuit of a journalistic angle, all of which contribute to 
“gaining control of the viewers’ emotions…to lead the audience to specific ideational 
conclusions.”26 This project will argue that the propaganda techniques delineated by 
Medhurst constitute key elements of the sportscast highlight form. 
Several studies within cultural studies have analyzed the impact that television’s 
use of the highlight form has had on sport. In “Football Since the War,” Chas Critcher 
notes that the editing of a ninety-minute game down to thirty “represents the game as a 
series of detailed moments rather than as a more general flow of action.”27 Critcher 
describes the effect of the press and television on the football sub-culture as debilitative. 
In “’Highlights and Action Replays’—Ideology, Sport and the Media,” Alan Clarke and 
John Clarke examine key processes through which the media interpret sporting events 









event. The two processes they explicate are the process of selection and the process of 
interpretation, through which the media are “involved in highlighting and 
reinforcing…ideological values.”28 The authors identify four values that inform the 
concentration of the presentation of sport: spectacle, drama, personalization and 
immediacy, values which they note are also intrinsic to coverage of crime news. They 
note, “These elements of concentration operate within the broader frameworks of sports 
programmes and they can be illustrated by looking at the conventions, the formats of 
such presentation.”29 While the article primarily analyzes these conventions based on 
textual evidence, the authors point to processes that have become accepted practices in 
sport-media production. In “Cool as the Other Side of the Pillow,” Farred argues that the 
commentary produced by ESPN’s SportsCenter anchors is a distinctive type of sports 
discourse permeated with a penchant for hipness. SportsCenter’s anchors use a discourse 
that “trades on two different, although by no means antithetical, kinds of ‘coolness’. In 
the first sense, it is…self-referential and literary; in the second, it is well versed in the 
latest in hip-hop speak.”30 By repeating their own trademark phrases, these anchors are 
not only patenting and claiming their expressions, they also are adding them to the public 
domain. 
D. Sport, Media and Society 
 The emergence of the sociology of sport as an academic discipline in the 1980s 
fostered a wealth of research on the relationship between sport, media and society. Gary 
Whannel’s Fields of Vision argues that television not only affects the ways in which we 









explicit statements, in words and pictures, about our sense of nation, of class, of the place 
of men and women, our relation to other nations and so on.”31 David Rowe’s Sport, 
Culture and the Media: The Unruly Trinity, focuses on the organizational structures and 
professional ideologies that shape the production of media sports texts and the way 
audiences deconstruct sports images and information. Rowe is most effective in 
“assessing the relative power of major sports and sports organizations and of media 
corporations and proprietors.”32 His critique is particularly relevant to a discussion of 
how the sportscast highlight form is deployed. Sport and Postmodern Times brings 
together a number of North American and European scholars whose work examines sport 
and its significance in the construction and diffusion of dominant cultural meanings and 
values. Several chapters confront the issues related to sport, representation and the 
postmodern mediascape, showing how sport appropriates “and reproduces postmodern 
aesthetic forms in order to better constitute itself as an object of hyperconsumption.”33 
The relationship between postmodernism and the highlight form is a key concept of this 
research. In the article “Sport on Television: Replay and Display,” Margaret Morse 
analyzes the impact of technical innovations like slow motion and instant replay in 
television broadcasts of American football, arguing that such innovations distort time and 
space to the detriment of the game’s overall geometry. This works offers an insightful 
analysis about one frequently used sportscast technique related to the highlight form. 
 Several works that do not deal with sport directly informed this study’s discussion 
of the changing protocols related to media. Timothy W. Luke’s Screens of Power 









His discussion informs the political and cultural economy of sport media forms. Although 
E. Ann Kaplan’s Rocking Round the Clock focuses on rock videos, the larger arguments 
about postmodernism, spectatorship and advertising are certainly applicable to the 
aesthetic issues confronted in this study. In Promotional Culture, Andrew Wernick 
delineates the unfolding relationship between the intensive and extensive development of 
the market as an organizing principle of life, emphasizing the impact of promotion on the 
objective side of culture. Wernick’s ideas on the spread of commodification were 
applicable to the deployment of sportscast highlights within the sport mediascape. Henry 
Jenkins’s Convergence Culture offers a cogent discussion on the collision of old and new 
media. Of particular interest to this study is his explication of convergence, participatory 
culture, and affective economics. 
E. Sports Journalism 
 There is a dearth of scholarship specifically devoted to the issues and contexts in 
which sports journalism, media and popular culture intersect. Raymond Boyle’s Sports 
Journalism: Context and Issues argues that sports journalism has been implicated in the 
construction of various sports discourses connected to wider issues of gender, race, 
ethnicity and national identity. Boyle’s discussion on the issues of co-promotion, 
punditry and journalistic values is particularly relevant in light of the recent recognition 
that the sports audience is more media savvy than previous scholars believed. Although 
David A. Klatell and Norman Marcus’s Sports for Sale is not wholly devoted to sports 
journalism, they explore several issues that stem from the entertainment ethos of 









enterprise reporting—that characterize “the woeful state of television sport journalism.”34 
Methodology and Sources 
This research project employs a historical-cultural methodology that seeks to 
explain the evolution and deployment of the sportscast highlight form by tracing the 
formation over a period of time. Such macro-level histories necessarily take a more long-
term view of the processes of historical change. Additionally, this methodology utilizes 
intertextuality as an analytical strategy to explore the relationships and connections 
between media, sports leagues and consumers. It theorizes media as constituted by, as 
well as constituting, social and cultural formations. As Scannell notes, “The media 
clearly operate within a set of economic and political frameworks, representing the 
prevailing social order, but its [sic] diversity as well as its internal representational 
struggles, as articulated by the media, serve also to poise the media uneasily between 
convention and innovation, reproduction and change.”35 Schrøder explains that in the case 
of news and other factual coverage, macro-level critical discourse analysis can be used to 
examine various media genres as they draw on other forms of discourse. He notes, “It is 
at this macro-social level that, ultimately, the meaning of discourses and practices may be 
evaluated.”36  
In order to account for the various economic, technological and cultural 
frameworks that have contributed to the shaping of media genres and forms, it is 
necessary to examine the intertextual structures within media. The methodological 
question, as Jensen points out, of how to examine intertextual structures and the social 









intertextual studies has centered on texts as self-contained entities, and these studies have 
made “little or no reference to complementary sources of evidence about literary and 
media institutions….”37 Jensen points to the work of Fiske as an alternative 
methodological approach that delineates different types of intertextuality according to 
their functions.  
  Fiske outlines two distinct types of intertextuality: Horizontal intertextuality 
concerns the transfer and accumulation of particular meanings over historical time, as 
preserved in metaphors, themes and, of particular relevance to this study, genres. Vertical 
intertextuality operates during a more delimited time period, but across several media and 
social contexts. To clarify this synchronic perspective, Fiske offers three types of texts: 
Primary texts refer to the center of attention (e.g., traditional artworks, a feature movie, 
etc.). Secondary texts consist of studio publicity, reviews and criticism, and tertiary texts 
consist of audience contributions in conversations and other interaction around media, 
which in today’s mediascape include blogs, internet forums and chat rooms. As Jensen 
points out, “Together the two axes of intertextuality may be understood as a model of 
how meaning is produced and circulated in society.”38 This study employs a diachronic 
approach that investigates the contributions of the various media to the development of 
the sportscast highlight form and its deployment in the creation of sport narratives 
disseminated to audiences. 
Seeking to unpack the intricate relationships between media, sports leagues and 
audiences, this study utilizes intertextuality as an analytical approach to question whose 









benefited from the narratives represented through the form, and whose interests have 
been consolidated from the commodification of the form. By locating how the highlight 
form evolved and was deployed, this study can better theorize “about the cultural 
meanings and interests particular sites of power engender and mobilize.”39 In the context 
of historical media research, intertextual analysis attempts to connect disparate historical 
events and entities to one another within a broader cultural framework. Because the 
highlight form has served as a means of encapsulating cultural values within a mediating 
object, intertextual analysis can be applied to access the process of meaning production, 
dissemination and consumption and offer a way to understand the past. 
 Ultimately, as Scannell asserts, “The precise method of any particular historical 
investigation will be shaped and informed by the nature of the topic and the available 
resources, but a willingness to read widely and to explore supplementary sources is 
vital.”40 The nature of this research project being to trace the evolution of an aesthetic 
form, the sportscast highlight, it is incumbent that the researcher investigate the primary 
sources that contributed to that evolution.  
This study is based upon primary and secondary sources related to sportscasts. 
Analysis revolves around a number of early films, located and available at the Library of 
Congress, Washington, D.C. These include: Leonard-Cushing Fight, June 14, 1894, 
Edison/the Kinetoscope Exhibition Company; Corbett and Courtney Before the 
Kinetograph, November 17, 1894 (filmed September 7), Wm. K. L. Dickson/Edison, 
Kinetoscope Exhibition Company; Corbett-Fitzsimmons Fight, March 17, 1897, 









& Biograph; World Championship, Jack Johnson vs. Stanley Ketchell [sic], October 24, 
1909, J.W. Coffroth/Kalem, Kleine Optical Company/MPPC and Gaumont, UK; Jeffries-
Johnson World’s Championship Boxing Contest, Held at Reno, Nevada, July 4, 1910, 
December 7, 1910, J. & J. Co., Photographed by Vitagraph; Supervised by J. Stuart 
Blackton; Willard-Johnson Boxing Match, May 4, 1915 (April 5 date of fight), 
Pantomimic Corp. (Fred Mace/L. Lawrence Weber; “Columbia” Winning the Cup, 
October 24, 1899, Thomas A. Edison, Inc.; producer J. Stuart Blackton, Albert E. Smith; 
and Racing at Sheepshead Bay, July 31, 1897, Thomas A. Edison, Inc.; producer, James 
White. 
Newsreels have been analyzed, covering the years 1929-1952. A collection of 
Universal Newsreels are available at the National Archives at College Park. This study 
examines a purposive sampling to establish not only the range of sports covered, but also 
the contributions of newsreel sport segments in the creation of a national identity and 
cultural hegemony. The purposive sample compares newsreels produced in the years 
immediately after the introduction of sound—1929, 1931, 1932 and 1933—with those 
from the years following World War II—1947, 1948, 1949, 1951 and 1952. These years 
were selected to avoid the war years when newsreel coverage of sports was reduced, yet 
allow enough passage of time to note any changes in form or content. Additionally, the 
sample includes three Olympic years, 1932, 1948 and 1952, to compare how that event 
was used in constructing national identity and presenting women and minority athletes.    
The Library of Congress has an extensive collection of NBC radio and television 









extant copies of early sportscasts, the log book and news releases provide valuable 
information about their creation, production and dissemination. Another important source 
of information resides in national newspapers and trade journals related to television. As 
sports became an important source of television programming in the years following 
World War II, the New York Times provided extensive coverage of the telecasts, offering 
factual information and insightful commentary on the significance of what was being 
televised. A limited number of archived sports news programs are also available, 
including CBS’s Sports Spectacular and ABC’s Wide World of Sports. It has been 
especially helpful to compare these programs before and after the development of 
videotape to determine what, if any, that had on the aesthetics of both programs. 
Cable programs such as ESPN’s SportsCenter are still being broadcast, so a 
purposive sample of one week during each season (i.e., spring, summer, fall and winter) 
was analyzed to establish the audio and video conventions of the sportscast. Additionally, 
other news programming such as Pardon the Interruption and Around the Horn, both of 
which utilize the highlight form, was also analyzed. A collection of spots from the 
advertising campaign “This is SportsCenter” were accessed and used to explicate the 
intertextuality of ESPN’s programming and branding strategies. Other programs such as 
ESPN’s reality program, Dream Job, provided insights into how anchors provide lead-ins 
and commentary for highlights.  
 In addition, this study has accessed a number of Web sites utilizing the sportscast 
highlight form in order to analyze the deployment, packaging and functionality of the 









leagues, media organizations and providers of wireless mobile services. Issues related to 
commodification and marketing have been explicated.  
 Lastly, an extensive number of newspaper articles have been utilized to delineate 
the social, economic, legal and technological changes that impacted the development of 
the sportscast highlight form. Given the dearth of archival television programs available 
for research, newspaper articles were an invaluable source in establishing not only what 
sports programs were televised, but also how those programs were critiqued by New York 
Times reporters like Val Adams, Jack Gould, Orrin Dunlap Jr., Sidney Lohman and 
Richard Witkin. These reporters covered the emerging medium of television and its 
relationship with sports with considerable verve and polish, offering insightful criticism. 
Newspaper articles constitute an important primary source for this study.      
While it is important for the researcher to become familiar with secondary 
sources, it is even more important to assess and analyze them “in regards to the types of 
evidence used, generalizations drawn and historical frameworks employed.”41 A 
thorough understanding of the secondary literature assists researchers in formulating 
paradigms and asking appropriate research questions which are at the heart of the 
historical process. Further, these secondary sources can help to “establish appropriate 
themes and set parameters conducive to consistent and logical arguments.”42 A list of the 
secondary sources that have been consulted in the grounding of this research proposal has 
been included in the bibliography. 
Context, Conclusions and Significance 









general and sports journalism in particular occupy within the political and cultural 
economy of late capitalism. Scholars have thoroughly explored the importance of sport 
within culture, leading Jennifer Hargreaves to posit, “The amount of time, energy and 
money devoted to sport in one form or another by all sections of society is undoubtedly 
greater than for any other aspect of culture.”43 Significantly, it is within the sphere of 
culture where the key economic processes of production, dissemination and exchange 
occur, connecting cultural production to the late-capitalist world of making products, 
supplying services and generating profits. Since cultural factors are central to economic 
processes, then sport and sports media clearly occupy a central position in the larger 
process that is reshaping society and culture. As Rowe argues, media texts, including 
sportscasts, are positioned “at the leading edge of this culturization of economics: they 
cannot be eaten or worn yet billions of people desire them in a bewildering variety of 
types, and media corporations are willing to expend billions of units of currency to 
supply them.”44 
 As a cultural and political form, television has largely been shaped by and 
dependent on the norms of late-capitalism. Sportscasts, like other television genres, are 
imbued with political and cultural economy. Rowe notes: 
Every fragment of sports reports, snatch of commentary, still shot and flickering 
image, and all other elements of sports discourse, are couched in visual and verbal 
languages whose grammar and syntax, vocabulary and framing, carry within them 
a kind of politics. These need not be overt, clear or consistent, but they represent a 









sport…. We underestimate the political economic weight of the media sports 
cultural complex at our peril.45  
Understanding how the sportscast highlight form became the means through which 
producers couch the visual and verbal languages of sport affect is one of the purposes of 
this research project, one that necessitates an historical-cultural lens. 
The significance of this project is also evidenced in the considerable impact the 
national and regional sports networks (e.g., CBS, NBC, ESPN, Fox Sports Net) have had 
on the proliferation of sportscasts. The sportscast landscape changed drastically with 
ESPN’s presence on cable systems, as its daily newscasts grew from fifteen minutes 
(originally titled SportsNight) to sixty minutes (SportsCenter). Additionally, when ESPN 
began broadcasting twenty-four hours a day in 1980, sports programming became an all-
the-time feature of American culture, Little wonder, then, ESPN research in 2003 showed 
an average of ninety-four million Americans spent fifty minutes a day or almost six hours 
per week with ESPN media.46 ESPN filled a programming void that the networks could 
not. Charles Hirshberg posits:  
And it did so by adopting, and perfecting, an underutilized, unappreciated method 
of communication: the sports highlight…. ESPN has made highlights the primary 
means by which the patterns and stories of sports are revealed. It’s a perfect 
medium for modern America.47  
As this project explains, Hirshberg’s contention that sportscast highlights have been 
“underutilized and unappreciated” is patently overstated, given the very prominent use of 









beginning of film. To understand ESPN’s success, this study explicates the changed 
context within which American electronic sports journalism has been organized and 
produced and the changed model of consumer behavior shaping programming and 
marketing strategies.  
Audiences for sportscast news often know the outcome of local and national 
games before they watch, yet they watch them to see the “highlights” and must be 
maintained as an audience.48 Electronic sports reporting has arguably changed from one 
that predominantly informs to one that primarily entertains by employing the highlight 
form to present increasingly dramatic and spectacular sports images. If Hirshberg’s 
description, “A good highlight is at once a poetic distillation of athleticism and a carnival 
barker’s holler for your attention, a shameless effort to keep you from pressing that 
damned remote” is even remotely accurate, then this “shameless effort” to maintain the 
audience not only dictates which highlights are presented, but also skews the aesthetic 
techniques toward more spectacular and viscerally-generating highlights.49 Operating 
within a postmodern market culture, sportscasts create rather than satisfy needs. Rail 
refers to this as the sport of desire.  
In postmodernity, there is less of a desire for sport than there is of a sport of 
desire: a constant and growing desire for new products, sensations and 
emotions—a desire fed but never fulfilled by the media, by the images.50  
The communication system captures, in this case, sport reality in its entirety so that the 
user becomes fully immersed in a virtual image setting in which “appearances are not just 









experience.”51 Experiencing a presentation of sportscast highlights becomes more real 
than the actual event. Ultimately, however many highlights are shown, the viewer is 
never satisfied, instead being fixated on a perpetual present of constantly changing 
texts—game recaps subsumed within pastiches of spectacular plays removed from game 
context, random images untethered to any meta-narrative. By pandering to the 
“Incredible Shrinking Attention Span and its cut-to-the-chase-and-show-me-what-you-
got values,” networks like ESPN may have found an easy way to rationalize its form of 
broadcast journalism, but calling it the “perfect medium for modern America” trivializes 
the product it purports to celebrate.52 
Lastly, this study analyzes the impacts electronic sports journalists have had in 
influencing and reflecting trends in race, gender, and ethnic relations, as well as political, 
economic and international affairs. This stems from the idea that sport and mediated 
presentations of it operate within a discourse permeated with symbolism and metaphor. 
As such, issues of representation remain central to electronic sports journalism, which are 
“saturated with ideas, values, images and discourses which at times reflect, construct, 
naturalize, legitimize, challenge and even reconstitute attitudes which permeate wider 
society.”53 In order to analyze the extent to which mediated presentations of sport impact 
the formations of race, ethnicity, gender and national identity, it is necessary to consider 
particular social, cultural and historical contexts. Rather than applying universal theories 
of sport, ethnicity and racism, particularly when examining the production and 
consumption of electronic news reportage of sport, it should be noted that a clear linkage 









Additionally, as Stuart Hall has noted, the positioning of the sports world in the 
social construction of news within both the layout of newspapers and the segmentation of 
local television news programs offers an important clue about our culture and a direct 
bearing on the coverage of sport, race and ethnicity. Hall points out that in major 
newspapers, sports are set off, “in a world distinct from other kinds of news, self-
contained and self-sufficient. It has its own internal ranking of big and small stories, its 
own climaxes and fillers. It has its own news order of stories.”54 A comparable 
positioning has occurred in local television news coverage wherein the sports segment 
was relegated to its own slot after news and weather.  
This positioning within electronic news media reflects the general place of sport 
in our culture as a well-defined enclave, “one of whose major attractions is that it has 
little or no relation to the rest of the news.”55 With the arrival of cable sports news 
programs, televised sports journalism truly set itself apart from the rest of the news. 
These programs had an immediate impact on local stations and the way they cover sports, 
since programs like SportsCenter “serve as models for local sportscasters in much the 
same way that network news programs serve as models for local newscasters.”56 By 
tracing the evolution of the sportscast highlight form, this research adds to our 
understanding of an important method of communication. Understanding the way 
sportscasts have been, and continue to be, deployed to shape cultural values helps 
educators to prepare a curriculum for future sports broadcasters. 
Precis of Chapters 









political and cultural economies, and social frameworks related to sportscast highlights 
that have been identified thus far, follows. 
Chapter One, “The Highlight Form,” provides a theoretical basis for explicating 
the highlight form as a rhetorical and aesthetic model; it also provides a review of the 
literature that informed this study, poses the research questions, reviews the methodology 
and sources, and explains the study’s significances.  
Chapter Two, “Knockout Rounds and Rounding Marks,” explores how early sport 
film actualities contributed several key components to the evolution of the highlight 
form—an operational aesthetic that established production practices for the presentation 
of sport, the popularization of a performance culture that relied on spectacle and sports 
celebrities, and the marketing, packaging and diffusion of sport content in the form of 
highlights for cultural consumption. With its ability to capture movement, whether in the 
form of a horse race, racing yachts on the water, or boxers in a ring, film proved highly 
popular with the public before the turn of the twentieth century.  
Another key aspect related to film’s operational aesthetic was its use of an on-
stage narrator or commentator. Although this development stemmed from the tradition of 
illustrated lectures, it was used to legitimize sports. For example, it diffused boxing’s 
unsavory aspect by suggesting that the exhibition could be appreciated for its “genteel 
style of presentation.”57 Ultimately, however, film actualities featuring boxing became a 
victim of their own success and of a racial ideology that would not allow the wide 
presentation of film showing a black champion. Racial ideology was fully realized with 









Jack Johnson and James Jeffries. 
 Chapter Three, “The Habit of Highlights,” explicates the importance of 
routinization and standardization in the ways newsreels were produced and viewed. 
Newsreels built on the advances of film actualities by nationalizing sports within an 
ideology of hegemonic masculinity, by refining audio commentary, and by increasing the 
sense of spectacle in capturing the activities of cheerleaders and fans. Sports became one 
of the three basic kinds of news for newsreels. Sporting events fell into the category of 
“scheduled events,” and could be readily counted upon for content, an important 
consideration when newsreels went to a twice-a-week schedule. With commentary 
provided by the era’s leading sports radio announcers, newsreels contributed to building a 
national identity in which sport had a central place. That central place was occupied 
almost exclusively by the dominant male white culture.  
Blacks and women were marginalized in most newsreel coverage of sports. Black 
athletes were to a large extent rendered invisible. Portrayals of women athletes upheld an 
ideology of hegemonic masculinity in which contact sports were exclusively a male 
preserve. While this was not a direct product of the aesthetic form of highlights, it points 
to the impact producers had in shaping the ideology that form manifests. Ultimately, with 
the advent of television, newsreels lost their hold on viewers, who increasingly watched 
sporting events as they unfolded on their home sets. 
 Chapter Four, “A Dream of Carnage and the Electronic Monster,” analyzes early 
sportscasting as an exclusively live medium, transmitting images and sound from one 









remote locations, and broadcasters developed the conventions of live coverage of 
sporting events. Considerations related to the production of sporting events had 
implications in the development of sports journalism’s institutional structures and 
professional values that shaped the representation of national identity, gender and race. 
Because coverage of live events was the preserve of the networks’ news divisions, 
conflicts and institutional jealousies within broadcasting arose almost from the very 
beginning of television production of live sporting events. Television contributed to the 
development of the highlight form for newscasts by constructing programs that offered 
the viewers highlight packages, profiles of sport stars and in-studio interviews. This was 
largely accomplished by borrowing from formats that had proved successful in the past 
and by developing new formats. 
In Chapter Five, “The Agony of Defeat and the Ecstasy of Communication,” 
videotape’s deployment as a means to create instant replays is explicated, illustrating its 
immediate and profound impact on sportscasts. It allowed network and local television 
stations to incorporate highlights more easily into sportscasts. Engineers from the Ampex 
Corporation first demonstrated the videotape recorder in 1956, a demonstration that 
revolutionized the industry and provided the technology that would make the highlight 
form a means of paramount importance for all sportscasts. 
So pervasive did the use of videotape technology become that it changed not only 
what fans could see of a game, but it also altered the role of announcers from color 
commentators to analysts. Even more significantly, the technology changed television’s 









technology literally became a part of many sports (e.g., football, hockey, soccer and 
tennis) in terms of on-field officiating decisions. Equally important from a journalistic 
perspective, videotape changed the way sports news was packaged and delivered. Until 
the arrival of videotape, scores and statistics were the primary discursive ingredients of 
the sport newscast; with videotape, highlights became the focal point. 
Chapter Six, “Sports Junkies, Junk Journalism and Cathode Ray Sterilization,” 
explicates cable television’s role in saturating the television schedule with sports, 
fragmenting the audience, driving ratings down, and creating Friday afternoon “fire 
sales” for advertisers.58 It points out the result was predictable: by the mid-1980s no 
station, cable or broadcast, was making money telecasting sports. Competitive bidding 
invariably drove up the broadcasting rights for major sporting events. This chapter also 
explores how cable television’s use of the highlight form changed not only the way 
events were telecast, but also how it changed the stadium and arena experience, long 
regarded as the last bastion against television’s encroachment on the sporting spectacle. 
Additionally, cable television changed the way sports journalists performed their jobs—
both in terms of coverage of live events and in the reporting of sports news. Most 
notably, the presence of women journalists in the press boxes, announcing booths and 
locker rooms altered the dynamic of the sports-media relationship. By the time ESPN 
celebrated its fifteenth year of broadcasting in 1994, the boundaries demarcating sports 
journalism as information and as entertainment had been blurred beyond recognition. The 
sports junkie’s loyalty was largely predicated upon an operational aesthetic in which the 









Chapter Seven, “The Little Shop of Highlights,” explicates ESPN’s appropriation 
and commodification of the highlight form as SportsCenter became the network’s 
flagship program. While SportsCenter doubtlessly made the highlight form its primary 
means of communication, the contention by Charles Hirshberg that it is “a perfect 
medium for modern America” raises questions about what impact the spectacularization 
of sport has had on viewers, anchors and athletes within a late-capitalist economy, what 
values are being promoted through the highlight form, and whose stories are being told. 
SportCenter’s ubiquitous place in American sports journalism is considered in terms of 
its formation and development, its constitutive elements, and its offshoots, namely, the 
“This is SportsCenter” advertising campaign and a reality show, Dream Job.  
 Chapter Eight, “The Real Virtuality for an Audience of One” explores the 
developments in new media that reshaped the sports mediascape by providing new 
technological means of delivering and accessing sportscast highlights. Over the past two 
decades, sports broadcasters, fans, athletes and the leagues have all been impacted by the 
changes, especially those precipitated by the development of new delivery systems (e.g., 
World Wide Web and mobile devices). However, because the integration of new media 
with coverage of major sporting events involved not only changes in technology, but also 
social and cultural practices, it is important not to fall prey to what Henry Jenkins calls 
“the Black Box Fallacy,”59 in which all changes are technological.  
To comprehend the dynamics of the new sports media landscape, it is necessary to 
consider the changed context of sportscasting and the changed model of consumer 









emotional underpinnings of consumer decision-making as a driving force behind viewing 
and purchasing decisions.”60 In this model, cultural protocols and practices related to 
media can be seen as dynamic for both producers and consumers. Today, new alliances 
between broadcast and cable networks, technology companies, and wireless mobile 
phone providers have forestalled television audience fragmentation and helped to build a 
new fan base for sports by offering Internet pay packages, enhancing production values 
for live coverage of major events, and providing more infotainment, especially highlights.  
Chapter Nine, “Significant Findings,” delineates the importance of the study’s 
major elements, including synecdoche, limitations of the various technologies, formation 
of a cultural hegemony, standardization of sportscasts, commodification of the form, 
codification and changing viewer protocols. Lastly, the study offers directions for future 
research.      
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CHAPTER 2: KNOCKOUT ROUNDS AND ROUNDING MARKS 
Introduction 
This chapter explicates the ways in which films featuring sports contributed to the 
evolution of the sportscast highlight form. Those contributions emerged in the two 
decades before the arrival of film technology as a result of sports like boxing, which 
borrowed promotional techniques and organizational structures from show business 
entities like vaudeville and the circus. These techniques included the use of road 
managers, booking agents, and advertising men.1 Known as the “sporting and theatrical 
syndicate,”2 this association of entrepreneurs was closely linked to the press, another 
institution that would have an important cross-promotional relationship with sports and 
films.  
Additionally, this chapter explains how early Edison films that captured sporting 
activity utilized production techniques, as well as marketing and exhibition strategies, in 
ways that were distinct from other film subjects. Early sporting films not only provided 
the content required to display the technology’s capacity to capture motion, but they also 
demonstrated film technology’s operational aesthetic, what Musser defines as “its ability 
to capture an unfolding event and re-present that event with relative immediacy…. The 
operational aesthetic fosters a level of skepticism in the spectator who must assess how a 
technology…actually works.”3 This fascination with film technology encouraged 
spectators to become consumers of the technology, and in turn the films became cultural 









that includes the accumulated cultural knowledge that confers power and status.”4 
Another consideration stems from the ways that films enhanced the status and 
earning capabilities of sport celebrities, whether represented as heroes (e.g., Corbett, 
Jeffries) or as villains (e.g., Jack Johnson). Not only did films facilitate the dissemination 
of information about sport stars, but they provided an important source of income to 
those stars. For example, boxers received royalties from their fight films and earned 
considerably more than they did from the fights themselves. Previously, fighters earned 
income by giving exhibitions and appearing in vaudeville shows. Even when states made 
boxing illegal, they did not prohibit the presentation of fight films in peep show parlors 
and nickelodeons.   
Film technology lent an air of veracity to the representation of sporting events. 
Before film, sporting events were reported in newspapers and magazines or recreated on 
stage, but the representation involved the subjective interpretation of the reporter or 
performer. As Musser notes, “The filmmaker’s role was to record an event and then re-
present it with as little intervention as possible, so that the audience was in a position to 
judge the outcome for themselves.”5 This observational cinema or cinéma vérité was 
further enhanced by the use of an expert commentator, who was positioned to the side of 
the screen and offered running commentary, a precursor to the sports announcer.  
Lastly, producers and exhibitors played important roles in the marketing of film 
content, and editorial control became a contested area between them. Hendricks notes, 
“Kinetoscope men did not buy a ‘pig in a poke,’ but viewed new subjects frequently, and 









multiple machines to exhibit the different rounds of a staged fight, usually six. Although 
exhibitors could purchase entire films for a set price or single rounds, the knockout round 
was often the only one sold.7 A viewer’s having to pay ten cents at each machine to see 
each round of a fight ultimately inhibited the success of the kinetoscope. Nonetheless, the 
packaging and exhibiting of knockout rounds is an important marker on the road to 
sportscast highlights.   
Film’s ability to capture movement, whether in the form of a horse race, yachts 
racing on the water, or boxers in a ring, proved to be highly popular with the public, 
creating opportunities for a shared culture. 
Sport in the Pre-Film Era 
 The relationship between sport and its dissemination through visual media 
emerged as a continuation and transformation of magic lantern traditions that had 
originated in the seventeenth century and gradually took shape along with the invention, 
development and deployment of nineteenth century communication technologies such as 
the telegraph, telephone and phonograph. Models for early moving pictures can be traced 
back to wall paintings and illustrated books, both of which employed series of images to 
tell a story. Arguably, the dissemination of sports via media was also an extension of a 
visual entertainment tradition (e.g., circus, burlesque, variety theatre, etc.) that 
“emphasized display and spectacle rather than story-telling.”8 Another part of the 
changing cultural system that fostered a fascination for sports and their visual 
representations was played by post-Civil War sporting magazines, which anticipated 









As early as 1872, Frederic Hudson, in his book Journalism in the United States, admitted 
that magazines “unquestionably give more information on the subjects they treat than the 
general newspaper can.”9 Even before Richard Kyle Fox assumed editorial control of the 
National Police Gazette in 1877, lurid illustrations and photographs were being utilized 
to exploit the dominant themes of crime and sex (Illustration 2.1). To those themes, Fox 
integrated the world of sport, especially boxing, so that the Gazette’s coverage of the 
Ryan-Goss fight of 1880 resulted in a run of 400,000 copies and justified the journal’s 
subtitle as The Leading Illustrated Sporting Journal in America.10 These and many other 
achievements within a long, dynamic process were necessary to help shift the cultural 
milieu from pragmatic, business-oriented technologies to consumer-oriented one.11 It was 
the conjunction of these lines of development that would ultimately produce the first 
filmed sports highlights. 
 While sporting magazines and newspapers were cultivating a fascination for 
sporting events and athletes, attempts to capture and project motion were being 
conducted in the laboratories of Muybridge, Edison and Marey. In February 1888, 
Eadweard Muybridge met Thomas A. Edison in the latter’s West Orange, New Jersey, 
laboratory to discuss combining Edison’s phonograph with his zoopraxiscope to project a 
series of painted images onto a screen, a process that Edison ultimately deemed 
impractical and inconvenient. Eight months later Edison wrote the first of his caveats 
about projecting motion pictures. However, it was not until Edison met Étienne-Jules 
Marey at the 1889 Paris Exposition that he formulated the ideas for a machine that 









frame of film for a brief fraction of a second, after which the strip was again moved 
forward, until the next frame of film was halted in front of the lens and likewise halted.”12 
After several experiments with cylinders, Edison and his camera specialist William 
Kennedy Laurie Dickson enlisted William Heise for the project, largely because Heise 
had expertise in moving tape-like strips of paper through a machine. In the spring of 
1891, their experimentation produced a horizontal-feed kinetograph camera and 
kinetoscope viewer, which used three-quarter-inch wide film. Of the seven films known 
to have been made with this camera, the last captured two men boxing.  
 Edison, who had recently returned from Chicago where he was asked to provide 
some electric novelty for the World’s Fair exposition, was quoted in a New York Sun 
story of May 28, 1891, that he had a machine being perfected, which would allow 
viewers to sit in their own parlor and see and hear opera singers. Not content to satisfy 
the more refined tastes and knowing what had already been produced in his Photographic 
Building, Edison added: 
That is only one part of what the machine will do. To the sporting fraternity I can 
say that before long it will be possible to apply this system to prize fights and 
boxing exhibitions. The whole scene with the comments of the spectators, the talk 
of the seconds, the noise of the blows, and so on will be faithfully transferred.13 
Edison’s comments anticipated a level of sophistication that became characteristic of the 
“Up Close and Personal” production values of Roone Arledge at the American 
Broadcasting Company (ABC). Edison at this point clearly understood that boxing, 









captured by a motion picture camera. Part of this was grounded in Edison’s fascination 
for boxing and the fact that newspaper and magazine coverage had already lent a degree 
of legitimacy to prize fighting, despite its illegal status in many parts of the country. 
 In fact, after the last bare-knuckle championship fight in which John L. Sullivan 
defeated Jake Kilrain (ring name of Joseph Killion) on July 8, 1889, in Richburg, 
Mississippi, Governor Lowry vowed to prosecute Sullivan and even offered a thousand-
dollar bounty. The state of Mississippi indicted Sullivan for the offenses of prize fighting 
and assault and battery. Tried and convicted of the first charge, Sullivan and his lawyers 
appealed that decision on the grounds that the nature of the crimes had not been 
adequately specified in the indictment, that the fight had not been public and that the law 
required two defendants who must both be charged.14 Although the court reversed the 
first decision and quashed the indictment, the entire ordeal cost Sullivan more money 
than he had won by defeating his opponent, and he vowed never again to fight under the 
old ring rules. The press played up both sides in the unseemly affair, exploiting the bout 
to sell newspapers and decrying the fighters’ flaunting of the law. Typical was the 
coverage found in Frank Leslie’s: 
The spectacle of two bruised and battered ruffians dodging about the country, to 
escape the officers of the law, was in itself sufficiently demoralizing, without the 
addition, in print, of the story of their debaucheries and their low brutalities: and 
the two together, as illustrative of prevailing popular tendencies, certainly afford 
little ground for confidence as to the future dominance of the better forces in our 









Once cleared Sullivan toured North America with a theatrical troupe performing the 
melodrama Honest Hearts and Willing Hands, written especially for him. After a 
lackluster tour of Australia in early 1892, Sullivan was goaded into issuing a challenge to 
face “any and all bluffers who have been trying to make capital at my expense,”16 
according to Marquis of Queensberry rules. Among the opponents to whom Sullivan was 
willing to give preference—all white fighters—was a young Californian named James J. 
Corbett, with whom he had previously sparred. 
 That the first heavyweight championship fight to be settled with gloves would be 
a legitimate media spectacle was testified by the fact that the articles for the $25,000 
purse and $10,000 side bet were signed at the offices of the New York World and not the 
Police Gazette. The battle between Sullivan and Corbett was scheduled for September 7, 
1892, at the Olympic Club in New Orleans, which was equipped with electric lights and a 
canvas mat. The New Orleans city council had authorized Queensberry rules fights in 
March 1890, with stipulations that no liquor be served, that no bouts be staged on 
Sundays, and that promoters contribute fifty dollars to charity.17 Additional evidence of 
boxing’s transformation from a sport dominated by gamblers to one in which 
entrepreneurs seized control was seen in the person of Corbett’s manager, William A. 
Brady. Having a background in show business instead of the ring, Brady soon became a 
theatrical and motion-picture promoter, one who clearly recognized boxing and bicycle 
racing as extensions of the entertainment field. 
 In addition to the heavyweight championship fight, the Olympic Club organized 









Champions.” The card included a lightweight title fight between champion Jack 
McAuliffe and Billy Myer on September 5, and the next night a featherweight 
championship bout between Jack Skelly and George “Little Chocolate” Dixon.18 The 
latter fight, in which the black champion defeated his white opponent in eight rounds, 
drew calls from both the Daily Picayune and the Times Democrat that the Olympic Club 
cease staging interracial matches. Although no hostile reaction was reported to have 
occurred at the Olympic Club, segregation became the law of the land within four years. 
 Press coverage of the heavyweight championship fight was extensive. Weeks 
before the fight, the New York Herald declared that “the events on hand are of national 
and international importance.”19 The Chicago Daily Tribune reported that “now men 
travel to great boxing contests in vestibule limited trains; they sleep at the best 
hotels…and when the time for the contest arrives, they find themselves in a grand, 
brilliantly lighted arena.”20 The Times Democrat noted that New Orleans was packed 
“with visitors of all classes, from the millionaire to the baker to the fakir. Politicians, 
lawyers, merchants and gamblers elbowed each other in all public places on 
comparatively equal terms.”21 The ten thousand fans who filled the Olympic Club were 
not the only ones anxious to see the fight, hyperbolically called the “clash of the Titans.” 
In almost every major city in the country, thousands of interested fans jammed into 
theaters, hotels and newspaper offices to receive telegraphic reports of round-by-round 
descriptions “read aloud and shared for a moment in an instantaneous national culture.”22 
Gorn noted that on top of the Pulitzer Building in New York, a red beacon was poised to 









The national information network of telegraph, telephone and newspaper 
communication provided instantaneous results of the fight. As the Sullivan-Corbett bout 
advanced to its conclusion, the New Orleans Times-Democrat provided headlines for 
individual rounds: 
SULLIVAN WAS SO THOROUGHLY SURPRISED 
CORBETT NOW BEGAN TO FORCE THE PACE 
CORBETT WAS THE AGGRESSOR 
HE FOUGHT WILDLY 
SULLIVAN STAGGERED BACK 
SULLIVAN STAGGERED BACK 
STORM OF BLOWS. 24  
 
Newspapers and magazines provided front page coverage of the fight. The New York 
Herald Tribune devoted several pages that included graphic illustrations. Not only did 
Corbett’s victory signal a change in the titleholder, it also ushered boxing out of a saloon-
centered, gambler controlled subculture and into the “larger twentieth-century landscape 
of big business, mass media, and corporate-capitalist ideologies.”25  
The Kinetograph, the Kinetoscope and the Black Maria  
 Less than a month passed after the Corbett-Sullivan fight before Dickson and 
Heise were testing the design of their motion picture camera. In October 1892 they shot 
four new films which used film whose width had been adjusted to one and nine-sixteenth 
of an inch (approximately 35mm). The subject matter for three of the four films was 
sports—boxing, fencing and wrestling—and selected frames (Illustration 2.2) were 
subsequently published in the October issue of The Phonogram. Musser asserts, “If 
format is considered, these films can be called the first modern motion pictures—though 









articulated the kinetograph’s importance, noting that viewers need not resort to seats in 
the open air to see events: 
Those who are interested in swift-running horses can see a race going on in 
Sheepshead Bay or Monmouth, without leaving New York and just here let it be 
remembered that this instrument may play a most useful part, for in a close race 
where a few inches of space turns the scales, it will take down just what happened 
faithfully; and the kinetograph will also record with fidelity all that takes place at 
prize fights, baseball contests and the noise, stir and progress of games.27   
Significantly, this passage not only heralded the kinetograph’s technological achievement 
in settling sporting disputes, anticipating the use of photo finishes and instant replay, but 
it also suggested the camera’s ability to capture the ambience of sporting events, similar 
to Edison’s comments for the Sun article in May 1891. 
 Having achieved a working camera, the Edison Company set about in late 
December 1892 to construct a studio specifically designed for motion picture production. 
The Black Maria, so named because it resembled the black paddy wagons that brought 
prisoners to jail, was constructed between December 1892 and January 1893. As Musser 
notes, the Black Maria “offered escape into nostalgia and play rather than the likelihood 
of imprisonment,”28 evidenced by the subject matter of the films first taken in its space—
Blacksmithing Scene, Horse Shoeing and The Barber Shop. In his History of the 
Kinetograph, Kinetoscrope & Kinetophonograph, Dickson related that the “exigencies of 
natural lighting” and “the lack of a suitable theatrical stage”29 necessitated the 









estimated that the Black Maria measured 48’ x 10’-14’ x 18’ overall (Illustration 2.3), 
and swung suspended on a central vertical axis over a graphite pivot to accommodate the 
need for sunshine, “although as a matter of practice nearly all Maria subjects seem to 
have been shot close to noon.”30  
 Although Edison had entered into an agreement to supply A. O. Tate with twenty-
five Kinetoscope machines for use at the World’s Columbian Exposition of 1893 in 
Chicago, production progressed slowly. By early May George Hopkins of The Scientific 
American examined the Kinetoscope in anticipation of demonstrating it at the annual 
meeting of the Department of Physics of the Brooklyn Institute of Arts and Sciences. 
This became its first official public demonstration, and although it did not include sound 
as promised, The Brooklyn Standard Union story offered an interesting account: 
The Instrument which was exhibited, however, only presented the moving picture 
without the noises accompanying. But even in this form it was startling in its 
realism and beautiful in the perfection of its working…. The pictures taken by the 
camera can scarcely be distinguished from one another, so slight is the difference 
between successive views. This explains the continuity and unbroken character of 
the scene as presented in the kinetograph.31  
According to Hendricks, one Kinetoscope was sent to Chicago and displayed in the 
Edison exhibit there, although the first parlor was not ready for the public until April 14, 
1894. 
 In anticipation of the grand opening, the pace of film production in the early 









specifically for publicity purposes to illustrate an article that appeared in the March 24 
issue of Harper’s Weekly. The other films capturing athletic movement included Athlete 
with Wand; Amateur Gymnast, no. 1; Amateur Gymnast, no. 2; Men on Parallel Bars; 
and Boxing Match. The most significant films of this period, however, included three 
films of Eugen Sandow, body builder and strong man, shot on March 6, 1894. Sandow, 
one of the most popular theatrical stars, was at the time appearing at Koster & Bial’s 
Music Hall, and his appearance at the Black Maria initiated the commercial phase of 
Edison’s motion picture work. Dickson relates in his History that Sandow’s chest 
expansion was fourteen inches. “The greatest expansion ever known at the Olympic 
games was six. This is demonstrated in the kinetograph series, together with the more 
remarkable feats relating to the action and uses of the various muscles, such as the lifting 
of three-hundred pound dumb-bells at arm’s length over his head…”32 Despite Dickson’s 
seemingly overblown contention about expansion, the making of the Sandow film marked 
an important break from past efforts and introduces “a relationship between the world of 
performance culture and the motion picture world that has continued in some form to this 
day.”33  
 The next major development occurred later that summer with the production of 
two fight films for the Kinetoscope Exhibiting Company,34 controlled by Samuel Tilden 
Jr., Enoch Rector and the Latham family—Woodville and his sons Otway and Gray. The 
Lathams proposed the exhibition of prize fight films in enlarged Kinetoscopes that could 
accommodate approximately one hundred and fifty feet of film, almost three times as 









have involved little more than the addition of spools to the spool bank,”35 a stronger 
motor and changes to the Black Maria’s interior, including the addition of padding on the 
walls and ropes on three sides of the twelve-foot square ring. The rounds would last a 
minute with seven or eight minutes in between rounds to load more film into the 
kinetograph. Newspaper accounts noted that several attempts to enlist fighters had been 
made before June 14, but those attempts proved unsuccessful.  
 Although titled Leonard-Cushing Fight, it is important to consider this production 
as distinctively different from a legitimate fight documented by a motion picture camera. 
Rather, this match was a boxing exhibition, limited by the constraints of the camera and 
the Black Maria space. Nonetheless, the Leonard-Cushing Fight was indeed marketed 
and advertised as a legitimate fight, evidenced by the descriptions in various catalogues. 
For example, the Maguire Catalogue (1898) noted, “This fight consists of six rounds 
between Mike Leonard, the very popular and well-known pugilist…and Jack Cushing. It 
was an actual contest, and is full of hard fighting. It has proved a popular and interesting 
subject.” 36 The Edison catalogue of July 1901 called it “an actual six-round contest 
between Mike Leonard…and Jack Cushing.”37 The Maguire and Baucus catalogue of 
1897 read: “Each of the above spirited boxing contests consists of SIX live rounds with 
‘knock-out’ in the last.”38 Several points merit consideration. By emphasizing that this 
was an “actual” fight with “spirited boxing” and “full of hard fighting,” the producers 
were obviously attempting to dispel the notion that this was a pseudo-fight, and to present 
it as a novelty worth the sixty cents a viewer paid to watch all six rounds. Although the 









a legitimate boxing contest. Streible posits that the Leonard-Cushing Fight raises a 
problem that surfaced with other boxing recreations and reenactments. 
The problem of distinguishing genuine contests from ones set up for the motion 
picture camera, first suggested in this production, became an increasingly 
complex issue that plagued both the early film industry and the sport of boxing as 
they simultaneously sought social legitimation over the next two decades.39  
While problems did surface when exhibitors attempted to pass off recreations as the real 
thing, no evidence suggested that customers entering a peep show parlor were duped into 
paying for anything other than a staged fight. More significantly, the Latham scheme of 
serializing the presentation in machines that offered viewers three times as much film for 
twice the cost of standard nickel-slot kinetoscopes created a viewing experience that 
emphasized the knockout as climax. The marketing ploy was readily picked up and 
disseminated by the press, evidenced in the New York World’s report: 
The theory is that when in the first round he [viewer] sees Mr. Leonard, to use his 
own language “pushing Mr. Cushing in the face,” he will want to see the next 
round and the next four. Thus he will pay sixty cents for the complete kinetograph 
[sic] of this strange and unheard of fight…40 
Believing that viewers would pay to see “a fight to the finish,” the Kinetoscope 
Exhibition Company opened a parlor at 83 Nassau Street in Manhattan that was devoted 
exclusively to showing the Leonard-Cushing Fight on the new model (one hundred and 
fifty-foot capacity) kinetoscopes. However, the relative obscurity of the fighters, both of 









knockout round contributed to the lack of success of the Lathams’ parlor. Hendricks 
posits, “Fans were probably viewing only the knock-out round, and more and more often 
the other five machines remained idle…. This is supported by the fact that the knock-out 
round of a fight was often the only one sold.”41 Nonetheless, the marketing of fight films 
by selling rounds remained in vogue into the first decade of the twentieth century and 
marked an important step in the evolution of the highlight form. 
 Regardless of how viewers interpreted the film, the Leonard-Cushing Fight also 
drew the notice of authorities. An article in the June 16 edition of The Sun noted that the 
Grand Jury in Essex County was being convened to “investigate a reported prize fight, 
something which was certainly meant to appear to be a fight to a finish took place in the 
grounds of the Edison laboratory at Orange on Thursday morning.”42 Although no formal 
charges were brought against Edison, concerns about the presentation of fight films 
continued as the technology improved and ultimately was used to capture actual boxing 
contests. 
 With the help of Enoch Rector and Samuel Tilden Jr., the Lathams attempted to 
arrange a bout that featured heavyweight champion Jim Corbett. After winning the 
heavyweight championship from John L. Sullivan in 1892, Corbett had not defended his 
title and fought only one exhibition against British champion Charlie Mitchell in January 
1894. Speculation swirled that Corbett would fight Peter Jackson of the British West 
Indies, but nothing came of that, in part because Corbett, like Sullivan, had promised not 
to break the color line and fight a black fighter for the championship. Newspaper 









fight, but the fight could not have happened “without throwing over ring rules bodily.” 43  
 Nonetheless, Corbett was enlisted, for a fee of $4,750 to fight “a clever Trenton 
heavyweight” Peter Courtney, who had supposedly “stood up against” Robert 
Fitzsimmons.44 That Corbett’s appearance at the Edison complex was a carefully 
choreographed promotion was evidenced by the fact that the fight was staged on the 
seventh of September, 45 (the second anniversary of Corbett’s knockout of Sullivan), by 
Edison’s presence at the Black Maria to greet the champion, and by the numerous 
newspaper accounts documenting the entire affair from Corbett’s arrival at the ferry dock 
at 8:15 a.m. to the celebrations at Johnny Eckhardt’s. Clearly, journalists from the Police 
Gazette and the World were complicit in assisting the Edison Company’s marketing of 
what was supposedly a genuine fight, the latter providing a series of drawings that were 
recorded by the newspaper’s “artist at the scene.”46 Although the Sun’s lead graph notes 
that “the fight was in the interests of science,” the outcome never was in doubt. In the 
Sun’s summary of the fourth round, the reporter notes, “It was now a certainty that 
Courtney would not last the six rounds…”47 Even as Courtney toed the mark to begin the 
next round, “he knew very well that Corbett would sooner or later knock him out, but he 
didn’t flinch a particle, and faced the music like a man.”48 In the climactic sixth round, 
“Jim had to finish him, however, as a matter of business…”49 For the purposes of the 
film, the knockout occurred on cue. 
 Dickson served as the producer for the filming of Corbett and Courtney before 
the Kinetograph, and Heise worked the camera. The Black Maria’s improvised ring was 









of the building. The floor was planed smooth and covered with rosin.”50 Five ounce 
gloves were used, although Hendricks noted that the gloves were changed to smaller ones 
“because they were too big and covered the faces of the fighters from the camera.”51 
Footage of the fight shows Corbett laughing while deflecting Courtney’s wild swings, 
possibly in the fourth round, when the Sun reported that “Corbett clinched him and then 
laughingly threw him off.”52 Kendricks noted that the six rounds of one minute and 
sixteen seconds, one minute and twenty-four seconds, one minute and twelve seconds, 
one minute and twenty-nine seconds, one minute and twenty-three seconds, and fifty 
seconds were appropriate lengths for the Latham-enlarged Kinetoscope.  
 As soon as newspaper accounts of the Corbett-Courtney fight were published, 
Judge Depue instructed the Grand Jury “to look into the Corbett fight in West Orange, 
before Edison’s kinetoscope, and find an indictment if the law has been violated.”53 The 
following day, Edison spoke to a reporter for the Newark Daily Advertiser, dismissing the 
incident: 
I don’t see how there could be any trouble about that fight. Those 
kinetograph people take pictures of anything that comes along. They have to do it, 
and we don’t interfere with them… 
Certainly I did not understand that a prize-fight was to take place, and it 
was not a prize-fight in any sense of the word, as I understand it…. I have been 
told that the men wore five-ounce gloves… 
I was not there. I have my business to attend to up here, but I have seen 









others, except that Corbett being one of the principals there was more interest in 
it. 
There was no knocking out done. It was simply a boxing match for a show 
for which these men were paid, and nothing more…. I should certainly not permit 
any fight to a finish in my place under any consideration.54  
This constituted almost the entire printed article and illustrated Edison’s careful 
manipulation of the situation, distancing himself from the immediate proceedings, 
claiming “I was not there” and “we don’t interfere” with “those kinetograph people” 
though he was told specifics “the boxers wore five-ounce gloves” and “the contest was 
similar to others.” Edison also clearly differentiated this “boxing match for a show” from 
a “fight to a finish,” although that distinction was meaningless when it came to marketing 
the fight for public consumption, at which point it again became an actual fight with 
knockout. Edison doubtlessly knew that the controversy surrounding the making of this 
staged film enhanced the public’s desire to see what all the fuss was about. Musser aptly 
notes that the reputations of Corbett and Edison were an important subtext of the event. 
Anticipating a relationship that would become much more common in the 
twentieth century, reports of filming became a periodic source of news (which 
sold newspapers) and publicity for stars and producers (which sold films and built 
careers).55  
Not surprisingly, then, Corbett and Courtney Before the Kinetograph became the most 
widely seen kinetoscope attraction, even after projected film replaced peep shows in 









stipulated that he receive $150 per week (later reduced to $50) for each set of films on 
exhibition in the kinetoscopes, the sum of which reached $13,307 by August 1896 and 
eventually exceeded $20,000.56  
Projection of Actualities 
 The progression from peep show to projection owed as much to the conditions 
related to audience comfort as to technological innovation. Woodville Latham testified 
that almost as soon as the Edison Kinetoscope Company began showing fight films in the 
enlarged kinetoscopes at their parlor on Nassau Street in Manhattan, his sons, Otway and 
Gray, began hearing viewers express a desire to see the films projected upon a screen.57 
Such a projection enabled several possibilities. For one, the audience would see a larger, 
if not life-size, representation of the subject matter more clearly and more conveniently. 
Secondly, rather than experiencing the film individually, viewers seeing a film projected 
upon a screen shared the experience with others. Thirdly, projection offered the 
possibility of exhibiting an entire sporting event instead of an abridged version 
necessitated by the kinetoscrope’s limited capacity. Projection also benefited the 
exhibitor in that parlors needed only one projector, reducing the wear and tear on both 
film and projector. Showing a film to many viewers at one time reduced costs and 
increased revenues, expanding the exhibitor’s range for distribution since more parlors 
across a wider territory could be opened with far fewer projectors.  
 By autumn of 1894, the Lathams were conducting experiments on a new 
projection system under the auspices of the Lambda Company, headed up by the 









laboratory in April of the following year. These experiments resulted in a new camera 
and the Eidoloscope projector, a demonstration of which was given at the Lambda 
Company offices (and workshop) on April 21, 1895. An illustration of the demonstration 
(Illustration 2.4) appeared in the New York Sun the very next day with a caption that 
reads: “Enlarged Kinetoscope Pictures Thrown on a Screen.”58 According to the Sun 
article, the projected image was about the size of a window sash, although “the size is a 
matter of expense and adjustment.”59  
 It is ironic that the Lambda Company’s first production with the projection system 
that was so instrumental in capturing actualities involved the re-creation of a fight 
between Young Griffo (Albert Griffiths) and Charles Barnett on the rooftop of Madison 
Square Garden in early May. The film included no more than eight minutes of action—
four rounds of a minute and a half with thirty seconds of rest between rounds—which 
was not significantly different than kinetoscope fights. What was different was that the 
action was shot without interruption. With an added loop to the camera—known as the 
Latham Loop—the capacity for continuous shooting was limited only by the amount of 
film housed in the film magazine.60  
The Latham Eidoloscope made its debut on May 20, 1895, in a small storefront 
theatre at 156 Broadway. The first commercial audience for projected motion pictures 
saw a reproduction of the Griffo-Barnett fight. A broadside for the fight related several 
key components about the exhibition, as well as a summary of the fight. The broadside 
noted that the reproduction was “Life Size” and that “During the Exhibition the Audience 









showing Actual Life Movements on a screen ever made in the world.”61  
A World article from late May lauded the advantages of the Eidoloscope, noting 
that viewers will no longer “have to squint into a little hole” to see the life size 
presentations. “It is all realistic, so realistic indeed that excitable spectators have forgot 
themselves and cried, ‘Mix up there!’ ‘Look out, Charlie, you’ll get a punch,’ ‘Oh! What 
do you think of that Mr. Barnett?’ and other expressions of like character.”62 The article’s 
point about viewers responding to the realistic images, despite being a representation of a 
recreated fight, was significant because it showed that in the absence of a commentator, 
viewers supplied commentary themselves. In the next important fight film, the Corbett-
Fitzsimmons Fight, commentary was provided for them. The article also noted that the 
audience sat comfortably and saw “fighters hammering each other, circuses, suicides, 
hangings, electrocutions, shipwrecks, scenes on the exchanges, street scenes, horse-races, 
football games, almost anything, in fact, in which there is action, just as if you were on 
the spot during the actual events.”63 In fact, those actual events included a horse race at 
the Sheepshead Bay track and several wrestling bouts on the roof of the Police Gazette 
building.  
Latham’s Eidoloscope Company exploited territorial rights for the projector and 
exhibited projected films in Chicago’s Olympic Theater in late August before moving on 
to the Cotton States Exposition in Atlanta where they encountered competition from C. 
Francis Jenkins and Thomas Armat, whose Phantoscope was technically superior in the 
use of an intermittent mechanism. By the end of 1895, Jenkins and Armat had a falling 









secure the rights to the Phantoscope for Edison. The machine was given a new trade 
name, the Vitascope, formed from the Latin vita, “life,” and the Greek, scope, “to see,” 
somewhat ironic since this machine eventually sounded the death knell for the 
Kinetoscope, the first commercially successful motion picture machine. Kinetoscopes 
would disappear from the American scene by the turn of the century. 
 When the Vitascope debuted on April 23, 1896, showing six films at Koster & 
Bial’s Music Hall on Thirty-Fourth Street and Broadway, it initiated a new phase in 
entertainment culture. In addition to the continuous band of fifty-foot or one hundred and 
fifty-foot films spliced together and shown repeatedly, the Music Hall band provided 
accompaniment to the projected images. Musser notes that two of the films were in color, 
through a hand-tinting process similar to that used for stereopticon slides.64 The 
representation of real scenes produced a heightened sense of realism. An article from the 
New York Mail and Express from April 24 captured this in detail: 
One could look far out to sea and pick out a particular wave swelling and 
undulating and growing bigger and bigger until it struck the end of the pier. Its 
edge then would be fringed with foam, and finally, in a cloud of spray, the wave 
would dash upon the beach. One could imagine the people running away. 65  
This produced congruence between the projected image and the everyday world as the 
viewers knew and experienced it directly. Musser argues, “Projected images were 
conceived as a novelty in which lifelike movement in conjunction with a life-size 
photographic image provided a sense of heightened realism and intensified interest in the 









were devoid of a narrative. The exceptions were those sporting events like the 1896 
Suburban Handicap that the Vitascope, more mobile and sensitive to light, captured on 
site rather than in the confines of the Black Maria studio. 
 Musser calls the Edison Manufacturing Company’s footage of the 1896 Suburban 
Handicap “the first American film of a horse race.”67 That also made the Suburban 
Handicap the first remotely shot sporting actuality to be projected for commercial 
distribution in the United States. The film debuted at Keith’s New Theatre in Boston in 
late June, less than a week after the running of the race. A Boston Herald article of June 
30 explained that the “portion of the picture showing the field was somewhat obscured by 
the dust raised by the racers, but the finish of the stretch, showing the judges’ box and 
grand stand crowded with spectators was extremely realistic”68 (emphasis added). 
Arguably, the race’s finish constituted the most important part of the race and the most 
natural to capture on the one hundred and fifty feet of film shot (approximately one 
minute), although it was not the only portion of the race captured. This testified to a 
deliberate, conscious decision on the part of the producers—James White and Raff & 
Gammon—to guarantee that cameraman Heise captured the highlights of the race. An 
editorial in the New York Herald from June 24 added more details, including the fact that 
the “day was perfect overhead” and that “the race itself was anybody’s until the horses 
were nearly home.”69  
The team of White and Heise also shot the 1897 Suburban Handicap at the 
Sheepshead Bay track of the Coney Island Jockey Club. This race was also filmed on a 









the stand to the starting post, the horses running past the stand, the finish, and the 
weighing out. Musser notes that the four-shot structure marked this Suburban as 
particularly noteworthy, although not so significantly different from the previous year’s 
film apart from the parade. Since the 1896 film is no longer available, a direct 
comparison is not possible, although only the pre-race parade seems to have been added, 
according to the information in the Boston Herald account. Both films were framed by 
editorial decisions about composition, and since a fifty-foot strip “showing the start and 
finish and weighing-out as above”70 was also available, the process of selection and 
editing to create highlights of the event was certainly accomplished. The process is 
synecdochic71 in that through the use of condensation and displacement, a part was used 
to represent the whole.    
The Corbett-Fitzsimmons Fight Film     
 When Bob Fitzsimmons knocked out Jim Corbett in Carson City, Nevada, on 
March 17, 1897, to win the heavyweight championship of the world, three hand-cranked 
cameras loaded with thousands of feet of film were situated at ringside in a specially 
designed wooden house to capture the entire spectacle. The fight was financed and 
promoted by a Dallas entrepreneur and sporting man, Dan Stuart, and the filming of the 
event was produced by the Rector-Tilden partnership, which had successfully brought off 
the Corbett-Courtney exhibition for the Kinetoscope Exhibition Company but was now 
operating under the aegis of the newly formed Veriscope Company.  
Organizers of the Corbett-Fitzsimmons fight had to overcome considerable 









one of the most difficult hurdles. In October 1895, Stuart unsuccessfully attempted to 
stage the championship fight in Texas only to be thwarted when the governor and 
legislature quickly enacted a law making prizefighting a felony. A similar scenario 
unfolded in Arkansas, and soon thereafter Corbett announced his retirement. The title 
then passed to Peter Maher, who knocked out Corbett’s sparring partner Steve O’Donnell 
on November 11, 1895, despite the fact that Fitzsimmons had easily outclassed Maher 
three years earlier. In turn, Fitzsimmons knocked out Maher on February 21, 1896, in 
ninety-five seconds in a ring constructed on a sandbar in the Rio Grande, although no 
film of the fight was taken due to a light rain and insufficient light. With Fitzsimmons 
touring the vaudeville circuit as champion, the debacle on the Rio Grande prompted 
Corbett to come out of retirement and proclaim himself champion despite a lackluster 
four-round draw against Tom Sharkey. Only after intense lobbying was Stuart able to 
convince Nevada lawmakers to once again legalize prizefighting.  
By the time an agreement for the fight, including film rights, was signed, the 
commercial potential for fight films had increased dramatically as a result of the 
development in projection by the Eidoloscope, Phantoscope and Vitascope. Boxing 
would be the first sport to realize considerable profits from motion-picture reproductions, 
complementing the profits reaped from paid admissions, betting, and theatrical 
exploitation of prizefighters’ celebrity status. Streible argues that films were the key to 
larger profits: 
Once secured, films could be indefinitely repeated and easily transported to 









live events…. After the Corbett-Fitzsimmons Fight scored an unprecedented 
success, film rights played a central role in major fight negotiations over the next 
two decades and beyond.72  
Importance of the event’s filming was evident in a Boston Herald headline that read, 
“The Kinetoscope Will Dominate Wholly the Arrangements for the Holding of the 
Battle.”73 Stuart even tried to alter the size of the ring to twenty-two feet square when he 
realized the Veriscope camera might not capture the action in one of the corners, where, 
as fate would have it, Corbett fell in the fourteenth round during the controversial 
knockout sequence. 
 While the eleven thousand feet of two and three-sixteenth-inch-gauge film stock 
with a wide-screen format shot by Enoch Rector’s specially built cameras on March 17, 
1897, was being developed for exhibition, a variety of religious and reform groups 
lobbied Congress to enact legislation that would ban not only prizefighting but also 
images and reports of fights. Fearing that such a broadly written bill would result in 
censorship of newspapers and magazines, Congress took no action on the proposed 
legislation. Even though a number of state legislatures also considered banning fight 
films, few enacted laws prohibiting the exhibition of fight films. Streible points to several 
factors that contributed to the defeat of such legislation, including boxing’s popularity, 
the absence of any clear conception of what constituted cinema, and the Veriscope 
Company’s effective publicity and promotional campaign.74  
 In addition to attempts to ban film of the fight, the Veriscope Company had to 









of boxers imitating the fight’s action, as well as on-stage reenactments performed by 
boxing experts based on telegraphic descriptions. Even more damaging were the fake 
fight films of Edward Hill Amet and Sigmund Lubin, despite legal threats from Rector 
and Stuart. Streible located a small portion of the Lubin counterfeit in the Library of 
Congress collection. His description is telling of the film’s poor quality: 
Shot from a very low camera angle, the film consists of two boxers standing in a 
tiny roped square (perhaps only six feet wide) against a white sheet. As they 
randomly spar, their ersatz identities become clear (despite noticeable 
underexposure): Corbett’s counterpart wears a pompadour wig, while the other, in 
imitation of the balding Fitzsimmons, sports a hair net…. The only other details 
added to this minimal representation are a pair of seconds who mind the bucket 
and stool in Fitz’s corner.75  
Although clearly a sideshow that catered to remote venues not served by Veriscope, 
Lubin’s fake film was more of an irritation than a direct threat. 
 Exhibition of the Corbett-Fitzsimmons Fight was noteworthy on several counts. 
Even before the film was made available for the public, Stuart screened the film for the 
New York press, generating considerable publicity about the film’s content rather than 
the technology. As such, each of the fighters made claims about what camera showed. In 
this regard, the company’s name, Veriscope or truth-viewer, proved beneficial in playing 
on the controversies stemming from the fight’s outcome. A New York World article noted 
that the camera proved to be “a triumph of science over the poor, imperfect instrument, 









camera could prove whether or not Fitzsimmons had been down for a ten-count in the 
sixth round and whether or not Corbett had been fouled in the decisive fourteenth round 
added to the film’s attraction.  
The exhibition of the Corbett-Fitzsimmons Fight, which debuted on May 22, 
1897, at the Academy of Music in New York City, was also noteworthy. The film, with a 
running time of almost two hours, was soon offered as a stand-alone feature in many 
large theaters of major urban centers. As a representation of an actual event, the film was 
both legally and socially acceptable viewing material for an audience that cut across 
cultural and economic lines. In Chicago, where the film enjoyed an initial run of nine 
weeks, admission ranged from twenty-five cents for a gallery seat to one dollar for the 
orchestra. Musser notes, “Theater seats became seats at ringside as patrons saw this 
ritualized sport unfold from a single camera perspective in realistic time.”77 Over time, 
the film was exhibited in various other amusement places—fairgrounds, resorts, 
amusement parks, storefronts, and midways—almost anywhere a screen could be hung 
and electricity provided. Despite newspaper reports that detailed the flickering and 
vibrations that proved trying to the eyes, prompting efforts to improve both prints of the 
film and the projecting machines, the Corbett-Fitzsimmons Fight remained a premiere 
attraction thanks to effective publicity and distribution, topicality and mode of exhibition.     
Arguably, the most noteworthy aspect of the film’s exhibition was its use of an 
expert who stood on-stage and provided running commentary. These experts varied from 
location to location, and undoubtedly the nature of their commentary also varied in terms 









especially its controversies, fueled the audience’s experience and drew considerable 
reactions, as evidenced in various newspaper reports. For example, the New York 
Tribune’s article of May 23, 1897, noted: 
In the sixth round, when Fitzsimmons was brought low for a few seconds, the 
crowd became so much excited that the lecturer who was explaining incidents had 
to give it up and let the spectators understand the rather complicated situation the 
best they could. He managed to get in just a word of explanation when it was 
nearly over.78  
The same article related that when Corbett was knocked out in the final round, spectators 
cried out, “Where’s the foul? Where’s the foul?” The fight’s ending, in which Corbett 
crawled out of the camera’s view, no doubt left many viewers wondering exactly what 
had happened.  
Streible explains that the live narrator’s presence was important for at least two 
reasons. The narrator connected the fight film exhibition to the tradition of the illustrated 
lecture and thereby “helped diffuse the unsavory blood-and-guts aspect of the exhibition 
by suggesting the more genteel style of presentation used in illustrated lectures on the 
bourgeois lyceum circuit.”79 Also, the spoken commentary rendered musical 
accompaniment unnecessary and doubtlessly inspired spectator yelling, cheering and 
generally playing the counterpart to the actual ringside spectators. Perhaps even more 
telling was Musser’s contention that in the use of an expert to provide commentary “the 
sports announcer had arrived.”80 Given the fact that within two years, several 









wireless technology with live reporting of an international yacht race off Sandy Hook,81 
Musser’s bold assertion is not without merit. Musser’s point that “the details and 
significant moments that would one day be brought out by close-ups were now 
emphasized by the narration”82 accurately illustrated the importance of this exhibition 
innovation in the development of a sportscast convention.  
The Corbett-Fitzsimmons Fight grossed approximately $750,000 with profits 
exceeding $120,000 after the fighters received their percentages, marking it as the first 
motion picture blockbuster. More important, perhaps, the fight’s film proved that a mass 
audience would pay to see a presentation of an actual event and that a privileged 
commentator could be used to guide viewers to the correct interpretation and feeling 
state. As Medhurst posits, “Though striving to appear fair, neutral, and objective, the 
privileged narrator ‘knows’ more than the audience and successfully communicates that 
superior knowledge through intonation, interpretation, and assertion.”83 
Issues  
 Although motion picture companies continued to film sporting events, as well as 
their recreations and reenactments, these undertakings were not without problems along 
various technical, social and legal fronts. Seeking to follow up on the success of the 
Corbett-Fitzsimmons Fight, the American Vitagraph Company attempted to photograph 
the Jeffries-Fitzsimmons fight, scheduled at the Coney Island Sporting Club on the night 
of June 9. That the film industry was having a direct economic impact on the boxing 
world was evident in a July 29, 1899, article by Sam C. Austin for the Police Gazette, 









stage this championship fight needed both money and motion-picture facilities, Austin 
argued that the exhibition of fights “has moved beyond the experimental stages…[of the] 
indistinct and unsatisfactory”84 Corbett-Fitzsimmons fight films and that the potential for 
the upcoming fight was enormous. 
To such an extent has the photographing of movable objects been perfected since 
then that a wholly satisfactory result may be obtained, and considering the amount 
of interest that is now being taken in pugilistic affairs an exhibition of a genuine 
championship fight, such as the one forthcoming [Jeffries-Sharkey], ought to 
profit its promoters to the extent of several hundred thousand dollars.85    
Although Austin’s claim that the photographing of movable objects, both staged and 
outdoor events, had been perfected was overstated, the same could certainly not be said 
of photographing live indoor events.  
To capture this indoor event, twenty-four lamps were erected over the ring, but 
the engine that was supposed to provide the necessary watt output failed to generate 
enough horse-power.86 The Phonoscope reported that only half of the lights powered up. 
“The light was perhaps equal to about four of the lamps burning as they should have 
burned, and the kinetoscope films developed out innocent of any marks that would 
suggest a negative.”87 The magazine blamed the fiasco on inadequate planning and 
“demonstrates the advisability of preliminary trial before risking an installation on an 
important venture.”88 The piece concluded by underscoring the fact that with more time 
to properly install and connect the equipment, the venture could be successfully 









including the knockout…faithfully reproduced”89 with the actual fighters for $150, but 
not before Lubin’s reproduction beat them to market, which Vitagraph also used for a 
time. 
When Jeffries and Sharkey met in a heavyweight championship fight of twenty-
five rounds on November 3, 1899, at the Coney Island Sporting Club, the lighting issue 
had been resolved from a technical standpoint. Despite shooting more than seven miles of 
footage on the largest film stock, two by two and three-quarter inches, Biograph’s 
production team encountered different problems. Some were self-inflicted and others 
“surreptitiously” imposed. The three hundred and fifty miniature arc lights needed to 
illuminate the ring for Biograph’s cameras almost roasted the fighters. After the fight, 
Jeffries decried the lights, telling the New York Herald, “No more picture machines for 
me. The intense heat from the electric lights bothered me considerably and made me very 
weak at times….”90 Additionally, the cameras failed before the final round was 
completed, so that a reenacted ending had to be filmed some time in the seventeen days 
before the film was ready for exhibition. This diluted Biograph’s contention that they 
alone were offering the “only complete and accurate pictures” of the fight.91 
Biograph waged an intense publicity battle in order to fend off Lubin’s faked fight 
reenactment and American Vitagraph’s fragments shot with cameras that had been 
smuggled into the arena by Edison and Vitagraph’s men, despite the presence of 
Pinkerton security hired to forestall such an infringement. Although the Vitagraph pirated 
version was copyrighted the next day by James H. White as The Battle of Jeffries and 









Company launched vigorous legal and publicity campaigns to prevent exhibition of the 
pirated film. Biograph took out an advertisement (Illustration 2.5) in the New York 
Clipper, offering the Edison Manufacturing Company $5,000 if it could dispute the fact 
that their pictures of the fight “are anything more than fragmentary snap shots of a few 
rounds, taken by cameras surreptitiously smuggled into the Coney Island Sporting Club 
and worked secretly.”92 A similar amount was offered to Lubin, although he countered by 
offering $10,000 to anybody who could prove his reproduction was not copyrighted. 
Lubin offered both a fifteen- to twenty-minute version of the entire fight, and a six-round 
highlight film. Interested exhibitors were even provided with free samples via mail. 
Unfortunately, fake fight films contributed to the dissolution of public interest in the real 
sport, which continued to struggle under the shadow of corruption and deception.   
Although Biograph’s exhibition of the Jeffries-Sharkey Fight met with financial 
success, the tour was short-lived in comparison to the Corbett-Fitzsimmons Fight. One 
contributing factor was the changed reception that existed in 1899-1900. Unlike its 
predecessor, this release did not engender calls for legislation and censorship. Rather, by 
the dawn of the twentieth century, editorial control became an area of contention between 
manufacturers and exhibitors. Musser explains that the Edison Company had assumed 
greater editorial control in the production and marketing of its films. For example, the 
film of President McKinley’s Funeral Cortege at Buffalo, New York was a four hundred-
foot “series” consisting of four separate films brought together through dissolves, 
introduced in the printing process. 93 The same process was employed for America’s Cup 









If the exhibitor did not like the sequence of subjects or only wanted some of the 
films and not the whole series, Edison was happy to sell them on an individual 
basis. Programs and reviews indicate that most prominent exhibitors were not yet 
willing to relinquish control over this area of expertise.94  
The America’s Cup yacht races between “Columbia” and “Shamrock I” in 1899 
and between “Columbia” and “Shamrock II” in 1901, the latter owned by Sir Thomas 
Lipton, drew considerable newspaper coverage. The New York Times reported on 
October 21, 1899, that “large and demonstrative” crowds gathered in front of the 
newspaper offices along Park Row to read the bulletins of the race’s progress, “impeding 
the progress of street cars and invaded City Hall Park for a considerable distance.”95 The 
crowds who gathered were both business men and “idlers who stood through the nearly 
four hours the race was in progress.”96 The races also provided an opportunity for 
Marconi to demonstrate his wireless technology. According to the Proceedings of the 
United States Naval Institute by the United States Naval Institute, the tests found that the 
"…coherer, principle of which was discovered some twenty years ago, [was] the only 
electrical instrument or device contained in the apparatus that is at all new.”97 A new 
technology was again tested through coverage of a live sporting event. 
The films of the 1899 America’s Cup, produced for Edison by J. Start Blackton 
and Albert E. Smith, captured select moments from each of the races. At least two were 
taken of the first race, contested on October 16, 1899. The first one hundred-foot film 
showed the “two yachts rounding the stakeboats and jockeying for a start.”98 The second 









“Shamrock” Tacking, which Musser posits might be the name of another film that was 
not copyrighted.99 For the third and final race, three films, each one hundred feet, were 
taken; the first two show the two yachts rounding one of the outer marks. The third, titled 
“Columbia” Winning the Cup, captured the decisive moment of the race. The Edison 
Film catalogue of July 1901 described the action. “As the ‘Columbia’ crosses the line, 
followed closely by the ‘Shamrock,’ we see the steam from the whistle of the Light Ship 
announcing the well earned victory of the American yacht.”100  
These America’s Cup films warrant consideration on several points. First, that the 
Edison Manufacturing Company created a series with the 1899 and 1901 America’s Cup 
races illustrated a desire to create and market a composite story of an event comprised of 
multiple parts. This strategy has certainly been employed to market DVDs that tell the 
story of a team’s victory (e.g., Super Bowl, World Series) or the story of a specific event 
(e.g., 2002 Salt Lake City Olympics, 1981 Wimbledon). Additionally, the decision to 
capture the decisive moments of a race that featured ninety-foot yachts rather than 
attempting to capture the event in its entirety necessarily involved strategic planning, 
coordination, and timing. It also pointed to a completely different aesthetic than had been 
employed for filming fights. As Musser notes, in capturing actual performances that 
unfolded in time, films of sporting events like boxing “worked against crucial aspects of 
the presentational approach that dominated early cinema.”101 However, these America’s 
Cup races, doubtlessly due to their length, their movement across a fixed course of open 
water, and their slow progress, lent themselves to an approach that could better highlight 









a cannon shot once the winning boat crossed the committee boat’s bow. This deliberate 
presentation of “key moments” was yet another important marker in the evolution of the 
sportscast highlight form. Lastly, these films served as standards against which to 
measure newsreel coverage of the America’s Cup races featuring J-boats in 1930, 1934, 
and 1937, as well as television coverage of the 12-metre boats starting in 1958, 
particularly the 1983 and 1987 America’s Cup competitions. The process of putting 
together excerpts of actualities that had taken place and editing in more recent film would 
also be used in the making of films about two fighters to promote and publicize what was 
billed as “The Fight of the Century,” namely, the Jeffries-Johnson heavyweight 
championship fight in 1910. More and more, film was being used not merely to capture 
an actual event, but also to generate publicity for an event that had yet to occur.  
Bifurcation 
 By the time the Chicago Fight Picture Company put together excerpts and 
knockout rounds from the recent fights of both Jim Jeffries and newly crowned champion 
Jack Johnson and sold it as The Making of Two Champions (1909-1910), both the film 
industry and the sport of boxing were in the midst of considerable change. During what 
was known as the Nickelodeon Era (1905-1915), the motion-picture industry changed 
from “a relatively small, wide-open part of commercial entertainment to a large, 
oligopolistic business based on mass production by studio.”102 These studios ultimately 
changed both their product, concentrating on feature-length fictional films rather than 
short subjects, and viewing spaces, replacing storefront nickelodeons and peep show 









also evidenced in the proliferation of the first trade magazines—Views and Film Index 
(April 1906), Moving Picture World (March 1907), Moving Picture News (May 1908), 
and the Nickelodeon (January 1909). As Streible notes, “Amid this expansion, American 
Progressivism also simultaneously implemented its age of reform, critiquing and 
regulating the practice of cinema as it did most other social institutions.”103 This 
concentration on social betterment forced the film industry to reassess its relationship 
with sporting entities, especially prizefighting. 
 In the first decade of the twentieth century, sports also experienced considerable 
growth as a source of popular entertainment. This growth was, in part, fueled by the 
continued proliferation of sporting magazines, the development and expansion of sports 
sections in newspapers, and the continued filming of sporting events for distribution 
within the growing motion-picture industry. The symbiotic relationship between these 
two industries generated tremendous enthusiasm by producing a constant flow of 
publicity through co-promotional activities. An article, titled “Pictures and Pugilism,” 
which appeared in the December 18, 1909, issue of Moving Picture World, captured the 
essence of this relationship: 
The fortunes of the prize ring are apparently interwoven with those of the moving 
picture. Without the moving picture your modern prize fight would be shorn of 
most of its financial glamour and possibilities; without the prize fight the moving 
picture would not appeal to so many people as it apparently does.104    
This joint venture to film and exhibit sporting actualities had to contend with reformists 









reputation as a brutal, savage blood sport with no socially redeeming value. Ultimately, 
the only spark needed to incite the move toward censorship and the banning of fight films 
was provided when Jack Johnson became the heavyweight champion by defeating 
Tommy Burns in 1908. As long as there had been a white heavyweight champion and the 
social hierarchy was maintained, the exhibition of fights was tolerated, even, at times, 
celebrated, especially when the feature showcased a popular champion like Gentleman 
Jim Corbett or Jim Jeffries.  
For black boxers, especially those who won championships, defeating white 
fighters in the process, acceptance was “contingent upon their ability to appear non-
threatening.”105 As already noted, when Jack McAuliffe won the lightweight 
championship in New Orleans in 1882, newspapers demanded that boxing clubs no 
longer stage inter-racial bouts. Because John L. Sullivan and his successors maintained 
the color line, no black heavyweight had been afforded the opportunity to upset that 
hierarchy. Although the social hierarchy did not allow a black heavyweight champion, 
film played an important role in creating a space where black athletes demonstrated their 
talents. As Musser notes, the camera captured these performers without cultural 
preconceptions. “Here was an alternative rather than an obviously oppositional vision of 
a world. Racial and economic hierarchies may not have been upended but they were 
potentially effaced, flattened out or otherwise subverted.”106 Johnson, however, not only 
upended the social hierarchy, but in his dominating ring presence and his flouting of 
social conventions by carrying on relationships with white women (e.g., Hattie McClay 









(e.g., Etta Duryea 1909; Lucille Cameron 1912), Johnson was cast as a threatening 
menace to the ideology of race. 
 Even before Johnson won the heavyweight championship, the news of a black 
boxer defeating a white sparked considerable violence. As the telegraphed returns of the 
1906 fight between Gans and Nelson were read at various sites, the furor of a black boxer 
beating a white fighter erupted in street violence. A New York Times article for 
September 5, 1906, with the headline “Almost a Lynching over Gans’s Victory,” reported 
on several incidents: 
There were half a dozen fights in different parts of town, which were brought 
about by the success of the negro pugilist. In at least one instance the trouble 
almost grew into a lynching. In another case a stonecutter who had applauded the 
decision in the negro’s favor in a saloon in Williamsburg was followed from the 
place and assaulted by three men. He may die from his injuries.107  
The films of Gans’s victory did not generate the same type of mob behavior, in part 
because venues for the exhibitions were segregated and alcohol was not served. Two 
years later, when Nelson knocked out Gans, the films grossed over $100,000, a dramatic 
increase attributable to both an increase in the film market and to the idea that “the 
majority white audiences and promoters were more anxious to anoint a white fighter.”108  
 Consideration of Johnson’s fight films—Johnson-Burns 1908, Johnson-Ketchal 
1909, and Johnson-Jeffries 1910—involved issues related to those racial policies that 
governed public life. One immediate result of Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) was the racial 









spaces for seeing the Johnson films were “legally separate but hardly equal.”109 Although 
Johnson defeated Burns for the heavyweight title on December 26, 1908, the film did not 
premiere until March 21, 1909, at the Chicago Auditorium where it played for two weeks 
for overwhelmingly white audiences. Promoter Hugh D. (Huge Deal) McIntosh provided 
the commentary, which often included calls, first uttered by Jack London, that the smile 
be removed from Johnson’s face and that Jeffries, who had retired undefeated and 
therefore still the rightful champion, come out of retirement to restore the championship 
to the white race. As Streible points out, white public outcry was accommodated by 
including footage of the Jeffries-Sharkey Fight of 1899, the moment of Jeffries’ greatest 
glory, to the Johnson-Burns film. This appendage served another purpose in addition to 
appeasing white panic; namely, it provided marketing impetus for a Johnson-Jeffries 
“Battle of the Century.”  
 Johnson’s ascendancy to the heavyweight championship came at a time of 
increased political activism within segments of the black community, especially related to 
the film industry. During Johnson’s reign atop the boxing world, 1908-1915, efforts 
included attempts by blacks to redefine stereotypical portrayals of black characters in 
theater and cinema, and debates about racial grounds for film censorship. Activists called 
for both access and autonomy, challenging segregation of exhibition venues and 
establishing independent black-run movie houses. Coincidental to Johnson’s capturing 
the heavyweight championship was the founding of the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) by W. E. B. DuBois and others in 1909. 









Chicago’s movie theatres, a campaign which was also taken up in Harlem.  
While there certainly was an expansion in the number of black-only movie venues 
during this time, the exhibition of Johnson’s films often lagged behind exhibitions in 
white-run movie houses. Because McIntosh alone controlled the rights to the Johnson-
Burns Fight, there were fewer advertisements for black theaters showing the film, 
indicating a lack of timely prints of the film.110 A similar situation did not occur when the 
films of the Johnson-Ketchel fight were made in October 1909, in part because the prints 
were controlled by the Motion Picture Patents Company (MPPC) and in part because 
Johnson himself demanded possession of the fight’s prints.  
The Johnson-Ketchel Fight generated both sensation and abhorrence. The extant 
prints of the film provided ample evidence that for most of the fight Johnson and Ketchel 
were engaging in a twenty-round exhibition more than a fight to the finish, cashing in on 
a money-making opportunity. As the fifth in a series of “Great White Hopes” that 
Johnson had fought and easily defeated since March 1909, Ketchel had earned a 
reputation as a fearless fighter. However, for most of his career Ketchel fought as a 
middleweight, and he was physically no match for Johnson. In fact, Ketchel was provided 
with lifts and padding to add girth to his stature for publicity photos. The film showed 
that for the first eleven rounds, Johnson toyed with the smaller man. Then in the twelfth 
round, Ketchel caught Johnson with a punch to the head, sending him to the canvas. As 
quickly as Johnson went down, he got up and quickly lunged at Ketchel, catching him 
with a vicious punch to the mouth that knocked him unconscious and left several of 









glove, as if to remove the teeth.  
Reception of the Johnson-Ketchel Fight ranged along the racial divide, 
accelerating white fears with images of black power and offering black audiences “a 
laudable antidote to the pervasive negative stereotypes of popular culture.”111 Neither 
black nor white audiences reacted monolithically, however. Black critics questioned the 
fight’s highly suspicious ending, which appeared to one columnist as choreographed for 
the cameras: 
If this Johnson-Ketchel fight wasn’t a pre-arranged affair, there was some awful 
clever catering to the moving picture machine…. After the supposed blow 
Johnson went down on his hands and toes, rolled over backward on one hand, and 
facing the moving picture machine all the time; then, seeing that Ketchel was 
waiting for his cue, he jumped up and rushed at Ketchel like a wild man…. The 
referee stood squarely over Ketchel, counting him out, and all three were in full 
view of the moving picture machine.112  
In addition to concerns about playing to the camera, black critics were also beginning to 
question Johnson’s exorbitant lifestyle. Conversely, not all whites viewed the film within 
a racial discourse. Regardless of their attitudes about race, white fans of the sport 
doubtlessly appreciated Johnson’s boxing skills. As Streible notes, “When boxing insider 
Joe Humphreys narrated the pictures for fight fans at Hammerstein’s Victoria theater, for 
example, Variety reported that he held forth on pugilistic and financial details rather than 
race angles.”113  









which was signed on November 30, 1909, a little more than six weeks after the Ketchel 
fight. Promoter George Lewis “Tex” Rickard lured Jeffries out of retirement, thanks in 
part to the largest purse for a championship fight, $101,000, with the fighters splitting 
two-thirds of the movie rights and each receiving a signing bonus of $10,000. The fight, 
originally scheduled for July 4, 1910, in San Francisco, was moved to Reno, Nevada, 
when in mid-June Governor James N. Gillett withdrew his support, bowing to pressure 
from civic and church leaders. According to a New York Times article from December 5, 
1909, details of the “moving picture clause” occupied a considerable portion of the 
negotiations and was finally “stricken out of the articles and incorporated into a separate 
agreement.” 114 That separate agreement included the formation of a stock company, the J. 
& J. Co., to handle the fight’s pictures. The MPPC ultimately bought up both boxers’ 
shares of the net film profits, paying Johnson $50,000 for his third and Jeffries $66,000, 
as well as buying Rickard’s share for $33,000. The Times article reported that profits 
would exceed $300,000.  
 In addition to the MPPC coverage of the event, numerous independent film 
companies shot footage of the boxers preparing for the bout. Significantly, these films 
contributed to the pre-fight publicity so important in generating interest and building an 
audience not only for the event itself, but also for the films that followed. Comprised of 
excerpted segments, or highlights, from previous fight films and edited footage of 
training and sparring sessions, these publicity films constituted an important step in the 
sportscast highlight form’s evolutionary process, serving as precursors for not only 









Video News Releases (VNR) that became staples of the sports broadcasting industry half 
a century later. 
Backlash and Bans 
 Production values of the Johnson-Jeffries Fight were not noteworthy, for despite a 
veritable cadre of cameras outfitted with special lenses being used by member companies 
Vitagraph, Essanay, and Selig, the film utilized most of the conventions of earlier fight 
films. Cameras were stationed on a platform thirty feet west of the wing and shot the 
action from that distance. One difference from earlier fight productions was the allocation 
of a panning camera to follow Jeffries, “framing the white boxer as protagonist and 
privileging white spectatorship.”115 Jeffries, however, was unable to match the ring skills 
of the younger, more agile Johnson, who not only controlled the action, as he had in other 
fights, but was also seen talking to his opponent, as well as to Corbett and Sullivan, both 
of whom served as handlers in the Jeffries corner. Another significant aspect that the 
camera captures was that during the climactic sequence in the fifteenth round after 
Jeffries had been knocked down three times, Jeffries’ handlers entered the ring (Corbett 
included), preempting the final knockout ten-count. This caused referee Tex Rickard to 
declare Johnson the winner and new champion rather than allowing Jeffries to be 
knocked out as he surely would have been. A similar, more intrusive ending had occurred 
in Australia when Johnson defeated Tommy Burns to win the championship in 1908. In 
that bout, Australian constables forced cameramen to stop filming so that the knockout of 
Burns was not recorded. These incidents marked only the beginning of what became a 









 In the immediate aftermath of Johnson’s victory, jubilant blacks celebrated and 
whites lashed back, and the ensuing race riots left a number of people dead. In a July 6 
New York Times article, titled “Bar Fight Pictures to Avoid Race Riots,” the Times listed 
seven cities where at least ten fatalities resulted from fights occasioned by the Johnson’s 
victory. The article also noted that Washington [D.C.], Atlanta, Baltimore, St. Louis, and 
Cincinnati were among the cities that decided “not to permit the exhibition of the 
pictures.”116 Despite the numerous calls for bans on the film of the fight, few decried the 
overt racial furor being played out in cities and towns across the country. The actual 
number of blacks killed as a direct result of white vengeance over Johnson’s victory has 
never been accurately documented. More telling perhaps, neither newspapers and 
magazines, nor church and civic leaders decried the behavior of white citizens for their 
actions. Rather, blame was placed on the sport of boxing or on black demonstrations of 
empowerment. The easiest target to censor was invariably the fight’s film. 
On July 6, the New York Times also reported that William Show, general secretary 
of the United Society of Christian Endeavor, had issued a formal statement in which he 
declared “that Independence Day had been dishonored and disgraced by a brutal 
prizefight: that the moral sense of the Nation had been outraged, but that this evil was as 
nothing compared to the harm which will be done by allowing children and women to 
view the production of the Jeffries-Johnson fight by moving pictures.”117 Significantly, 
this declaration against the fight film invoked a paternalistic tone of protecting women 
and children from viewing the film, despite the fact that women and children were 









than the Corbett-Fitzsimmons Fight, few women sought admittance to fight films.118 
Church leaders like James Cardinal Gibbons, Archbishop of Baltimore echoed a similar 
concern, namely, that the pictures would have a desultory effect on women and children. 
“If the pictures of this contest were permitted, I am sure hundreds of children would see 
them, and what would be the result? Their morals would not only be contaminated, but 
they would have the wrong ideal of a true hero.”119 Although not explicitly stated, the 
message was clear: Johnson could never be considered a hero. Implicit was the idea that 
it was up to the white race to lead the way “to confer these gifts of civilization, through 
law, commerce, and education on the uncivilized.”120 A legal tact was taken by Mayor 
Patrick Henry McCarthy of San Francisco, who claimed: “Inasmuch as the contest 
resolved itself into a prizefight pure and simple and was not a boxing match, the 
exhibition of the moving pictures would be as unlawful as the fight itself.”121 Streible 
posits that these disparate attacks served both the progressive and racist agenda.  
For some groups, then, the desire to control what they believed to be black 
peoples’ riotous nature by removing racially inflammatory images was consistent 
with their view of religion, reform, and progress. For others with more overtly 
white supremacist opinions, the rhetoric of moralism simply served as subterfuge 
for their calls to suppress anything which might suggest black power, 
achievement, or uplift.122  
The entire episode marked a nadir in American sporting history. 
 Attacks on the Johnson-Jeffries Fight film did not go unchallenged. The New 









Johnson-Jeffries fight films will resort to the courts of the several States to determine 
their right to show the pictures…”123 Black newspapers and clergy also added their voices 
to those advocating for the films to be shown, often pointing out the hypocrisy of the 
situation. The St. Paul Appeal asked, “Who believes for one minute, that had Jeffries 
been the victor at Reno, there would have been any objection to showing the pictures of 
him bringing back ‘the white man’s hope?’”124 Similar stances were taken in black press 
editorials and cartoons, noting that the film of Johnson’s victory would have beneficial 
effects for the political and psychological well-being of black citizens. 
 When New York City’s mayor had made it clear that the film would not be 
banned, offers from theaters and houses of amusement poured into the MPPC offices on 
Fifth Avenue. With promises from the film’s producers and the MPPC that the films 
would be carefully handled, meaning “the shows will be stag,”125 the Johnson-Jeffries 
Fight escaped total censorship for some time. Exhibitors, in practicing class, gender and 
race controls, were able to show the film and charge steeper prices for admission. This 
meant that not all of Johnson’s supporters, especially those in black communities, got a 
chance to see the Johnson-Jeffries Fight. For the next several years, Johnson held the 
heavyweight championship. Unable to find anyone who could defeat Johnson in the ring, 
those who sought to dethrone Johnson used the Mann Act, which forbade, under heavy 
penalties, the transportation of women from one state to another for immoral purposes, to 
prosecute and jail him, forcing him to leave the country.  
The first attempt to ban fight films, as well as telegraphed descriptions of fights, 









Iowa). Although that effort failed, two years later, another bill was introduced by 
Representative Thetus Sims (D-Tenn.) early in 1912. Southern Democrats pushed 
through the legislation, which was modeled after existing federal control on obscene 
publications (e.g., birth control, abortion literature). With the Sims Act of 1912, passed 
on July 31, 1912, Congress used its constitutional power to regulate commerce by 
forbidding interstate transport of fight films. As Lee Grievesen notes, “The Sims Act 
effectively defined moving pictures as commerce and thus brought them within the orbit 
of federal government intervention. This intervention was clearly linked to a moral 
concern over the effect both of prizefights in general and the effect of images of 
Johnson's victories in particular.”126 That the Sims Act was motivated by racial ideology 
was evidenced by the demagoguery deployed in the debate. On July 19, two weeks after 
the fight, Representative Seaborn A. Roddenbery (D-Ga.) delivered a speech in which he 
called Johnson “an African biped beast”127 and that failure to take action against “black-
skinned, thick-lipped, bull-necked, brutal-hearted African”128 would lead to another civil 
war. Ironically, those who had been longing for Johnson’s defeat were denied the 
opportunity to see the bout with Jess Willard in 1915 that ended Johnson’s tenure as 
heavyweight champion. 
Conclusion 
 The ban on boxing films did not mean filmmakers no longer sought to capture and 
disseminate sporting events. In the years that followed, leading film companies continued 
to capture actualities with their newsreel divisions, which began in 1911, one year before 









imagination on both national and international stages. Major league baseball began 
playing its World Series in 1903 and baseball was captured on film as early as 1906.129 
Another sport that grew in popularity at the turn of the century was college football, 
which the Edison Company captured on film during 1903. Still another sporting spectacle 
that grew in popularity was the modern Olympic Games, which began in 1896. In short, 
sporting events served as important content for the newsreel divisions of the major film 
studios.  
 What is especially important about the formation and development of what today 
is called the sport-media-commercial complex130 was not merely the technological 
improvements that allowed cameras to stage or capture live sporting events. Rather, all of 
the various constituencies played key roles in the evolution and development of the 
sportscast highlight form. Arguably, far more is known about the ways that inventors, 
promoters, exhibitors, journalists, athletes, civic and church leaders attended to the 
consumption of sport culture than about the audience. It is difficult to ascertain who 
watched sport films and what they thought of them. Economics, as Musser points out, 
limited the access to films by the poorer members of the working class and the poor. 
Drawing its audience from across the upper, middle and working classes, films sought to 
accommodate people of diverse financial status. He argues: 
Spectatorship was undoubtedly distributed unevenly through these different 
economic groups, but economic difference was only one of the many factors that 
determined attendance. Geography, general accessibility to cultural events, age, 









personal tastes all affected the likelihood of seeing films.131      
It should not be assumed that the audience was comprised of males only. While the films 
showing the physique of Sandow, as well as the fight films featuring Corbett and Jeffries, 
were primarily intended for male patrons, these films almost certainly “held considerable 
erotic interest for women spectators.”132 At least a few women asserted their 
independence by visiting theaters showing fight films and other sporting events, 
especially those that offered matinees.  
 While many factors determined the composition of the audience, it is also 
important to understand that control of the places of exhibition was as contentious as the 
controlling of the content. As the motion-picture industry became financially lucrative, 
not all entities shared equally in the profits. The system of selling the rights by states 
spawned highly competitive practices among exhibitors seeking to capitalize on topical 
films. States rights owners also faced considerable difficulties in recouping their 
investments in specific film properties. The sheer number of motion picture enterprises, 
especially in the early years of projection, exacerbated the difficulties of making profits 
from exhibitions. As the MPPC gradually gained more and more control over the 
distribution of feature-length fictional films, fewer independent companies were left to 
compete.  
 This concentration of control in the hands of the studios ultimately pushed sport 
films from the feature to the news actuality. With feature-length fight films no longer 
legal, sports became an important source and a regular part of the newsreel. As such, 









one that remained an integral part of the newsreel genre, even as radio broadcasting 
became the vehicle for capturing and disseminating a live sporting event.       
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CHAPTER 3: THE HABIT OF HIGHLIGHTS 
Introduction 
By the time the Sims Act was enacted in 1912, barring the interstate 
transportation of fight films for commercial exhibition, the cinema industry had already 
entered into the second phase of newsreel development with the release on August 8, 
1911, of the first American-produced newsreel by the French-owned Pathé Weekly. An 
announcement in the July 29, 1911, issue of Moving Picture World, signaled the 
beginning in America of a weekly newsreel, “…issued every Tuesday, made up of short 
scenes of great international events of universal interest from all over the world.”1 
Regularity certainly became a hallmark of the newsreels, allowing them to become 
something with which the audience could be comfortable. Luke McKernan posits, “The 
news itself is always subject to form and habit.”2   
Several factors related to production and distribution facilitated the establishment 
of the weekly exhibition of filmed news. The ready availability of serviceable cameras, 
projectors and film stock allowed a sufficient number of producers “experienced in the 
rudiments of cinematography to take the chance offered by spectacular events far away in 
which there was intense public interest everywhere.”3 Additionally, the public’s interest 
in film entertainment had been established, evidenced by the fact that in the United States 
the number of cinemas grew from nine thousand in 1908 to almost fourteen thousand in 
1914. This growth would not have been possible without a very large number of people 









The ability to exhibit reproductions of actual events anywhere a darkened space 
and a projector could be brought together transformed the economic basis of 
entertainment from a local commodity of theatrical performance to a national and 
international industry. Clearly, it was the large production companies with world-wide 
connections that had the resources to produce news films to satisfy the public’s insatiable 
appetite for this new medium of communication in which the wonder of the moving 
image supplanted the magic of acting.4 
 That sports played an instrumental role in the development of the newsreel form 
was first realized in Great Britain when Birt Acres and Robert Paul filmed the Epsom 
Derby on June 3, 1896, and projected it the following evening at the Alhambra. This 
“element of rushing an event of entirely ephemeral but great topical interest to the public” 
had been missing from other cinematic presentations of actualities.5 Equally importantly, 
the coverage of sporting events proved that film communicated aspects of an event which 
could not be captured by print news media at the time or by radio when it eventually 
emerged. The news films of boxing, horse and yacht races, and athletic (i.e., track and 
field) competitions evoked a greater degree of emotional involvement from the audience 
than printed words or illustrations by supplying moving images of the scene, despite the 
fact the results often were already known. As such, evocations of crowd responses 
demonstrated the power of newsreels to “reduce the individuality of the people in the 
audience and substitute a mass response for a critical and individual assessment.”6  
Film’s ability to affect an audience en masse had both positive and negative 









allowing it to act like a demagogue capable of tremendous influence through the power of 
intimacy, while on the other confining it to the workings of a motion picture camera 
within the context of a news organization trying to catch its news on the fly, often 
rendering its coverage superficial and entertaining. Nonetheless, watching newsreel 
coverage of sports joined attending those events, as well as reading about athletic contests 
in the print press and listening to games on the radio, in creating a common popular 
culture centered around sports.7 One component of that popular culture was being in the 
public eye, which now meant being seen.  
 This chapter explicates the development of the sportscast highlight form within 
newsreels. It argues that sports, as scheduled events, became one of the mainstays of 
newsreel subject matter. According to a 1949 survey, sport was the most popular 
newsreel segment, not only because it captured the spectacle and pageantry of the events, 
but also because it “helped nationalize sports by visualizing major sports heroes who had 
never before been seen by sports fans outside of the cities where they played.”8 Although 
newsreels were not wholly responsible for creating this national sporting identity, the 
newsreel sports segment perpetuated the dominant masculine sporting identity extolled in 
early twentieth century sports discourse.9 To a large extent this discourse developed at a 
time when the modern Olympic movement was initiated by Baron Pierre de Coubertin in 
1896. The Olympics were appropriated by those advocates of nationalistic athletic 
prowess as a means of celebrating the melting pot character of the United States.  
Additionally, sports lent themselves to a formulaic approach employed by 









throughout the world thanks to their network of cameramen, as well as to their 
operational bases throughout the globe and to the private exchange agreements among 
them, which guaranteed both financial and technical advantages and curtailed challenges 
from local producers. This system of gentlemanly competition resulted in a general 
increase of productivity through routinization and standardization.10 As explicated in the 
previous chapter, the earliest news films before the newsreel era were shot in fifty-foot 
and one hundred and fifty-foot segments, and these were followed in the first decade of 
the twentieth century by three hundred-foot topicals, also known as actualities. When 
newsreels supplanted topicals in the market, they retained their length and stayed that 
way for almost their entire history. Because a cameraman had a limited amount of 
footage to shoot, every shot had to be a highlight. Michael Oriard has argued that sports 
newsreels were the predecessors of today’s sports news programs like ESPN’s 
SportsCenter: “Whatever the photographer shot became the big plays for the audience in 
the theater, and in a cruder way and a simpler time the producers of newsreels achieved 
the same effect as today’s more extravagantly financed and technically advanced 
highlight films.”11 Analysis of most newsreel sports segments reveals specific 
characteristics. For example, in the case of a college football game, there was a general 
view of the stadium to establish the venue, followed by a shot closer to the field, then by 
a shot of the crowd (e.g. cheering), a shot of a crucial play (e.g. touchdown), close-up of 
the hero, and at the end a shot of celebration by the team and fans. Cameramen were not 
expected to capture footage in sequence, and close-ups were often edited into the final 









 When the first all-sound newsreel was premiered by Fox Movietone News on 
October 28, 1927, at the Roxy Theater in New York City, it contained highlights of the 
Army-Yale football game at the Yale Bowl and the rodeo in New York. Sound newsreels 
necessitated a more complex approach to editing to insure synchronization and sound 
levels.12 In early sound newsreels, microphones were strategically positioned to capture 
the sounds of the bands and cheerleaders, and canned footage “of cheering throngs and 
football pageantry were edited into the game action.”13 As newsreel editors became more 
comfortable and ambitious with the sound-on-film process, commentary was used to 
enhance the excitement of sport segments. Commentary was often provided by the some 
of the period’s leading sports radio announcers, who became among the most widely 
known personalities in the nation. As Luke McKernan notes, “The word, and its emphatic 
delivery, makes the sound newsreels a rich source of material for anyone seeking to 
interpret the values and attitude of the period.”14  
 One of the most significant developments regarding the relationship between 
newsreels and sports revolved around securing the exclusive rights to film a sporting 
event. As noted in the previous chapter, piracy and re-enactments (i.e., fake fight films) 
plagued early film actualities. Perhaps the most glaring illustration of this continuing 
problem occurred in October 1923 with the filming of the match race between Kentucky 
Derby winner Zev and Epsom Derby winner Papyrus at Belmont Park. Pathé spent 
$50,000 for the exclusive rights to the race, but the event was pirated by cameramen from 
Fox Movietone and Hearst’s Metrotone. They exhibited their film of the entire race—five 









The issue of securing the rights to important sporting events did not end with the Zev-
Papyrus; in fact, the practice of charging film companies for access to footage of the 
Olympics took root in that same year, 1923, and greatly contributed to casting the 
Olympic Games as a commercial commodity.   
Just as the sports newsreel segment became the prototype for today’s highlight 
form, the newsreel companies also served as the prototype for today’s multinational 
corporations. It was this economic aspect of the cinema industry which, more than any 
other factor, characterized the history of newsreels, inextricably linking the development 
of film as journalism to the development of film as entertainment.15  
Routinization and Standardization 
 The coverage of sports by newsreels was predicated on routinization—both by 
producers and by viewers, who flocked to the cinema on a weekly and then bi-weekly 
basis expecting to be entertained. At the height of newsreel popularity in the 1930s, 
sports accounted for twenty to twenty-five percent of the footage, and weekly attendance 
of over one hundred million meant an estimated audience of twenty million for each of 
the five major newsreel distributors.16 Producers crafted the sports segment of highlights 
in terms that combined newspaper headlines with a synecdochic approach to the visuals 
and commentary that played up themes related to celebrity, nation (melting pot), gender 
and race to maintain the dominant cultural hegemony. Another aspect of the routinization 
revolved around the standardization of the visuals, which used a sequence of shots taken 
before and after the action, juxtaposing shots of the event’s location with close-ups of 









enactments. Lastly, the sports segments followed the progression of the sports seasons, 
heeding the calendar in a very predictable fashion—ski jumping in the winter, horse 
racing in the spring, baseball in the summer, and football in the fall.  
The newsreel sports segment relied on a combination of scheduled events, 
breaking news, and human interest stories that often featured oddities (e.g., child 
prodigies, daredevils and crashes). Comparing a purposive sample of Universal 
International Newsreels from the beginning of the sound period—1929, 1931, 1932 and 
1933—with those from the years following World War II—1947, 1948, 1949 and 1951—
not only provides an overview of what sporting events comprised the newsreel sports 
calendar but also reveals a constricting of the range of sports covered as certain sports 
like college and professional football and events like horse racing’s Triple Crown, 
Wimbledon, and the World Series came to dominate coverage. Being able to count on 
scheduled events afforded newsreel editors opportunities to dispatch cameramen to cover 
breaking news as it arose as well as to find those human interest stories that highlighted 
the bizarre, the unusual and the spectacular. Significantly, coverage was characterized by 
“picture material, not analysis.”17 
The newsreel sports calendar in the early 1930s was far different than it would be 
in the early 1950s, especially during the winter months. In the earlier period, viewers 
were more likely to see newsreels of speed skating, ice boat racing, ski jumping and dog 
sled racing during January, February and March than viewers in the later period. 
Although viewers in the later period were treated to some traditional winter sports like ski 









bowl games, and featured sports that were growing in popularity, including figure 
skating, college basketball, indoor track and field, speed boat racing and professional golf 
tournaments. Horse racing was one sport that retained a favored position in both time 
periods, as thoroughbred racing from Florida (Hialeah) and California (Santa Anita) was 
covered, as well as the Grand National steeplechase from England. It is worth noting that 
steeplechase racing, which often featured spectacular falls as horses and riders attempted 
to jump barriers, offered the visual material that newsreels sought. Although not in 
season, baseball, usually in the persons of stars like Babe Ruth and later Joe DiMaggio, 
received some coverage in March as teams began spring training. Several factors 
contributed to the wide assortment of winter sports covered in the early newsreels, 
including the absence of two key professional leagues—the National Hockey League and 
the National Basketball League—as well as limited coverage of college basketball’s NIT 
and NCAA tournaments.  
Adding spice to the mix of winter sporting highlights was 1930s coverage of 
oddities like water-ski polo, aquatic ballet, tub races down mountains as well as 1950s 
coverage of roller-skate hockey, ice skaters jumping barrels, cliff diving, and motorcycle 
racing on ice. Neither time period refrained from odd and exotic events, including women 
wrestling men, pee-wee golfers performing trick shots, kick boxing, and mass 
gymnastics. Any event that featured spectacular crashes in the snow or daredevil stunts 
on the water or ice was certain to be included.  
While the winter season offered sporting events that depended on the elements, 









revolved around horse racing’s Triple Crown—including the Kentucky Derby, the 
Preakness Stakes and the Belmont Stakes—as well as English races like the Epsom 
Derby, the Grand National steeplechase and the Ascot Gold Cup. Other sports’ top races 
such as the Boston Marathon, the Indianapolis 500, America’s Cup racing, and speed 
boat racing’s Gold Cup were also covered. In fact, races of all kinds—from crew and air 
racing to bike and race walking—were captured. Part of racing’s lure for the newsreels 
stemmed from the fact that its organic unity lent itself to the process of highlighting.  
What constituted a sports highlight in either period was dictated by “the 
complexities of telescoping the time element into the scale of a newsfilm.”18 In other 
words, until 1945 cameras were capable of filming continuously for no more than ten 
minutes, so capturing a race’s finish was easier to time than attempting to capture the 
scoring of a goal, touchdown or home run. Even after the introduction of sixteen 
millimeter (16mm) safety film, newsreel companies could not afford to film most events 
in their entirety or for long stretches to secure the decisive moment-of-truth plays. For 
that reason, racing of almost any kind was captured, especially because it offered at least 
one decisive moment, the finish, which was combined with the start and almost any other 
part of the race to suggest a complete story. Add to that establishing shots of the crowd 
and a shot of the winner celebrating, and the reel was complete, economically and 
efficiently captured. Except for the shortest races, usually track and field’s sprints and 
hurdling events, editors preferred transforming what had been captured into a highlight 
by allowing the headlining and commentary to maximize the affect and importance of 









photographers had to be lucky to capture the game’s crucial plays.”19 With racing, 
cameramen did not rely on luck; rather, they relied on the knowledge that if they captured 
the finish, they had the highlight.  
Just as the coverage of most any race was routinized, so too was the coverage of 
those summer sports in which individual athletes were the focus. Newsreels presented 
highlights of the major tennis and golf championship events, focusing on the stars of 
those sports. Arguably, neither of those sports lent themselves to the spectacular footage 
that characterized coverage of auto, bobsled, or speed boat racing. Lacking visually 
exciting crashes and pile-ups, these sports rarely offered the kind of footage so 
characteristic of newsreels featuring races. Given the aforementioned limitations, 
capturing the moment-of-truth shot or decisive point proved exceedingly difficult for any 
cameraman shooting a Wimbledon final or the final round of the U.S. Open Golf 
Championship. Not surprisingly then, coverage focused on the star personalities of those 
sports, including Bobby Jones, Walter Hagen and Babe Didrickson in golf and Bill 
Tilden, Suzanne Lenglen and Helen Wills Moody in tennis. 
The formula for those individual sports used at least one familiar technique of 
juxtaposing longs shots and close-ups, although the key was capturing the final point or 
putt, the handshake between competitors, and holding or hoisting the trophy, culminating 
with a close-up of the victor. For example, Universal’s highlights of the 1930 women’s 
final at Wimbledon featuring two Americans, Helen Wills Moody and Helen Hull Jacobs, 
set the stage by showing the two women before the final, then presented a rally of several 









the trophy, and lastly viewers were provided a close-up of her on board ship as she was 
returning home.  
Moody was certainly a favorite of the newsreels, evidenced by the coverage of her 
marriage in December 1929—titled “Life’s Doubles”—her 1924 Olympic gold medal in 
tennis, her many Grand Slam victories, and her exhibition match against the eighth-
ranked American male player, Phil Neer, whom she defeated on January 28, 1933, in San 
Francisco. In 1933, the newsreels also covered the last match she played at the U.S. Open 
in which she retired during the final against Helen Hull Jacobs due to a back injury. At 
the time, Jacobs was leading in the third set. Because she felt the press and fans treated 
her harshly at the U.S. Championship, Wills decided never to play there again.  
That the focus of the coverage was squarely on the star athlete is further 
evidenced by another piece taken at the 1930 Davis Cup Challenge Round contested at 
Stade Roland Garros in Paris, France, between the United States and France, the three-
time defending champion. Using the formula described above, the piece focused on 
Tilden’s victory in the first singles match, a four-set victory over Jean Borotra, one of the 
legendary Four Musketeers who helped France hold the Davis Cup from 1927-1930. 
Significantly, Tilden’s victory was headlined, no doubt because it was the only one of the 
five matches won by the United States that year, but also because it was Tilden’s final 
match as a member of the U.S. Davis Cup team. Even after Tilden turned professional, he 
remained a favorite of the newsreels. 
Golf posed comparable problems for cameramen attempting to capture highlights. 









difficult to know exactly when a competitor will make a winning or spectacular shot 
(e.g., hole-in-one, long putt). For this reason, golf coverage most often showed the 
eventual winner teeing off on the first hole of the final round, followed by shots of the 
crowd swarming toward a green, and the competitors taking turns putting on the final 
hole. The final sequence typically included the final putt, the handshake and the trophy 
presentation with a close-up of the winner.  
This formula is much in evidence in the newsreels that captured Robert Trent 
Jones’s historic Grand Slam in 1930, with victories in The (British) Open Championship, 
the U.S. Open Championship, the U.S. Amateur Championship and the British Amateur 
Championship. The coverage of Jones winning the British Amateur followed this 
formula, providing shots of Jones teeing off for the final round, as well as the final putts 
and the hoisting of the trophy. Universal’s headline provided the drama: “Bobby Jones 
Victor in British Amateur After Close Finish.” A month later, the Universal cameraman 
was able to capture the ultimate shot in the 72-hole event held at the Interlachen Country 
Club. Positioned as the first segment of the newsreel for July 14, 1930, the segment 
showed Jones teeing off for the final round with a comfortable five-shot lead. By the final 
hole that lead had almost completely disappeared, thanks in part to a double-bogey on the 
penultimate hole when Jones uncharacteristically hit a wayward drive into a water 
hazard.20 After his second shot to the final green, Jones, clinging to a one-shot lead over 
MacDonald Smith, was left with a long, 40-foot putt that had to travel over a mound. The 
camera was rolling as Jones lined up the shot, got into position and struck the ball with 










Although no audio is available with the archival newsreel footage, the New York 
Times story provided a comparable dramatization. 
…Now was this the time for Calamity Jane, his renowned putter, to deliver a 
telling blow and deliver it he did. His ball went up the hill, over the top and into 
the hole for a birdie 3 which left Mac Smith with the impossible to do. 
As Bobby’s ball made its way toward the hole there was utter silence, but 
when it disappeared into the tin a shout that could be heard to the utmost limits of 
the course went up.  
Jones had won again—the only man in the history of the game to gain the 
two British championships and one of the two American championships in the 
same year. All that now remains for him to do in order to accomplish a feat that 
probably will never be equaled in golf is to win the American amateur at Merion 
next September.21   
Given the fact that Jones went on to complete the Grand Slam, a feat which has never 
been duplicated as the New York Times reporter aptly predicted, the Interlachen putt is 
arguably one of the most significant sports highlights ever captured on film. When Jones 
completed the Grand Slam by decisively defeating Eugene V. Homans in the finals of the 
U. S. Amateur Championship by a score of eight and seven at the Merion Golf Club, 
Universal featured it as the lead story on September 29, 1930.   
 Jones, Tilden and Moody were not the only stars to shine in the newsreel sports 









of champion boxers. For example, in February 1930 the cameras were rolling as soon as 
Sharkey knocked out Phil Scott, actually capturing Sharkey raising his arms in victory. 
Not being allowed to film the fight did not discourage the newsreels from capturing pre- 
and post-fight footage. Being limited to previewing fights and showing the aftermath 
served as important precursors for the wrap-around programs that were later adopted by 
television producers for coverage of many sports, especially college football. That boxers 
had remained as sport celebrities is not surprising given the stature they had achieved 
prior to the Sims Act; in fact, boxing was arguably the most important sport in terms of 
generating what famed sportswriter W. O. McGeehan called “ballyhoo” in referring to 
the excessive attention given to sport. As Mark Dyreson notes, “McGeehan insisted that 
publicity agents and the press had manufactured a star system in athletics which rivaled 
that of Hollywood.”22  
 McGeehan was not alone in spotlighting the attention that athletes garnered. In 
Only Yesterday, Frederick Lewis Allen decried the heights to which ballyhoo elevated the 
sports stars of the 1920s. Noting that the decade was a great sporting era, he added:  
But it was an even greater era for watching sports than for taking part in them. 
Promoters, chambers of commerce, newspaper-owners, sports writers, press 
agents, radio broadcasters, all found profit in exploiting the public’s mania for 
sporting shows and its willingness to be persuaded that the great athletes of the 
day were supermen.23  
Allen illustrated this public fascination by noting the meteoric rise of Red Grange, who 









next day, Grange signed a contract to play with the Chicago Bears, collecting $12,000 for 
his first professional game on November 26, another $30,000 on December 6 for his first 
New York game, and the very next day signing a $300,000 movie contract with Arrow 
Picture Corporation.24  
Allen also noted how fickle the public’s attention was since shortly thereafter, 
Gertrude Ederle swam the English Channel and was welcomed in New York “to 
thunderous applause.”25 Additionally, the attention generated by the Dempsey-Tunney 
fights in 1926 and 1927 was so pervasive that even the New York Times “a paper so 
traditionally conservative in its treatment of sports…announced the result of a major bout 
with three streamer headlines running all the way across its front page.”26 Perhaps, too, 
Allen was bemused by the “incredible sum” of $2.6 million that was taken in by the 
second of their two title fights, an amount six times as great as the $452,000 that the 
Dempsey-Willard fight had been worth in 1919. Little wonder that following those fights, 
the Literary Digest questioned the value of these sport celebrities, positing, “How much 
of their fame is pure metal and how much of it is mere ballyhoo does not matter as long 
as they add to the gaiety and credulity of nations.”27  
 The most significant change to the routinization of the sports calendar from the 
1930s to the 1950s can be seen in the increased coverage of team sports during the 
autumn months. Although baseball’s fall classic, the World Series, had been and would 
remain a showcase event in the 1930s during early October, in terms of the number of 
segments, college football dominated newsreel sports coverage. In October 1931, for 









college football. Two years later, those numbers had not changed significantly, three 
World Series segments to two college football segments. Although a World Series might 
last a minimum of four games, coverage usually spanned at least two newsreel dates—a 
Wednesday and Saturday—and if the series lasted through the seven-game maximum, it 
spanned three dates, as it did in October 1951.  
However many segments were devoted to the national pastime, baseball posed at 
least one problem that cameramen had difficulty overcoming, namely, following the ball. 
For example, Universal’s segment on the 1930 World Series, titled “Record Crowds See 
Cards and Mackmen Battle for Title,” illustrated that problem. The segment attempted to 
capture action, but the shots of hits and base runners at times resembled a Buster Keaton 
comedy. Not being able to follow the ball also characterized early television coverage of 
baseball, and it was not until cameras were improved and better positioned that baseball 
coverage caught up to the other sports in terms of aesthetic quality. In 1934, the 
newsreels began covering baseball’s other glamour event, its mid-summer All-Star game, 
which lent itself to cut-ins of star players and shots of celebrities in the crowd. 
Several factors contributed to the significant rise in the number of newsreel 
segments devoted to college football. For one thing, the schedule of college games, 
beginning in September and ending on January 1st with the bowl games, was made far in 
advance, publicized in every section of the country, and intended to provide stimulating 
rivalries. Additionally, the fact that the games were played on Saturday afternoons meant 
that the newsreels could process and edit footage of several top games from across the 









Saturday game for newsreel cinemas in New York City. Lastly, the pageantry and 
spectacle of college football provided newsreels with the kinds of action shots, cheering 
crowds, and band and card section choreography upon which they relied. Oriard explains: 
Newsreel football was the early ancestor of ESPN’s SportsCenter: highlights in 
which every game is a big game, every play a great play, every crowd wildly 
cheering…. The calculated heightening of dramatic spectacle—to the extent of 
filming “berserk” fans cheering touchdowns before the game even began—was as 
important as the action on the field.28  
Little wonder, then, that the newsreel coverage of the Army-Navy game became one of 
the favorites, thanks in large part to “the goat and the mule, the dignitaries in attendance, 
the rows upon rows of uniformed cadets and midshipmen marching before the game and 
cheering in unison throughout the contest.”29 The newsreels also employed the leading 
sports radio broadcasters such as Ed Thorgerson (Fox Movietone News), Clem McCarthy 
(Pathé), Graham McNamee (Universal), Bill Stern (News of the Day), and Ted Husing 
(Paramount) to heighten the excitement of college football coverage.30  
The numbers provide ample evidence of the newsreels’ increased coverage of 
college football. For example, Universal increased the number of college football 
segments during November from six and four in 1931 and 1933 respectively to thirteen 
and sixteen in 1947 and 1949. As Oriard aptly explains, “Football fan or not, anyone who 
went to the movies the week after the Army-Navy game, the Thanksgiving Day contests, 
or the bowls on New Year’s Day came to understand football’s role in the calendar of 









and technique that in 1952 a UNESCO study reported that no major changes in methods 
of selecting and presenting sport segments occurred during a quarter-century (1927-
1952), which included almost the entire period of sound newsreels.32   
Access and Rights 
 While the routinization and standardization of newsreel sport segments was 
largely a product of the lack of competitiveness that characterized the later years, the 
same can not be said for the formative years of the silent newsreel era. Competition 
between news film producers was intense even before the introduction of Pathé Weekly 
in 1911, evidenced by the attempts at pirating such events as the Jeffries-Sharkey 
championship fight in 1899. In his history of American newsreels, Raymond Fielding 
posited that in those early years securing exclusive news material in advance of 
competitors sprang from motives that ranged from prestige to economic survival. Noting 
that the acquisition of exclusive rights by one company “automatically provoked attempts 
at illegal coverage by the competition,” Fielding explained that piracy of sporting events 
was “more the rule than the exception.”33 At the crux of the issue was the idea of whether 
or not sporting events were news, the rights to which Pathé, in particular, argued, “could 
no more be properly sold to a newsreel company than they could be sold to a newspaper 
association.”34 Perhaps no single sporting event illustrates the lengths to which competing 
companies went to pirate an event, as well as the attempts to counter pirating, as the 
match race that took place at Belmont Park on October 20, 1923, between Kentucky 
Derby winner Zev and Epsom Derby winner Papyrus. 









received more ballyhoo than any other previous horse race, would not be an 
overstatement. The Jockey Club was offering one of the two gold cups that would be 
awarded to the winner, the main trophy being worth $5,000. As the New York Times 
reported, “This will be a permanent trophy and it is hoped will continue for all time as a 
challenge cup to serve for the turf as the America’s Cup does for yacht racing and the 
Davis Cup for lawn tennis.”35 The Jockey Club also assumed responsibility for selecting 
the thoroughbred that was to represent the United States in this race by sponsoring what it 
called the American Trial Sweepstakes, scheduled for late September at Belmont Park. 
When Zev injured himself in winning the Lawrence Realization Stakes at Belmont Park 
on September 10, 1923, and could not participate in the American Trial Sweepstakes, the 
matter was thrown into considerable dispute.  
 The dispute over which American horse the Jockey Club would select drew the 
attention of many people, including Brigadier General William Mitchell, assistant chief 
of the U. S. Air Service, who wrote a letter to August Belmont, Chairman of the Jockey 
Club. Published in the New York Times on October 1, 1923, Mitchell’s letter explained 
that the entire country was thrilled by the announcement that the race had been arranged 
and even those who cared nothing for racing “looked upon the announcement as an 
excellent method of cementing relations between the two great English speaking 
peoples…worth more than years of activities in diplomacy, propaganda and other things 
which are now taking so much money and efforts…”36 Conceding that Papyrus had been 
the unquestioned choice to represent Great Britain, Mitchell expressed the view that he 









manner in which your club has chosen or rather has neglected to choose the American 
standard bearer.”37 Mitchell outlined the merits of the leading contenders, especially 
Zev—winner of that year’s Kentucky Derby, the Withers, the Belmont Stakes, the 
Paumonok, and the Rainbow Handicap, as well as the aforementioned Realization 
Stakes—and My Own—winner of “every race in which he was entered, including the 
Fort Edward Handicap, and galloping away from Harry Payne Whitney’s Bunting in the 
Saratoga Cup.”38 My Own’s owner, Admiral Cary Grayson, had offered to race Zev “at 
any place, any time, with or without a purse, the whole matter to be left to the decision of 
the Jockey Club.”39 Mitchell argued that if Zev were not fit to race in the American Trial 
Sweepstakes on October 6, then “the committee cannot justify the selection of him for the 
big race on Oct. 20…. The condition of a horse last Spring or Summer cannot be 
controlling for a race in October. It seems to me that the question should be settled 
without delay…or the public should be given very good reasons in support of your 
decision.”40  
 Mitchell was doubtlessly disappointed when the Jockey Club issued a statement 
on October 5 in which it named its top three horses: Zev, My Own and Untidy. As the 
New York Times reported, “This means that Zev, if he remains fit and well, will be the 
horse…. The definite choice of Zev sets at rest any speculation as to the chances of My 
Own outranking him for the honor and puts an end to the controversy which has been 
raging for the past two weeks.”41 The Selection Committee’s decision may have put an 
end to the controversy for the present, but only two days before the race, Admiral 









Own immediately to Belmont Park and [told] that the shipment of his colt is being 
provided by the Jockey Club.”42 Perhaps the Committee had been unimpressed by Zev’s 
workout the previous Sunday, even though it was reported that the horse had come 
through that work in good shape. More likely, the Committee became alarmed and “was 
put in an embarrassing position by a malady of uncertain diagnosis that affected Zev.”43 
That malady proved to be a skin irritation that did not impact Zev’s overall conditioning. 
 In addition to the reporting on each horse’s condition, the New York Times 
devoted an article to the betting odds in Paris—Zev being a five to eight favorite among 
the French—as well as one to those notables who would be in attendance, including 
“three Governors, at least one member of the President’s Cabinet, officers high in the 
army and navy, United States Senators, foreign diplomats, bankers, merchants, famous 
turfmen, notables from other branches of sport, society leaders and thousands of 
others.”44 In an editorial titled “The International Race,” the New York Times lauded the 
amenities offered by Belmont Park, hailing it as  
one of the finest [race] courses in the world. Compared with Epsom, the scene of 
so many historic contests, Belmont Park, with its spacious track, its great infield, 
its stately trees and its towering grandstand, is noble in all appointments…. An 
American may be pardoned for thinking that a grandstand at Belmont Park with 
its parterres of fashionably dressed women, who take as much interest in the sport 
as the men, is an attraction in itself that will bear comparison with any similar 
gathering in the world.45  









also that special trains would run from 11 a.m. until 1:45 p.m., with “special cars for 
ladies.”46 A Macy’s display ad noted that the store had “Glasses for the Races,” declaring, 
“You will see Zev and Papyrus much more clearly Saturday, if you are equipped with a 
good, strong glass.”47 In the days after the race, several other ads—taken out by the 
Socony Gasoline & Motor Oil Company and John Wanamaker—made use of the match 
race to sell their products. 
 Given the race’s importance, it certainly made good business sense that Pathé 
News, despite having fought so hard against paying for exclusive rights to sporting 
events, spent $50,000 for the rights to film the race. They doubtlessly knew their 
competitors would attempt to film the event. In fact, as the New York Times made clear in 
an article published the day following the race, Pathé went to considerable lengths to 
keep its rivals from acquiring footage of the race: 
A smoke screen thrown up on the far side of the course, opposite the grand stand, 
and the dancing motion of two enormous reflectors over there were observed with 
much curiosity, it is true, by the spectators on the lawn and in the crowded grand 
stand…. The spectators also had evinced interest in five airplanes which, from 
some time before the first race at 2 P.M., had been twisting and cavorting over 
them. 48  
The reporter explained that these were not part of the overall scenery, but “were barriers 
arranged by the racing officials and employes [sic] of a motion picture company which 
had bought the privilege of taking pictures of the race to prevent other film companies 









tactics,”50 the other companies got pictures of the great event “right under the noses of the 
men who had been delegated to prevent their doing so.”51  
 Fox Movietone and Hearst Metrotone accomplished their goal of surreptitiously 
shooting film of the race by stationing cameras both inside and outside of the track. For 
one company, “every available house in the vicinity of the race course from which 
motion pictures could be taken with long distance lenses was hired…and then 
arrangements were made to get camera men inside the track to take pictures as the two 
horses were battling for victory.”52 The article added that one of the companies paid $600 
to a house owner “on a line with the second turn of the course and with a clear view of 
the start and finish of the race.”53 Not to be outdone, the other company “paid for the 
privilege of erecting a ‘crow’s nest’ in a clump of trees directly overlooking the grand 
stand.”54 Not satisfied with this, the company also “arranged to have an automobile and a 
delivery truck drive right into the race course at points between the third and fourth turns 
on the left of the grand stand and near the first turn on the right.”55 Lastly, they enlisted 
“two motion picture actresses who were seated at vantage points in the grandstand with 
small cameras concealed in ornamental handbags, resting on the rail in front of them.”56 
The article explained that these “actresses” merely had to press a button in each camera 
until the horses had passed beyond them.  
 As has been pointed out, to combat these efforts, Pathé utilized various means to 
keep its rivals from acquiring film of the race. These included setting off “‘smoke pots’ to 
spoil the plates of those interloping camera men and [using] reflecting mirrors to prevent 









race.”57 The smoke pots, set off as soon as the horses entered the track from the paddock 
area and paraded past the grand stand, were followed by cars pulling “two large mirror 
reflectors, glaring in the sunlight, bouncing up and down as they made their way along 
the outer rail on the opposite side of the track…in an effort to blind the lenses of the rival 
cameras.”58 Detectives were stationed at the entrances in an attempt to keep rival 
cameramen out. While one rival “effected a perfect disguise and took one of the large 
motion picture cameras into the inner field merely through the medium of wearing a 
black derby hat,”59 another, disguised merely with a false moustache, was nabbed when 
“this added adornment came loose just as he was undergoing the scrutiny of a scout for 
the concessionaire.”60     
 The episode, as reported by the New York Times, raises several points worth 
considering. For one, the article was based almost entirely on unnamed sources, no doubt 
to protect the identity of these “interlopers,” as they were referred to in the article, raising 
questions as to the validity of what these sources told the reporter. It seems likely that 
while some of these tactics were employed, the subterfuge was invariably exaggerated, 
especially considering the fact that by 1923 newsreel cameramen had acquired a 
reputation for daring and bravado in their quest to capture footage of important events. 
The article reported that it was “considered unprofessional” for a cameraman to wear 
anything but a cap on his head, yet no mention was made of the dubious ethics of pirating 
what another company has paid the rights to film exclusively. Lastly, Emanuel Cohen, 
editor of the Pathé News, was identified by name in the article’s final paragraph, only 









take film of the race “from Benjamin Irish, owner of the English contender, who was 
granted the motion picture privilege in his agreement with the racing association.”61 
Perhaps the Jockey Club granted Irish the exclusive film privilege to this event as an 
inducement to get him to ship his horse across the Atlantic Ocean. Perhaps, too, because 
Pathé’s international home was based in London, that company invariably had the inside 
track to secure exclusive film rights to the event. In England, companies routinely paid 
for the rights to film important sporting events; however, securing the rights to an event 
“which was being sustained by the public”62 was not common practice in America. That 
Pathé, which had so vigorously fought against paying for rights, changed course for this 
particular event becomes understandable given the Jockey Club’s decision to cede rights 
to Irish.  
 On October 21, 1923, the New York Times ran a listing of “This Week’s 
Photoplays,” including the Zev-Papyrus race at the Rialto, and a day later, the Strand’s 
presentation of the race was reported in an article under the heading “The Screen.” This 
film showed Zev “gradually plowing his way ahead of the British winner, and at the end 
slow-motion pictures of the race, which give a wonderful idea of the speed of the two 
horses.”63 Also noted were the shots of the crowd, hurling their hats high in the air. This 
certainly followed the standard newsreel formula of editing in crowd shots reacting to an 
event’s outcome. That either Movietone or Metrotone had such a well-edited version 
available only two days after the race seems remarkable, although Fielding asserts that 
these companies were showing the race a week before Pathé.64  









several articles the New York Times ran that reported reaction in England, thanks to 
wireless and special cable. The day following the race, the New York Times reported that 
when the race result was announced on the screen in the cinemas “there were groans of 
disappointment, and then the program went on.”65 The next day another article noted that 
a (London) Times correspondent wrote that Papyrus’s defeat surprised no regular 
followers of racing there, noting no other result “was ever possible, and the whole 
episode, with its alarums and excursions in the American press and the cinema rights, 
savored more of a prize fight between two heavyweights than a horse race of any sort.”66 
Finally, on October 28, 1923, the New York Times ran a lengthy article, titled 
“Resourceful Camera Men,” which noted that in England, events similar to what had 
happened during the Zev-Papyrus race occurred regularly. Ultimately, as a result of this 
episode, the practice of purchasing exclusive newsreel rights to sports events in the 
United States came to an abrupt end. 
Although it is difficult to estimate what, if any, impact the piracy that marred the 
filming of the Zev-Papyrus match race had on securing the rights to filming other 
sporting events, later that year the New York Times reported that “the French Olympic 
Committee has just signed a contract with a private French firm granting it the exclusive 
moving picture and still picture rights for both the Winter sports at Chamonix and the 
Summer games at Colombes.”67 The article reported that the decision was reached after 
“a long investigation and study into the situation” led to the conclusion that the “great 
number of cinema men and photographers likely to be attracted to the games would 









early January 1924 noted that it would be impossible for judges, timekeepers and umpires 
to perform their duties “if persons not competing were allowed to come and go at will.”69 
This decision, issued shortly before the initial Olympic Games in Chamonix, France, set 
off a vigorous protest by American and international newsreel companies. A similar 
scenario had unfolded before the 1920 Antwerp Games, but because of the clamor, 
organizers allowed the newsreel cameramen and photographers access. The Organizing 
Committees for the 1924 Olympic Games in Chamonix (winter) and Paris (summer) held 
fast, however, and their November decision may, in part, have been influenced by what 
had happened at Belmont Park in late October.   
As preparations for the 1924 Paris Olympic Games began, difficulties arose, 
especially relating to the rugby tournament, scheduled for May, prior to the other athletic 
contests. On May 8, the New York Times reported that Franco-American relations had 
been strained “over the determination of the American players to take their own 
photographs of the match with Romania Sunday for documentary and training purposes, 
despite the insistence of the French Olympic Committee that exclusive contracts already 
had been let to French firms for all photographic work in connection with the Olympic 
Games.”70 The issue quickly reached an impasse, prompting team manager Samuel 
Goodman to threaten “to abandon the game if the permission were not granted.”70 After a 
meeting between Goodman and Alan Muhr, the assistant general commissioner of sports, 
Muhr issued a note explaining that the private company who owned the right to make 
pictures of all Olympic contests would allow “your official photographers to make 









that these pictures are purely for record and educational purposes.”72 Goodman’s threat to 
“prevent the French company’s men from filming the rugby matches participated in by 
the Americans unless American photographers were allowed the same privilege” 
apparently convinced the French Olympic Committee, “which promised to break its 
contract with the moving picture concern having the concession, or to pay it 
100,000f[rancs] forfeit money in order to allow American photographers to work.”73  
When a similar ban was announced before the 1928 Olympic Games to be held in 
St. Moritz (winter) and Amsterdam (summer), American newsreel companies appealed to 
the U. S. Department of Commerce “to make an unofficial protest against the action of 
the Amsterdam Olympic Games committee.”74 What especially vexed the American 
newsreel companies was the fact that the film rights had been sold to the Ufa Company, a 
German company, and this marked the first time since World War I that the Germans 
were participating in the Olympic Games. In their appeal, the newsreel companies 
complained of having to pay “large sums for the privilege of photographing the Winter 
sports.”75 By May, the newsreel companies were “formally protesting…against the 
attempt to sell the exclusive American news-reel rights for $60,000.”76 The companies 
contended that charging for film footage was “contrary to journalistic precedent and 
practice and that they are entitled to the same privileges and consideration as the press.”77 
In addition to this contention was the threat that the American public would not have an 
opportunity of seeing its Olympic athletes in competition, a scenario similar to what had 
happened in England when British companies refused to make any pictures of the 1924 









America could be purchased for the aforementioned price. When the newsreel companies 
took their protests directly to Amsterdam, they were “served notice that no photographer 
from any foreign newspaper or newsreel would be permitted to enter the Stadium.”78  
Except for those Olympic Games hosted in the United States—1932 Summer 
Games in Los Angeles, 1932 Winter Games in Lake Placid, and the 1960 Winter Games 
in Squaw Valley—American newsreel companies were required to pay for access to film 
showing the Olympic Games. The argument asserting their right to cover the Olympic 
Games free of charge was based on the premise that they were covering a news event. 
Conversely, Olympic organizers recognized that the distinction between news coverage 
and entertainment was a difficult one to distinguish. Furthermore, there was no way to 
prevent news organizations from editing their coverage into commercially viable 
packages that would detract from sales of the official Olympic film, long a staple of each 
Olympiad. This impasse culminated in a major showdown before the Melbourne Games 
of 1956, which ultimately led to a major revision in the Olympic Charter, known as Rule 
49 regarding the selling of publicity rights and distinguishing between news coverage and 
live television rights, which by that time had become the primary source of income for 
the International Olympic Committee. Rule 49 stipulated that television networks seeking 
exclusive rights to more than the nine minutes of royalty-free daily coverage granted to 
all television and cinema news agencies would have to pay for the enhanced level of 
programming.  
Nationalism and a National Culture 









important issue for American newsreel companies revolved around the ways with which 
both the newsreels and print media used the Olympic Games to foster a national culture. 
After only the second day of the 1896 Olympic Games, the New York Times reported, 
“One thing is believed to have been established, and that is that the future of the 
Olympian Games has been decided, and that they will henceforth take their place among 
the noted events of the athletic world.”79 The American press quickly seized upon these 
noted events and crafted stories that proved to themselves and the rest of the world that 
American athletes possessed the character and make-up of an exceptional people, “a 
people who illuminated for the world the path towards progress, political perfection and 
social justice.”80 The symbolic relationship between athletic success and national vitality 
became a cornerstone in the drive for a national culture. According to press accounts, 
American victories at the Olympic Games “stemmed from America’s democratic 
institutions, the predominance of the work ethic, and the essential fairness of American 
society.”81 By the turn of the twentieth century, sport discourse had become one of the 
key sources in shaping national identity. The American press even devised a means of 
keeping score of the Olympic Games—only the track and field events were counted—so 
that in 1908, for example, even though Great Britain won far more medals during the 
entire competition, the American press proclaimed the United States team victorious 
based on their achievements in track and field. 
 Formulating a national identity did not happen at once; rather, the process evolved 
over the course of several Olympiads. The earliest teams were principally composed of 









the very first modern Olympic Games held in Athens in 1896, notions of American 
athletic success cast in national terms were attributable in part to foreign commentators. 
For example, one Greek newspaper described American athletic prowess as attributable 
to their mixed blood “join[ing] to the inherited athletic training of the Anglo-Saxon the 
wild impetuosity of the red-skin.”82 These representatives of America were also lauded 
for their enterprise and their skill. G. S. Robertson, a British participant in the 1896 
Athens Games, commented on the effort of the American team, attributing the team’s 
participation to “the natural enterprise of the American people and to the peculiarly 
perfect method in which athletics are organized in the United States.”83   
In 1900, the New York Times simply referred in headlines to the participants as 
“Our Athletes in Paris” and “American Athletes Win.” Held in conjunction with the Paris 
Exposition, the 1900 Olympic Games ran into several problems. One stemmed from the 
scheduling of several sporting events on a Sunday, which the New York Times reported 
“is the day of all big sporting events in France,” but which aroused “a strong feeling of 
the American colleges from [against] participating in Sunday games.”84 The other was the 
scheduling of several track and field events on the same day as the annual review of the 
troops of Paris by the President at Longchamps, resulting in a sparse crowd of not more 
than a thousand spectators, most of whom, the New York Times reported, were American: 
Two small stands only were provided for the spectators, and only one of these 
was fairly filled, chiefly with bright, young American girls, who wore the colors 
of the various American colleges competing and gave unstinted applause as their 









Americans, and it was gaily bedecked with the Stars and Stripes.85  
As evidenced here, sport served as an institution to socialize both American men and 
women in gender-specific roles—men to compete and women to support them by 
cheering them to victories. The New York Times concluded that the primary “feature of 
the meeting was not only the number of events the Americans won, but the ease with 
which they outstripped their competitors, often finishing first and second, laughing side 
by side, and in a canter.”86 That the participants would be laughing and not running at full 
speed draws attention to the lack of competitiveness in certain events.  
Americans exhibiting an air of superiority became a staple of Olympic myth-
making, culminating in the most mythologized story of American Olympic bravado, 
which purportedly occurred at the opening ceremony of the 1908 London Games. During 
the parade of nations, American flag-bearer Ralph Rose refused to lower the American 
flag before English royalty, reputedly growling that “this flag dips for no earthly king.”87 
Perhaps this was done in retaliation when the American flag was not displayed in the 
stadium for the opening ceremony.88 Other commentators have suggested that Rose, of 
Irish descent, was irked that the English had refused to allow the Irish to participate as a 
separate team. From this event the mythology of never dipping the American flag before 
a foreign leader at an opening ceremony took root, despite evidence that the flag was 
dipped at both the 1912 Stockholm Games and again at the 1924 Paris Games.  
 The theme that dominated media portrayals of American athletes competing in 
Olympic competitions to forge a national sporting identity was the image of the melting 









America effectively assimilated the various ethnic groups into a unified athletic team was 
used by Progressives as an explanation of American athletic prowess, as well as in a more 
general sense to explain away the debilitating effects of industrialization, urbanization 
and immigration.  
The melting-pot image was certainly fostered by the American media and 
officials of the American Olympic Committee. For example, in 1912, Edward Bayard 
Moss, a leading sports journalist, anointed the U. S. Olympians as “America’s Athletic 
Missionaries,” who represented a “heterogeneous gathering [of] lawyers, physicians, 
policemen, Indians, negroes, [sic] Hawaiians, college men, school boys, clerks, 
mechanics, and, in fact, entrants from every walk of life.”90 A New York Times 
photograph (Illustration 3.2) from July 26, 1908, titled “Tewanima the Indian competitor 
in the Marathon Leads the Fourth of July War Dance,” illustrated the conflicting ideology 
that characterized the melting-pot imagery. On the one hand, Tewanima, a Hopi who was 
enrolled at the Carlisle Indian Industrial School, is shown performing a war dance for his 
laughing teammates. Upon returning to the United States, Tewanima and another Carlisle 
Olympian, Frank Mt. Pleasant, were greeted by President Theodore Roosevelt, who told 
the two athletes that he was “glad to have this country represented abroad by a genuine 
native American.”91 On the other hand, the use of the stereotypical “War Dance” by a 
stoic, noble savage possessing natural athletic ability to illustrate the democratic ideals 
which recognized no class or racial distinctions was typical of mainstream press 
representations of American Indian athletes, especially the Carlisle school football team.  









were not completely realized became painfully evident after the 1912 Stockholm 
Olympics when double gold medal winner Jim Thorpe, a teammate and classmate of 
Tewanima at Carlisle, was stripped of his medals by the American Olympic Committee 
and the Amateur Athletic Union when it was discovered he had played professional 
baseball several years earlier. As Pope has noted, “athletic organizations and their 
publicists scrambled to explain Thorpe’s ‘mistake’ in terms of his race, which they had 
characterized as ‘American’ just months prior.”92 In an editorial, the New York Times 
lamented not Thorpe’s disgrace but the disgrace “which he has brought upon his 
country—with the derision and denunciation which all Americans will long have to hear 
from the foreign critics.”93 Neither the AAU nor the AOC expressed much sympathy for 
Thorpe when they informed him that ignorance was no excuse. The final irony of the 
situation played itself out in 1982 when Florence Ridlon, the wife of Thorpe biographer 
Raymond Wheeler, discovered that Olympic rules stipulated that any contestation of a 
medal won must be filed no later than thirty days after an event has been completed. 
Petitioning the IOC for the return of Thorpe’s medals, Wheeler and Ridlon told the IOC: 
“Gentlemen, with all due respect, ignorance of the general regulations for the 1912 
Olympics was no excuse for illegally divesting Jim Thorpe of his awards.”94  
The American newsreels made nationalism an integral part of their Olympic 
presentations, especially in the 1932 Olympic Games, hosted by Lake Placid (winter) and 
Los Angeles (summer). These constituted the first Olympic Gamaes the United States 
had hosted since 1904 when the Games were included as part of the St. Louis World’s 









was not until the 1920 Antwerp Games that American newsreel companies decided to 
film the competitions. Faced with the prospect of paying for rights to show the Olympics 
in 1924 and again in 1928, newsreel companies limited coverage, especially when the 
American team fared poorly in Amsterdam. Nonetheless, Fox Movietone News “touted its 
Olympic coverage as one of the highlights of its fall offerings.”95 For the 1932 Games, 
four American newsreel companies were granted rights to shoot footage, including Pathé, 
Paramount, Fox-Hearst and Universal. In addition to sponsoring special showings of 
feature films and social gatherings that included motion picture stars “of both native and 
foreign persuasion,” the studios “planned to release previews of the days [sic] events 
which would include slow-motion footage.”96 Moreover, the 1932 Games were touted by 
the media as “Depression-busters,” infusing money and creating jobs during a time of 
considerable economic distress, leading AOC President Avery Brundage to proclaim, “It 
is a remarkable fact that in this unprecedented period of financial and industrial distress 
there has been practically no disturbance, disorder or social unrest.”97 Although glossing 
over the depression’s impact, Brundage enlisted the support of many companies that used 
the Olympics to market their products, including Standard Oil, Union 76 Petroleum 
Company, Nisley Shoes, Kelloggs, Weiss Binoculars, Safeway and Piggly Wiggly.  
Universal’s coverage of the 1932 Winter Games in Lake Placid presented the 
Olympics as a competition between nations. This idea of winning the Olympics, 
originally based on a method of scoring devised by the media, continued to be employed. 
In its first Olympic Games segment on February 4, 1932, Universal used a formulaic 









the newsreel presented two key victories by American athletes—one in speed skating and 
the other in the two-man bobsled event. As the headline makes clear, these “Thrilling 
Victories clinch U. S. Triumph in Winter Olympics.”99 In its last segment on the Winter 
Games, Universal showed ski jumping, not because Americans won medals—the 
Norwegians swept the top three places—but because the event featured several 
spectacular crashes. The final contest shown was the four-man bobsled event in which the 
American quartet raced to victory, purportedly sealing a victory for the U. S. team. 
Sixteen years later during its coverage of the 1948 Winter Games in St. Moritz, 
commentator Ed Herlihy contradicted the claim of victory in the 1932 Olympics. In 
describing Dick Button’s victory in men’s figure skating, Herlihy announced that 
Button’s victory provided precious points for the American team, helping it secure third 
place, “the strongest showing of any American team” at the Winter Games.100  
The idea of winning the Olympic Games as a nation also dominated coverage of 
every summer Olympiad. For example, at the 1932 Los Angeles Games, Universal 
focused on that aspect in almost every one of its headlines: “U.S. Maintains Lead in 10th 
Olympiad as World Marks Fall,”101 “U.S. Increases Lead in Olympics as More World 
Records Fall,”102 and “U.S. Athletes Add to Overwhelming Lead in Xth Olympic Games 
of 1932.”103 This aspect of winning the Olympics has remained an important theme in the 
American media’s coverage, although the idea of winning has changed slightly from a 
scoring system in which points were tabulated to a system of counting medals. As John 
Slater has noted, “In the pre-television era, the media chose, by and large, to ignore 









Slater’s point merits consideration in that the media certainly created heroic 
myths in their coverage; however, the media in general, including the newsreels, did not 
completely ignore Olympism and Olympic ideals. Newsreel coverage highlighted the 
pageantry of the Games, giving considerable attention to the opening and closing 
ceremonies. The opening ceremonies of the 1932 Los Angeles Games, for example, 
merited “Special” coverage in which every aspect was presented—the parade of nations, 
greeting from American dignitaries, release of the pigeons as a symbol of peace, the 
athletes’ reciting the Olympic oath, and the lighting of the Olympic flame. In fact, 
Universal repeated several of the same segments, a technique that had been employed in 
early film actualities of fights to lengthen the reel. In its coverage of the St. Moritz 
Winter Games of 1948, Universal’s commentator noted the “Tempestuous start” to the 
Games, in which “fist fights and sabotage imperil the Cold War developments over 
eligibility.”105 As a result of this dispute over the use of professionals, ice hockey was not 
officially recognized that year, although Universal ended that week’s segment with a shot 
reminding viewers that the Olympic “torch burns brightly with hope that nations will 
foster friendship through continued sportsmanship.”106 Another example of 
sportsmanship was prominently used in one segment from the 1948 London Games 
featuring the men’s 4 x 100-meter relay race in which the winning American team was 
disqualified for an illegal baton pass, giving the host nation its only gold medal. After the 
Americans protested the decision, race officials, using slow-motion filmed footage, 
reviewed the disputed exchange and reversed their decision. Herlihy noted, “The gallant 









While Olympism and sportsmanship received attention, it often was 
overshadowed by intense national pride. For example, at the 1952 Helsinki Games, with 
the arrival of a team from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, political ideology was 
added to the formula. In describing the parade of sixty-seven nations, Herlihy explained 
that this was “the first Russian team since the days of the czar, forty years ago, and the 
political implications of their presence overshadow the sporting side.”108 In the same reel, 
the commentary noted that Finland, “the little nation that pays its debts,” is “still 
struggling under the yoke of Russian reparations…. Finland is proud host of the athletic 
pride of the world.”109 Not surprisingly, the Soviet team was identified as the “Russian” 
team, and the hammer and sickle icon was not prominently displayed, although several 
Soviet athletes were shown on the medal stand with the CCCP emblazoned on their 
uniforms. In its final segment featuring the Helsinki Games, Universal noted the 
contributions of American swimmers to the team’s point total. This allowed the 
American team, the commentator explained,  
to win the unofficial team title, overtaking the Russian team in the closing days of 
the Games. The Soviet news agency, TASS, is telling its readers the Russians won 
the Olympics. Those at Helsinki, and especially the American swimmers, whose 
victories contributed greatly to our Olympic triumph, know better.110  
For the next four decades, the ideological battle between communism and capitalism 
characterized an Olympic rivalry that resulted in boycotts, allegations of professionalism, 
and charges of cheating, all of which undermined Olympic ideals. In fostering a national 









that reinforced a cultural hegemony. Steven Pope explains: 
The capacity to structure sport in preferred ways, to establish sporting traditions, 
and to define the range of “legitimate” practices and meanings associated with 
sport practices enabled Olympic advocates to extend their hegemony over an 
ever-growing sporting public.111 
Cultural Hegemony 
The newsreel coverage of sports was dominated by a cultural hegemony that 
marginalized women and minority athletes. The newsreels, to a large extent, followed the 
print media in reflecting and reinforcing traditional roles for women in American culture. 
Women’s sports newsreel features were created within a context of gendered power 
relationships in that they were almost entirely filmed by men, edited by men and had 
commentary written and provided by men.112 That images of women were almost entirely 
produced through the male gaze to accommodate male interests and desires is testified by 
the fact that Pathé’s in-house Hints to News Film Cameramen noted that “only the most 
strikingly beautiful specimens should appear.”113 For example, in Universal’s coverage of 
the 1948 St. Moritz Games, Barbara Ann Scott is identified as “Canada’s Pretty 
Ambassadress” and “Queen of the Flashing Blades.”114 That she was not an American 
was less important than the fact she was blond and attractive. Jean Shiley, a participant in 
the 1932 Los Angeles Games, received praise for being “the prettiest girl of the American 
track team.”115 Having a strict company policy meant that newsreel coverage of women’s 
sport was framed by a hegemonic, patriarchal male discourse which helped to define the 









general newsreel stories featuring women were related to sport, the percentage of 
women’s sport newsreel segments ranged from five to seven per cent of all sporting 
newsreels.116 Moreover, women’s achievements in sport were projected as part of a 
marginalized, separate sphere. For example, women’s sports were often introduced with 
headlines and phrases such as “Gals Get into the Act”117 and “And Now Something for 
the Ladies.”118 In a similar way, the commentary almost always referred to women 
athletes as girls, and members of the U. S. Olympic team were called “Uncle Sam’s 
nieces.”119  
 Newsreel sport segments featuring women athletes focused on the socially elite, 
white, heterosexually feminine women. Not surprisingly, the more genteel sports such as 
tennis, golf and figure skating figured most prominently with commentary delineating the 
grace, style and elegance of athletes such as Suzanne Lenglen, Helen Wills Moody, 
Althea Gibson, Carole Heiss and Peggy Fleming. When Helen Wills married in 1929, 
Universal used that event to “emphasize her heterosexuality and marriage as an adequate 
source of fulfillment”120 beyond winning Grand Slam titles. A woman’s role as wife or 
mother often overshadowed her athletic accomplishment. When Universal showed 
Andrea Meade Lawrence winning two alpine skiing gold medals in the 1952 Oslo 
Games, Herlihy emphasized her marital status rather than her technical expertise, telling 
viewers, “The pretty Vermont housewife swept down the steep slope with flawless 
perfection.”121 As Gina Daddaria explains, “If an accomplished athlete is also portrayed 
in roles that are valued in a patriarchal society, such as wife and mother, then she cannot 









which had long been the voice of the women’s suffrage movement, sport provided an 
opportunity for a woman to enhance her sexual appeal as much as her political right. As 
Mark Dyreson explains, “The Woman Citizen thus married the old and deeply-entrenched 
stereotype of women as sexual objects to a new image of politically and socially 
emancipated women.”123 Public discourse about women athletes fostered this duality—
emancipated and sexually appealing—as a way of reassuring men that these new women 
were still alluring.  
 The sports that the newsreels and the print media used to focus attention on the 
physical attractiveness of women athletes were swimming and diving. These were the 
two sports that were first introduced into the Olympic Games of 1912, although the 
American Olympic Committee (AOC) resisted the inclusion of women until 1920. In 
1914, in a meeting at the New York Athletic Club, the AOC went on record as being 
opposed “to women taking part in any event in which they could not wear long skirts.”124 
Ironically, when the AOC finally allowed women on the 1920 Olympic team, the 
committee failed to field a U. S. tennis team to compete in the much anticipated tennis 
tournament that featured France’s Suzanne Lenglen. Instead, the U. S. team included one 
female figure skater and fifteen women swimmers and divers. American women 
dominated the 1920 Antwerp Games, winning all three medals in four of the five 
women’s events. Ethelda Bleibtrey won three swimming gold medals and Aileen Riggin 
and Helen Wainwright each won two gold medals.  
In both the 1920 Antwerp Games and the 1924 Paris Games, photographs and 









these two sports showcase the athletes’ grace and rhythm exhibited in their performances, 
but they also allowed photographers to show them in their bathing suits and 
commentators to use the terms “mermaids,” “naiads,” and “water sprites” as discursive 
motifs to accentuate their other-worldliness. Bleibtrey, Riggin and other women 
swimmers were featured in a special Sunday picture section of a Pittsburgh newspaper 
that was removed from textual articles about American Olympians, appearing in their 
swim-suits under a headline that accentuated their physical appeal, “A Bevy of Fair 
American Mermaids.”125 Riggin “shares the beauty honors of the American Olympic 
team with Miss Helen Wills,”126 and Sybil Bauer, despite holding the world’s record in 
the 440-yard backstroke for both men and women, became Johnny Weissmuller’s “pretty 
teammate.”127 Caroline Smith, winner of the gold medal in diving, was described in terms 
suggesting it was her beauty rather than her athletic accomplishments that won over the 
highly partisan French crowd: “With her beautiful figure standing out impressively 
against a blue sky and a smile of unassuming confidence on her face, she sailed so 
gracefully in the high dive that she inspired the first real tribute that a French crowd gave 
to an American during the entire games.”128 Little wonder, then, that one of the leading 
American sportswriters of the era, Grantland Rice, dubbed these Olympians the “Form 
Champions” of the Paris Olympics—possessing the swimming form to dominate their 
rivals and the feminine form to charm onlookers.129  
Newsreels also expressed reservation and anxiety when women athletes ventured 
into iconic masculine sports. Women were not allowed to compete in Olympic track and 









inclusion was doubtlessly the belated reaction to the first Women’s Olympics held in 
Paris in 1922 and sponsored by the Fédération Sportive Féminine Internationale (FISI), 
which proved so successful that the International Olympic Committee was forced to drop 
its resistance to women’s participation. Of the events that were introduced in 1928, the 
women’s 800-meter run drew the most criticism. Despite the fact Germany’s Lina Radtke 
broke the world record by seven seconds, sports journalists drew attention not to that 
achievement but to the exhaustion of the runners as they crossed the finish line, decrying 
the race as a “spectacle [that] proved…such events are not right for the Olympics.”130 
Paul Gallico also lamented seeing women exerting themselves, “If there is anything more 
dreadful aesthetically or more depressing than the fatigue-distorted face of a girl runner at 
the finish line, I have never seen it.”131 Not surprisingly, the 800-meter run for women 
was dropped from the next Olympics, and women did not compete in all the distance 
running events until 1984 when the women’s marathon was introduced. 
As women’s sports became more prominent, the newsreels struggled to reconcile 
the incursion by women athletes into male preserves, reflected in newsreel titles such as 
“What’s next girls? Cross-country running, the latest sport to be taken up by women” and 
“Should women box?”132 While newsreels did document certain women’s achievements, 
like Gertrude Ederle’s record-setting swim across the English Channel, other 
presentations made light of gender-bending activity. Universal segments like “Girl Mat 
Gladiator Wins Smashing Bout with Man Rival” and “Woman Champ Defeat Man Rival 
in Bowling Clash” showed women were capable of defeating men at their own games; 









certain level. When an athlete exceeded that level, as Daddario notes, “an athlete then 
begins performing on a male’s playing field, which, in turn, prompts the media to identify 
this as a gender anomaly or a female impossibility.”133    
   The case of Mildred “Babe” Didrikson offered insight into the masculine 
ideology that governed sport. Didrikson’s performance at the 1932 Los Angeles Games, 
in which she won two gold medals and a silver medal in the three events in which she 
competed, challenged the idea that women should not participate in rigorous athletic 
competition. The media responded in typical fashion, referring to her as a “slender, 
brown-haired Texas girl.”134 The media diminished Didrikson’s accomplishments by 
noting that while her victories were impressive, they did not “contribute to the United 
States point score in the men’s track and field competition.”135 Didrikson was also 
characterized as a “Viking girl” and “Amazon,” capable of “Viking capacity for berserk 
rage.”136 Didrikson, the media asserted, proved that women’s participation in rigorous 
athletics would lead to “a new super-physique in womanhood.”137 As David B. Welky 
explains, an athlete like Didrikson had the capacity to “overturn traditional gender roles 
and was, therefore, carefully excised from the ranks of women and placed in a new, 
derogatory category by itself.”138 This category implicitly questioned the femininity of 
Didrikson and other female athletes. Significantly, when Didrikson expressed her desire 
to join the women’s golf tour, the media immediately printed pictures of Didrikson in a 
dress. By taking up golf, considered a more appropriate game for women, Didrikson was 
cast “into the ideal of what a woman should be.”139  









characterized by a conflicting discourse that framed these athletes as “icons of liberty and 
objects of desire,”140 capable of contributing to the national sporting identity by not only 
vanquishing the opposition, but also by looking sexually appealing. In the process, 
women athletes became the heroines of a burgeoning consumer culture, second only to 
movie stars in public esteem. Little wonder that in the 1920s far more Americans would 
rattle off the names of Olympic champions like Ethelda Bleibtrey and Aileen Riggin, as 
well as tennis stars Helen Wills and Suzanne Lenglen, and English Channel swimmer 
Gertrude Ederle than could name the women who served in the U. S. Congress in 1924—
Jeanette Rankin of Montana, Edith Nourse Rodgers of Massachusetts and Mary Theresa 
Norton of New Jersey. 141  
Just as the newsreel presentations of women athletes was characterized by a 
conflicting discourse of sexual appeal and icons of liberty, the presentation of America’s 
black athletes was characterized by a discourse that sought to avoid controversy by 
presenting their contributions in a factual manner. With their formulaic approach, 
newsreels encapsulated events by capturing their superficiality, “interpreting intellectual 
issues along lines of strong pictorial action to reduce intellectual participation of the 
audience.”142 Scholars have identified five historical stages of news about minorities: 
exclusion, threat, confrontation, stereotypical selection, and integrated multiracial 
coverage.143 Except for rare occasions when an individual athlete was identified as 
“Buckeye Bullet” (Jesse Owens in 1936), “the flashy Negro Back” (Bernie Jefferson in 
1938,) or “sensational Negro back” (UCLA’s Kenny Washington in 1939), race was 









sports that openly barred them.144 However, in amateur sports like track and field, 
particularly in the Olympics, black athletes who won medals could not be totally 
excluded from coverage in newsreels or the mainstream press, although that coverage 
largely reinforced traditional patterns of racism.  
As early as 1904 when George Poage won a bronze medal in the 400-meter 
hurdles, becoming the first black to win an Olympic medal, black athletes contributed to 
America’s national sporting identity. As noted above, the contributions of blacks and 
American Indians in early Olympiads were explained under the “melting pot” paradigm 
that celebrated these victories as evidence of the democratic ideal of inclusiveness. When 
black athletes like Eddie Tolan, winner of two gold medals in the 1932 Los Angeles 
Games, and Jesse Owens, winner of four gold medals in the 1936 Berlin Games, emerged 
as star performers, a new paradigm emerged, one that began to proclaim the physical 
superiority of the black athlete.145 This dialectic, in which white athletic prowess was 
aligned from superior intellect, will power, and scientific training and black athletic 
prowess was aligned with natural ability, closeness to nature, and “physical attributes 
peculiar to their race,”146 was incorporated into a double-edged discourse that promoted 
national identity while marking racial differences. 
Universal’s coverage of the 1932 Los Angeles Games, for example, showed 
Tolan’s victories in both the 100- and 200-meter sprints, Ralph Metcalfe’s silver and 
bronze medals in the same races, as well as Edward Gordon’s gold in the long jump. 
Unlike the print media, which gave these athletes nicknames like “Negro flash,” “dusky 









understatement, focusing more on the point totals contributed toward the U. S. team 
score. As Mark Dyreson notes, “Unlike Jesse Owens’ later accomplishments, Tolan’s and 
Metcalfe’s feats did not spark widespread discussion in white mainstream America about 
racial equality or any ideologies of white supremacy—not Aryanism, nor Nordicism, nor 
Jim Crow.”147 By using commentary to frame these victories within the overall team 
victory, the newsreels avoided having to explain the total absence of blacks from the 
American Olympic Association or the American Olympic Committee, and the absence of 
any black coaches or managers.  
Other coverage was blatantly racist in nature. For example, in November 1931, 
Hearst Metrotone News featured a game between two Norfolk, Virginia, high schools. In 
this piece titled “Colored Gals Get Football Fever,” the newsreel’s commentator refers to 
the “dark shadows” playing on the field and to the “red hot mama that keeps the crowd a-
sizzling, and every time her man makes a couple of downs, she starts a ragtime 
chorus.”148 A football is carried “in a watermelon clinch,” one team’s shift is “better than 
pork chops,” and one of the captains calls “the magic signal, ‘Come seven, eleven.’”149 
As Oriard explains, “This was football in minstrel blackface, football as buffoonery, 
football played by Amos ‘n’ Andy, yet nothing in the images on the screen suggests 
anything but a conventional game.”150 Shown in movie theaters across the country, this 
newsreel, like others produced by Hearst’s company in the early 1930s, played on 
demeaning stereotypes of the dice-throwing, watermelon-eating, sexually promiscuous 
and superstitious darkies. Not all portrayals of African Americans were equally 









of them can be found in All-American News, a newsreel founded by Claude Barnett in 
1919. Barnett also founded the Associated Negro Press in 1919, and sports also played an 
important part of the black press’s appeal to its readers, providing a “continuing drama of 
triumph and injustice,” enacted by its athletes.151 
Conclusion 
 This chapter has argued that the importance of newsreels to the development of 
the sport highlight form is rooted in the increased standardization and routinization that 
produced information packaged as entertainment. By comparing a purposive sample of 
newsreel sports segments, this chapter has delineated the sporting calendar that the 
newsreels companies established in their coverage, as well as a hierarchy of team and 
individual sports that were preferred. The more important the event, the more coverage 
the newsreel companies provided. The sample clearly illustrated not only a predilection 
for name events (e.g., Wimbledon, the Olympics, the World Series), but also for star 
athletes (e.g., Bobby Jones, Helen Wills Moody, Babe Ruth, Babe Didrickson). 
Comparing newsreels from the early 1930s and 1950s also established the 
reluctance of the newsreel companies to depart from a clearly established formula. 
Newsreel sports segments from the 1950s were not significantly different than those from 
the 1930s in terms of how the major sporting events were covered. Shot composition, 
editing and commentary of sporting events and sport celebrities established the highlight 
form’s reliance on synecdoche, in which the part represents the whole. With this 
technique, newsreel cameramen created a condensed sporting discourse that reached a 









In the decades between the world wars, newsreels helped to establish athletes as 
the heroes and heroines of a burgeoning consumer culture, comparable in stature to the 
Hollywood movie actors that followed the athletes onto the screen. Athletes became 
recognizable commodities within a national sporting identity. That national sporting 
identity was largely based on a strict separation between whites and nonwhites and 
reinforced the unequal distribution of power based on class, race and gender. While the 
newsreels reinforced existing attitudes about culture, class, gender and race, they rarely in 
themselves changed those attitudes.  
Newsreel companies sought the same rights and access to sporting events that 
print journalists and photographers enjoyed, yet these companies handicapped themselves 
with a superficial formula that relied on the entertainment rather than the journalistic 
value. Despite the limitations imposed by the workings of a motion picture camera and of 
a news organization attempting to use it to capture its news on the go, newsreels provided 
viewers with a very broad range of sporting events and athletes. Even though viewers 
might have known the results of the events they were watching, the highlights presented 
in the newsreels evoked a greater degree of emotional involvement than print media 
offered. In eliciting crowd responses, the newsreels had a power “which it did not 
bequeath to its successor, television.”152   
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 Any indication that television was to become the medium within which the 
sportscast highlight developed into the most important form for the dissemination of sport 
news was certainly not evident when the first steps in bringing sport to the public through 
the camera eye or magic window were taken.1 That some of the initial steps were taken 
by Vladimir Zworykin, a Russian scientist who had fled post-Bolshevik Russia and who 
eventually came to work for the Radio Corporation of America (RCA) and its president, 
David Sarnoff, another Russian immigrant, helps to explain the lore of television’s 
mythological beginnings. Beginning in 1933, Zworykin and his assistants took 
photographs of daily activities and special events conducted in and around his Camden, 
New Jersey, lab. Among the earliest photographs of images captured on the television 
screen are a pair related to sports—one taken of a football game that shows one team 
about to score a touchdown and the other a long shot of a baseball game (Illustration 4.1).  
These images do not represent an actual broadcast of sport; rather, these images 
are “photographs of a television camera’s image of another photograph” to illustrate the 
effect that different scanning rates had on picture clarity.2 Additional steps were taken in 
August 1934 by another important figure in television’s development, Philo T. 
Farnsworth, a part of whose demonstration of the world’s first electronic television 
system showed a scrimmage between members of the Philadelphia Eagles outside the 









system at the 1939 World’s Fair in New York City, these tenuous steps provided little 
evidence that television would become the primary purveyor of sport across the world, let 
alone that it would displace existing media—newspaper, film and radio—as the medium 
people chose to enjoy consuming sport.  
 This chapter traces the formation of the television-sport-commercial complex in 
the first of its two distinct stages.4 The first stage spans the period from 1934 through 
1956, covering experiments and the resulting telecasts of sporting events before World 
War II through the introduction of videotape into television broadcasts of sports. In its 
early years, television was almost exclusively a live medium, transmitting images and 
sound from one space to another in real time. Viewers watched as events unfolded in the 
studio or from remote locations. In terms of viewing sport, this marked a considerable 
difference from the technology of film, which was unable to transmit a live event to 
viewers in real time. Until 1939, sport fans could either watch an event at the site or listen 
to a radio broadcast, which might originate from the event’s location or might be the 
skillful recreation of an announcer working from Western Union reports rather than live 
coverage.5 Walker and Bellamy posit:  
Listening to the radio broadcast was not the same as watching the game. Although 
some have argued that in the voice of radio’s most skilled announcers baseball 
was better, no matter how much people may long for radio’s theater of the mind 
and its ability to stimulate our imagination, sight is still our first sense. Only being 
at the game or watching it on television could deliver that visual experience.6  









reasons that sporting events had become a staple of the newsreel and radio industries. 
Sporting events, scheduled well in advance throughout the year, offered dramatic 
spectacle that appealed to ready-made fans. Having learned the operational aesthetic of 
both film and radio, these fans quickly adapted to a new technology that was accessed in 
the public sphere of the neighborhood tavern or in the private sphere of the home. 
Producing a sporting event for telecast was accomplished as efficiently and economically 
as a studio program, especially in the case of sports like boxing, which became the 
medium’s most popular televised sport. The popularity of boxing on television stemmed, 
in part, from the controlled indoor environment in which the bouts took place, as well as 
the fact that boxers occupied a prominent position among sport celebrities. Thanks to the 
prizefight’s inherent drama, neither scripts nor rehearsals were needed.7 Similar 
production considerations contributed to the popularity of televising sports like 
professional wrestling and roller derby.  
Additionally, considerations related to the production of sporting events had 
implications in the development of sport journalism’s institutional structures and 
professional values that shaped the representation of national identity, gender and race. 
Because coverage of live events was the preserve of the networks’ news divisions, 
conflicts and institutional jealousies arose almost from the very beginning of television 
production of live sporting events. Not only were there questions about the allocation of 
resources and personnel, but questions also surfaced about television’s role in reporting 
on the sports events being covered and in promoting those events to guarantee that 









broadcasting came to utilize what Klatell and Marcus call “a carefully orchestrated blend 
of entertainment, promotion, journalism and controversy”8 to build an audience that 
attracted sponsors and advertisers constitutes one of the overarching themes of this 
chapter. As sports promoters and the professional sports leagues entered into partnerships 
with television broadcasters, conflicts of interest were but one of a formidable set of 
obstacles that encumbered sports journalists. Early on-air announcers not only had to sell 
the game, but also the sponsor’s products. If a station bought the rights to a team’s 
games, the announcers often avoided criticizing “their contractual partners.”9 Control 
over the descriptions and accounts of a sporting event may have belonged to the 
broadcaster in theory, but in practice that control was shared between the broadcaster, the 
team and league, and the sponsors and advertisers. As Klatell and Marcus note, “So long 
as sports events are considered private performances, to be sold by their rights-holders at 
their discretion, the broadcasts of those events will in no way intentionally resemble 
unfettered journalism.”10 As rights became more expensive, a “cooperativeness factor”11 
was as important as the amount of money that blind bidders put forth.  
Not only were sports broadcasters faced with questions about how to satisfy the 
responsibilities of the journalism profession while producing coverage that was mutually 
beneficial for their contractual partners, but they also had to produce television that 
attracted and maintained an audience via a medium whose technology paled in 
comparison to film in terms of picture size and quality. While the public had certainly 
acquired a taste for watching newsreel coverage of sports, no one knew for certain 









ranged in size from 2 x 3 inches to 9 by 6.75 inches.12 Not only was it difficult to follow a 
baseball or hockey puck, but the signal, especially in outlying areas, was not always 
clear.  
The primary thing that television capitalized on was its liveness, for while 
newsreel viewers often knew the outcome of the sporting event’s highlights they were 
watching, television offered the opportunity to see the event as it unfolded. In the early 
days of sports telecasting when the question of television’s impact on attendance at 
sporting events was still being debated, New York Times columnist Arthur Daley 
explained that television catered “to sheer animal comfort”: 
It eliminates long trips to stadia or arenas; you just walk across the room and twist 
a dial. It eliminates crowding, pushing and those hard wooden seats; you sprawl 
out in an easy chair with all the elbow room you need. It eliminates the 
uncertainties of the weather; as far as is known, blizzards, rainstorms and the 
broiling rays of summer sun don’t invade the living rooms.13  
Daley noted that while some believed that television was not a threat because it could not 
convincingly capture “the feeling of excitement, the restless hum of the crowd, the sense 
of ever-sharpening anticipation,” others understood that television’s potential in 
“satisfying too many potential spectators and stifling lesser sports and lesser attractions in 
favor of the big ones.”14 Perhaps the most prophetic pronouncement Daley included came 
from one promoter who said: “Radio has made sports fans, but television will only make 
television fans.”15 The implication was that viewers would be satisfied as long as they 









event. In 1939, only one broadcast was needed for producers to realize that a single 
camera was not enough to cover a baseball game. That broadcast began a never-ending 
process of presentational refinements that led to multiple camera positions, new camera 
technologies (e.g., mobile, tracking, miniature and blimp), on-screen graphics, and faster 
editing. As Margaret Morse posits, “The television event may indeed be a better vehicle 
to give form to the fantasies which animate the cultural model of sport.”16  
 Lastly, television contributed to the development of the highlight form for 
newscasts by developing programs that offered the viewers filmed highlight packages, 
profiles of sport stars and in-studio interviews. This was largely accomplished by 
borrowing from formats that had proved successful in the past and by developing new 
formats. On the one hand, the networks borrowed and converted successful radio 
programs into content for television. For example, NBC developed a television program 
that utilized a similar format and the name of its radio counterpart—radio’s Colgate 
Sports Newsreel was recast as the Gillette Summer Sports Newsreel, a summer 
replacement for the Gillette Cavalcade of Sports program. Offering “round-the-world 
coverage of the biggest sports stories,”17 the reel included headline sports events, sound-
on-film interviews with leading sports personalities, and unusual features. 
On the other hand, the networks also attempted to complement their live 
broadcasts with studio programs. For example, all four television networks—NBC, CBS, 
ABC and DuMont—televised sport news round-up shows and pre- and post-game shows 
to accompany their live sports broadcasts between 1947 and 1959, many during prime 









programs as totally inconsequential because none lasted very long would be short-
sighted. These programs served as important forerunners for not only the omnibus-format 
shows that replaced them, but also for the sport news programs that are so ubiquitous in 
today’s sport programming schedule. Additionally, it is important to consider several 
issues related to the broadcasting of these early sports news programs, including 
scheduling, format and competition from newsreels.  
Prime Time Coverage  
Television’s broadcasting of sports followed a similar trajectory to the media that 
preceded it, especially radio. This trajectory included the broadcasting of live sporting 
events, and both NBC and CBS radio networks assigned the “description and accounts” 
of sporting events to their news departments.18 That the distinction between news and 
sports became blurred beyond recognition was attributable, in part, to the use of the most 
prominent on-air commentators like Graham McNamee for both types of events.19 In this 
way, Walter Cronkite served as host for CBS’s coverage of the 1960 Squaw Valley 
Olympic Games, and Roone Arledge, who headed ABC Sports through numerous 
successes including Wide World of Sports and Monday Night Football, was selected 
president of ABC News. Not surprisingly, the public’s perception of broadcast sport as 
entertainment contributed to the blurring of journalism with entertainment.  
In 1939, the first American sporting event to be telecast was a collegiate baseball 
game in which Princeton University defeated Columbia University at Baker Field by a 
score of 2 to 1 in ten innings, which, the New York Times reported, “consumed 2 hours 









pictures and associated sounds on ultra-short waves to the main transmitter atop the 
Empire State Building, from where they were picked up at Radio City, at the World’s 
Fair and other receiving outposts in the metropolitan area.”21 This telecast followed 
efforts by Universum Film AG (UFA) at the 1936 Berlin Olympics and by the British 
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) the following year when its first broadcast was 
transmitted from Wimbledon. Although the baseball game’s picture quality ranged from 
blurry—players described as appearing like “little white fliers”—to clear—the skyline of 
apartment buildings “sharply defined” in the background—telecasting quickly improved 
with the addition of a second and third camera.22 As the New York Times noted in 
September 1939, “Four or five cameras will be used before long and then baseball as a 
motion picture will be in the air to stay, providing, of course, that some scheme is 
evolved to protect the gate.”23 Protecting the gate to live sporting events, which served as 
the main source of revenue for most sports, proved to be one the main impediments to the 
acceptance of televising those events. One sport, professional football, protected teams’ 
gate receipts through the use of blackouts; others, like boxing and minor league baseball, 
were impacted by the proliferation of coverage until fans almost completely stopped 
attending, nearly ruining each sport. 
That boxing was destined to become television’s favorite sport to broadcast was 
evident from the very first televised fight at Yankee Stadium on June 1, 1939. Because 
this bout was covered during television’s experimental period, “no contract was involved 
and no fee was charged by the promoter for the rights to telecast,”24 Orrin E. Dunlap Jr. 









say that Dunlap was enthralled by the telecast would not be an overstatement. Dunlap 
watched the telecast “in a darkened room at Great Neck on Long Island, about twelve 
miles beeline from Yankee Stadium,” which was “like sitting in a front row seat.”25 
Within the first few paragraphs of his review, Dunlap favorably compared the experience 
to listening on the radio or seeing highlights of the fight in newsreels. “To see a prize 
fight telecast is 10,000 times more interesting than listening sightless to a broadcast 
announcer. The telecast batters broadcasting into the category of the silent film.”26 
Interestingly, Dunlap relegated radio to the status of silent film, another visual medium, 
rather than to another auditory medium like the phonograph, which could not capture live 
what radio was capable of capturing. In fact, in the next paragraph, he noted that “this 
seeing by radio is far more exciting than watching a belated and cut newsreel of such 
warfare, because here the result is in suspense, it may be revealed at any moment.”27  
Dunlap pointed to the size of the boxing ring, the two contestants being within an 
arm’s length of each other, and the well lighted ring as reasons for the telecast’s success. 
Later, he admitted that “television is not quite clear enough yet to show swollen eyes and 
lacerations, but the different colored trunks are a great aid to the spectator in following 
and identifying the fighters at all times.”28 Dunlap recommended against sending two 
fighters into the televised ring in the same colored shorts, which suggested that the black 
and white picture alone was not enough to distinguish between the fighters, who were of 
similar builds. That Dunlap did not describe the bruises each fighter suffered—Baer’s 
badly cut lower lip required four stitches and Nova’s right eye was swollen shut and had 









not rich in graphic details. Not surprisingly, then, Dunlap admitted that while the sights 
and sounds of the event came alive, “it is still considered necessary that a sports 
commentator sit alongside the camera to thread the illustrated story together.”30 Noting 
that the commentator had to be attentive to every blow because the public was seeing 
exactly what he saw, Dunlap praised announcer Sam Taub for his “colorful reporting job. 
His words fitted every whack.”31   
Dunlap aptly summarized the televised bout’s importance, not only identifying 
that “television uncannily projects intimacy into the performance” so that the fighters 
seemed “to be slamming in the family circle, not for the 16,738 huddled around the ring 
under June’s starlit canopy.”32 Dunlap also correctly surmised that televised boxing 
would do for sales of television sets what radio broadcasting had done for radio sales, 
noting that once television sets were mass produced, the price would inevitably come 
down. He also predicted that “eighteen years from now, in 1957, fistic classics will be 
projected on wall screens, and no doubt a coast-to-coast audience will surround the 
arena.”33 Pronouncing boldly that the first American televised bout had provided 
evidence galore that boxing was a natural for television, Dunlap did not mince his words. 
“Carnage has been a dream of television…. There is no dodging of reality, for television 
is already recognized as an instrument of truth. Seeing is believing.”34 Coincidentally, the 
same thing was proclaimed about film, and like the older technology, television’s 
truthfulness was also manipulated and compromised. 
Only after World War II did television build a programming schedule. In 1946, 









on Saturdays.35 Two years later, sports, most notably boxing, figured prominently in the 
early prime-time schedules. This was attributable to the fact that the networks had very 
little idea what programs the public wanted to watch, “which made the early years of 
network programming a time of great trial-and-error.”36 Additionally, with few stations 
operating and the cost of building studios in which to create original programming costly, 
television turned to boxing, which afforded an economical alternative to the studio 
program, with production costs running approximately $2,500 per program.37  
The first regularly scheduled television sports program, known as the Cavalcade 
of Sports and owned by the Gillette Safety Razor Blade Company, featured boxing from 
St. Nicholas Arena in New York City on Monday evenings from 9-11 p.m. and from 
Madison Square Garden on Thursday evenings from 9:15-11 p.m. The show had made its 
debut on Mutual Radio in 1941 with the broadcast of the Joe Louis-Billy Conn 
heavyweight championship fight, thanks to the enterprising work of A. Craig Smith, who 
paid only $14,820 for the rights to the fight.38 Smith also secured the rights to the World 
Series and baseball’s All Star Game for Gillette (Illustration 4.2), which it retained into 
the mid-1960s. Bob Stanton served as the announcer for the Cavalcade of Sports program 
until 1948 when he was replaced by Ray Forrest, who remained with the program for 
only a year. Jimmy Powers took over the role in 1949, and remained while NBC aired the 
program until 1960 when it was dropped. ABC then picked it up, moved it to Saturday 
nights, and continued airing it until 1964. In total, the program broadcast over six 
hundred nights of boxing. The Cavalcade enjoyed one of the longest runs in television 









Best Sports Program at the seventh annual awards ceremony of the Television 
Academy.39 That marked the last time the academy included Best Sports Program as a 
category until 1979 when a number of sports categories were awarded in a separate 
ceremony.  
Despite its success on television, the Cavalcade of Sports was also broadcast on 
radio. Ads, which read like press releases and included photographs, regularly appeared 
in New York newspapers the day of the broadcast. The writing for these ads emphasized 
the local draw, “Jawbone” Jake LaMotta or “Rock-a-bye” Rock Graziano. The ads also 
promised plenty of action, “a slam-bang affair” or “a blistering battle.”40 The ads always 
ended with the same two paragraphs, the first identifying the radio station (WJZ, WHN) 
and the second providing the Gillette logo and jingle. It read: “And remember, 
men…LOOK sharp! FEEL sharp! BE sharp! Use Gillette Blue Blades with the sharpest 
edges ever honed.”41  
By the time Gillette attached its company name to the program’s title in 1948, the 
Gillette Cavalcade of Sports had become one of the most popular programs with the 
neighborhood tavern audiences throughout New York City.42 Interestingly, the fees to 
broadcast the program rose dramatically when Madison Square Garden demanded 
$200,000 for the weekly rights during that television season.43 A year before, the DuMont 
network experienced “a considerable increase in fee” to broadcast fights from the Jamaica 
Arena in New York City, despite the fact that “Apparently not all boxing promoters are 










In addition to its weekly coverage of boxing, Gillette also secured the rights to the 
world heavyweight championship bout between Joe Louis and Jersey Joe Walcott for 
$100,000. The New York Times reported that the deal between Gillette and the 20th 
Century Sporting Club “occasioned some surprise along Radio Row, since previously a 
television contract for a major bout had been made directly with a broadcaster rather than 
with a sponsor.”45 No doubt this surprise stemmed, in part, from the fact that NBC had 
enjoyed considerable success with the broadcasts of other championship fights, 
particularly the Louis-Conn fight in 1946, which Gillette had also sponsored. The 
broadcast’s success caught the attention of advertising agencies, which noted the 
achievement by the industry “to bring forcibly to the attention of the public the practical 
value of television.”46 This practical value largely revolved around the introduction of 
new consumer products.   
NBC did, in fact, broadcast the Louis-Walcott rematch, scheduled for June 23, 
1948, in Yankee Stadium. A display ad (Illustration 4.3) that appeared in the New York 
Times on the scheduled day of the fight conveyed the importance of not only the fight, 
but also of the telecast as a means of promoting the NBC television network, its news and 
entertainment programs and its sponsor. In the advertisement’s copy, NBC noted that 
“Tonight’s fight—like the last three World’s Heavyweight Championship Bouts—will be 
seen on the NBC Television Network…WNBT in New York.”47 Coverage of the fight 
was yet “another in the parade of exciting events which make NBC television’s No. 1 
Network.”48 Since the fight was scheduled to coincide with the Republican National 









complete television coverage of the convention.49 Nineteen-forty-eight marked the first 
television coverage of the national political conventions, which eventually led to the 
development of nightly network news. The ad did not mention that the fight was being 
televised over NBC (coaxial) lines through its outlets in Washington, D.C., Philadelphia, 
Baltimore, Schenectady, Boston, and Richmond. Additionally, coverage of the fight and 
convention was to have been broadcast to home receivers in the Midwest, thanks to “the 
first public demonstration of stratovision.”50  
Stratovision was a technology, developed by Westinghouse with the backing of 
the Glenn L. Martin Company, which utilized a B-29 Superfortress, orbiting 25,000 feet 
above Pittsburgh, to receive the television signal directly from WMAR-TV in Baltimore 
and send the signal to an area over five hundred miles in diameter.51 The bomber 
(Illustration 4.4) was outfitted with an eight-foot mast on its vertical stabilizer to receive 
programs; the signal was then sent from the antenna to the cabin and on to the broadcast 
antenna, projected twenty-eight feet down when in operating mode. Stratovision was 
successfully used to broadcast coverage of the Republican convention on June 23, the 
night of the scheduled Louis-Walcott fight, although the fight was twice rescheduled due 
to rain. While the rain played havoc on the fight’s schedule, television did not deter 
people from attending. The New York Times reported that 42,667 people paid $841,739 at 
the gate to see the bout on June 25, noting that receipts would have surpassed the one 
million dollar mark had the inclement weather not forced two postponements and the 
refunding of over $100,000. The newspaper also reported that eighteen members of the 









watch the fight via television, although his wife “saw the fight from a home of a friend 
but nobody would say where.”52 That the broadcast garnered considerable coverage in the 
press suggests the gathering importance of the medium in American culture. 
Boxing was not the only sport to appear in prime-time in the late 1940s. In terms 
of quantity, 1948 marked a high point in the number of programming hours devoted to 
sports, accounting for twenty-seven of the eighty-three hours broadcast. The second most 
popular sport was basketball, which was offered on Saturday nights during prime time by 
three of the four networks. In addition to its Saturday night broadcast, CBS offered a 
game on Monday nights. One can only wonder what prompted the networks to commit 
over nine hours of their schedule to a professional sport that had certainly not taken root 
with the sporting public, evidenced by the fact that, by all accounts, college basketball 
was more popular with double-headers often offered at Madison Square Garden. That 
three networks scheduled games at the same time on the same night proved to be not only 
overly ambitious but “not a wise choice for prime-time programming, as it proved to be 
much less popular than boxing.”53  
Professional wrestling was also shown by three of the networks—ABC, DuMont 
and NBC—on four nights a week; however, each network scheduled its boxing program 
on a different night, thereby avoiding direct competition. In many ways, professional 
wrestling attracted a more diverse audience than other professional sports. As Neal-
Lunsford notes, “What really made wrestling popular with advertisers, however, was that 
most estimates, however reliable, found women to be the most avid home wrestling 









pose and preen under the television lights.”54 Wrestling drew the attention of state 
legislators in New York, who enacted a law requiring that every match be listed as an 
exhibition, not as a contest. Regardless of what prompted lawmakers to pass such feeble 
legislation, wrestling’s status as a legitimate sport clearly concerned the networks and 
advertisers. In fact, wrestling’s choreographed moves, exaggerated drama, florid 
costumes, identifiable heroes and villains proved well suited to television. Further 
cementing their relationship with television networks, wrestling promoters “took special 
care to ensure that the matches did not exceed the time slots between commercial 
interruptions.”55  
The same features that made professional wrestling popular also characterized 
another pseudo-sport, roller derby, thirty separate contests of which ABC broadcast on 
Monday, Thursday and Friday evenings in 1949, making it the network’s most popular 
show for a short while.56 Roller Derby, “the patented concoction of Leo Seltzer,”57 was 
popularized up and down the East Coast. For example, beginning in March of 1949, it 
enjoyed a five-month run in New York City, which included an eighteen-night run at the 
Fourteenth Regiment Armory in Brooklyn, a sixteen-night run at the Sixty-ninth 
Regiment Armory, and a run at the Twenty-second Engineers Armory in May. After 
covering the National Roller Derby championship match on September 22, 1949, which 
drew 13,000 fans to Madison Square Garden to see the New York team defeat Brooklyn, 
ABC dropped roller derby from its Monday night programming schedule, but retained it 
on Thursday and Friday evenings through most of 1950. When Pulse, Inc., issued a report 









roller derby was listed as the sixth most popular among video shows,58 less popular than 
other shows like Howdy Doody and Kukla, Fran and Ollie, but more popular than the 
News Caravan and Six-Gun Playhouse.59  
Roller derby’s popularity elicited a New York Times article in which Jack Gould 
argued that roller derby “represents television at its most narcotic.”60 Gould explained 
that despite its narcotizing effect, as television, “the derby has it all over a couple of the 
more accepted diversions, such as hockey and basketball.”61 Like boxing, roller derby 
featured “a new jam [a type of scrum in which one team’s skaters attempt to pass the 
other team’s skaters, thereby scoring points] coming every couple of minutes.”62 Because 
jams did not take particularly long and commercials were aired between them, roller 
derby’s flow was well suited to television. Each team featured both men and women, and 
because the carefully choreographed hair-pulling, fist fights and anguished shouting were 
part of the performers’ repertoires, “it’s still a lot more vivid TV than wrestling.”63 Lest 
readers take away the wrong impression, Gould qualified his assertion by noting that the 
coverage’s most glaring weakness was “the worst play-by-play commentary to be heard 
anywhere on radio or television.”64 Not only did Ken Nydall never forget that he was the 
press agent for roller derby, but he also chose the moment when the action was at its 
height “to beg the viewers to buy tickets to the derby.”65 Gould concluded by noting that 
roller derby would remain popular “until the novelty of television wears off a little 
more.”66  
ABC planned another season of roller derby in 1950 before the networks began 









professional wrestling successfully migrated to local television stations. The popularity of 
wrestling and roller derby is understandable when considering its suitability for television 
in terms of form and content. Most noticeably, these sports featured both male and female 
performers. This fact did not escape the notice of advertisers. An article published in 
Business Week noted, “In the past decade, two impacts have hit the American public—the 
atom bomb and the Roller Derby—and it appears the latter will have the most permanent 
effect.”67 Perhaps such optimism was delusional, perhaps it was ballyhoo, but in any 
event, roller derby, unlike much of the other sports coverage, appealed to women 
viewers, who largely “controlled viewing choices as well as consumer spending.”68  
By 1949, the television audience had grown considerably. In that year, the New 
York Times published another article by Jack Gould that included a television map of the 
United States (Illustration 4.5), which showed that television was available in areas 
“inhabited by 60,000,000 people.”69 The report also noted that there were one and one-
half million sets, with a regular audience of six million. Although coast-to-coast 
broadcasts were still more than two years away, Gould predicted that by 1953, “television 
looks forward to serving 19,000,000 families and a total audience of 50,000,000.”70 
Gould noted the continued improvement in television set manufacturing and the 
increased variety of programs, of which sports, “as a ready-made attraction, retain their 
hold on a large part of the audience.”71 The most pressing problems were economic, 
Gould explained, commenting that “no single television network is yet making 
money…production overhead runs high…the actors have not yet organized television and 









that the main concern of the industry was directed toward satisfying “public demand.”73  
In 1950 television viewing choices greatly expanded, as network prime time 
offerings increased from ninety to one hundred and nine hours. Sports accounted for only 
eleven per cent of that total, or twelve hours and thirty minutes, down from nearly 
twenty-seven hours in 1948 and fifteen hours the previous year.74 While many decried the 
impact television was having on attendance at sports events, others realized that sports 
were becoming a far less important source of network programming but more important 
for local television stations. In this regard, television was merely following the precedent 
of radio. In a New York Times article, Sidney Lohman presented two reasons for the 
decline in the number of hours devoted to the network televising of sports events: “(1) a 
growing reluctance on the part of promoters to permit the televising of their shows, and 
(2) the elimination of choice nighttime viewing periods as more time segments are sold 
for sponsored shows with long term contracts as opposed to the seasonal fluctuations in 
sports events.”75Lohman and others aptly recognized that while sports had played an 
important role in helping television gain a foothold into American popular culture, that 
role changed significantly after 1950. Two decades passed before sports re-appeared in 
prime time with ABC’s Monday Night Football.  
The impact of television on sports journalism was immediate and long lasting. 
With their “descriptions and accounts” of sports events, the networks were largely 
responsible for reinvigorating sports journalism. Klatell and Marcus explain:  
In many respects, the growth of the modern newspaper sports page…can be 









reaches of the nation, greatly popularizing the topic, and spreading interest 
wherever their signals reached.76 
Klatell and Marcus also note that while broadcasting helped to sell newspapers and 
magazines, “broadcasters frequently use the existence of newspapers and magazines as 
justification for their own abdication of much journalistic responsibility.”77 As more local 
television and radio stations broadcast the games of local teams, the audience expected a 
certain familiarity with the announcers, many of whom remained with the same team for 
years. Klatell and Marcus suggest that familiarity breeds anything but contempt. In fact, 
“television viewers are much less comfortable with their reporters and announcers acting 
in an aggressive or confrontational manner…. As a result, the landscape is littered with 
‘homers’—utterly biased observers in the employ of the event they are supposed to be 
covering.”78 Unfortunately, on the local level, the audience has come to expect biased 
reporting as “a harmless part of the sports entertainment package.”79  
The Eternal Time-Present 
Except for the Gillette Cavalcade of Sports and special events like the World 
Series, sports programming was moved from prime time to the weekends, by default as 
much as by design. For example, in 1953 ABC introduced its Major League Baseball 
Game of the Week, despite the fact advertising account executive Edgar J. Scherick had 
managed to secure the television broadcast rights for only three teams: the Philadelphia 
Athletics, the Chicago White Sox, and the Cleveland Indians.80 Further, the owners of the 
other teams imposed a blackout on ABC stations to protect their own game attendance, 









league city. In spite of these conditions, the Falstaff Brewing Company went ahead with 
its sponsorship, and Game of the Week made its debut on June 6, 1953, with former St. 
Louis Cardinals pitcher Dizzy Dean providing the play-by-play. The program struggled 
to attract much of an audience for the first half of the summer, but by the end of the year, 
Game of the Week had achieved an 11.4 national rating and a fifty-one percent share of 
sets in use on Saturday afternoons. Part of the attraction was certainly related to Dean’s 
homespun style. Ron Powers explains: 
Television had not witnessed Dean’s like before. Nearly all the new TV 
personalities up until his time, not only in sports but in prime time and news, had 
been either Eastern-urban, or, like Mel Allen, scrubbed and urbanized. Dean was 
an absolutely unexpected blast from the heartland, the real goods. The Stetson, the 
string tie, the impulsive warbled snatches from “Wabash Cannonball,” the artfully 
cornponed usage—“Fawstaff—hit’s Amurica’s P’emium Quality Beer!”—struck 
the Republic as authentic, even somehow deliciously truant, a thumbed nose to 
straitlaced authority.81  
ABC’s success with Game of the Week in 1953 and 1954 arguably defied explanation. 
With far fewer affiliate stations than the other networks, ABC experienced television 
losses of almost $2 million in 1950 alone. Only a merger with United Paramount 
Theaters in 1953 and an accompanying infusion of $30 million in capital saved the 
struggling network from going out of business. Clearly, what made Game of the Week a 
ratings success was Dean’s easy-going style, which appealed to viewers in rural areas.  









although not exclusively since NBC began its Saturday and Sunday coverage in 1957 and 
in 1959 respectively. In 1960, ABC resumed Saturday telecasts, and the three networks 
combined to telecast over one hundred games. Only in 1965 did MLB end its blackout in 
the cities that were home to MLB teams when it signed a $6.5 million deal with ABC, a 
sum which it shared equally among the teams. Thanks to this contract, ABC provided the 
first-ever nationwide baseball coverage with twenty-eight weekly Saturday and holiday 
broadcasts of Game of the Week. ABC's deal covered all of the teams except the New 
York Yankees and Philadelphia Phillies, both of which had existing television deals. 
ABC blacked out the games in the home cities of the clubs playing in the televised 
games. Chris Schenkel, Keith Jackson, and Merle Harmon were the principal play-by-
play announcers for ABC's coverage. In October 1966, NBC signed a three-year deal 
with MLB, which cost roughly $6 million per year for the twenty-five Games of the 
Week, $6.1 million for the 1967 World Series and 1967 All-Star Game, and $6.5 million 
for the 1968 World Series and 1968 All-Star Game. This brought the total value of the 
contract up to $30.6 million. 
NBC’s coverage marked a considerable change in the number of games, although 
viewers did not necessarily embrace that change. The idea that whatever game was 
attractive for one market would be attractive for all markets proved to be a mistake that 
neither the network nor MLB had anticipated. Instead of watching over one hundred 
games on three networks, a majority of American viewers were limited to twenty-eight 
telecasts on one network. Another change that arguably impacted viewer reception was 









listeners as the national signature of baseball broadcasting,” asserts Curt Smith. “From 
1966 through 1975, he called play-by- play for every All-Star Game, every World Series 
game, and virtually every regular season network game.”82 That list excluded Gowdy's 
work on seven Super Bowls, seven Olympic Games, twelve NCAA basketball 
championships, thirteen Rose Bowls, the Pan Am Games, and twenty years of The 
American Sportsman. Employing a very different style than Dean’s, Gowdy was unable 
to achieve comparable ratings, even before becoming burdened with the weight of 
overexposure. His highest regular season rating was still two full points below Dean's 
first year, despite the ban that MLB markets had imposed on ABC’s initial telecasts. The 
ratings for NBC’s telecasts dropped fifteen percent by 1970, and NBC’s World Series 
ratings fell by nearly twenty percent, although it was not Gowdy’s fault alone.  
To his credit, Scherick recognized that baseball, although better suited as a local-
station commodity, would attract an audience if the game was properly packaged. Rather 
than banking on the teams to serve as the attraction, Scherick counted on Dean’s colorful 
use of the language and insider baseball knowledge to involve the audience in the 
moment. Scherick believed that television, unlike newspapers and magazines, left no 
record; rather, it inhabited an eternal time-present and “could revise itself at will.”83 More 
than anything else, this focus on the eternal time-present, keeping viewers in the moment, 
became one of the most important aspects of television’s operational aesthetic. Scherick 
used that same enterprising attitude to bring the Falstaff Brewing Company to another 
backwater sport with seemingly untapped potential, professional football. 









Regular season broadcasts of National Football League games on CBS did not 
begin on a league-wide basis until 1956. Until this time, individual teams negotiated 
contracts for the rights to their games, but realized next to nothing in profits.  In fact, in 
1948 the Chicago Bears televised six home games and because the team had to pay two 
of the stations to transmit the broadcasts, the Bears lost $1,750 in the venture.84 Having 
reached the championship game in 1949, the Los Angeles Rams sold the rights to their 
1950 home games to the Admiral Television Company with one important stipulation: 
Admiral would compensate the Rams if attendance did not increase by ten percent. 
Despite having one of the most potent offenses in league history, attendance fell from an 
average of 49,854 to 26,804, costing Admiral $307,000.85 With the Western Conference 
title game against the Chicago Bears blacked out in Los Angeles, the Rams drew 83,501 
fans to the Coliseum, ending the television experiment on the local level.  
In 1951, NFL Commissioner Bert Bell decreed that league teams could not sell 
broadcast rights to home games, which the U. S. Department of Justice challenged as an 
unlawful restraint of trade. Assistant Attorney General H. Graham Morison articulated 
the Justice Department’s position, noting that the NFL’s policy was “a denial to the 
people of their right to see football games.”86 As expressed by Morison, the Justice 
Department’s premise that the public should not be denied “their right to see football 
games” ran counter to the entire commercially-based American broadcasting system and 
was positioned closer to the British and European system.   
On November 12, 1953, U. S. District Court Judge Allan K. Grim issued a ruling 









radius—but it specified no interference with telecasts outside that area.87 The ruling also 
prohibited the blacking out of radio, and it disallowed Bell’s powers “to approve or 
disapprove all contracts made by the league teams for the telecasts or broadcasts of their 
games.”88 The NFL had unsuccessfully argued that “it was not subject to the anti-trust 
laws because it was not a business engaged in interstate commerce.”89 Grim rejected that 
argument, holding that radio and television is an interstate industry, and “the league’s 
policies interfered with the conduct of its business.”90 Significantly, Grim’s ruling did not 
address the status of the league. Only a few days earlier, the U. S. Supreme Court had 
ruled that MLB could continue to enforce its reserve clause in players’ contracts because 
it was not an interstate business.91 The NFL, Bell noted, had “won the most important 
part of its case because the league’s most vital need is the protection of the home gate if 
we are to continue our existence.”92  
In reviewing the decision, New York Times columnist Arthur Daley offered 
commentary that was clearly laced with sarcasm, especially in regards to the 
government’s position that the public had a “right” to the games. “The Government had 
claimed that the play-for-pay boys violated the anti-trust laws by not giving away their 
products on video for free-to-all comers.”93 Although noting that “it all sounds ridiculous 
to a non-legal mind,”94 Daley took another shot at the government by pointing out the 
hypocrisy of that position. “The Government didn’t demand that Westinghouse and other 
pro football sponsors give away their products for free. The gridiron folks were the only 
patsies.”95 Daley aptly surmised that the decision was “tremendously important”96 and 









slowly is being strangled to death by the electronic monster and yet the baseball folks 
were too scared to make a move until the suit against the gridiron game was settled.”97 
Daley concluded by bringing the Grim decision into perspective with the Supreme 
Court’s decision to uphold MLB’s anti-trust status. “The world of sports has got so many 
green lights in the last few days that it’s beginning to resemble a St. Patrick’s Day 
parade.”97  
Daley’s assessment of the baseball situation was confirmed over the next decade. 
Even though MLB attendance was not adversely impacted by televised games, attendance 
at minor league games was, in fact, devastated. According to statistics compiled by 
William O. Johnson, over forty million Americans attended minor league contests in 
1949. A decade later, that number plunged to thirteen million and then to ten million by 
the end of the 1960s. The number of minor league teams dropped from almost five 
hundred in 1949 to approximately one hundred and fifty in 1969.98  
 The Grim decision was the first of several important legal cases that shaped the 
broadcast landscape of televised sports over the next several years. Emboldened by the 
decision, Bell then imposed stipulations within the contract the NFL had signed with 
CBS that “CBS News shall instruct its cameramen and camera crews to make every 
reasonable effort to avoid training any television camera on any fights among or injuries 
to the players.”99 Significantly, Bell did not restrict print journalists from reporting on any 
such events. However, Bell insisted that radio and television had to be held to a higher 
standard because broadcasting was a matter of public interest. “We don’t want kids 









sportsmanship.”100 Bell’s invocation of protecting children echoed the very same 
concerns that had been used to bar fight films.   
From 1951-1955, the Du Mont network televised the NFL championship game at 
a cost of $95,000 per year. The first nationally televised championship game was 
broadcast in 1951, featuring a rematch between the Los Angeles Rams and the defending 
NFL champion Cleveland Browns. The 1950 title game that the Rams lost by a score of 
30-28—called the “greatest football game I’ve ever seen” by Commissioner Bert Bell—
was not carried nationally, and the surviving film of this momentous game has no 
sound.101 The 1950 championship game would be replaced atop the hierarchy of greatest 
games only a few years later by the 1958 NFL championship game when the Baltimore 
Colts defeated the New York Giants 23-17 in sudden death overtime. The game-tying 
touchdown was almost not televised to the forty-five million viewers watching when a 
cable that connected NBC’s cameras to its remote truck outside of Yankee Stadium was 
jarred loose from its power supply. Cables were not the only things exposed to the 
elements. Announcers Chris Schenkel and Chuck Thompson were perched into one of the 
NBC camera cages that had been suspended from the right-field upper deck, exposed to 
the elements. The near accident “illustrated television’s second-class status in that era.”102         
A Byers Market 
 By the time Walter Byers assumed the position of executive director of the 
National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) in 1951, college football attendance 
had experienced television’s impact in much the same way as the major professional 









each season from 1950 through the 1953 season. Another seven seasons passed before 
attendance reached the same levels as in the 1949 season. Television was blamed for 
falling attendance, especially after the University of Pennsylvania and Notre Dame 
University signed contracts with ABC and DuMont respectively to allow telecasts of all 
their home games in the 1950 season. In September of that year, the New York Times 
reported that New York City viewers would have “a choice of five different games each 
Saturday during most of the season and three night-time Friday games in addition.”103 
CBS was telecasting the home games of Army, Navy and Harvard; WABD carried Notre 
Dame’s home games; ABC televised the home schedule of Pennsylvania; WOR-TV was 
televising a slate of games but had not decided on which teams at the time the article was 
published; and WPIX was to televise Yale’s five home games at Yale Bowl and 
Fordham’s two home games at the Polo Games. The night games were also carried by 
WPIX and featured Boston College’s home games, to be played at Braves Field in 
Boston.  
Only the Big Ten Conference banned televised games entirely, and attendance at 
those games dropped less than the national average. Other colleges across the country 
were at liberty to negotiate deals with local television stations, and with no restrictions 
and not much money offered, it was definitely a buyers’ market. Those conditions 
precipitated considerable angst within the NCAA, especially after two studies—one 
conducted for the NCAA by the Crossley Corporation in 1948 and another, requested by 
the NCAA’s newly formed television committee, by the National Opinion Research 









rated watching games on television to be equal or superior to watching them from the 
stands, and the latter concluded that attendance would have been at least forty percent 
higher had no games been televised.104 Swift action was taken. 
At the national convention in January 1951, the NCAA decided to “establish an 
experimental program of total and partial blackouts so that the NORC could make a 
comparative study of the impact of television on the gate.”105 With television coverage 
limited to seven regular season games in each region and three nationally televised 
games, NBC announced in August that fifty stations on its network would carry its slate 
of games, including “the majority of Big Ten universities, most of the Ivy League and 
some colleges in the Southern and Southeast conferences, as well as numerous large 
independent institutions.”106 If NBC was not terribly specific in terms of which schools 
would be participating in the broadcasts, it was attributable to the furor that the NCAA 
plan engendered, including bills introduced in a number of state legislatures that required 
the “games of their respective state universities be televised”107 and a charge from one 
governor that the NCAA was engaging in an “illegal conspiracy.”108 Having paid 
$700,000 for the rights, Westinghouse Electric Corporation used its national advertising 
agency to arrange the slate of games. To complement its telecasts, NBC also introduced 
pre- and post-game shows for the 1951 season as a means to keep viewers informed 
about traditional rivalry games they chose not to broadcast.  
To its credit, NBC dealt with the televising issue head on. In October and 
December of 1951, NBC offered two simulcast programs about college football on 









Sundays at 2:30 p.m. The first program was billed as a debate, titled “What’s Wrong with 
College Football?” and offered the opinions “of four experts”109: K. L. Wilson, 
Commissioner of Athletics in the Big Ten Conference; Avery Brundage, president of the 
American Olympic Committee; Arch Ward, sports editor of the Chicago Tribune; and 
Marshall Smith, sports editor of Life magazine. In December, another group, also 
composed of collegiate athletics administrators and sportscasters, discussed the question 
of whether there was too much football on television. 
 Things hardly improved the next year when the NCAA Television Committee 
sold the rights to NBC for $1 million with the stipulation that no college would appear on 
the air more than once. A week before announcing the deal, NBC named Lindsey Nelson 
as assistant director of sports and David M. Camerer as coordinator for the NCAA 
football television coverage.110 When it announced the deal on July 29, NBC noted that 
“under controls as outlined by the National Collegiate Athletic Association,”111 it would 
telecast a single game coast-to-coast on eleven of the twelve Saturdays from September 
20 through November 29. Tom Gallery, NBC’s sports director, explained that the 
schedule of games would be announced after extensive field tests were conducted to 
guarantee remote pickups. Gallery noted, “We hope to bring games of national and 
intersectional significance from stadiums that, heretofore, have been ‘out-of-bounds’ for 
full network transmission.”112 The other Saturday would be devoted to televising regional 
and local games. In August, however, NBC announced that General Motors would 
sponsor the television broadcasts of the college football “television game of the week”113 









be no ‘blackouts’ this year.”114 This marked the first venture of General Motors into 
television broadcasts of sporting events. NBC designed special letterhead (Illustration 
4.6) for the “College Football News” press releases that went out for each of the eleven 
telecasts. It dropped its pre-game film show in 1952, but retained its post-game show.  
 Having achieved a measure of control over the telecasts, the NCAA’s Television 
Committee added to the price for the television rights. To the list of conditions, it 
included the right to approve all network play-by-play announcers. Ron Powers posits, 
“Byers’ influence was clear in this matter. He felt that any reference, no matter how 
indirect, to professional football was tantamount to free advertising for a competitor’s 
product. The networks indulged this blatant editorial interference until the mid-
1960s...”115 Through the remainder of the 1950s, the NCAA’s Television Committee 
exerted more control on telecasts and undermined the popularity of its signature sport on 
television in an attempt to save attendance figures.  
 The NCAA’s policy of restricted telecasts was not well received. In November 
1952, New York Times reporter Jack Gould called the telecasts “dull viewing…. It is 
almost a sure bet that if there is a dull game around it will turn up on TV.”116 Gould 
explained that the decline in quality of college football on television stemmed from the 
NCAA’s attempt to curb the impact television was having on attendance at the games. 
What was troubling was the manner with which the NCAA had elected to cope with the 
problem. Part of the problem related to picking the games in June, “which is palpable 
nonsense… The individual team’s quality can only be judged after the season’s start. 









ahead.”117 Getting the maximum of colleges on the air was “as silly as its schedule-
making” because “the teams commanding national interest always have been relatively 
low.”118  
 Rather than adhering to a rigidly fixed schedule put together in the spring, the 
NCAA should focus on telecasting the best game available, Gould argued. He maintained 
that presenting “one decent game a week cannot possibly destroy the football industry 
from coast-to-coast.”119 Not announcing which teams would be shown until the 
Wednesday or Thursday before the game was important, he argued. “With uncertainly 
until almost the last moment over what game would be on the air, the sale of tickets could 
be protected.”120 Admitting that a nationally televised game might adversely impact 
attendance of a local game, Gould reasoned that a solution was available by moving the 
telecast of the “game of the week” to a Saturday night. “This would satisfy the TV fan, 
protect all the country’s other games from the financial standpoint, and remove a constant 
source of argument.”121 Gould concluded that whatever solution the NCAA decided upon, 
“for a change it might abandon its essentially negative approach to the medium and see if 
a little sensible imagination cannot accommodate it.”122 Gould’s warning proved 
prophetic. Not only did Byers' iron grip on controlling the schedule and other aspects of 
the telecasts not solve attendance issues for almost another decade, but college football 
also lost the popularity contest as professional football gradually became more popular 
with football’s television viewers, who “tired of being treated as a scrub viewer.”123  
News and Information Programs         









broadcasting of live events alone. Beginning in the late 1940s, the networks developed a 
number of programs that featured sports news, information, interviews and highlights 
from game action. The process of gleaning highlights from film was time-consuming and 
required several steps before copies could be dispatched to subscribing stations that 
carried the program. These programs, referred to as kinescopes, were syndicated to the 
network’s affiliate stations. Walter Byers, who became executive director of the NCAA, 
began his career by working for the Big Ten Conference. In 1949 he prepared highlight 
kinescopes of Big Ten Conference football games for distribution in the Midwest. He 
described the process required to produce a highlight reel. 
During Sunday evening, I ran through countless yards of 16-mm black-and-white 
film from Saturday’s games to select the best plays. Then the lab editor made a 
work copy of the edited version, which I viewed for purposes of writing the script. 
The announcer would then put a voice on the master print, the lab would hurriedly 
print the 26-1/2-minute Big Ten highlight film, and copies would be dispatched to 
subscribing stations in the seven-state Big Ten territory.124  
The process was certainly paved by years of newsreel production, and viewers had come 
to expect news in the manner the newsreels presented it. This had a considerable impact 
on both the production and reception of sports news on television. 
 In 1949, ABC, CBS and NBC introduced sports news programs. CBS offered the 
Sportsman’s Quiz, hosted by Don Baker and Bernard Dudley. Sponsored by the magazine 
Sports Afield, this five-minute filler first seen on Mondays from 8-8:05 p.m. posed and 









the program’s host and posed the questions. Baker provided the answers, using drawings, 
pictures, diagrams and other visual aides to illustrate his responses. Viewers were 
encouraged to send in questions of their own.125 The program moved to Friday nights in 
August 1948 where it remained until January 1949 before moving to Mondays at 7:10 
p.m. The DuMont network introduced a similar, but more ambitious half-hour program, 
the Fishing and Hunting Club, in September 1949, which aired on Friday evenings from 
9-9:30 p.m. Hosted by Bill Slater, this program offered demonstrations and interviews 
with various outdoor experts and enthusiasts. In January 1950, the program was re-titled 
Sports for All, but it was discontinued in March of that year. This type of hunting and 
fishing program was fully realized in 1965 when ABC introduced The American 
Sportsman with Curt Gowdy as host and enjoyed an eighteen-year run. 
 ABC was next to introduce a sports news program in August 1948. Sports News 
with Joe Hasel was a fifteen-minute summary of the sports news of the world. Hasel 
provided scores and commentary for the edited film highlights, and he conducted 
interviews with notables from various sports. ABC tried the program on Saturday 
evenings at 7:30 p.m. from August through January before moving it to Friday evenings 
at 9:30 for two months and then to Tuesday evenings at 7:15 for another two months. 
ABC also introduced a half-hour collection of filmed short subjects on various sports and 
sports personalities, titled Sports Camera, in September 1950. The following year it was 
reduced to a fifteen-minute program, and in December was renamed Sports on Parade. 
Similar in format to these programs, CBS’s Your Sports Special, with reporter Carswell 









Friday evenings and then varied from two to five nights per week in January 1949. The 
program’s ambitious schedule, offering viewers daily news and interviews, provides 
evidence that the networks were searching for a format that would complement their live 
telecasts of sports. The use of a studio host also characterized NBC’s five-minute 
program, Sportswoman of the Week, which aired in 1948 from September 9 until 
December 2. Conceived as a documentary about a different notable woman each week, 
the program changed to a straight interview show, hosted by tennis champion Sarah 
Cooke. The program was first called Girl of the Week, echoing the newsreels in referring 
to women athletes as girls.    
Later, in September 1949, CBS tried a fifteen-minute weekly sports news 
program on Tuesday evenings, This Week in Sports, which offered “newsreel highlights 
from various events, films of outstanding individual plays and short profiles of well-
known sports personalities.”126 This program, which aired from September through mid-
December, covered the end of the baseball season, the World Series, most of the football 
season, and the beginning of the basketball season. Arguably, based on this description, 
highlights of individual plays constituted the main focus rather than a recitation of scores 
and statistics. That the visual element served as the primary focus provides an indication 
of how television developed its news-oriented programs around highlights.  
 In October 1950 ABC began offering a half-hour highlight show of a major 
college football game, titled Game of the Week, and hosted by Bill Fisher. After a two-
year hiatus, ABC brought the program back in 1953, and although it retained the title, the 









in part by the NCAA’s decision to restrict universities from negotiating their own deals. 
Because no college could appear on NBC’s telecasts more than once and given Notre 
Dame’s national popularity, it is not surprising that ABC created a vehicle to show all of 
that university’s games. The program replayed almost the entire game, excluding only 
inconsequential plays, with Harry Wismer and Ford Bond serving as announcers. The 
program lasted only one season. Several years later, in 1957 ABC offered the All-
American Football Game of the Week, a highlight program of one major college game 
played the previous Saturday. It is unclear whether this program was televised using 
kinescopes or videotape, which had been introduced for commercial use earlier in 1957.  
On Friday nights, Joe Hasel hosted New York Giants Quarterback Huddle, a 
program that was syndicated as Pro Football Highlights, which offered extensive 
highlights of the previous week’s New York Giants game, as well as interviews with 
players and discussions of news and issues about the NFL. Although it aired neither 
program in 1951, DuMont brought back the Giants highlight program in 1952 and used 
Coach Steve Owen as host. Although the program only lasted for two seasons, the format 
served as the prototype for the half-hour programs that local television stations eventually 
offered in every NFL city and their surrounding markets. In 1957 ABC offered a half-
hour highlights program of the New York Giants games, and two years later began to 
offer “a full-length videotape replay of the game that had been played earlier that day.”127 
If Brooks and Marsh are accurate in their description, this marked an important 
development in the use of videotape technology as a means of time-shifting, which had 









Corporation of Redwoods City, California, had developed a visual version of its system, 
and its new four-head Quadruplex system was first used in American television on 
November 30, 1956, in Los Angeles.128 The Ampex videotape recording (VTR) system 
being used at this time did not allow for cutting and editing, so the program would have 
to be aired in its entirety if, indeed, videotape was being used. Chuck Thompson and 
Howard Cosell provided the commentary for this 1959 videotaped program. 
Cosell hosted another sports news program in the late 1950s, titled Sports Focus. 
This fifteen-minute program aired on weekdays from 7-7:15 p.m. on ABC. Cosell 
summarized the day’s news in the sports world, also providing personal commentary on 
controversial issues, which became his signature contribution to sports journalism. At a 
time when the relationship between sports journalists and athletes was nothing if not 
cozy, Cosell was different, as Klatell and Marcus explain, “for reasons of style, impact 
and precedence. Throughout his career, he tussled with his subjects, his employers, his 
on-air image, and his own true self…. He was controversial, but perhaps part of this was 
only in contrast to the pallid docility of so many others in the business.”129 Although not 
as well known as his later work on ABC Sports, especially his Monday Night Football 
announcing, Sports Focus was one of the first programs in which Cosell honed the 
journalistic techniques with which he widened the public agenda on sports.  
With both live telecasts and highlight shows using a Game of the Week concept, 
the format proved to be a viable means of attracting an audience without negatively 
impacting gate attendance. Another important consideration related to the highlight show 









once again showed that it intended to pursue its own course. In 1965 the NFL took an 
important step to securing control over the highlights of all its games when it began 
negotiations with Blair Motion Pictures, owned by Ed Sabol, who suggested to 
Commissioner Pete Rozelle that the league bring his company in-house as a promotional 
vehicle. At the NFL meetings in the spring of 1965, the owners agreed to buy Blair 
Motion Pictures, which had shot the previous two championship games, and renamed it 
NFL Films. That fall, NFL Films dispatched two cameramen to every NFL game. One 
camera captured the game from a press-box-wide perspective and the other from the field 
was used for close-ups. As Michael MacCambridge notes, “The endeavor took flight 
immediately, and in 1965 many CBS affiliates, along with American Express, had bought 
into a syndicated weekly feature, the NFL Game of the Week… And so began the 
profligate documentation that would bring about the self-mythologizing of pro 
football.”130 That sense of mythologizing was achieved with production values that 
mirrored “the way Hollywood produces movies—lots of closeups, pictures of faces and 
hands, great music.”131 John Facenda lent his distinctive baritone voice to do the voice-
overs, and a media spectacle was born around professional football. In addition to 
syndicated features like NFL Yearbook, Inside the NFL, NFL Week in Review, NFL 
Action and Great Teams/Great Men, NFL Films created a half-hour highlight movie for 
each team each year. In comparison, MLB introduced its first syndicated series, This 
Week in Baseball, in 1977.132          
All of these programs were ambitious television sports news programs at a time 









sports news programs like the Colgate Sports Newsreel on the radio. In terms of 
delivering visual highlights of sports, these programs directly competed with the firmly 
established newsreels and their sports segments, ultimately hastening their demise. Once 
the local and network stations began offering nightly news programs, which invariably 
included a sports segment, most of these television programs no longer were needed, 
although some of the formats were brought back by local stations and later by cable 
stations.  
Things Old, New and Borrowed 
 The marriage between sports and television prospered thanks to formats that had 
been successfully employed by film and radio. On August 17-18, 1951, NBC offered 
television viewers re-broadcasts of major sporting events from the past. As part of its 
Greatest Fights of the Century series, it showed a 1909 fight between heavyweight 
champ Jack Johnson and middleweight champ Stanley Ketchel. According to a press 
release, “the 42-year-old film of this spectacular bout had to be carefully reprocessed to 
make a television showing possible.”133 The next night NBC presented a re-creation of 
Roy Reigels’ historic wrong-way run in the 1929 Rose Bowl as part of its Silver Jubilee 
on NBC program. Sportscasters Bill Munday and Graham McNamee, who had provided 
the original call, re-created “complete with sound effects…his [Munday’s] exciting 
commentary of Reigels’ dash toward the wrong goal posts and the frenzied reaction of 
the Rose Bowl crowd to the classic boner.”134 It is not surprising that television, a 
medium attempting to build an audience, utilized re-broadcasts and re-creations to fill its 









even greater liberties in re-creating news events beyond the world of sports. Even today 
ESPN has a channel, ESPN Classic, specifically devoted to providing re-broadcasts of 
past sporting events and, on occasion, recent events under the title “Instant Classic.” With 
these, producers are able to keep sporting mythologies alive. Roland Barthes explains that 
mythologies are created when sporting images emerge, freeze and circulate in a very 
particular type of signification, a process of hide-and-seek that characterizes myth. 
Barthes explains: 
The meaning will be for the form like an instantaneous reserve of history, a tamed 
richness, which it is possible to call and dismiss in a sort of rapid alternation: the 
form must constantly be able to be rooted again in the meaning and to get there 
what nature it needs for its nutriment; above all, it must be able to hide there.135 
As a summer replacement for the Gillette Cavalcade of Sports, Sports Newsreel 
aired on WNBT on Friday evenings at 10 p.m. from 1950 until 1955. This half-hour 
program showed the week’s sport highlights, and unquestionably was the television 
counterpart to its Colgate Sports Newsreel radio program. The Sports Newsreel featured 
sporting events like the Withers Handicap at Belmont Park, the Wimbledon tennis 
championships, and the IC4A track meet at Franklin Field in Philadelphia. It also 
included “sports sidelights” or sports oddities in newsreel terms, featuring the annual 
medieval football game in Florence, Italy, the Morris and Essex [dog show] at Madison, 
New Jersey, and training camp shots of heavyweight boxers Joe Louis and Lee Savold, as 
well as profiles of athletes like Maureen Connolly and Florence Chadwick. Various 









In 1952 the program became known as the Gillette Summer Sports Reel. At first 
the program used newsreel highlights and later added its own commentary. Eventually, 
the show used a host and studio guests to analyze the features and filmed events. Sports 
Newsreel served as a forerunner for omnibus programs like the CBS Sports Spectacular 
(1960) and ABC’s Wide World of Sports (1961). All of these programs featured highlights 
of games and events played during the week. As Boyles and Haynes note, they were 
“designed to combine filmed material with studio comment and interviews, with much 
emphasis placed on sporting personalities.”136 These programs were considered important 
in helping the networks develop an audience of both sports lovers and the uninitiated, 
who, producers hoped, eventually would appreciate more specialized live sports 
programming. 
 Perhaps the key development that contributed to the way sportscasts are presented 
today was the decision by NBC to add pre-game and a post-game shows to its broadcasts 
of the 1951 college football season. Additionally, on September 22, a week before it 
began coverage of its slate of regional football games, NBC aired a half-hour special, 
Football Kickoff, 1951, which featured several Ivy League coaches “to tell what can be 
expected during the coming season.”137 NBC’s fifteen minute pre-game show, sponsored 
by General Tire & Rubber Co., was hosted by well-known broadcaster Ted Husing, who 
commented “on the players and strategy of the competing teams.”138 In addition to 
previewing each Saturday’s top match-ups, Husing interviewed “a leading coach or 
football expert.”139 This use of expert opinion became a lasting characteristic of 









own highly personal and vernacular style. As Raymond Boyle notes, “While not strictly 
journalism, the rise of ‘punditry’ and ‘expert opinion’ has become an important part of 
the wider journalistic discourse that surrounds sports.”140 More importantly, NBC’s pre-
game show made use of “film clips of notable contests of last season.”141 The week 
between games afforded enough time to select and edit film to use for these highlights. 
However, because television had not yet developed the technology to create action 
(instant) replays and slow motion, the post-game show was restricted to “an up-to-the-
minute roundup of the latest scores of the day of games played across the country.”142 
Nonetheless, in developing these programs in which the editing of highlights played such 
a prominent role, the networks established the key institutional practices that made the 
highlight form so important. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that in sports, television networks and local television 
stations found programming to fill broadcast schedules. Both live telecasts of sporting 
events and sports news and information programs figured prominently in the early 
weeknight prime time schedule (1946-1952) and the daytime weekend schedule from 
1947 to the present. In its formative years, television had a deleterious effect on 
attendance at sporting events, and both the professional leagues and the NCAA struggled 
to find a way to use live telecasts and highlight shows to build and maintain its audience 
for events. It has been clearly established that the more important the sporting event, the 
less impact television has on attendance. However, for sports like boxing, the sheer 









to change the way the sport was played, prompting rule changes that protected the 
quarterback and promoted more scoring.  
In presenting live the accounts and descriptions of sporting events, the television 
networks continued using many formats and announcers from film, radio and newsreels. 
More significantly, television maintained the widely held belief that broadcast sports 
were entertainment programs, staged to attract an audience to whom sponsors and 
advertisers offered their products and services. This belief had lasting implications in 
terms of how sports journalism’s institutional values and practices were formed. As the 
costs to broadcast rights for sporting events escalated, the teams and leagues “were 
immune from the usual intrusions of journalists into topics other than what took place on 
the playing field.”143 Despite this commercial imperative, television attempted to develop 
news and information programs that moved discussions beyond what was merely good 
for the game. Relatively little success was achieved with these programs. Part of the 
reason for the programs’ relatively quick cancellations can be attributed to an audience 
that had come to expect all sports news to look like newsreel sports segments. Perhaps, 
too, television executives and sponsors feared how the audience might react to hard-
hitting sports news.  
In the post-war period, sports provided television with programming that was 
relatively inexpensive to produce. As the television industry relied more and more on 
variety programs to fill its prime-time schedule, live sports telecasts were relegated to the 
weekends. This shift from prime time to the weekends for sports programming marked 









sporting events. The strategy of attracting an audience primarily comprised of males for 
weekend telecasts of both live and news-related sports programming was greatly aided by 
the development of videotape. Videotape was first used to re-broadcast professional 
football in 1959. Two years later, ABC introduced the first slow-motion highlight during 
halftime of a college football game. In December 1963, CBS used instant replay during 
game action, and in the following year slow motion and instant replay became regular 
features of most major sporting broadcasts, thanks to the Ampex Corporation’s 
videotape-recording machine, the Mark IV. Its impact on sportscasts was immediate and 
profound. Network and local television stations more easily incorporated highlights into 
their sportscasts. The highlight revolution was born. 
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This chapter traces the growing importance of the sportscast highlight form in 
television’s second stage of development from 1956 through 1979, covering those years 
when videotape was first used in broadcasting up through the beginning of cable 
television. The videotaping of television shows for rebroadcast had a profound impact on 
how those programs were produced and viewed, which triggered a revolution that 
allowed for time shifting, which means “the recording of programs so that they could be 
broadcast live in the Easter Time Zone and three hours later, from the kinescope, in the 
Pacific Time Zone.”1 Equipment (e.g., optical film recorder, embossing on uncoated 
aluminum) to record radio broadcasts had been available from almost the very beginning 
of broadcasting; however, it was not until the Ampex company started work on an 
American version of the Magnetophone tape recorder, developed in Germany in the mid-
1930s, that recording technology moved toward magnetic tape. Examples of the 
technology were sent back to the United States during World War II, and “because the 
Germans had not taken out U.S. patents, the technology was up for grabs in the U.S. and 
other countries.”2 Bing Crosby’s Philco Radio Time, which aired on ABC, is often 
credited as the first radio show to be played back from an edited recording in 1947, 
although scholars point out that there were prerecorded shows on Mutual as far back as 









their restrictions on transcribed shows, and by the early 1950s, canned shows were the 
norm.3  
Arguably, videotape had an even greater impact on television. Until its initial 
demonstration at the 1956 convention of the National Association of Radio and 
Television Broadcasters in Chicago, a film recording, or television transcription, was 
made of every “live” commercial television program on a network.4 All of those films, 
known as kinescopes, were “filmed by a specially built movie camera off the face of a 
picture tube while a ‘live’ program is in progress.”5 The program was then shipped to 
stations not linked by the coaxial cable. The prevalence of kinescopes was due, in part, to 
the number of non-interconnected television stations in many cities, “making it 
impossible for the four major networks to feed programs into those cities 
simultaneously.”6 For example, a program like One Man’s Family was presented live on 
twenty-eight stations, and then presented as a kinescope on thirty-four additional 
stations.7 Kinescopes served other purposes—“as promotional advertising, as aids to 
criticism of program techniques and content, and as legal records including 
documentation of station operation for the records of the FCC.”8  
According to an RCA Victor engineer, in May 1949 the networks were using 
250,000 feet of film every week in New York City alone, and a 1951 New York Times 
article estimated that the television industry would require 550 million feet of film, 
“about one-fourth of Hollywood’s consumption,”9 to meet its weekly demands. By 1954, 
the television networks were using more film on a weekly basis than all the Hollywood 









the former shipping forty-four hours of programs weekly and the latter forty-two hours. 
Each of the networks distributed approximately one thousand film prints to stations every 
week, and after the films completed their rounds, the Eastman Kodak Company bought 
back the film “at a salvage rate of 7 cents a pound.”11 The New York Times also noted 
some of the “gremlins” that plagued the distribution system of kinescope film prints. 
“Once a station affiliated with the A.B.C. network ran off an entire kinescope film before 
it discovered the show belonged to N.B.C. One network sent a station Part 1 of a certain 
program and Part 2 of a separate program, the station telecasting both parts as the same 
show.”12 Given these costs and various gremlins, it was not surprising that after seeing 
the Ampex demonstration, CBS almost immediately ordered three videotape recorders 
and announced it would “eliminate its kinescope film recording process in Hollywood 
when the tape recorders are delivered.”13    
The use of videotape also had an impact on sports coverage. As noted in the 
previous chapter, in 1959 a New York City television station began broadcasting full-
length videotape replays of a college football game that had been played earlier in the 
day. However, with videotape technology, broadcasts of live sporting events could be 
recorded on videotape and played back during the event, for later news segments, for 
sports round-up programs, and for on-air program promotions.14 Although slow-motion 
was a technique that had been introduced in sport films like the 1897 Corbett-
Fitzsimmons heavyweight championship fight (e.g., the solar plexus punch), it was not 
until April 1962 that slow motion instant replay was used during the BBC’s coverage of 









during CBS’s broadcast of the Army-Navy game on December 7, 1963.  
So pervasive did the use of videotape technology become that it changed not only 
what fans could see of a game, but it also altered the role of announcers from color 
commentators to analysts. Even more significantly, the technology changed television’s 
role in relation to the sports it covered. As Neal-Lunsford explains, “Television is not just 
a purveyor of sport to the viewing audience, it is an active participant in the conduct of 
sporting events.”16 That participation occurs in the way that instant replay is used to 
confirm or overturn on-field officiating decisions for many sports (e.g., football, hockey, 
soccer and tennis). Equally important from a journalistic perspective, videotape changed 
the way sports news was packaged and delivered. Until the arrival of videotape, scores 
and statistics were the primary discursive elements of the sport newscast; with videotape, 
highlights became the focal point. 
This chapter also explicates the commercial imperative that characterized 
television’s broadcasting of sports. As already demonstrated with the newsreel industry, 
buying the rights to sporting events, as well as securing access to cover events, was often 
a contentious and expensive undertaking. However, there is no question that sports 
helped draw an audience to television and spur the sale of television sets, in the very 
same way that sports helped radio to grow. With television, the pendulum swung quickly, 
in part thanks to a pair of rulings. The first was a 1936 FCC ruling that stipulated that the 
baseball teams and not the broadcasters owned the rights to disseminate the product.17 
The second came to be known as the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961 (15 USC 1291), 









without fear of anti-trust legislation.18 As Brad Schultz posits, this ruling “shifted power 
away from the sports provider toward the broadcaster, especially the networks.”19 In other 
words, because the networks utilized sports to fill their programming schedule, stations 
negotiated deals with individual teams. In the early years, the stations secured the 
broadcast rights for many sporting events inexpensively. Once television helped 
popularize sport, however, the professional leagues, as well as organizations like the 
International Olympic Committee, came to depend on the revenues from selling network 
television broadcast rights to offset escalating staging costs and players’ salaries. To 
justify their investment, the networks translated the higher rights fees into more 
sophisticated production values to attract larger audiences, which, in turn, allowed them 
to charge sponsors more expensive advertising rates. The networks enjoyed considerable 
control through the 1970s until the arrival of cable and the fragmentation of the television 
audience. 
In addition to technological, legal and economic factors that impacted sports 
broadcasting, a philosophical change about production was articulated by ABC’s Roone 
Arledge in a memo prepared during the summer of 1960. Shortly before ABC began 
telecasting college football on Saturday afternoons, Arledge composed a memo that Ron 
Powers characterized as “a feverish yet tightly reasoned burst of youthful idealism and 
exuberance … [that] foretold with almost unnerving accuracy the technological and 
philosophical future of television sports.”20 Arledge provided a summary of the memo’s 
major themes in bold letters mid-way through the document: “WE ARE GOING TO 









business was Arledge’s way of reconfiguring the relationship between televised sports 
and the audience. Arledge felt that the best way to “take the viewer to the game” was to 
“utilize every production technique that has been learned in producing variety shows, in 
covering political conventions, in shooting travel and adventure series to heighten the 
viewer’s feeling of actually sitting in the stands and participating personally”22 in the 
experience. The memo outlined the concepts that came to characterize ABC’s “up close 
and personal” coverage of sports. What Arledge articulated in this memo not only served 
as the template for ABC’s live coverage of college football, the Olympics and Monday 
Night Football, but also for the omnibus program that would be “Spanning the globe to 
bring you the constant variety of sport: The thrill of victory and the agony of defeat, the 
human drama of athletic competition.”23 That program was ABC’s Wide World of Sports.    
Lastly, this chapter explains the relationship between televised sport and viewers 
by considering how the audience’s migration from public to private space impacted the 
development of production values. In the early days of television before many individual 
homes were equipped with sets, programs were shown in restaurants, bars and 
neighborhood taverns. The installation of television sets in taverns changed the dynamic 
of that social space. Inhabiting a space of amusement that already had regimented 
practices and behaviors, television changed how taverns were aligned with other 
working-class diversions, provoking protests from motion picture exhibitors and sport 
team owners.24 Taverns also created a distinct market for large screen television, spurring 
the development of “direct view” systems for public viewing.25 As a means of viewing 









with both the spectacle and the context of that viewing.  
When the number of home television sets increased rapidly in the 1950s and 
1960s, the production values of sports broadcasting became more sophisticated and for 
the home viewer more entertaining. The entertainment ethos compromised sports 
journalism’s presentation of live events and its coverage of those events during the sports 
segments of newscasts. The television networks’ view of sports did not change with the 
growing commercialization of sports, and the complex ties between sport, media and 
business were largely unreported by broadcasters “who clearly viewed sport as a form of 
entertainment and had a vested interest in portraying sport in a particular light and 
context for a range of ideological and commercial reasons.”26  
A Bombshell Starts It All 
 The project to develop the first videotape recorder began in 1951 at the Ampex 
Corporation laboratories in Redwoods City, California. In its early days, the project was a 
rather low priority and was suspended twice—the first time in May of 1952 and again in 
June of 1953—in favor of other high priority company programs. In fact, as Charles 
Ginsburg, one of its engineers noted, the project enjoyed no continuous status until 
August 1954, although “a certain amount of progress had been made on specific 
problems by means of some very minuscule man hour and money allotments, some 
authorized and some bootlegged.”27 Eventually, a report was drafted that included a 
request for time to make modifications on the machine that became the Mark I. By the 
end of August Ginsburg and Charles Anderson demonstrated the Mark I for an Ampex 









the project. The project team was expanded to include Fred Pfost, Shelby Henderson, Ray 
Dolby and Alex Maxey, in addition to Ginsburg and Anderson.  
Although Ginsburg related that the work did not “flow from divine inspiration or 
a miraculous break through,”28 several major innovations—including varying tape 
tension and redesigning the individual magnetic heads—keyed the recorder’s 
development. By the end of 1955, the team demonstrated their improved model, which 
Ginsburg described as “a rather crude looking wooden cabinet containing a metal top 
plate and a few electronic units, which operated in conjunction with two partially filled 
19-inch standard equipment racks.”29 Having achieved considerable improvements in 
resolution and in signal-to-noise ratio thanks to the shift from fast-moving tape to fast-
moving heads, the team was instructed to package its machine more attractively and to 
prepare a “surprise demonstration” at the National Association of Radio and Television 
Broadcasters (NARTB) Convention in Chicago, scheduled for April 1956. That improved 
packaging resulted in the Mark IV (Illustration 5.1), which was successfully 
demonstrated to a group of thirty Ampex people in February 1956, whose response 
“shook the rafters of the building with shouting and hand clapping.”30  
Before demonstrating the Mark IV at the NARTB Convention, Ampex invited 
representatives from CBS, ABC, CBC and BBC to see separately the new invention. 
NBC’s parent company, RCA, was in the process of developing its own videotape 
recorder. Bill Lodge of CBS was impressed enough to invite Ampex to give a showing at 
the annual CBS Affiliate’s Meeting, scheduled for the day before the opening of the 









stage a simultaneous demonstration of the videotape recorder for the press at its Redwood 
City headquarters using the Mark III model. Despite almost constant refining, on the 
night before the affiliates meeting when Lodge saw the pictures the engineers were 
getting, he declared they were not good enough—the signal-to-noise ratio was too low 
and the noise banding was unacceptable.31 This time the team decided better tape was 
needed, and an emergency call was made to the chief physicist at Minnesota Mining and 
Manufacturing, better known as 3M. A total of ten minutes of new tape (Illustration 5.2) 
was produced overnight, rushed to the Minneapolis airport and surreptitiously passed to 
an Ampex employee on board a Chicago-bound airliner.32  
With two hundred CBS network affiliate representatives gathered, Lodge 
delivered a speech that was taped using the Mark IV. One attendee described what 
happened:  
… after a brief introduction from Bill, we were looking at pictures of ourselves on 
the monitors not only taken just seconds before, but of a quality that was hard to 
realize was actually electronically duplicated and not “live.” It took a few seconds 
before we realized the significance of what we had seen, and then, for all the 
world like a football crowd cheering Doak Walker or Bobby Lane trotting off the 
field after the winning touchdown, the entire audience rose to its feet and 
applauded spontaneously.33  
That the audience’s reaction was compared to a cheering football crowd points to the 










In his front-page story for the next day’s New York Times, Val Adams reported 
that the introduction of the device, the only one ready for commercial use, was “bound to 
set off long and arduous jurisdictional battles between various motion picture and 
television unions.”34 Adams detailed the differences between the Ampex recorder and 
RCA’s model, which had been first demonstrated in 1953, although that device used far 
more half-inch wide tape. Whereas the RCA recorder’s nineteen-inch reel could only 
record a quarter-hour program, the Ampex device could record sixty-five minutes of 
program on its fourteen-inch reel. Despite the recorded picture’s clarity, one minor 
distraction was noted. “Tiny white streaks shot across the screen here and there, 
indicating flaws in the recording.”35 In spite of this flaw, in a follow-up story the next day 
Adams reported that broadcasters and reporters who saw the demonstration “were 
amazed at the clarity of the tape-recorded picture.”36 CBS, which placed an order for 
three of the recorders, said that the first application “will be in the area of delayed 
broadcasts.”37 By the end of the convention, Adams reported that seventy-three recorders 
had been ordered, which represented gross sales of $3,800,000.38  
Although RCA presented “the first public demonstration of moving color pictures 
recorded on magnetic tape”39 in October, the entire tape-recorded portion lasted only two 
minutes. By the end of November, CBS used the Ampex Mark IV Video Tape Recorder 
to present a delayed broadcast of Douglas Edwards and the News on the West Coast, 
marking the first time that any video tape had been broadcast.40 In December, the New 
York Times reported that CBS had conducted a closed-circuit test in which Art 









air, was fed from Hollywood to CBS headquarters in New York City. CBS also disclosed 
that it was planning to record the Arthur Godfrey’s Talent Scouts program on tape and 
release the taped version to West Coast viewers “at the usual hour.”41 In the same story, 
Adams reported, “By coincidence, engineers and executive of the National Broadcasting 
Company also witnessed a private demonstration here yesterday of Ampex tape.”42 In 
January, NBC began daily telecasting of a live show, Truth or Consequences, from a pre-
recorded magnetic tape, and in April, ABC began using the Mark IV for delayed 
broadcasting at the beginning of daylight savings time.43  
Within a month, NBC and CBS combined to present almost twenty hours of tape 
recorded programming weekly, and on April 1, it was reported CBS “quietly transmitted 
a magnetically recorded version of ‘Cinderella’ to the West Coast last night, marking the 
first time ninety consecutive minutes of tape-recorded images have been telecast.”44 The 
New York Times article does not explain what was meant by “quietly transmitted,” 
although the playing of tape-recorded feature length films more than likely brought to the 
fore jurisdictional issues between the motion picture and television unions. The Times 
story also noted that the technical flaw of the white flash across the screen, or drop-out, 
was at a minimum. Engineers had determined that the flaw causing the drop-outs was in 
the tape and not the recorder. 
The impact of the Mark IV was felt by television network producers, who no 
longer had to create and distribute thousands of kinescopes, and by millions of viewers, 
who no longer had to watch an inferior picture of programs shown live elsewhere. As a 









WHEREAS FILMED TV LOOKS FILMED,” and “TAPE CAN BE PLAYED BACK 
IMMEDIATELY, ERASED, RE-USED, EDITED.”45 The technical benefits to 
broadcasters were almost immediately incorporated into programming, including creating 
time lapses, dissolves, and special effects, as well as allowing for immediate review of 
performances and for flexibility in covering events and scheduling production. It was 
3M’s latter point, however, which proved to have long-term implications, especially for 
archivists. Because video tape cost $306 for a reel, almost three times as much as film, 
the only way to make it cost effective was by reusing it over and over again. What 
broadcasters in the 1950s considered important was not longevity and stability but 
durability. As Jeff Martin explained, the question was not “whether a tape could survive 
decades on the shelf but whether it could survive multiple passes through the recorder 
without an unacceptable loss of quality, a loss perceived by deterioration visible to the 
home viewer.”46 Additionally, tape stock was often defective, so once a good tape was 
identified, having successfully recorded a program already, that tape would necessarily 
be reused, regardless of what had been previously recorded on it. Lastly, since most of 
the early videotape recorders were actually prototypes, “their hand-built record and 
playback heads were unique, and not compatible with one another—a tape recorded on 
one machine could only be played back on that machine.”47 Unfortunately, these factors 
contributed to the loss of a tremendous amount of early television programming. 
The Coup d’NBC 
Even before the arrival of videotape, CBS used kinescopes to get around the 









August 19, 1951, Val Adams reported that CBS “will film a selected college football 
game in its entirety on Saturday afternoons this fall and televise a one-hour condensation 
of the contest twenty-four hours later” and that some Sundays would offer “highlights of 
two games rather than one.”48 Since NBC owned the rights to televise one NCAA football 
game per week that season, CBS was using a highlights program to get around the newly-
imposed restrictions and NBC’s contractual exclusivity to televise college football live. 
Adams noted that CBS planned to use Red Barber and Dr. Mal Stevens to “offer ‘live’ 
commentary with the specially edited films.”49 This technique of offering “live” 
commentary over an edited film had its antecedent in “live” radio broadcasts of baseball 
games done from Western Union transcripts. It also became commonly used for sporting 
events that were videotaped and then edited for television omnibus programs. 
ABC used videotape to present a full-length replay of a college football game 
played earlier that day in 1959. The more important use of videotape for sports 
broadcasting, however, was its utilization for telecasting omnibus-format programs like 
the CBS Sports Spectacular and ABC’s Wide World of Sports. This latter program had, in 
part, been made possible as a result of ABC’s securing the rights to NCAA football on 
March 14, 1960, at New York City’s Royal Manhattan Hotel. On that day, NBC’s Tom 
Gallery, not recognizing any competitors, submitted his bid to the NCAA believing that 
no one was bidding against him. Ron Powers described what happened next. 
Now came the moment of Stanton Frankle. With the dramatic flourish of a 
stovepipe-hat villain emerging from the draperies in a riverboat melodrama, the 









heads swung toward him, Frankle—following Scherick’s orders to the finest 
detail—announced himself, thrust forward the ABC envelope and slapped it 
down. Gallery was trumped.50   
That coup, master-minded by Tom Moore and Ed Scherick, whose Sports Programs, Inc. 
company served as the foundation upon which ABC Sports was built, was not the last 
time ABC pilfered from the older network. The ascendancy of ABC Sports was largely 
attributable to Scherick’s bringing together a team that included Chet Simmons, Roone 
Arledge, Chuck Howard and Jim Spence.  
 Having secured the rights to NCAA football, Scherick and Moore attempted to 
develop a low-budget, regularly scheduled weekly program for the second quarter of the 
broadcast schedule, from April through July, featuring videotaped sports events that 
people would not mind watching on a delayed basis. They believed such an omnibus 
program would not only satisfy the needs of their affiliates, who were exasperated by the 
lack of ABC sports programming, but would also attract sponsors. Faced with the 
daunting prospect of having almost no money to secure the rights to established events 
and no idea how to sell the idea for a sports program without a name, Scherick 
approached Arledge and instructed him to find events they could tape between April and 
September. In turn, Arledge told Chuck Howard, his production assistant, to develop a 
list of events during that time period. When Howard questioned how he was going to do 
that, Arledge instructed him to venture to the NBC library and look through microfilm of 
New York Times sports sections by posing as Pat Hernon, who, while working at an NBC 









library, and Howard found everything he needed to compile his list in the NBC library.51 
Scherick then sent Arledge to the annual board meeting of the Amateur Athletic 
Union (AAU) in January 1961 where he secured the rights to all AAU events for 
$50,000, including track and field, gymnastics, swimming and diving, and the Soviet 
Union-American track meet. Getting advertisers to commit to a program still without a 
name proved difficult even when Scherick and Arledge promised agencies opportunities 
to advertise on NCAA football in the fall. Unable to secure sufficient sponsorship and 
facing an absolute deadline of March 31, Scherick was rescued by a not-so-unlikely hero, 
A. Craig Smith and the Gillette Safety Razor Company. When $30,000 of Gillette’s 
advertising budget that had been earmarked for the CBS Sports Spectacular suddenly 
became available after a rival shaving cream company bought an extra minute of 
advertising time, Gillette’s agency went to Scherick with the money. On the same day, R. 
J. Reynolds also decided “to take a chance on the unnamed, unstaffed, unwritten 
program,”52 and Scherick and Arledge suddenly had enough sponsorship. Finally, Chet 
Simmons suggested the name Wide World of Sports, adapted from NBC’s popular 
program, Wide, Wide World of Entertainment. Once again NBC provided an integral 
ingredient for ABC’s fledgling sports programming.        
Parades and Charades 
Although scholars point to the CBS Sports Spectacular as the format that ABC 
adapted to suit its new program, it should be noted that the omnibus-format had been 
conceived by the BBC. For example, the mid-week program Sportsview, introduced by 









and interviews, with much emphasis placed on sporting personalities.”53 In 1956 
Saturday evening’s Sports Special, the forerunner of Match of the Day later launched on 
BBC 2 in 1964 after the introduction of videotape, was “built on the back of the BBC’s 
exclusive deal with the Football League for edited filmed highlights.”54 Finally, 
Grandstand, introduced by David Coleman in 1958, brought together “previously 
disparate live outside broadcasts from sport under one umbrella programme, and was 
invariably structured around horseracing.”55 All of these programs predate the American 
programs, so it is reasonable to assume American producers were at least aware of the 
programs. Even if American producers were not aware of them, the omnibus format 
resembled the newsreels in terms of the variety of sports presented. 
 In March 1961, Scherick sold Sports Programs, Inc., and all its properties to ABC, 
including Wide World of Sports, for $500,000 in stock. After becoming the second largest 
individual stockholder at ABC and its vice-president in charge of sales, Scherick never 
again produced a sports program for the network he rescued from the television 
doldrums. In drawing up the guidelines for Wide World of Sports, Scherick wanted no 
demonstrations or exhibitions, demanding that the events be legitimately contested and 
resolved in the show. Although those guiding principles were followed, production 
values that emphasized place and personality characterized the presentation of Wide 
World of Sports. 
 Shot live on videotape for airing on a later Saturday, Wide World of Sports made 
its debut on April 29, 1961, with Jim McKay (McManus) serving as host and reporter. 









the globe by going from Acapulco, Mexico; to Le Mans, France; to Nagoya, Japan; to 
Moscow, Russia; to cover twenty-five different events in fifteen different sports.56 Also 
important were the technical innovations—capturing divers from the bottom of the pool 
as they entered the water, using the creepy-peepy hand-held camera to show Soviet and 
American track and field athletes joining hands as they paraded across the infield and in 
1965 transmitting the Grand Prix from Le Mans via the Early Bird communications 
satellite.57 Arguably, the element that made Wide World of Sports successful “sprang 
from the authenticity of the human characters.”58 That included not only a veritable 
parade of athletes who became well known—Olga Korbut, Evel Knievel, Dorothy 
Hamill, and A. J. Foyt—but also those cliff divers, barrel jumpers, demolition car drivers 
and others in “unheard-of events performed by people whose names were frequently 
unpronounceable, let alone familiar or beloved.”59 One such athlete, Yugoslavian ski 
jumper Vinko Bogataj, became an iconic figure who personified “the agony of defeat” in 
the show’s opening sequence, aired each and every week. At the show’s twentieth 
anniversary celebration, Bogataj was the only individual performer to receive a standing 
ovation, although in his own country, he was neither a hero nor well known.  
 Although the program was almost canceled after its first run in 1961 because of 
low ratings, Wide World of Sports telecasted over eight hundred shows and over twelve 
hundred hours of sports in its first twenty-five years.60 The program also spawned several 
spin-offs, the most notable being The American Sportsman with Curt Gowdy. The pilot 
aired in May 1963 on Wide World of Sports with a segment that featured Gowdy and 









Chile border. Gowdy and Brooks were paired against two Argentine fishing guides in a 
pseudo-competition in which “points were awarded for the most fish caught, the biggest 
fish, etc.”61 Not only can the legitimacy of the competition be questioned, but before long 
all three networks were producing other spin-offs that focused more on celebrity than 
competition. Shows such as Superstars, The Women Superstars, The World Superstars, 
The Superteams, Challenge of the Sexes, Celebrity Challenge of the Sexes, Dynamic 
Duos, US Against the World, The Battle of the Network Stars, and The First Annual [sic] 
Rock ‘n’ Roll Sports Classic became the vogue of the self-absorbed 1970s. Ron Powers 
explains that the corruption implicit in these made-for-television sports programs lay 
neither in the phoniness of the competition, nor in the presence of celebrities. “It lay in 
the premeditated, coolly disinterested attempt to package an audience attitude along with 
the packaged event. This phony packaging of attitude would prove to be among the most 
corrosive elements in American televised sports’ progressive decline from excellence.”62  
That phony packaging soon extended beyond televised sports as reality programming 
firmly took root in prime time television in the 1990s. 
 Videotape and communications satellites certainly changed the way the American 
networks approached telecasting sporting events that originated in Europe and the Far 
East. The most common solution was to offer the event on tape-delay, as Wide World of 
Sports often did, or to offer same-day tape-delayed coverage, especially for World 
Championship and Olympic events. Time-shifting effectively solved the problem of not 
having to telecast an event (e.g., Australian Open tennis championships) at 3 a.m. when 









issue surfaced, namely, the restriction of news of the event’s outcome before the 
videotape was scheduled to air. While the producers of Wide World of Sports often 
counted on their audience not knowing the results of many events, the problem of other 
news organizations reporting the results has become more pronounced in today’s nonstop 
news cycle.  
Moreover, the practice of recording events on videotape was also used when time 
was not the issue, but the event’s length did not fit into the program schedule. Videotape 
allowed producers and editors a way to edit down long events to fit into a specified time 
frame. The event was videotaped in its entirety with announcers providing commentary 
as the event unfolded. That tape then was edited to eliminate long, boring or 
inconsequential stretches. To create a seamless, tightly edited product, the announcers re-
narrated the edited version on videotape, which Klatell and Marcus explain, greatly 
enhanced “their ability to anticipate events in the race, or comment on something which 
might happen (and usually did).”63 In this way, television created the appearance of 
providing live and objective “descriptions and accounts,” when in fact the product was 
stripped of its “liveness” in favor of an artificial, scripted package in which suspense, 
sequence and narrative were manufactured. Klatell and Marcus posit that the practice 
raised a question about whether this constituted “merely an intelligent utilization of 
television technology to enhance its audiences’ enjoyment, or was it a charade which 
undercut the pretense of journalism and objectivity?”64  
A-synchronicity 









satellites—Telstar in 1962, Syncom III in 1964 and Early Bird in 1965—were used to 
broadcast television across the oceans. In the New York Times, Jack Gould reported that 
the successful transmission of French and British television signals on July 11, 1962, 
would spur governmental agencies and the networks “to prepare for the new era in global 
communications” in which television would become “the dominant medium for speaking 
directly to the peoples of the world.”65 Gould explained that the Kennedy Administration 
“hoped to keep the problems of international television separate from those of domestic 
video.”66 Those domestic problems had lingered ever since FCC Chairman Newton N. 
Minow characterized “much of television programming as a ‘wasteland.’”67 Another 
question that needed to be addressed, Gould noted, revolved around “the extent that 
commercial broadcasters can be asked to make the sacrifice of donating evening time at 
home in order to assure the presentation of the American position abroad.”68 Broadcast 
executives were reportedly concerned about the costs of trans-Atlantic transmissions and 
“that as a practical matter Telstar programs will be limited to major news events with 
Television stations on both sides of the Atlantic deciding what they would carry.”69  
In a separate story published on the same day, the New York Times reported that 
Japanese officials and scientists were impressed by Telstar’s success. Ichiro Matsui, an 
Olympic official in charge of television planning, said that the Telstar project “is a very 
hopeful sign for live televising of Olympic events, but there are still a number of 
problems to be solved.”70 In August, the Times reported that the United States and Japan 
had agreed “to hold technical talks…to determine whether live telecasting of the 









was any mention of network executives and to what extent they would be involved in the 
endeavor of international cooperation.  
In January 1964, the Times reported that “urgent studies” were being conducted 
by the newly formed Communications Satellite Corporation (CSC) to see whether the 
next Syncom satellite, Syncom III, scheduled for a July launch, “might be able to 
transmit pictures sufficiently improved so that commercial broadcasts would be 
possible.”72 Manufactured by the Hughes Aircraft Company, Syncom III was to be 
orbited at the synchronous altitude of 22,300 miles above the Equator, which would 
allow for continuous live broadcasts because the satellite would keep pace with the 
Earth’s west-to-east rotation (Illustration 5.3). Previously, satellites could only transmit 
signals while in line of sight with both coasts, usually for less than an hour. Because of 
the synchronous orbit, Syncom III would remain at a fixed point in range of both the 
Japanese and California coasts. Despite these promising developments, Richard Witkin 
reported NBC was planning “to fly films by jet across the Pacific. Events would go on 
the air here anywhere from 10 to 14 hours after they took place.”73 Although plans for at 
least some live coverage had been “bandied about for many months,” there was still only 
“an outside chance that television audiences here will have extended live coverage of the 
Olympic Games in Tokyo this fall.”74   
Prospects for live coverage of the 1964 Tokyo Games remained dim after a test 
was conducted in late April by representatives from NASA and NBC. The test used 
Syncom II, hovering near the West Coast, to relay pictures from an antenna at Fort Dix, 









Maine, before being relayed to NBC studios by coaxial cable. The New York Times 
reported, “Officials of both organizations adjudged the pictures not of standard 
commercial quality but adequate for brief broadcasts of important events.”75 Not 
surprisingly, the Japanese representative, Dr. H. Uyeda, was more enthusiastic about the 
quality of the reception than the U. S. representatives. Underscoring the sensitivity of the 
negotiations, the State Department was reported to have written to the CSC, which served 
as the carrier responsible for setting up a receiving station on the West Coast, “asking it, 
in the national interest, to look into the possibility of live TV coverage of the 
Olympics.”76 Providing live coverage of the Olympic Games may have been deemed “in 
the national interest” by the State Department, but it was not of considerable interest to 
NBC’s executives. 
When the 1964 Tokyo Games opened on October 10, 1964, NBC provided live 
coverage of the opening ceremony on the East Coast of the United States from 1-3 a.m. 
The broadcast was relayed by the Syncom III satellite, which had been launched into a 
synchronous orbit in July and provided pictures that Jack Gould described as 
extraordinary. “They were so rich in detail that they often seemed superior to pickups 
made under ideal lighting conditions in studios.”77 Although President Johnson and 
Secretary of State Dean Rusk hailed the plan for live Olympic telecasts as “a stimulus to 
friendship between peoples,” NBC balked at the plan, explaining that long before anyone 
knew Syncom III would be aloft and working, “it had been necessary for NBC to arrange 
a schedule of Olympic broadcasts.”78 That schedule included an arrangement providing 









Coast “to avoid interfering with commercial programming, including the Tonight show 
with Johnny Carson.”79 NBC offered no further live telecasts of the Tokyo Games. 
The incident provides ample evidence that the commercial interests of NBC were 
asynchronous with the desires of the State Department, the Japanese Embassy in 
Washington, D.C., and the CSC. In a scathing review titled “When TV Lost the 
Olympics,” New York Times reporter Jack Gould lamented the recurring problem 
between “the exciting wonders of science and the harsh practicalities of commerce.”80 
Gould noted the significance of the experience—the remarkable progress of electronic 
transmission of signals, as well as overcoming the element of time—in terms that he 
admitted were idealistic. “The potential of Syncom 3 and its successors as instruments for 
advancing world unity and understanding was so vividly apparent that one’s imagination 
inevitably ran off in all directions.”81 While all the organizations that had worked so 
tirelessly “to achieve the scientific collaboration between countries expressed 
disappointment,” David Sarnoff, chairman of NBC who was in Japan for the Olympics, 
“could not understand the adverse reaction from Washington.”82 Gould scoffed at the 
notion that the incident could be rationalized by contractual provisions, however valid 
they might be. “Such is the importance of TV and the international interest in the medium 
that it becomes a commentary on American values when the rest of the world hears that 
this country makes a moment of history subordinate to the fate of a cluster of advertising 
spot announcements in California.”83 Gould berated NBC for neglecting its trusteeship of 
the public airwaves and its failure to recognize that at times national interest will 









concluded succinctly, “Isolationist TV is a contradiction in terms.”84 Despite Gould’s 
condemnation, NBC’s coverage of the 1964 Tokyo Games, comprised of tape-delayed, 
highly edited filmed highlights, was a harbinger of the way NBC presented the Olympics.         
Scoring Again and Again 
 In addition to tape delaying telecasts, videotape was a technology that allowed for 
other noteworthy uses in telecasting sports. Arguably, the most significant use of 
videotape in sports telecasting was the development of instant replay. As early as 1955 
George Retzlaff, head of sports for the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) and 
producer of Hockey Night in Canada, experimentally used a "hot processor" to develop a 
kinescope (film) recording of a goal within thirty seconds for "almost instant" replay.85 
Although he used the process in a live telecast, he had not forewarned MacLaren 
Advertising, which expressed displeasure at not being able to promote the new feature. 
Additionally, the Montreal studio, one of two Canadian studios that produced Hockey 
Night in Canada each Saturday, was not equipped to produce such a replay, and the CBC 
had a rule that hockey productions from both centers had to look alike. Retzlaff did not 
use the technology again.  
A year later, ABC announced that it had installed a speeded-up process for 
recording a live television program on film and playing it back within an hour.86 Several 
years later, Roone Arledge related that while in Japan to secure the rights for the Japanese 
All-Star baseball game, he watched a samurai epic and became intrigued by a scene 
filmed in slow motion. After returning to the United States, he explained what he had 









motion effect with television. Arledge explained: “We’d tape the action, and as it 
replayed on an orthicon camera tube, tape it again with another camera running at half 
speed. Voila, we’d have slow motion.”87 After considerable experimentation and 
refinement to eliminate the picture flickering and drop-outs (i.e., lines running through 
it), Arledge debuted the special effect during halftime of a college football broadcast on 
Thanksgiving Day 1961. The replay of a made field goal originated from a videotape 
machine in New York City rather than the ABC remote truck. The following weekend, 
Arledge’s production team again utilized the effect, showing a seventy-yard scoring run 
in which the player appeared to move “with dreamlike grace…. Watching, I saw the 
future open up before me.”88 However, Arledge’s memory of instant success was only 
partially reliable in that ABC refused at that time to allocate a budget to develop the 
technique any further.  
Instant replay was first used during CBS’s telecast of the Army-Navy football 
game on December 7, 1963, after Tony Verna, a director, solved the problem of how to 
rewind and replay videotape immediately after a play. Verna explained: 
In those days there were no such things as footage counters or electronic readouts. 
It wasn’t like film. When we rewound the tape we didn’t know where we were. I 
finally ordered one of my technicians to coordinate a “beep” tone to the point at 
which the quarterback took the snap.89  
Attempts to employ the technique during the early parts of the game failed until Verna 
and his technicians finally cued up usable footage of Army quarterback Rollie Stichweh 









explain the replay. Taking his cue literally, Nelson repeated to the audience: “This is a 
videotape! They did not score again! They did not score again!”90 During the following 
season, instant replay became a regular part of sports telecasts.         
     Instant replay’s impact on sport telecasts was significant, resulting in what 
Margaret Morse refers to as a representation of considerable deformation through “spatial 
compression and temporal elongation and repetition.”91 When instant replays are shown, 
time is manipulated in order to dramatize and analyze action that has just occurred. 
Morse posits that instead of bringing perspective to the game’s overall geometry, instant 
replay tends to emphasize “only points of action and body contact.”92 Not only is the 
overall geometry of the game lost in the camera’s myopic gaze, but the television screen 
itself becomes a canvas on which multiple, fragmented images are displayed. As 
Geneviève Rail explains, “Split screens and screen windows concentrate events that are 
diffuse in space, while highlights concentrate events that are diffuse in time. In several 
ways, mediated sport defies localization and adds to the effacing of history.”93 This 
transformation of televised sport means in one sense that the images were no longer 
subject to the laws of linear space and uni-directional time. With slow-motion instant 
replay, the world of speed and violent collisions was transformed into a dance-like 
beauty. Morse argues that in telecasting sports, the operational aesthetic is to “bare the 
device, allowing the enormous capital investment in sport itself and in broadcasting 
technology to gleam through the ‘live’ event, exhibiting the highest production values in 
regularly scheduled television.”94  









music, amplification of field noises, collages, superimposed graphics, rapid cuts, 
computer simulations, color arrangements, and shocking images. Gary Whannel suggests 
that in order to dissect this complex combination of visual and auditory techniques, “it is 
more useful to think in terms of conflicting tensions between attempts to achieve 
transparency and desire to build in entertainment values.”95 
On the other hand, slow-motion instant replays can be treated as part of 
hermeneutic process of scientific discovery. They allowed for the analysis and 
appreciation of complicated choreography, the nuances of which were normally 
inaccessible to view. Instant replays also presented the commentator(s) with the 
opportunity to judge individual performance, evaluating it as well as setting it in 
statistical and biographical perspective.96 Morse notes that “as his name implies, the 
color-man is also responsible for the spectacle aspect of the game, for conveying the 
enthusiasms of the crowd vocally, inviting discharge.”97 This dual capacity has justifiably 
lent special effects innovations and the accompanying discourse an aura of scientificity.  
In terms of scientificity, the camera’s ability to capture mistakes was not always 
welcomed at sporting events. Raymond Fielding noted that toward the end of the 1920s, 
sports promoters barred slow-motion cameras from sports events when “footage revealed 
gross errors in the judgments of umpires and referees, resulting in complaints from sports 
enthusiasts and gamblers.”98 In 1961, at almost the same time that Arledge introduced 
slow-motion replays during halftime, the New York Times reported that a local television 
station would show “TV highlights of the disputed Notre-Dame-Syracuse football game 









Dame that became the point of contention for Syracuse.”99 Invariably, with more and 
more slow-motion instant replays came more disputes related to officiating. Morse notes 
that the technology “allows the viewer to outguess the referee and see what ‘really’ 
happened.”100 Morse’s analysis proved prophetic, for as camera and replay technology 
improved, the use of instant replay not only served to entertain the viewer, it became an 
active participant in the conduct of sporting events. In the case of professional and 
collegiate football, hockey, tennis and basketball, instant replay is now “an integral part 
of how the game is conducted as field officials consult with replay officials to determine 
whether or not certain calls should stand.”101  
Segmentation and Routine 
Videotape and special effects techniques allowed for other uses besides in-game 
replays. Other notable uses of videotape occurred in the preparation of highlights for 
inclusion in the sports segment of newscasts and on-air promotions for both network 
sports events and entertainment programming. As David Rowe posits, “A single sports 
‘live’ TV broadcast can be shown in ‘real time’ and endlessly afterwards, and can be cut 
up and packaged in myriad ways, with its soundtrack separated from its visual images so 
that both can be continually manipulated and reproduced.”102 With the advent of 
videotape, the use of the sportscast highlight form was greatly facilitated.  
In explicating the importance of the sportscast highlight form to convey narratives 
through moving images and audio commentary, it is worth considering the special 
placement of sports within the newscast. The positioning of sports in the social 









culture and has a direct bearing on the coverage of sport, identity, race, gender and 
ethnicity. Stuart Hall pointed out that sports are set off, “in a world distinct from other 
kinds of news, self-contained and self-sufficient. It has its own internal ranking of big and 
small stories, its own climaxes and fillers. It has its own news order of stories.”103 A 
comparable positioning occurs in local television news coverage wherein the sports 
segment is relegated to its own three- to five-minute slot after news and weather. 
Television news’ positioning of sports followed the pattern that was established in the 
newsreels. Within that positioning, sports stories were, and continue to be, reported based 
on traditional values related to timeliness, proximity, significance and oddity. To those 
traditional news values must be added the availability of videotaped material in highlight 
form, shot either by the television station itself, provided by the local sports teams, or 
acquired directly from the networks.  
This positioning of sports within the televised newscast also reflected the general 
place of sports in our culture. Hall and other scholars described this as a well-defined 
enclave, “one of whose major attractions is that it has little or no relation to the rest of the 
news.”104 Even before the advent of cable stations devoted strictly to live sports 
broadcasting and news programming, local television stations were able to include scores 
and highlights, breaking news, and previews of upcoming events. As Klatell and Marcus 
note, “The sheer tonnage of material available through broadcasting, combined with its 
immediacy and ability to beat most newspaper deadlines by hours, eventually forced a 
change on newspaper sports sections.”105 Despite this distinct advantage over 









accommodate breaking news. As noted in the previous chapter, sports news ended up in 
local newscasts because sports news programs in the late 1940s and early 1950s failed to 
attract enough of an audience to hold a prime time slot. The sports segment remained a 
viable part of the newscast primarily because it provided coverage of local sports teams. 
Perhaps because of the narrow range of news historically covered by television stations, 
sports ranked at or near the bottom in most late twentieth century research polls as to why 
people watch local television news.106 For example, in a 1998 poll conducted by the 
Radio and Television News Directors Foundation, the percentage of people (two percent) 
who watched local news because of sports matched those that said they watched because 
there were no other choices on television.107 
An End Run into Congress 
Although commercial television did not begin until 1941 and was quickly 
curtailed by World War II, early telecasts provided ample opportunities for advertisers to 
hawk their wares. During early broadcasts, announcers got around the FCC restrictions 
against commercial sponsorship by “holding up examples of each sponsor’s product as he 
[Red Barber] read their advertising copy.”108 Another way advertisers circumvented the 
restrictions stemmed from the exposure television cameras inadvertently provided when 
billboards along a field’s perimeter were included within the frame of action. The trade 
journal Broadcasting noted, “Sponsors of ball games will have to take over the billboards 
at the parks…or see other advertisers get as much benefit from telecasts as they do.”109 
Despite the rather limited number of television sets in use when the first FCC-approved 









like Bulova Watch Company quickly recognized the potential of sports productions as a 
vehicle for advertisements.  
Sponsors like Gillette became identified with specific programs, which proved to 
be mutually beneficial. Thanks largely to its sponsorship of NBC’s Cavalcade of Sports, 
which began in 1946 under that name and then became the Gillette Cavalcade of Sports 
in 1948, Gillette’s share of the shaving products market rose from sixteen percent in the 
1930s to more than sixty percent in the late 1950s.110 As previously noted, rights fees and 
production costs in the formative years of sports broadcasting were relatively 
inexpensive. Sports like boxing, wrestling and roller derby, all of which became staples 
for early sports broadcasts, cost little to produce because they took place in a small indoor 
arena which provided ample lighting for the bulky and difficult to maneuver cameras that 
could capture the action and close-ups of the participants. Additionally, rights fees for 
regular season baseball and college football games were reasonably priced, ranging from 
$1,000 per baseball game to $3,000 for college football. For example, the DuMont 
network paid the New York Yankees $75,000 for the rights to regular season games in 
1947.111 Almost a decade later, CBS purchased the rights to NFL regular season games 
for $750,000, and earned more than one million dollars in advertising sales.112 It did not 
take long for professional teams and leagues to realize that rights fees for broadcasting 
their games was a virtual gold mind that could be exploited. The key development 
occurred a decade later when league teams pooled their rights.  
In 1961, the federal government challenged the new two-year $9.3 million 









exclusive right to televise all League games.”113 Under the terms of the contract, the NFL 
was to distribute that money equally among the fourteen teams. The government sought 
restoration of the situation as it existed prior to the execution of the contract, arguing that 
the NFL and its member clubs “combined and conspired to violate the Sherman Anti-
Trust Act.”114 This complaint was, in fact, the very same one the Justice Department had 
made when it originally filed a complaint on October 9, 1951. In that case, United States 
v. National Football League, 1953, Judge Allan K. Grim ruled that the agreement to 
prevent the broadcast of home games was a restraint of trade, but “such restraint was not 
always illegal,” holding that “the restraint in this case was reasonable in order that the 
league be able to ensure attendance at home games…”115  
In his written opinion for United States v. National Football League, 1961, Judge 
Grim noted that the 1961 contract between CBS and the NFL marked a basic change in 
television policy whereby implicitly the member clubs agreed to pool their rights and sell 
the package of pooled television rights. Grim ruled that “by agreement, the member clubs 
of the League have eliminated competition among themselves in the sale of television 
rights to their games.”116 Teams were enjoined from making any agreement separately, 
“having the purpose or effect of restricting the areas within which broadcasts or telecasts 
of games may be made.”117  
Over the next several weeks, the NFL launched its appeal both in the courts and in 
the court of public opinion. Pete Rozelle, NFL commissioner who had negotiated the 
contract with CBS, predicted the decision would have a “far-reaching effect on televised 









balance, which, they argued, was directly tied to the equal distribution of television 
revenues, an impossibility if each team were to negotiate its own deal. Bert Rose, owner 
of the NFL’s newest team, the Minnesota Vikings, noted that Judge Grim’s decision 
“would make it impossible for the team so affected to compete on equal terms with 
selected franchises able to sell their television rights for substantial fees. The final end 
would be the destruction of the balance which has made competition in the NFL so 
interesting for hundreds of thousands of football fans across the nation.”119  
On July 26, the New York Times reported that the NFL had submitted two 
petitions to Judge Grim “in an effort to proceed with TV schedule of ninety-eight games, 
starting Sept. 17.”120 The first petition asked Judge Grim for a modification of the 1953 
decree to permit arrangements with a single network for the televising of its games. The 
second petition requested permission to go ahead with its schedule of telecasts, due to the 
time necessary for a modification to the 1953 decree. At the hearing, Rozelle told Judge 
Grim that if the NFL’s contract with CBS were disallowed, “only half of the fourteen-
team league will wind up with TV coverage in 1962.”121 Judge Grim asked Justice 
Department lawyers whether they believed “television contracts involving such groups as 
the National Collegiate Athletic Association, National Basketball Association and the 
American Football League (AFL) were legal.”122 Lawyers for the government told the 
judge that several of the contracts were being investigated by the anti-trust division and 
that they doubted their legality. Of particular interest to the NFL, of course, was the 
television contract signed by the AFL with ABC, granting the network “a package deal” 









“without package television professional football would cease to exist” and that the NFL 
would be unable to compete with the AFL, which had a package deal.123  
Having floated such dire consequences, the NFL proceeded with its plan to 
provide for the same coverage as it had the preceding season whereby fans would get the 
road games of their home team televised. Behind the scenes, NFL executives lobbied 
members of Congress to have packaged contracts exempted from antitrust laws. In early 
fall, a bill legalizing single-network television contracts by professional sports leagues 
was introduced in Congress by Representative Emanuel Celler (D-N.Y.). It passed the 
House and Senate and was signed into law by President John F. Kennedy, September 30. 
By passing The Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961 (Public Law 87-331; 75 Stat. 732), 
which granted antitrust immunity to any agreement among the clubs in the professional 
leagues—baseball, basketball, football, and hockey—the U. S. Congress countered Judge 
Grim’s ruling and allowed each league to pool and sell their broadcast rights to sponsored 
telecasts of league games. The New York Times noted, “Instead of taking on the court, the 
league made an ‘end run’ into Congress and had packaged contracts exempted from the 
antitrust laws.”124 The bill also offered a provision protecting college football by 
“preventing the telecasting of professional football games on Friday night or Saturday 
within a seventy-five-mile radius of a college game.”125  
Although many local, independent television stations opposed the law, The Sports 
Broadcasting Act was passed mainly on the merits of providing equal shares of 
broadcasting revenues equally among league teams, as well as protecting gate attendance, 









Sports Broadcasting Act, the NFL and CBS signed a four-year deal worth $4.65 million 
annually. Additionally, the fees the networks paid for the national regular-season rights 
began a steady climb that today continues unabated. For example, the rights to telecast 
MLB climbed from $2.0 million in 1962 to $5.7 million in 1967 to $12 million in 1977. 
The rights to NFL games climbed from $6.5 million in 1965, followed by contracts that 
climbed to $27.7 million and $50.1 million annually.126 Without question, pooling proved 
to be one of the most financially rewarding strategies the professional sports leagues have 
employed, and as Ira Horowitz noted, “the TV exposure has provided free advertising 
that has undoubtedly helped at the gate.”127  
Another impact of the Sports Broadcasting Act was the leverage that it gave to the 
major sponsors. Sponsorship of network sports programming has distinct advantages 
despite the increased costs that accompany each new rights deal signed by the 
professional leagues and the networks. The networks justified the increased rights fees by 
selling advertising time at commensurately higher prices. National advertisers were 
willing to pay these prices, Horowitz noted, “when the sponsor is guaranteed a large 
viewing audience that will not be offered a comparable, simultaneously telecast 
alternative.”128 Horowitz also explained that due to the absence of any competitive 
alternatives, producers of like products were denied the opportunities to air their 
promotional messages to sports audiences. Thus, for the national advertisers that tended 
to dominate sports sponsorships, rights pooling allowed under the Sports Broadcasting 
Act has “afforded certain sponsors unique TV advertising opportunities that, if truly 









Because sports programming attracts the most desirable demographic, comprised of the 
18-49-year-old age group, sponsors of network sports are assumed to be reaching a 
captive audience that is “especially ready, willing, and able to purchase the sponsors’ 
products.”130  
Moreover, those national advertisers that can afford sponsorship of network sports 
acquire an extremely cost-efficient national advertising medium. Horowitz argued, 
“Sports programs represent unique sponsorship opportunities for a relatively small set of 
firms in a relatively small set of industries.”131 Those industries include firms that sell 
automobiles, automobile-related products, and petroleum products, firms that sell tobacco 
products, clothing, and toiletry articles, as well as brewers and firms that provide travel-
related and financial services.132 For example, in 1966, four companies—Gillette, 
Chrysler, R. J. Reynolds, and Falstaff Brewing—each paid $5 million for one-quarter of 
NBC’s Game of the Week baseball coverage. This represented expenditures ranging from 
twelve to fifty percent of their total advertising budgets.133 Of the top one hundred 
television sponsors, only twenty-three were among the major sponsors of network sports; 
conversely, the principal network television sponsors such as Proctor & Gamble and 
Bristol-Meyers are not heavily involved in sports sponsorships.134  
Interdependence and Co-promotion 
 The business of televised sports is to deliver a large audience to the advertisers. 
As such, the leagues and teams, advertisers and broadcasters share an interdependence in 
developing and maintaining an audience interested in watching sports. Accomplishing 









controversy”135 to generate interest in the product. Controlling this blend has largely 
become the preserve of sports management and sports public relations specialists, who 
interpose themselves between journalists and team players and coaches in order to 
maximize return on sponsors’ investments. These tightly controlled conditions impact 
sports journalists in several ways, including selection of on-air announcers, the tendency 
to avoid criticism of contractual partners, and the practice of giving prominence to those 
events being broadcast by particular stations. 
 Until Roone Arledge stood up to NCAA executive director Walter Byers, the 
NCAA attempted to exert pressure on the networks in terms of which announcers did the 
telecasts. The NCAA was not alone in this regard. Klatell and Marcus posit that “in the 
majority of broadcast contracts, the selection of announcers is either shared with, or 
granted outright to, the rights holder.”136 Not only have teams and television stations 
cooperated to make sure announcers refrain from undue criticism of the league, team, 
owner and players, but announcers have been enlisted to serve as the spokesperson in 
advertising campaigns featuring local companies. Some even have their own 
endorsement contracts with advertisers. Because advertising and sponsorship 
commitments are negotiated long before a sporting event is telecast, “advertisers are 
rightfully nervous about the future performance of a team in which they have invested 
their clients’ budgets.”137 Not surprisingly, the interdependence has reinforced the 
tendency to downplay negative news and cast everything that happens during a game or 
season in the best possible light.  









vested interest in presenting the event in the best possible light. This includes the telecast 
of the event itself, the pre- and post-game shows that wrap around the game, and the 
halftime show. All of these elements became integral parts of the broadcast, not only to 
serve a journalistic function of bringing the accounts and descriptions to the viewer, but 
also to inspire the interest and adulation of the viewing public. The codification of 
production values for coverage of sporting events evolved over the first three decades of 
television; however, the main tenets were articulated by ABC’s Roone Arledge shortly 
before ABC began its coverage of NCAA college football in 1960. Arledge wanted to 
bring the viewing audience to the game by making viewers familiar with the host 
campus, by providing impact shots of the coaches, players, cheerleaders and people in the 
stands, and by supplying human drama—bringing the players to the audience in up close 
and personal ways—i.e., “by means of pictures of them in their normal street attire.”138 
These “delightful adornments,” as Arledge referred to them, were complemented by 
using “video tape recorders to enable us to replay the decisive plays of the first half 
during the half-time break.”139  
Thanks to videotaped highlights, halftime for the television viewers included 
much more than the pageantry of marching bands. In fact, halftime highlights became 
significantly more important in 1970 when ABC re-introduced a sports program into the 
prime-time flow with Monday Night Football (MNF). The six- to seven-minute package 
of the NFL’s best games combined highlights into a montage that utilized both the 
technology of videotape and filmed footage shot by NFL Films crews the previous day. 









narrated the package, working from only a “bare-bones play sheet.”140 Cosell 
unquestionably elevated what MacCambridge posits had been “the sweet and empty 
cadences of a generation of highlights readers.”141 MacCambridge doubtlessly was 
referring to the commentary provided by newsreel sports announcers and the early 
television announcers who reported sports in local newscasts. MacCambridge explains 
the significance of Cosell’s work: 
At a time when an easy relay of highlights was sharply limited, and when NFL 
Films’ highlight package This Week in Pro Football didn’t air until the following 
Saturday in most markets, the halftime highlights package became a powerful 
vehicle. Even in blowouts, the audience numbers stayed strong through the 
halftime package.142 
Monday Night Football’s halftime show of highlights marks another important step in the 
evolution of the highlight form, one that placed a premium on affect in the attempt to 
keep the audience entertained when no on-field action was available. 
    With increased use of highlights to entertain the audience tuned into live telecasts, 
to report on completed games and events, and to promote upcoming games, a gradual re-
orientation occurred in the level of sports news self-promotion among competing 
networks. Increasingly, both networks and local stations presented news reports of, and 
promotions for, those events to which they held the rights and access. The larger the 
event and the costlier the rights to telecast the event, the more pronounced co-promotion 
was utilized to maximize viewership. Klatell and Marcus argue, “The urge to build and 









their integrity.”143 Klatell and Marcus cite several examples to illustrate how the networks 
signed exclusive contracts with several boxers who had won gold medals at the 1976 
Montreal Olympics. Owning the rights to telecast the fights of these boxers, the network 
never bothered to inform audiences that “these boxers were, in effect, employees of the 
telecasting network.”144 Networks not only routinely used name athletes to promote 
events they would be telecasting, but they often employed expert commentators (e.g., 
Dick Button, Donald Dell) who also owned production companies for the sports which 
they promoted and then commented on. What strains the ethical fabric was not the use of 
these promoters as commentators per se, but, as Klatell and Marcus explain, “the 
network’s unwillingness to disclose these conflicts [of interest] during the telecasts, so 
that viewers could, indeed, decide whether their existence was bothersome.”145  
 In the two decades following the introduction of videotape and the proliferation of 
highlights, television sports journalism rarely investigated, critiqued or reported on the 
increasingly important role that sponsors and other commercial interests exerted on 
mediated sport presentations. Both televised event coverage and sports reporting 
struggled to attract and maintain an audience to deliver to advertisers. Raymond Boyle 
explains that under these conditions, the networks often deferred to sports stars and the 
organizations to which they were commercially beholden. As the commercial dimensions 
of the industry grew substantially in the next two decades, Boyle argues that television’s 
view of sports remained unchanged. “Indeed, the increasingly complex ties between 
sport, media and business were going largely unreported by broadcasters who clearly 









particular light and context for a range of ideological and commercial reason.”146 
Television’s approach was to become even more commercial in its presentation of sports.   
The Ecstasy of Communication 
Cultivating an audience for television sports was predicated on the same rationale 
that had spurred the growth of radio—generating enough interest in programming so that 
listeners/viewers would purchase sets. On July 2, 1921, WJY broadcast the heavyweight 
championship fight between Jack Dempsey and Georges Carpentier, the French 
champion. More important than Dempsey’s fourth round knockout of his opponent were 
the behind-the-scenes ramifications in which RCA chief David Sarnoff and promoter Tex 
Rickard cooperated to arrange for radio sets and loudspeakers to be set up at locations 
throughout the eastern United States at which admission was charged to collect funds for 
“aid to devastated France.”147 The broadcast audience was estimated at 300,000. Erik 
Barnouw argues, “Thus sports excitement, interest in radio, patriotism, and 
humanitarianism were all skillfully channeled into a formidable promotion for the age of 
broadcasting.”148 Not only was the demand for radio sets now assured, but sports was 
also implicated in the seduction of consumers whereby broadcasts delivered “the 
commodity of audiences to advertising producers and the advertised commodities of 
producers to the consumer audiences.”149  
Television cultivated its audience in the years following World War II within the 
neighborhood tavern. In 1946 only eight thousand television sets had been sold to people 
in the New York City area. The following year, sales of television sets increased to 









in 1948 as more and more stations cropped up west of the Mississippi River. By the mid-
1950s over seven and one-half million television sets were in use, and some television 
shows were receiving higher ratings than radio’s top-rated program, Lux Radio 
Theatre.150 The path to home viewing of television traveled through the neighborhood 
tavern, evidenced by a 1947 survey that showed most viewers watched from the tavern 
rather than from home.151 According to Business Week, tavern patrons preferred sports 
and news to other types of programs. When bar owners began to advertise that sports 
were available for viewing, baseball owners threatened to prohibit baseball telecasting in 
the future. First motion picture exhibitors and later local liquor boards considered 
initiatives to curtail the use of televisions in taverns. Anna McCarthy notes, “The 
barroom was no longer simply a place for community leisure, it had become a place of 
public, mass amusement and a competitor to the stadium in the market of sports 
spectatorship.”152 Bar owners quickly realized the opportunities that mediated sports 
programming afforded them, including raising prices, imposing drink minimums, and 
suspending draft beer sales in favor of more expensive bottled beer during important 
sports telecasts.  
Televised sports also changed the social dynamic within the bar, since more often 
than not people came to the bar to watch television and not for the social drinking 
experience; these viewers also drank more slowly, tended to leave as soon as the game 
was over, and made regulars feel unwelcome. In 1948, the New York Times reported, 
“Thanks to the intrusion of a garrulous pictorial contraption called television, the thirsty 









momentary rewards; as a curb on freedom and continuity of speech, it can only breed 
resentment.” 153 From its very beginning then, televised sports programming clearly 
impacted the social sphere of the bar, providing a venue for spectatorship instead of a 
space of interpersonal communication. 
 As viewing habits shifted from the social sphere to the home, audiences readily 
came to expect sports programming to be entertaining. Invoking participation from the 
viewer was largely achieved through familiarity with production values related to visual 
and auditory techniques and effects that elicited emotional identification with specific 
players and teams. However, scholars have come to view that participation as largely 
anti-mediatory, which, Geneviève Rail explains, “does not allow for communication. The 
viewer is always positioned as a passive observer or listener and has no freedom but to 
consume or reject the sport spectacle.”154 As television production values became more 
sophisticated, rendering the viewer passive was largely accomplished by overwhelming 
the viewer with sensations that were both related and unrelated to the game or event. 
Camera angles, close-ups, slow motion, instant replays, game summaries, and highlights 
all became pieces of a production model that emphasized immediacy, pace and action.  
 While attempting to recoup the soaring costs of rights fees and production, the 
television networks emphasized entertainment values and attenuated the traditional 
sporting experience. Benjamin Rader has argued that television sacrificed sport’s inherent 
drama to the requirements of entertainment governed by a technologically driven power 
to magnify and distort images. By interrupting its telecast with advertisements, special 









tuned” teasers for upcoming segments (e.g., halftime show, post-game show, other 
events), the narrative was undercut by fragmentation. Morse argues that the contiguity 
between the various and alternating images reinforced a flow of values. 
While the viewer is consciously aware of the difference between sport material 
and ad material, at another level the contiguity between these continuous and 
alternating images is an index of the flow between them…. Ads do not endanger 
the “live” framework of sport by offering a realistic contrast, but rather reinforce 
an atmosphere of otherworldliness.155  
Despite producing programs within a realist frame that purported to present accounts and 
description, sports broadcasters undercut their reportorial function by emphasizing an 
entertainment ethos that led the viewer to believe the telecast represented the only 
acceptable version of sport. Ultimately, this has compromised the sports journalists’ 
ability to pursue important stories. As Klatell and Marcus explain, “To the dismay of 
those few within broadcast sports who want to be regarded as serious journalists, their 
viewing audiences often seem offended when they act that way in pursuit of legitimate 
stories.”156 Aggressive and contentious sports announcers or reporters often are vilified 
by an audience conditioned to sports programming that no longer confronts living in the 
drama of alienation, as defined by Marx, but instead leaves viewers entranced within the 
ecstasy of communication, as set forth by Baudrillard.157 
Conclusion 
      This chapter has argued that television presentation of sports was impacted by two 









years before the advent of videotape, CBS provided a program featuring highlights with 
“live” commentary of college football games as a way of getting around the limited 
broadcast schedule of NCAA games on NBC that fall. Videotape’s impact was 
immediate in that it allowed stations not on the coaxial cable to present a much improved 
version of programs. Not only did videotape allow for easier time shifting of programs, 
but it also spurred the development of omnibus-format sports programs like CBS’s Sports 
Spectacular in 1960 and ABC’s Wide World of Sports in 1961 that were shot live and 
edited to fit the program’s time-slot. 
 Satellite technology offered television networks the means to share programming 
with stations in Europe and Japan. Presented with an opportunity to televise the 1964 
Tokyo Olympics live from Japan, NBC offered only the Opening Ceremonies to viewers 
in the Eastern Time Zone and tape-delayed the telecast for the West Coast. The issue 
brought into focus the conflict over use of television as a means of fostering cooperation 
and communication in the national interest and the use of television to satisfy the 
commercial interests of the networks. Significantly, New York Times reporters like Val 
Adams, Jack Gould, Orrin Dunlap Jr., and Richard Witkin covered the emerging 
importance of television and its relationship with sports with considerable insight, 
offering incisive criticism. 
 Videotape was also used to provide instant replay during live coverage of sporting 
events and to facilitate the use of highlights during the sports segment of newscasts. 
Instant replay not only changed what viewers saw in a sports telecast, but it also 









at their disposal, network presentations of sports and sports news became more 
entertaining in order to cultivate and maintain an audience to present to advertisers. The 
interdependency between broadcasters and advertisers resulted in less criticism of 
contractual partners. Sports journalists increasingly reported on those events being 
covered by the television station. As the commercial dimension of the sports industry 
became more substantial, television’s view of sport did not significantly change. 
The reporting of sports scores and the presentation of highlights during newscasts 
arguably suffered from the same sense of routine that plagued newsreel coverage of 
sports. Part of the problem stemmed from the very same issue that impacted live 
reporting of the accounts and descriptions; namely, television stations were dependent on 
the teams they covered for access to the games, coaches and players. Although never 
stated explicitly, sports journalists traditionally avoided controversy in their coverage of 
the local team and its players, believing that to expose wrong-doing or ineptitude would 
result in a loss of the broadcasting rights, sponsorship support, and access to highlights. 
One of the results of this relationship was that sports newscasters took the lead in 
focusing more on celebrities and the sporting celebrity culture. As Whannel notes, “Sport 
is presented largely in terms of stars and narratives: the media narrativise the events of 
sport, transforming them into stories with stars and characters, heroes and villains.”158 
Highlights have the power through repetition to elevate the status of certain athletes into 
iconic figures. In this way, not only does the who often determine which highlights make 
the newscast, but the athlete’s celebrity status also steers the newscast away from 









politics should be kept out of sport. However, the reality, as Rowe argues, is that “Sports 
journalism is addressed to a popular cultural realm which, while saturated with politics 
and power, is commonly apprehended as transcending or bypassing the structured 
conflicts of everyday life. Most sports writing colludes in this misrecognition of sport’s 
place in the reproduction of social inequality.”159 While recognition that this collusion 
occupied a prominent place in sports journalism through most of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries has begrudgingly become accepted, sports journalists have largely 
continued to sidestep their responsibilities in covering issues related to gender, race and 
ethnicity and in doing so, perpetuate sport’s place in reproducing social inequality. As the 
links between sports and television outlets, both national and local, grew closer, a vested 
interest in promoting and presenting sport in a positive light became part of the sports 
journalist’s routine. Significantly, television’s refusal to change its view of sports in light 
of the changing cultural, economic and ideological forces mirrored the same stubborn 
approach the newsreels had employed. That approach, of course, doomed the newsreels.     
The model used to cultivate an audience for sports on television was anti-
mediatory, wherein viewers were led to believe that what was presented to them 
constituted the natural and universally accepted version of sport. As Rail points out, the 
many enhanced production techniques—music amplification of noises on the sport field, 
collages, superimposed graphics, rapid cuts, computer simulations, color arrangements, 
shocking images—are used “to capture and sustain the audience’s gaze. Mediated sport is 
oriented toward the consumption of images, aesthetic forms, and brilliant but empty 









That sports telecasts’ enhanced production values have the capacity to distort a 
viewer’s perception of what is being watched is evidenced in the findings of a study 
conducted in 1983. According to the Miller Lite Report on American Attitude Toward 
Sports, almost half of all adult Americans, and sixty-four percent of those who regularly 
view televised games, “feel that given the right training they could at least sometimes 
perform as well as the athletes in their favorite sport.”161 For those under thirty-five years 
of age, the proportions were even higher. Two in five believe they could do at least as 
well, if not better, than coaches and referees, despite the lack of specialized training. 
Rather than being drawn to sporting events by their respect for and appreciation for 
athletic prowess, viewers are drawn, Hughes and Coakley argue, “by the belief that 
anyone can play and there is nothing special about those who do, at least nothing special 
enough to discourage active emulation.”162 In other words, the very scientificity that 
characterizes effects like slow-motion action replays can be employed to deny differences 
in ability and competence, even in “activities [professional sports] where those 
differences are clearly observable and objectively demonstrable.”163 This paradoxical 
situation occurs as a result of mediated sport becoming a victim of its own popular 
appeal. Hughes and Coakley argue that as viewers become more attentive to style than 
substance, the criteria for measuring worth lurch toward the more sensational and less 
nuanced aspects of the sport. Christopher Lasch has described what happens to sports 
when they depend on support of a mass audience. “As spectators become less 
knowledgeable about games they watch, they become more sensation-minded and 









competition but the presence of an unappreciative, ignorant audience and the need to 
divert it with sensations extrinsic to the performance.”164 
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CHAPTER 6: SPORTS JUNKIES, JUNK JOURNALISM AND CATHODE RAY 
STERILIZATION 
Introduction 
 This chapter explicates the developments related to cable television that spurred 
the proliferation of the sportscast highlight form. Arguably, the most important among 
the developments was the creation of the Entertainment and Sports Programming 
Network (ESPN) by William Rasmussen and his son Scott. Until May 27, 1978, 
Rasmussen served as communications director of the New England Whalers of the World 
Hockey Association (WHA) and executive director of Howe Enterprises. On that late 
May day, Rasmussen received a phone call from Colleen Howe, who informed 
Rasmussen that she was terminating his relationship with Howe Enterprises and that 
Howard Baldwin, managing general partner of the Whalers, was firing him from his 
position with the Whalers. As Rasmussen related in his book, Sports Junkies Rejoice! The 
Birth of ESPN, that call from Colleen Howe “sparked a series of events that no 
scriptwriter worth his salt would concoct.”1 Over the next few weeks, Rasmussen, his son 
Scott, Ed Eagan and Bob Beyus hatched the idea for a cable network that forever changed 
the sports mediascape. 
 Until Rasmussen received the fortuitous phone call, he had almost no experience 
with the world of domestic satellite communications and very little practical experience 
with cable television. While satellite communication’s impact on television had been 
realized throughout much of the 1960s, cable television’s genesis was anything but 









was Walson’s pragmatic response to poor reception caused by the area’s geographic 
topography. Walson decided to put up a much higher antenna and to provide television 
signals to people in the mountains who bought sets from his appliance store in Mahanoy 
City, charging $100 per hookup and $2 per month.2 Known for most of its first twenty-
five years as Community Access Television (CATV), cable television literally took off 
with the launching of the RCA Americom communications satellite in December 1975. 
Until the launching of the RCA Americom satellite, programming was not the concern of 
the fledgling CATV industry; rather, reception of existing television programming was its 
only concern. Even after its launch, the RCA Americom satellite was greatly 
underutilized because there were only two earth receiving stations—one in Jackson, 
Mississippi, and one in Fort Pierce, Florida. As a result, in 1976 there were fewer than 
twelve million households receiving cable television, which represented less than twenty 
percent of the total number of television households in America. By 1980, the number of 
receiving stations exceeded three thousand and more than eighteen million households, or 
one quarter of all television households, were receiving cable (Illustration 6.1).3 
Within five years from the day ESPN launched its programming, the television 
schedule was saturated with sports, fragmenting the audience, driving ratings down, and 
creating Friday afternoon “fire sales” for advertisers.4 The result was predictable: by the 
mid-1980s no station, cable or broadcast, was making money telecasting sports. 
Competitive bidding invariably drove up the rights to major sporting events. For 
example, almost two years before the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games were held, 









Organizing Committee that the exclusive rights to the 1988 Seoul Olympics would be 
worth $750 million and that a “pay TV package offering 19 straight days and 24 hours of 
Olympic activity at $200 a household might generate as much as $1.8 billion just from 
the United States.”5 Even though those predictions proved to be more than twice the 
actual amount paid by NBC, cable television drove up the rights fees for sporting events 
until the market was saturated and prices decreased. 
 Further complicating the television landscape were several legal decisions that 
wreaked havoc on an already teetering empire. In 1981 after two universities challenged 
the National Collegiate Athletic Association’s (NCAA) right to control television 
contracts, a federal judge ruled that the NCAA could no longer negotiate television 
contracts with the networks for coverage of football games. Ruling that the NCAA had 
engaged in unlawful restraint of trade under the Sherman Antitrust Act, the judge created 
a veritable free-for-all in allowing all broadcasters a share of the television pie. Other 
decisions directly impacted the regulation of cable television. One ruling by the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) in 1980 allowed cable television systems to 
broadcast as many distant signals from commercial networks and local stations as they 
wished. That decision reversed a 1972 FCC ruling that had limited the number of distant 
signals that local cable systems could pick up.6 Almost immediately, the NFL contested 
the 1980 FCC ruling because cable systems were then able to telecast several 
professional football games to a given city each Sunday. The NFL challenged the FCC in 
court and was joined in the suit by the three major professional leagues and the three 









considerable leverage in being able to import signals into their systems. The act also 
fixed compensation rates, further compromising the rights holder’s ability to make a 
profit on the distribution of the signal.7  
 This chapter also explores how cable television’s use of the highlight form 
changed not only the way events were telecast, but also how it changed the stadium and 
arena experiences, long regarded as the last bastion from television’s encroachment on 
the sporting spectacle. In 1982, the New York Times reported, “the public’s fascination 
with replays is one reason why many arenas and stadiums have installed large 
scoreboards equipped with slow-motion and [instant] rerun capabilities.”9 Other 
improvements included the use of blimps in live coverage of the 1983 America’s Cup 
race, which earned ESPN its first Emmy. That production values increasingly became a 
critical aspect of how viewers perceived a sportscast was evidenced by the fact that as 
early as 1982 communication research was cited in newspaper reports about cable 
television.10  
 The proliferation of sports programming stemmed in part from the creation of 
more regional sports enterprises (e.g., Sportschannel), further fragmenting the audience 
and dispersing advertising revenues. As coverage of sporting events became more 
segmented, sports audiences became more specialized in the same way as readers of 
magazines. This forced networks like ESPN to broaden its programming in 1983 by 
adding a non-sports program to its morning line-up and scheduling morning fitness shows 
for women.11 Despite the addition of those programs, women’s sports were rarely 









production studios.12 Because of increased competition, both the over-the-air and cable 
networks offered live sports coverage at all hours of the day and manipulated playoff 
schedules and starting times to maximize exposure.13 For example, ESPN offered live 
coverage of the 1980 NFL draft at 9:30 a.m. on a Sunday, and both NBC and ABC 
provided live coverage of select events during morning hours. Cable networks like ESPN 
also enjoyed the advantage of being able to show an early event live and then re-
broadcast the event again later that evening and perhaps even a third or fourth time over 
the next day. 
 By the mid-1980s, increased competition and the proliferation of programming 
led to a drop in ratings for televised sports programming. For example, in 1983 ABC’s 
Monday Night Football earned its lowest ratings for the telecasts of its sixteen games that 
fall. Not only did the loss of rating points hurt ABC in terms of its battle for prime time 
supremacy, but it also meant the network had to compensate advertisers with free 
commercial spots during other sports telecasts.14 Cable television also wrestled with 
ratings, although for distinctly different reasons. For one, it took several years before 
cable networks reached enough homes for Nielsen to gather data. Additionally, the cable 
networks had to sell advertisers on the idea of reaching a target rather than a 
heterogeneous audience. Advertisers did not readily adopt this concept since the size of 
the audience remained their controlling factor. Cable networks such as MTV and ESPN 
employed complementary measurement strategies tailored to reflect cable’s strengths.  
This chapter also explicates the problems that sports journalists continued to 









programming. In a New York Times article titled “Highlights Aren’t Enough,” Michael 
Goodwin decried the lack of depth and “the bland menu of scores, taped highlights and 
tame interviews”15 that dominated local televised sports news. Local stations were not 
alone in questionable journalistic practices. In a separate article, Goodwin noted that the 
news served up by the broadcast networks during the news segments of their pre-game 
shows (e.g., CBS’s NFL Today) “reveal themselves better at self-promotion than 
journalism.”16 
 The proliferation of sports on television also changed the way sports journalists 
performed their jobs. Most notably, the presence of women journalists in the press boxes, 
announcing booths and locker rooms changed the dynamic of the sports-media 
relationship. Women sportswriters and broadcasters were subjected to intimidation and 
sexual harassment by players, coaches and co-workers. Only after two much-publicized 
lawsuits brought by women sports journalists did the leagues and networks enforce 
policies intended to punish blatant sexism and allow access to locker rooms to both 
genders. Despite the publicity related to these cases, women remained underrepresented 
in sports journalism broadcasting and management positions. 
By the time ESPN celebrated its fifteenth year of broadcasting in 1994, the line 
between sports and entertainment had been blurred beyond recognition. That ESPN had 
successfully “invaded the broader culture beyond sports”17 was evidenced in the many 
times SportsCenter was cited in popular movies and television shows like ABC’s 
fictionalized Sports Night. Having adopted the self-proclaimed mantle of “the worldwide 









threatening while inviting the audience to “crave” its ever-expanding stream of messages, 
highlights, and top-ten plays. The 1990s advertising campaign, titled “This Is 
SportsCenter,” was not merely an advertisement’s tag-line; moreover, it “induced 
viewers to crave more ESPN,”18 to indulge their addiction and to never be satisfied. The 
sports junkie’s loyalty was largely predicated upon an operational aesthetic in which the 
highlight form became the network’s sui generis.  
Liftoff 
 Domestic satellite communication operations began in the spring of 1974 with the 
launch of the Western Union Corporation’s Westar satellite. It was equipped with twenty-
four transponders, each capable of receiving and transmitting one color television channel 
or six hundred two-way voice signals at one time, as well as “telephone calls, data 
transmission, communications between land point and offshore points, television shows, 
movies and visual presentations.”19 Although the Communications Satellite Corporation 
(Comsat) had served as the official representative of the United States in the international 
satellite field throughout the 1960s, it was not until 1970 when the FCC rejected 
Comsat’s argument that its charter entitled it to run the domestic satellite business and 
adopted an “open skies” policy advocated by the Office of Telecommunications that the 
domestic satellite industry took shape.20 The FCC adopted the stance that satellite 
communications should be “open to any applicant qualified and financially able to handle 
the expenses.”21  
In addition to the monthly cost of leasing a transponder, companies wanting to 









New York Times reported in a September 1975 article, “run from $1-million to $4-million 
each, depending on size.”22 The cost of smaller stations sought by oil companies to 
facilitate communications between oil rigs and shore ranged from $50,000 to $100,000.23 
The New York Times also reported that the number of applications to construct earth 
stations had increased from fourteen to sixty-eight during the preceding year. In response 
to the increased demand, the FCC streamlined the regulatory procedures regarding earth 
stations by consolidating into one application the requirements of obtaining one permit to 
purchase earth-station equipment and another to construct the station.  
Significantly, satellite technology and cable television was first used to transmit a 
boxing match. On September 30, 1975, Home Box Office (HBO) became the first 
television network to deliver signals via the Westar satellite when it showed the boxing 
match between Muhammad Ali and Joe Frazier. In this brutal fight, the third and deciding 
fight between the two boxers, Ali earned a technical knockout when Frazier did not 
answer the bell for round fifteen. Billed as “The Thrilla in Manila,” the fight was 
produced by Don King and broadcast to many countries worldwide via HBO’s signal. 
The fight also garnered tremendous media attention, thanks in large part to Ali’s taunting 
of Frazier in the lead-up to the fight. In fact, Ali played up the fight’s billing in news 
conferences by punching a rubber gorilla meant to represent Frazier while saying, "It's 
gonna be a chilla, and a killa, and a thrilla, when I get the Gorilla in Manila.”24 In 1999, 
ESPN’s SportsCentury listed the fight as the fifth greatest sporting event of the 20th 
Century.25  









subsidiary of RCA, launched the Satcom I satellite from Cape Canaveral, becoming the 
second domestic communications satellite to be launched. Equipped with twenty-four 
transponders, Satcom I was originally built to provide long distance services between 
Alaska and the lower forty-eight states, as well as to offer competition with Western 
Union’s Westar satellite and one proposed by AT&T and the General Telephone and 
Electronics Corporation (GTE), scheduled for launch in the summer of 1976. Built at a 
cost of $50 million, Satcom I had transponders available in 1978 when Al Parinello, an 
RCA salesman, pitched the satellite’s capabilities to Scott and Bill Rasmussen in a 
conference room leased for $20 from United Cable because the Rasmussens did not want 
anyone to see the “very low-budget offices” of what was called ESP-TV.26 Parinello 
described the leasing rates for a transponder on Satcom I, depending on the time 
requested, which in 1978 RCA was offering from one occasional hour to five hours 
nightly. Before leaving, Parinello mentioned one rate not on the card: a pre-emptible 24-
hour transponder for $35,000 a month with an increase after twelve months over the 
course of a five-year lease with termination liability.27  
Despite not having financing, the Rasmussens determined that it was less 
expensive to lease a transponder for $35,000 a month than it would be to pay the daily fee 
of $1,250 for five hours seven days a week. Within days, ESP-TV had a 24-hour 
transponder with no money down and no payment due until ninety days after the contract 
was signed.28 That ended up being the last transponder RCA leased under those particular 
terms. When the Wall Street Journal published a story predicting that the cable television 









availability of satellite communications technology (i.e., Satcom I), media companies like 
Time, Inc., Walt Disney Co., 20th Century-Fox, and Warner Brothers Communication 
began applying for transponders.29 Having beaten several media giants to the punch, 
ESP-TV was not only guaranteed a transponder, but did so before the fees to lease 
transponders increased dramatically. Despite the fact that satellite communications 
technology was far from perfect—Satcom II lost control and pitched position and Satcom 
III was lost—its impact on cable television was profound. Writing for the New York 
Times, John Noble Wilford noted, “Cable television in this country is proliferating in 
large part because of the revolution in satellite communications.”30  
Loosening the Cultural Glue 
 Even before ESPN went on the air for the first time on September 7, 1979, several 
occurrences provided indications that the network would impact sports broadcasting. In 
addition to leasing a transponder on RCA’s Satcom I, Rasmussen acquired $75,000 in 
funding from the K. S. Sweet investment firm, enough to keep ESP-TV afloat and 
produce a test telecast on November 17, 1978. That telecast featured taped coverage of a 
University of Connecticut (UConn) men’s soccer game, followed by live coverage of a 
men’s basketball game. The telecast was viewed by 850,000 households across twenty-
six states, including several UConn alumni who contacted athletic director John Toner 
“to express how happy they were to see Connecticut sports on television.”31  
Building on the interest that telecast generated, Rasmussen and J. B. Doherty, 
representing the Sweet investment firm, pitched the idea of a sports cable channel to 









five days, Rasmussen shuttled between Getty’s headquarters in Los Angeles and NCAA 
headquarters in Shawnee Mission, Kansas, attempting to secure funding from Getty, 
which, in turn, would satisfy the NCAA enough to grant ESP-TV the rights to NCAA 
contests. Throughout December 1978, ESP-TV, having used up all of the K. S. Sweet 
investment money, was on the verge of demise. Yet, at times, fortune seemed to be 
smiling on them: On the day Scott Rasmussen was supposed to pay $18,000 for a plot of 
land in Bristol, Connecticut, on which the cable network’s facilities were to be build, 
money they did not have, a snowstorm forced the meeting to be rescheduled for 
February.32 Although Rasmussen ultimately had to sell off eighty-five percent of ESP-TV 
to secure the $10 million investment money from Getty, he leveraged that security into a 
two-year contract telecasting a plethora of NCAA events, some live and some taped.  
 The trajectory from statewide cable channel to national all-sports network was as 
improbable as it was daring. ESP-TV’s original stated purpose was “to complement 
rather than compete with current NCAA television contractual arrangements…[to] 
televise nationally a minimum of five hundred (500) NCAA Division I, II, III men’s and 
women’s athletic events.”33 Not only were events broadcast several times to maximize 
exposure, but “highlight packages, commercial network action segments, and extensive 
NCAA and member institution promotion [were] to be an integral part of ESP-TV’s 
effort.”34 That modest proposal was enough to land in May 1979, almost four months 
before going on the air, a $1.38 million contract with Anheuser-Busch, which the New 
York Times noted constituted “a record in the annals of cable television.”35 The deal’s 









campaign over the next year. For example, one display ad states: “Bud and ESPN. It’s a 
natural. Anheuser-Busch is the king of TV sports advertisers. ESPN, the 24-hour total 
sports cable network, is the future of TV sports.”36 The ad mentions several other 
advertisers, including American Express, Michelin, Noxzema, Magnavox, and Hilton. 
That the hotel chain became another major advertiser of ESPN is understandable given 
Evey’s vision that ESPN would become what he called a “‘lift network,’ part of a basic 
package that cable operators could use to…entice viewers with the pay-movie channels 
like HBO and Cinemax, where the real profits were.”37 Several weeks after the cable 
channel went on the air, its list of advertisers also included “such impressive and 
sophisticated promoters as Pontiac, Hertz, The Wall Street Journal, Sony and Getty.”38  
On July 13, 1979, ESP-TV became ESPN, and five days later, Evey signed 
Chester R. Simmons, former president of NBC Sports, to take over the new cable 
network. Almost immediately, Simmons began to enlist the help of many NBC 
colleagues. Once again, a struggling television entity pilfered the older network’s treasure 
trove of talent, signing producers such as Scotty Connal and announcers such as Jim 
Simpson, who provided much-needed sports broadcasting experience both in front of and 
behind the cameras. In a New York Times article, Simmons added salt to the older 
network’s wound, noting that while the three broadcast networks combined to provide 
more than twelve hundred hours of sports programming, ESPN, “when it reached 
maximum programming, would have 8,700 hours…and the seven mobile units now 
under construction would make ESPN the best equipped network for covering sports.”39 









center of the sports cable television landscape had moved from New York City to Bristol, 
Connecticut, a fact that was noted in a Times article soon after ESPN began broadcasting 
on September 7, 1979.40  
When Lee Leonard said the very first words uttered from the ESPN studio, “If 
you love sports…if you REALLY love sports, you’ll think you’ve died and gone to 
sports heaven…”41 it is doubtful that many viewers residing in the sixteen million 
households equipped to receive a cable signal took Leonard’s words literally. In part, that 
was attributable to the sports programming ESPN provided during the first year—rugby, 
hurling from Ireland, Australian-rules football, karate, table tennis, as well as NCAA 
football, basketball, soccer, and hockey games—constituted events that the three 
networks had no interest in broadcasting. Although a Nielsen study of subscribers to four 
hundred television systems that carried ESPN showed subscribers tended to be more 
upscale than network television viewers, both Simmons and Rasmussen described 
viewers of ESPN in separate New York Times articles as “sports junkies,” a description 
Red Smith emphasized in a column about cable television that was given the headline 
“Cable TV for Sports Junkies.” After describing a typical weekend of sports 
programming on ESPN, Smith created a brief exchange in which one man reacted to 
hearing the schedule: “That is the ghastliest threat to the social fabric of America since 
the invention of the automobile.” The other responded: “No, it is ESPN, the 
Entertainment and Sports Programming Network for sports junkies who have to have a 
fix everytime they touch the dial.”42  









attract the sports junkies, as well as insomniacs and workers coming off the night shift. 
Simmons explained the phenomenon by using the concept of narrow-casting:  
Twenty-four hours of sports sounds like a lot, but not in the concept we call 
narrow-casting. Cable subscribers have about 18 channels to choose from. There 
are 24 hours of news, 24 hours of religion, 24 hours of movies, etcetera. We offer 
24 hours of sports, so we can repeat a lot of shows in different time slots for 
people who can’t tune in the first time. In no way do we expect anyone to watch 
all 24 hours, though a few may try at first.43  
By February 1980, television critics were describing cable as “an electronic magazine 
rack” with channels devoted to almost every interest, as well as programming 
“specifically for children, the elderly, blacks and Hispanics.”44 People’s willingness to 
pay for what they wanted to watch on television marked “a monumental cultural 
development”45 that was as important as the technological revolution. This was evidenced 
by the fact that consumers were not so much interested in the technology as what 
programming it provided. In this way, Les Brown noted, “cable is not only breaking up 
the mass market of television but also is loosening the cultural glue that has bound the 
country for three decades with the three-network system of commercial television.”46  
Challenging Big Daddy 
If the cultural glue was loosening, cable was also loosening viewers’ purse 
strings, as well as those of major advertisers and, more importantly, sports organizations 
and professional leagues. Television Digest estimated that in 1979 cable revenues reached 









billion by the mid-1980s with a third of the revenues generated by pay-cable.47 Because 
the broadcast networks were barred under FCC rules from owning cable systems, they 
were forced to track cable’s growth from a distance, knowing that it was only a matter of 
time before cable impacted their control. In a New York Times article, Kevin O’Malley, 
the vice president of program planning for CBS, noted that cable, even though it was only 
available in thirty percent of the country, was already competing for showcase sporting 
events. He said, “When cable gets to about 50 percent of the country, they will become 
more competitive. It’ll be fascinating, because then Madison Avenue will call the tune.”48   
If, as the New York Times opined, television had become “America’s Big Daddy 
of sports during the 1970s…building its own games and names…and tantalizing viewers 
with sophisticated space-age toys like mini-cameras and videotape machines,”49 then the 
1980s marked the beginning of the decentralization of television broadcasting dominated 
by the networks for three decades. ESPN made inroads into that domination with a two-
pronged strategy. The first strategy was to secure live events that the networks did not 
telecast. For example, in March 1980 ESPN aired over four hundred hours of NCAA 
men’s college basketball or related programming, especially the early rounds of the 
tournament, which were completely ignored by the networks.50 In April 1980, ESPN 
began a weekly boxing series to which a Saturday night series was added in the fall of 
1982 to counter a college football game-of-the-week deal signed by Turner Broadcasting 
System (TBS). Beginning in July 1982, ESPN began airing its 16-game schedule of the 
Canadian Football League (CFL), which, the Times reported, drew no official comment 









show.”51 Also that summer, ESPN and The Spanish International Network between them 
offered every game of the World Cup for home television, the first time in Cup’s history 
the entire tournament was shown in America.52  
The second prong of its strategy was to increase news programming with its first 
highlight show, Sports Recap, eventually dropped in favor of SportsCenter, with which 
ESPN began its weeknight broadcast schedule. The most significant hurdle faced by the 
show’s producer was the dearth of highlights, which, Freeman notes, “underscored the 
gaps in ESPN’s coverage.”53 Seeking permission to use network highlights, Simmons 
approached network contacts. NBC, tired of losing employees to the cable network, 
offered its highlights with the condition that Simmons stop hiring away NBC 
employees.54 ABC also agreed to share its highlights, believing that the cable station 
posed no serious threat to its sports programming. When CBS balked at his numerous 
requests, Simmons decided to take them without permission. Despite complaints, 
Simmons continued using CBS highlights until the network relented, “realizing that 
fighting Simmons was a waste of time, as taking legal action would be.”55  
In addition to securing network highlights to complement its own footage, ESPN 
borrowed from reliable sources like NFL Films, with which it signed an agreement in the 
fall of 1980 at a significantly lower rate than its owner, Steve Sabol, normally charged.56 
Sabol hosted the program himself during early morning hours; however, the program 
became such a viewer favorite that the show’s producer requested use of Sabol’s films 
during its Monday night football show, NFL Prime Monday, which preceded ABC’s 









network telecast. That would be but the first of many ESPN news programs related to the 
NFL, which came to include NFL Gameday, NFL Matchup, NFL Live, Sunday NFL 
Countdown, and NFL Primetime. In fact, the very first NFL gem ESPN secured was the 
rights to the NFL Draft, which it broadcast for the first time on April 29, 1980, after 
convincing the NFL to shift the date from a Tuesday to a Sunday. ESPN advertised the 
event, emphasizing that the draft was “LIVE ONLY ON ESPN.”58 Although few could 
have imagined that the show would attract much of an audience, over time it became one 
of the events ESPN became known for covering.  
While the decision to secure the rights to the NFL Draft was consciously taken, 
coverage of other events was prompted by viewers. For example, in September 1983, 
viewers requested nonstop coverage of the seventh and deciding race of the America’s 
Cup being contested by Australia II and Liberty. As Peter Alfano noted in his review of 
the overall poor coverage by both the networks and cable channels, ESPN had passed up 
the opportunity to acquire exclusive rights to the races, believing “that sailing was too 
specialized to appeal to a sport-oriented audience.”59 It was only when the Australian 
challengers tied the series at 3-3 after having fallen behind by deficits of 2-0 and then 3-1 
“that the network sports divisions scrambled to catch up to what had been an intriguing 
and controversial story all along.”60 Alfano decried the networks’ coverage, which treated 
the race “as lightly as some of the winds blowing off Newport, R.I.,”67 relegating race 
results to the morning news shows (i.e., Today, Good Morning America). While 
admitting that it was unrealistic to believe that the networks would devote five to six 









following the 11 P.M. news would have been nice. And more elaborate coverage on the 
weekend anthology shows [Wide World of Sports, Sports Spectacular] would not have 
been asking too much.”61 Although ABC’s Jim McKay provided a brief segment during 
Wide World of Sports, he offered nothing more than setting and atmosphere since light 
winds had forced the race to be rescheduled until the following Monday.  
Significantly, if only by default, ESPN provided the most complete coverage. 
Having planned to provide occasional updates beginning at noon, ESPN made the 
decision “to stay on the air with live coverage of the race, once it had started.”62 ESPN 
aired WJAR’s feed, which included aerial views that Alfano described as breathtaking. 
He noted, “The America’s Cup might not make for action-packed viewing, but it is one 
of the more esthetically pleasing sports events. And because this was the deciding race, 
all the elements of excitement, drama and urgency were present. If nothing else, it was 
different and more interesting than two-minute drills.”63 In responding to the demands of 
its viewers, ESPN learned an important lesson about broadcasting special events. The 
next time ESPN had the opportunity to secure the exclusive rights to the America’s Cup 
in 1987, it would not need prompting from viewers. In fact, it showed Big Daddy how to 
produce an esoteric event like the America’s Cup into a full-fledged sport media 
spectacle. 
End of a Classic Cartel  
 Even though long-range optimism for cable’s prospects remained high—buoyed 
by promising numbers that showed the industry in the final months of 1982 was adding 









monthly64—warning signs that all was not well with sports programming were becoming 
clearly visible. The most telling development occurred in September 1982 when U. S. 
District Judge Juan Burciaga struck down the NCAA’s college football television 
contracts with CBS and ABC after two college football powers, the University of Georgia 
and the University of Oklahoma, brought an antitrust suit in 1981, contending that the 
NCAA, acting like a classic cartel, “has unreasonably restrained trade in the televising of 
college football games.”65 Judge Burciaga’s decision was upheld by the United States 
Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit in May 1983. The NCAA and the networks were 
able to operate under the terms of the old contract for the 1983 college football season 
only after U. S. Supreme Court Justice Byron R. White, a former University of Colorado 
football standout, issued in July a stay of the appeals court’s decision so that the U. S. 
Supreme Court could consider the case. 
 The following year, in a 7-2 decision, the U. S. Supreme Court upheld the rulings 
of Judge Burciaga and the Court of Appeals that the NCAA’s power to negotiate 
television contracts and to set limitations on the number of appearances a school’s team 
could make constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade that violated Section I of the 
Sherman Antitrust Act. Associate Justice John Paul Stevens wrote the majority opinion, 
in which he agreed with the District Court’s findings that “competition in the relevant 
market had been restrained in three ways.”66 In addition to fixing the price for particular 
telecasts, the NCAA’s exclusive network contracts “were tantamount to a group boycott 
of all other potential broadcasters…and placed an artificial limit on the production of 









competitors losing their ability to compete in the marketplace. Justice Stevens argued, 
“Price is higher and output lower than they would otherwise be, and both are 
unresponsive to consumer preference. The latter point is perhaps the most significant.”68  
 The Court rejected the NCAA’s arguments that it had no market power, “no 
ability to alter the interaction of supply and demand in the market.”69 It also rejected the 
argument the NCAA had used since 1950 that its television plan was necessary to protect 
live attendance, holding that argument “is not based on a desire to maintain the integrity 
of college football as a distinct and attractive produce, but rather on a fear that the 
product will not prove sufficiently attractive to draw live attendance when faced with 
competition from televised games.”70 In effect, the NCAA’s television plan protected 
ticket sales by limiting output, “just as any monopolist increases revenues by reducing 
output.”71 While noting that the NCAA needed ample latitude “in the maintenance of a 
revered tradition of amateurism in college sports,” Justice Stephens concluded that “rules 
that restrict output are hardly consistent with this role.”72  
 Issued on the day Division I schools were meeting in Chicago to consider 
intercollegiate legislation, the ruling sent the members in search of a direction to follow 
for the coming football season, scheduled to begin within two months. Until the NCAA 
received clearance as to what role it could play from the federal court in Oklahoma City 
where the antitrust suit had originated, schools were reportedly “eager to avert a 
circumstance in which each would negotiate separately with over-the-air and cable 
networks.”73 Coincidentally, at the very same meeting, representatives from the one 









championship game, despite the fact that it was, and remains to this day, the only sport in 
the NCAA that does not have a national championship game, preferring to award what 
was often called by broadcasters its “mythical national championship” to whatever school 
“finishes atop the season-ending polls compiled by the news agencies.”74  
The ruling’s impact on the networks was mixed. On the one hand, as Peter Kaplan 
reported in the New York Times, the Supreme Court’s affirmation of Judge Burciaga’s 
decision to strip the NCAA of its power to negotiate contracts for college football 
telecasts “will most likely save the big networks money and give them better games to 
broadcast.”75 Removing the limitation on the number of games that could be televised 
greatly expanded the number of games available, driving down the price for rights fees. 
For example, shortly before the 1984 season began, the Times reported that CBS was 
paying $10 million for fourteen games involving the Big Ten and Pac-10 conferences 
over ten Saturdays. ABC offered $12 million for a package of twenty College Football 
Association (CFA) games over thirteen Saturdays while ESPN paid $9.2 million to 
televise fifteen CFA games, primarily on Saturday nights.76 That meant the price for 
nationally televised games ranged between $525,000 and $575,000 while the maximum 
price for a regional telecast was $400,000.77 The lower price was directly attributable to 
the coverage by “two major networks, two national cable networks [TBS and ESPN], five 
syndicators, countless local cable or pay-per-view systems and even the Public 
Broadcasting Service.”78 With almost two hundred games being broadcast in 1984, a 
number that more than doubled the previous year’s total of eighty-nine, coverage of 









On the other hand, the glut of games invariably produced lower television ratings, 
especially for the broadcast networks. While the ratings for the 1982 and 1983 seasons 
averaged 10.7 and 9.7 respectively, after four games of the 1984 season, the two 
networks were averaging only 6.9.79 Complicating matters was a stipulation in the 
contracts signed by ABC and ESPN with the CFA, which gave ABC the 3:30 p.m. start 
time and ESPN the 7:30 p.m. start time for their games, meaning the CFA’s 63-member 
schools were prohibited from televising their games on regional cable or syndicated 
networks during these times.80 In games involving CFA schools and Big Ten or Pac-10 
teams hosted by teams from the two conferences, ABC and ESPN attempted to withhold 
consent to have the games televised by CBS; however, two teams from the Pac-10, 
UCLA and USC, filed suit challenging the stipulation that CFA schools were prohibited 
from allowing telecasts of any games against non-CFA opponents.81 Federal District 
Judge Richard Gadbois Jr. ruled in favor of the Pac-10 teams, holding that they would be 
harmed by the loss of television revenue if the CFA rule were allowed to stand. He noted, 
“By issuance of this order, ABC and ESPN are not measurably harmed, other than by 
some perceived diminution of their ability quickly to dispatch CBS from the market for 
nationwide college football telecasts.”82 Judge Gadbois’s ruling clearly admonished the 
attempt by ABC and ESPN to prevent non-CFA schools from acquiring rights fees for 
any games involving CFA schools. Perhaps ABC’s director of college football media 
relations, Donn Bernstein, described the situation best when he asked, “Is it healthy to 
have 7 ratings? Is it healthy to have a million games on TV each weekend? No, it’s not 









Cathode Ray Sterilization 
 College football was not the only sport to saturate the television market in the 
1980s. Having endured a brief challenge from Gary Davidson’s World Football League 
(WFL) in the mid-1970s, the NFL faced another challenge from the upstart United States 
Football League (USFL), which in May 1982 entered into a two-year, $18 million 
contract with ABC calling for the network to televise a game on Sunday afternoons when 
the league began play in March 1983. A month later the USFL hired Chet Simmons away 
from ESPN to become its first commissioner and days later announced that it had signed 
a contract with ESPN and its almost 18 million subscribers to broadcast two games a 
week during prime time.  
The USFL’s hope for football in the spring was buoyed by a survey of six 
hundred professional football fans conducted in 1980 by Frank N. Magid Associates in 
which seventy-six percent of the respondents replied favorably to the question of whether 
or not they would watch televised games of a top-quality professional league during the 
March-July period.84 Comparisons with the AFL, which had begun in 1960 with eight 
teams and earned yearly average ratings of 5.8, 6.3 and 7.3 in its first three years on 
ABC, provided optimism for the USFL. As Neil Amdur noted, “The unknown resource 
attached to a network television agreement, aside from obvious weekly exposure, is 
promotional value.”85 Amdur explained that in ABC the new league had Roone Arledge, 
“and no network official has had more success in the packaging and promotion of sports 
than Roone Arledge.”86 The league was also banking on the idea that the second quarter 









the fact that baseball did not attract considerable interest until after the All-Star break. 
Similarly, neither professional hockey nor professional basketball earned great ratings on 
network television until their play-offs.87 
    That the USFL’s success was predicated on coverage by ABC and ESPN, of 
which ABC had purchased a ten percent share in August of 1982 for $20 million with an 
option to purchase another thirty-nine percent at $2.2 million per point, was cleverly 
articulated in January 1983 by George Vecsey in a [Sports of the Times] column titled 
“All Leagues Look Alike.” Reacting to the USFL’s first official public event, its draft of 
college players, Vecsey explained the USFL men conducting “the cattle auction by 
telephone” looked exactly like their counterparts in the NFL except for one small detail: 
draft selections were written in a calligraphy “more suited for health-food restaurants 
than for the manly meat-and-potatoes sport of football.”88 Explaining that such visual 
trappings were essential to the new league, Vecsey concluded, “Marshall McLuhan, the 
late prophet of the television age, might very well be the patron saint of the USFL.”89 
Vecsey reserved judgment on the new league’s fate, noting that the USFL’s market 
research had been taken before the NFL’s fifty-seven-day strike in the fall of 1982 
resulted in a spike in the number of unused tickets from 3.7 percent and 5.7 percent 
before the strike to fourteen percent after the strike.90 Additionally, after the strike 
television ratings plummeted.  
Simmons was quoted as saying that baseball had recovered from its strike and 
then set attendance records, and, more importantly, that the demographics were ripe for 









What Simmons is saying is that in front of the television set, there are no seasons 
anymore, no budding of the lilacs, no crickets buzzing on an August night, no 
autumn leaves, no crunch of footsteps in the first snow. When the cathode rays are 
sterilizing your brain pan, it is a perpetual southern California of the soul.91  
Vecsey’s assertion that television sterilization was capable of superseding the seasonal 
(dis)order of American sports was doubtlessly a witty, veiled sarcasm intended to show 
how truly saturated the television sports landscape had become.  
Packaged Reality 
 Not only did the emergence of sports on cable television engender a plethora of 
social, legal and economic changes, but the cable networks also altered the texture, 
perceptions and images of sports for both stadium fans and television viewers. Decreased 
advertising revenues and slumping ratings precipitated by a saturated market did not 
forestall the advance of ever-increasing “refinements in editing, replays from a variety of 
camera positions, slick graphics and lighter, more mobile cameras.”92 In late 1982, Neil 
Amdur of the New York Times, cited Dr. Jennings Bryant of the University of Evansville 
in Indiana, who described what the viewer actually sees on television as “packaged 
reality.” Bryant defined package reality as “not the reality of the stadium or arena. It’s 
what the producer and director, by their shot selection and pictures and the addition of 
commentary, create.”93 Not only did television’s technical innovations result in changes 
at arenas and stadiums with the addition of scoreboards equipped to show slow-motion 
instant replays, but television also fostered other changes including “more attractive, 









Korbut and Nadia Comaneci in Olympic gymnastics, a relatively obscure sport, as further 
examples of television’s ability to rearrange reality.”94  
That television had become totally enamored with technology was evidenced in 
such innovations as use of blimps for overhead shots, installation of cameras in stock 
cars, and the use of wireless microphones on football and basketball coaches, runners and 
outriders at thoroughbred race tracks.95 Further, in the 1984 Super Bowl, CBS provided 
over 100 replays in little more than one quarter of play.96 The following year, the USFL 
introduced the use of a television instant-replay system to review on-field decisions by 
officials during a pre-season game. While instant replay was being used “to eliminate the 
second-guessing that surrounds crucial calls in many games,”97 it was also being used to 
entertain viewers. In his column, Amdur cited Dr. John Ledingham, an associate 
professor at the University of Houston, who said, “For many people, watching Dr. J 
[Julius Erving of the Philadelphia 76ers] flying through the air for a dunk is not as 
exciting as watching the rerun of the dunk. And the athletes have caught on to the theory 
that they’re show-business people.”98   
Packaged reality also depended on an increase in dramatic rather than descriptive 
commentary. Bryant’s seminal study of the impact commentary can have on viewers’ 
perception of a sporting event was cited in Amdur’s column. In Bryant’s study, one 
hundred college students listened to dubbed commentary of a routine tennis match 
between two veteran players. One third of the group listened to commentary in which the 
players were reported to be good friends; one third heard commentary describing the 









was not specified. The study’s results suggested that “viewers who perceived the 
competitors as hostile found the telecast more interesting, exciting and enjoyable.”99 
Integrating more drama into a telecast, then, was shown to elicit more involvement from 
viewers. This resulted in a trend toward more commentary emphasizing player-versus-
player conflict. Amdur’s column included one of Dr. Bryant’s conclusions about the 
difference between the stadium experience and the television experience that remained 
for many years unchallenged: “Viewers expectations of sporting events have changed 
because of television. Because TV has to rely on dramatic elements that often have to do 
with high risk, giving all and violence, the event on television is different from what is 
unfolding on the field.”100  
Other technological innovations included the use of a computer software program 
to count punches thrown and those landed by boxing contestants. HBO Fightstat, a 
program developed by Sports Information Data Base of Hasbrouck Heights, New Jersey, 
was first used in February 1985 during the televised rematch between Livingstone 
Bramble and Ray Mancini. The software program required that two counters, one for 
each fighter, feed the statistics into a computer that was available to HBO’s boxing 
analysts, one of whom, Larry Merchant, told the New York Times’ Michael Katz that he 
was looking forward to using it. “You can’t break down a fight punch by punch any more 
than you can an opera note by note or a painting stroke by stroke. But I’ll be looking 
forward to having some fun using it in a discreet-enough way so that it supplements what 
our eyes tell us,” Merchant said.101 The pay-channel had a distinct advantage for using the 









producer for the fight, Ross Greenburg, explained that he would not use the computer’s 
data during rounds, noting, “Those three minutes are intense enough. And in the wrong 
hands, it can be the stupidest statistics in the world.”102  
When the cable and broadcast networks attempted to enhance their live boxing 
coverage by keeping viewers apprised of the judges’ official scoring for a fight in 
progress, the innovation was “doomed by ostrich-like commissions that were worried 
about the effect on ‘gaming’—whatever that means—and partly as protection for the 
judges from second-guessers on television.”103 Katz’s sarcasm is well-employed here in 
that the term “gaming” was doubtlessly used as a euphemism for gambling, although it is 
unclear why knowing exactly how each judge had scored a round could have an effect on 
“gaming” interests while a fight was in progress. Each judge’s round-by-round scoring 
was made available to the press following a fight, and second-guessing by reporters, both 
in print and broadcasting, had always been a part of boxing coverage. Katz quoted Bob 
Lee, the acting commissioner of New Jersey’s State Athletic Commission, as saying, 
“Not knowing who’s winning, that’s part of the suspense.”104 Katz decried such 
reasoning, explaining that the only problem with open scoring occurred “when the arena 
crowd can immediately second-guess the judges. But when only the television audience 
is involved, there is no reason [not to use it].”105 In not providing television announcers 
the judges’ scores immediately after a round, the state boxing commissions’ desire to 
protect judges only obfuscated what should have been a transparent process. 
Junk Journalism 









open scoring, he took exception over what he considered a cheap shot directed at boxing 
by ESPN SportsCenter anchor Tom Mees. In reporting on a nationally televised fight 
between Meldrick Taylor and a fighter named Roberto Medina, who was, in actuality, 
John E. Garcia, an escaped convict from a Colorado state penitentiary, Mees said, among 
other things, “Only in boxing.”106 Noting that boxing was “such an easy target for the 
Tom Meeses of broadcasting,” Katz sarcastically decried the cryptic remark as “the kind 
of in-depth commentary one expects from television sports news…. There are a lot of 
escaped convicts; for all we know, some may be working on television.”107 What fueled 
Katz’s ire was the lack of serious television reporting on boxing, such as that provided for 
a time by Howard Cosell, who, although he had enhanced his journalistic stature covering 
boxing, became an outspoken critic of the sport and covered his last fight in December 
1982, “a healthy sign that television sports broadcasters do have the intellectual capacity 
to change their mind.”108 Cosell provided quality investigative reporting on the award-
winning program Sports Beat, regrettably canceled by ABC in 1985 after Cosell 
published his autobiography, I Never Played the Game, in which he criticized colleagues 
at ABC Sports.   
In the same column, Katz criticized CBS’s omnibus program, Sports Sunday, for 
its coverage of the Tour de France by implying at the top of the taped show that “the final 
leg Sunday down the Champs-Élysés would decide the overall winner. What nonsense. 
CBS knew very well, as it explained graphically later, that Bernard Hinault of France was 
going to win his fifth Tour and that Greg LeMond, his American teammate who finished 









Claiming that boxing was a lot cleaner than bicycle racing, Katz parenthetically remarked 
that drug use was rampant and that one should never “bet against the chalk in the Tour de 
France.”110 He saved his most stinging criticism for reporter John Tesh, who “deserves a 
purple jersey for his prose,” with which Tesh compared the leader’s yellow jersey, 
saying, “the golden fleece was up for grabs where Pyrenees and mist had fashioned this 
bizarre battleground.”111 
Katz was not the only New York Times columnist who offered criticism of 
television sports reporters. In a piece titled “Highlights Aren’t Enough,” Michael 
Goodwin used the occasion of two New York stations’ search for sports anchors as a 
vehicle to comment on the sorry state of local television sports news. Goodwin began the 
piece with his own classified ad that delineated the qualifications. “Good teeth and nice 
hair essential…. Must believe in the divine right of athletes.”112 While admitting that 
there were indeed good television journalists in New York, Goodwin added “none covers 
sports,” and he doubted the new hires would “provide any major relief to the bland menu 
of scores, taped highlights and tame interviews that dominate local sports news.”113 In 
addition to his criticism of sports journalists’ reverential attitude toward the athletes they 
cover, Goodwin allowed the outgoing reporters to point out the failure of the sports report 
to provide anything more than a headline approach that prevented serious investigative 
journalism. The lack of pressure “to do any digging”114 stemmed from the absence of 
competition between stations, all being equally comfortable with what was done and not 
done to entertain viewers, many of whom cared little about sports. Goodwin concluded 









journalism would be presented. “If more sports time would only be wasted on more 
headlines, let’s hope extra time at channel 9 goes to the weatherman. Better yet, why not 
give him the sports job? Hellllloooooo sports fans!”115  
Goodwin’s criticisms were not limited to the sports reporting on local television 
stations. In “The Perils of Slapdash Journalism,” Goodwin attacked the networks’ 
“breezy viewer warm-ups to Sunday’s [NFL] game telecasts.”116 Despite aspiring to be 
more than fun by providing a news segment, these pre-game shows (i.e., CBS’s NFL 
Today and NBC’s NFL ’86) were better at self-promotion than journalism. As evidence, 
Goodwin cited examples in which NBC announced the teams playing in that year’s Fiesta 
Bowl and CBS announced it had retained the rights to the men’s college basketball 
championship. “Neither network included an important aspect of such ‘news’—the price 
the network paid for these events. And neither generally finds such items newsworthy at 
all if it means mentioning a rival network.”117 Goodwin offered a more blatant example of 
slapdash journalism in which NBC’s Bob Costas reported that “informed sources” had 
intimated that Miami University football coach Jimmy Johnson might be headed for the 
University of Texas. Even though Costas denied asserting that Johnson was going to 
Texas, his cleverly worded statement that “speculation may have him headed for the 
vacancy” constituted, for Goodwin, little more than a sleight-of-hand, “intended to give 
that impression while not exactly saying so…. Knowing that, and seeing how they 
constructed their report, it is hard to believe NBC didn’t want viewers to think they meant 
to say Johnson was going to Texas. Call it junk journalism.”118  









for spreading rumors. Rather, the criticisms were directed at ABC’s team of analysts 
covering the Olympic Winter Games in Calgary, many of whom were former athletes. 
These athletes-turned-announcers were most comfortable providing detailed analysis of a 
performance, especially during highlights; however, as Gerald Eskenazi noted, “when it 
came to fleshing out an interview, it was a different story.”119 For Eskenazi, the general 
coziness between athletes-turned-analysts and competing athletes was symbolized “by 
Peggy Fleming’s impulsively hugging Debi Thomas in an interview after Thomas’s 
missteps cost her the figure-skating gold medal.”120 Eskenazi also noted that ABC was 
beaten to the punch by newspaper reporters in covering controversies surrounding the 
bobsled and speed-skating teams. In fairness, Eskenazi posed the question as to what a 
televised Olympics is supposed to be—showcase for tough journalism or television 
event—and then provided the answer with which most television critics would agree. 
“The lines have always been blurred and always will be.”121 As a sports journalist 
working for a print medium, Eskenazi readily criticized television’s failure to offer hard-
hitting reports while pointing out how newspaper reporters covered controversies more 
effectively; however, in overlooking newspaper reporters’ often cozy relationship with 
athletes, Eskenazi demonstrated a bias for the work of print journalists.  
  That the lines had become permanently blurred was evidenced not only in weak 
interviews by analysts who, for the most part, had little or no journalistic training, but 
also in questionable journalistic practices that at times turned a blind eye to issues of 
violence and sexism in order to achieve sufficient ratings within a highly competitive, 









technology, viewers watched more sports on the airwaves. Even though broadcasters did 
not completely ignore violence that went above and beyond what is allowed in the rules, 
the message being provided by sports reporters was often overwhelmed by the pictures 
on the screen. Richard Horrow, a Florida-based attorney who wrote a book about law and 
sports violence, said, “I really think that exposure with a disclaimer is as significant as 
exposure with nothing said. As for kids, the trickle-down effect is that they’re learning 
about elbowing, sliding with spikes high and jabbing with hockey sticks.”122 
Local sports broadcasters inadvertently contributed to increased exposure of 
violence by showing more highlights gleaned from games all over the country. This 
concentration on violence in sportscast highlights led to charges and counter charges by 
league and media executives. Warner Wolf of WCBS in New York said, “It’s not that I 
condone it. It’s a journalistic issue. If I don’t show them, I’d be censoring the news. I’ll 
stop when they stop fighting.”123 Wolf’s assertion illustrates the tendency of broadcasters 
to sidestep the issue of whether or not a fight or a violent hit actually merits consideration 
as a sportscast highlight. More germane to the issue was Horrow’s argument that whether 
or not fighting and other violence actually increased was not as important as the 
perception that it had, fueled by media’s concentration on violent plays as highlights. 
Offensive Interference 
More disturbing than the conflicting signals television broadcasters sent out about 
violence were those issues related to women’s role as sports journalists and control of the 
sports broadcasting discourse by the hegemon. Not only were women’s sports largely 









women in the broadcasting booth. NBC’s coverage of the 1983 French Open women’s 
final included Dick Enberg and Bud Collins in the booth with Donald Dell and Bjorn 
Borg at courtside. In his review Neil Amdur noted that Borg was too reticent and Dell did 
not belong because of a conflict of interest stemming from his role as a lawyer who 
represented players and tournaments. Amdur added:  
More conspicuous during the final two days, however, was the absence of a 
woman announcer during the taped telecast of the women’s singles final on 
Saturday between Chris Evert Lloyd and Mima Jausovec. Any number of current 
or former players…could have contributed more about the players and the 
women’s tour than Dell or Borg, who were obviously positioned as a dress 
rehearsal for Sunday’s men’s final.124  
Women sports journalists’ struggle to gain equal access to broadcast booths, press 
boxes, locker rooms and production facilities made headlines in the 1970s. On January 
21, 1975, the NHL became the first professional sports league in America to allow 
women sports journalists to enter the players’ dressing room for interviews after its All-
Star game.125 Shortly thereafter, the NBA instituted a rule opening the locker room to all 
reporters until forty-five minutes before the start of a game and after the first ten minutes 
following a game. Despite that progress, in late 1977 Melissa Ludtke, a reporter for 
Sports Illustrated, brought suit against the commissioner of Major League Baseball, the 
New York Yankees, the mayor of New York and other city officials for barring her from 
Yankee Stadium’s locker rooms during baseball’s playoffs and World Series. Ludtke and 









defendants from denying Miss Ludtke and other accredited representatives of TIME 
access to professional baseball clubhouses on the basis of their sex.”126  
MLB Commissioner Bowie Kuhn’s prepared response stated that he would allow 
“female sportswriters” into locker rooms if they “could satisfy us that we have violated 
any law” with current policy. Kuhn considered the policy of “providing female reporters 
with interview facilities adjacent to the teams’ dressing quarters completely appropriate 
and consistent with the views and interests of the press in general, the players and our 
fans.”127 By invoking the interests of the media, players and fans, Kuhn subtly shifted the 
issue from one of access to “standards of decency.” The implication was that allowing 
women access to locker rooms where ballplayers wander “naked and semi-naked” near 
their lockers “would be offensive” to those standards.128 Ludtke decried the way MLB 
successfully made “equal access appear as a moral and not a political problem and as a 
sexy, but not a sexist issue that it is.”129  
Baseball was not alone in questioning women’s pursuit of equal access. In 
January 1978, ABC Sports Magazine aired a segment exploring the issue, and two New 
York Times columnists, Roger Kahn and Red Smith, employed variations on the modesty 
rationale in addressing the issue. Kahn compared the restrictions imposed on Ludtke with 
those imposed on him: “Covering the Yankees, she cannot catch Thurmon Munson in the 
shower. I remain slightly restricted. Covering Wimbledon, I cannot catch Chris Evert in 
the tub.”130 Noting that the women’s basketball team from Immaculate had not invited a 
New York Times reporter into their changing room, Smith framed the issue 









and “the equal rights movement vs. the manly modesty of Catfish Hunter.”131 Absent 
from Kahn’s column was any mention about the importance of allowing women the 
access needed to function on a level playing field with their male colleagues.    
On September 27, 1978, Judge Constance Baker Motley ruled that all reporters, 
regardless of sex, should have equal access to athletes, even if such access included the 
locker room. What followed was, in Ludtke Lincoln’s own words, “a three-ring news 
circus” that bombarded the public with reports of the plight of women in the Yankee 
locker room. In a column she wrote for the New York Times shortly after the beginning of 
the 1979 season, Ludtke Lincoln lamented that “not one reporter chose to address the 
issue of why women need access to the athletes to do their job. Instead, some newspapers 
and television stations assigned women to report on how their presence affected the 
ballplayers.”132 Later in her piece, Ludtke Lincoln explained the dilemma facing women 
sports journalists. She and other women journalists were being portrayed “as women who 
wanted nothing more than to wander aimlessly around a locker room, to stare endlessly at 
naked athletes and to invade the privacy of individuals whose privacy had been disrupted 
for years by our male colleagues.”133   
Unfortunately, the accusation that women sports journalists used their access to 
male locker rooms to engage in voyeurism again surfaced in September 1990 when 
Boston Herald reporter Lisa Olson was accosted by several naked members of the New 
England Patriots as she conducted a practice-day interview in their locker room. 
According to the NFL’s official investigation, which produced a 108-page report, Zeke 









writing; you are looking.” Mowatt and four other teammates then began fondling 
themselves, asking Olson, “Is this what you want?”134 After the story broke, Olson 
received obscene phone calls and hate mail, and her car and apartment were vandalized. 
As a result of the investigation, Mowatt and two teammates were fined by the NFL. 
Victor Kiam, Patriots owner, publicly called her “a classic bitch,” and at a Stamford Old-
Timers Athletic Association dinner, he told a joke that asked: “What do the Iraqis have in 
common with Lisa Olson? They’ve both seen Patriot missiles up close.”135 Kiam was 
fined $50,000 by the NFL on November 27 and publicly apologized to Olson for his 
comments. Olson filed a sexual harassment suit against the Patriots, Kiam and several 
members of the team in April 1991 and eventually settled out of court. Although the NFL 
strengthened its policies regarding equal access to the locker room, Commissioner Paul 
Tagliabue showed a lack of resolve when it came to collecting the players’ fines. 
Speaking to the Association for Women in Sports Media, Tagliabue said that he might 
not be able to collect the fines, citing the threat of a lawsuit from the players’ union, even 
though the league regularly instituted policies involving players without the union’s 
blessing.136    
Significantly, by calling her a “looker,” the players attempted to curtail Olson’s 
publicly recognized role to criticize male performance as part of a profession that gave 
her access into the locker room. As Mary Jo Kane and Lisa Disch note, “As an authorized 
transgression of typical parameters of deference, her looking unsettles the certainties of 
binary sex, gender complementarity, and oppositional sexual orientation on which phallic 











 Women sports journalists have also experienced sexual harassment outside of the 
locker room, particularly in the work environments of media organizations like ESPN. 
While the network has a commendable record of hiring and promoting experienced 
women sports journalists—Gayle Gardner, Katie Ross, Robin Roberts, Linda Cohn, Chris 
McKendry, Andrea Kremer, Doris Burke, Pam Ward and Suzy Kolber—it also has, what 
Michael Freeman calls, “a troubling history of sexual harassment…as hostile a work 
environment for women as any Wall Street brokerage firm.”138 In his uncensored history 
of ESPN, Freeman provides summaries of specific sex discrimination lawsuits brought 
against the network, testimony from named and unnamed former employees, and 
statements and statistics provided from ESPN management.  
 One sex discrimination lawsuit involved Linda Whitehead, who worked as a sales 
assistant at ESPN’s Michigan sales office beginning in 1983. Whitehead’s lawsuit, filed 
on August 24, 1998, in a Michigan circuit court, claimed that she and other women were 
discriminated against on the basis of their gender by her supervisor Theodore Andrusz, 
and that she earned, at times, half the salary of male counterparts. After Whitehead 
complained about her treatment, she alleged that the network retaliated against her, 
violating state and federal laws. Whitehead reached a settlement of the suit for an 
undisclosed amount of money and the stipulation that neither she nor her attorneys would 
comment about the lawsuit.139  









ESPN retaliated against her for complaining about the pay system. Truskoski served as 
executive secretary to Scotty Connal, who had been with ESPN since almost the very 
beginning, until both Connal and she were demoted. Truskoski filed a complaint with the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission over the demotion and accompanying 
decrease in salary, but withdrew the complaint when ESPN reinstated her salary. 
Presented with a deadline of thirty days to find a job within the company comparable to 
her old one, Truskoski refused to accept any of the positions offered and was ultimately 
fired. Freeman explains that when other secretaries posted stories on the bulletin board 
about Truskoski’s case, management “removed the articles and prohibited anyone at the 
network from discussing the case, not only with the media but with each other.”140 In 
1993, Truskoski won the case, was reinstated in her position as executive secretary and 
awarded $115,000 for legal fees. 
 For production assistants, associate producers and other women employed in the 
newsroom, the harassment ranged from the innocuous to the explicit. In Freeman’s 
history, anchor Katie Ross offered several anecdotes related to the bartering of time in 
editing bays for sexual favors. Additionally, Julie Anderson, a former producer, described 
the rampant sexism at the network related to routine production responsibilities. “A guy 
would take your highlight package and rewrite it, and you knew it was only because you 
were a woman. You were up against people’s ideals.”141 One former employee who 
worked in both television and radio production explained that almost every day there was 
some form of sexual harassment. “I would be walking down the hall and a total stranger 









baby with you….’ Men look you up and down, staring at you. There was one manager 
who, when he spoke to you, would look you up and down and stop at your breasts and 
then your pelvic area.”142 Significantly, this testimony constitutes another discourse 
related to being a “looker.” In this discourse, the woman becomes what Kane and Disch 
call “a feminine spectacle, an exceptionally attractive woman who advertises herself as 
an object of man desire.”143 Kane and Disch posit that this discourse sexualizes the 
woman in an ideological construct that sets the parameters of the social relationship in 
such a way as to reproduce and normalize accepted certainties. 
  According to a former senior member of ESPN management who dealt with 
sexual harassment complaints, during a three-year period in the early 1990s, “between 
seventy-five and one hundred complaints of sexual harassment were made by women 
employees throughout the company, and between twenty to twenty-five of those cases 
were categorized as serious incidents.”144 Although ESPN disputed those numbers, and 
suggested that its complaint numbers were “not unusual for a male-dominated 
company,”145 Freemen offered a more telling piece of evidence—a memo from Steve 
Bornstein, who became ESPN’s president in 1989, that outlined the reorganization of the 
remote and studio production departments into one consolidated production department. 
In Bornstein’s memo, there is no mention of women in senior management positions. 
Freeman’s point is clear: “ESPN was for men, and the men were not uncomfortable 
making that clear to the few women at the network…”146  
 Despite the considerable progress women sports journalists have made since 









women who serve as sports editors, sportscast anchors, and play-by-play announcers 
suggests that in comparison to their male counterparts, women “are still literally and 
figuratively limited to the sidelines in men’s major sporting events.”147 Nonetheless, in 
December 1987, Gayle Siemens made history by becoming the first woman to do play-
by-play on NBC’s regional telecast of a NFL game between the Seattle Seahawks and 
Kansas City Chiefs. The New York Times’ Michael Goodwin, in reviewing her 
performance, felt compelled to note several gaffes, such as getting the final score wrong 
as well as the presentation of a bouquet to her analyst. While admitting that “some new 
blood in the broadcast booths is needed,” Goodwin explained that the use of Siemens, 
coming so late in the season announcing a meaningless game, “was so gimmicky as to be 
distasteful.”148 Goodwin also complained that several weeks before Siemens’s debut, 
NBC employed a sports psychologist in the broadcast booth, a far cry from another 
gimmick NBC had tried a few years earlier when it showed a game without announcers. 
Several years later, Lesley Visser “became the first and only woman to host the 
presentation of the Lombardi Trophy”149 following Super Bowl XXVI in January 1992. 
Having distinguished herself at CBS, Visser moved on to become a prominent reporter 
for both ABC and ESPN.  
The New Economy   
By the time the NFL signed a new $1.428 billion television contract in March 
1987, cable’s impact on the television sportscape was undeniable. For the first time, a 
cable network, ESPN, was included in the package, paying $153 million for three years’ 









ended the NFL season. The new contract marked the first time rights fees for NFL games 
actually decreased—by 3.3 percent—and the amount paid remained flat at $476 million 
for each of the three years.150 Many factors contributed to the decrease, including lower 
ratings and network losses (i.e., production and increased rights fees) for NFL telecasts 
over the previous two seasons with losses in 1986 alone reaching a combined $75 
million. Additionally, escalating player salaries, which had doubled over the course of the 
last television contract as a result of competition from the USFL, meant that television 
revenues, which had risen only fifty percent, were not keeping pace with other 
expenditures.151 
One of the first indications that the market for professional football was softening 
occurred in the fall of 1983, the same year in which the USFL played a spring schedule, 
when ABC’s Monday Night Football finished its fourteenth year on the air with the 
lowest ratings in its history. 152 The 18.1 rating and 31 share marked a decrease of 2.5 
rating points from the previous year, the lowest since its first season in 1970. The other 
networks’ telecasts on Sunday afternoons also slipped in 1983, although by a smaller 
percentage. While different reasons were offered for the decreased ratings, including an 
unappealing schedule of games assembled for Monday night, some industry executives 
said they believed that “the glory days of professional football in prime time may have 
passed.”153  
One direct result of the decreased ratings was an accompanying drop in the cost of 
advertising. This drop in cost was directly attributable to the saturation of sports 









audience.”154 These conditions created a situation in which broadcasters were unable to 
sell commercial time on many sports programs at full or nearly full price. For example, in 
1985, selling was so difficult that “50 percent price reductions were not uncommon, even 
for major [sporting] events.”155 Instead of leaving slots unsold, the networks were selling 
them for prices that were below 1984 prices, and in some cases, below those of 1983. 
What had once been an industry that earned profit margins that regularly reached 10 to 15 
percent suddenly found itself losing considerable amounts of money. Goodwin reported 
that in 1985, ABC Sports lost upward of $40 million, with both of its major attractions, 
baseball and football, believed “to be bathed in red ink.”156  
With so much more sports programming being televised, traditional sports 
advertisers became more strategic in evaluating alternative advertising vehicles. While 
automobile makers and beer companies continued to advertise on sports programs, they 
also decided “to no longer focus their marketing efforts exclusively on the male audience 
that an athletic event provides.”157 For example, Chevrolet reduced its emphasis on sports 
by 25 percent when studies showed that women bought 35 percent of all cars, an increase 
of 10 percent from the mid-1970s. Not only did Chevrolet move its ad money to prime-
time shows, but what money it allocated to commercial time on sports programs was 
largely diversified. Rather than placing a package with one network, Chevrolet bought 
commercial time on college football broadcasts with CBS and ABC and purchased 
halftime coverage of ESPN’s Saturday night broadcast, as well as sponsoring its own 
post-game show on the cable network.158 Even though beer companies did not spend less, 









focusing more on cable options. Over the next two decades, however, sports sponsorship, 
the process of allocating resources for the production of sports events to achieve 
organizational objectives,159 increased dramatically. The total amount of money spent on 
global sports sponsorship trebled in the 1990s alone, with 37.8 per cent of that being 
allocated for events in North America, 36.4 percent for Europe, and 20.8 per cent for 
Asia. Sport sponsorship and advertising rose from $500,000 in 1970 to $20 billion in 
2000.160  
The networks accepted the loss in advertising revenues because they were paying 
less for rights fees. The reduced payments the networks paid for rights to the NFL in 
1987 was an extension of what had begun in 1984 after the NCAA lost its antitrust case. 
Further evidence was provided by the bidding for the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games. 
Because ABC had generated $450 million in revenues after paying $225 million for the 
rights to the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games, many industry experts believed the 
rights would “surpass $500 million and perhaps reach $1 billion.”161 All three networks 
bid considerably less than that, with NBC ultimately paying $300 million. Organizers of 
smaller events saw their payments decrease from the networks by as much as 70 
percent.162    
Cable networks like ESPN actually thrived in the new sports economy. Despite 
losses that exceeded $100 million in its first six years, ESPN showed a $10 million profit 
in the final quarter of 1984, and earned more than $35 million the following year.163 
Several factors contributed to the upturn, including the decision to charge cable stations 









ESPN landed its part of the NFL contract in 1987, the price was twenty-six cents per 
subscriber. After the contract, ESPN promptly increased the price to thirty-six cents per 
subscriber.164 Those increases were accepted by the cable systems largely as a result of 
the 1984 Cable Communications Policy Act, which “provided for full deregulation of 
fees,”165 meaning cable operators could charge whatever they wanted for a basic package 
of channels, which invariably included ESPN. Profits continued to soar, in part because 
non-union labor reduced ESPN’s operating and production costs in comparison to 
network expenditures. Finally, in January 1989 ESPN was available in more than 50 
million homes, becoming the first cable station to surpass fifty percent penetration of 
households in the United States.166 By the time the Walt Disney Company bought ABC 
and ESPN in the summer of 1995 for $19.08 billion, ESPN was deemed by Michael 
Eisner, chairman of Disney’s board, as “the crown jewel” of the purchase.167   
Conclusion 
 Cable television proved to be a Pandora’s Box for television sports. On the one 
hand, it decentralized sports programming, gradually forcing the networks to give up 
precious pieces of the sports pie to cable networks like ESPN and TBS. On the other 
hand, cable networks saturated television with live coverage and news programming that 
made up with quantity what was lacking in quality. Because the cable networks could not 
afford to compete with the networks for major sporting events, they showed sports that 
previously had not been seen on television. Cable networks helped to popularize sports 
like gymnastics, figure skating and ice hockey while the networks played it safe with 









magazine rack was an appropriate one for cable television in its first two decades.  
Television critics and communication scholars contended technological 
innovations continued to transform sports viewing into a mediated spectacle. 
Underpinning such assertions were the mass-mediated sport entertainment spectacles that 
represent the primary motor of sport’s cultural economy, and a significant element of the 
broader cultural economy. According to Douglas Kellner, “the extent to which sports 
have become commercialized and transformed into a spectacle”168 is one of the 
characteristic features of contemporary society, one that took shape with cable 
television’s saturation of sports programming. Such an allusion to Guy Debord’s concept 
of “the society of the spectacle” is wholly appropriate since Debord illustrated the 
multidimensionality of the spectacle and its dualistic function within spectacular society. 
“The spectacle appears at once as society itself, as a part of society and as a means of 
unification.”169 Confirming this observation, Debord identified two, necessarily inter-
dependent, orders of the spectacle: the upper-case Spectacle (the mass mediated mega-
event) and the lower-case spectacle (the relentless outpourings of corroborating and/or 
parasitic culture forms). These, respectively, provided the monumental and vernacular 
architecture of a society within which the spectacle “is both the outcome and the goal of 
the dominant mode of production.”170 Arguably, a cable network became the prototypical 
purveyor of mass-mediated sport entertainment spectacle, namely, ESPN.  
Bryant’s assertion that what happens on the field and what happens on television 
are different gradually has, to a great extent, lost its significance. While fundamental 









unfolds on the field has been directly impacted by television. Examples include television 
timeouts, rules changes to enhance action, and instant replay to challenge on-field 
officiating decisions. Moreover, the addition of scoreboards with replay capabilities and 
enhanced audio technologies has significantly narrowed the differences between stadium 
and television experience. In fact, players and stadium fans routinely watch scoreboard 
replays, and their reactions are often picked up by the telecast.  
The proliferation of sports programming has done little to improve the quality of 
broadcast sports journalism. Many of the analysts are former athletes, and many have 
struggled with the mechanics and techniques of fundamental journalistic practices like 
researching and interviewing. According to Klatell and Marcus, many sports announcers 
“get remarkably little training or support within their own organizations, and they face 
unremitting caution and wariness from their would-be subjects.”171 Without appropriate 
journalistic training, these broadcasters struggle to identify, develop, and contextualize a 
story, or anticipate an audience’s state of knowledge and understanding about sports 
issues.172  
That women sports journalists struggled to gain equal access into the press boxes, 
broadcast booths, locker rooms, and production facilities provides compelling evidence 
that “professional athletics participates in the construction of gender as an asymmetrical 
relation between two mutually exclusive but complementary categories and establishes 
that social construction as a fact of nature.”173 Despite significant progress made by 
women sports journalists, producers and announcers, we have not yet, as a society, 









and not to who happens to be reporting the story, but it is a goal worth pursuing. The 
presence of women sports journalists in the broadcasts booths, press boxes and 
production facilities of national media is important because, as Susan Tyler Eastman and 
Andrew C. Billings noted, women sports journalists serve “as important models for local 
sportscasters and sports reporters, and because of their large reach, they influence 
society’s perceptions of women athletes and women’s roles in world culture.”174   
As cable television has emerged, the many references to television’s sports 
junkies that continuously need a fix from an unending stream of sports programming 
raises disturbing questions about the relationship between programmer/pusher and 
viewer/junkie. That a woman named ESPN as a codefendant in a divorce case during the 
summer of 1982, charging “that the network was instrumental in ruining her marriage by 
providing too much sports coverage,”175 is perhaps indicative of a deeper, more pervasive 
distortion of values. As Richard Sandomir explains, “ESPN exists in a self-created 
wonderland, one that took root innocuously, then grew into a force so potent that it treats 
itself as a producer of events and studio shows as well as a newsmaker on par with the 
leagues it buys games from.”176 The wonderland of highlights reflects tendencies of 
postmodernist thought in which the world becomes highly fragmented and meaning 
becomes elusive and slippery. Ultimately, however many highlights are shown during 
live coverage or on SportsCenter, the sports junkie is never satisfied, instead being 
fixated on a perpetual present of constantly changing texts—game recaps subsumed 
within pastiches of spectacular plays removed from game context followed by random 









rationalize its form of junk journalism, broadcasters demean viewers and trivialize the 
product they purport to celebrate.  
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CHAPTER 7: LITTLE SHOP OF HIGHLIGHTS 
Introduction 
This chapter explicates the role played by ESPN in the proliferation and 
commodification of the highlight form. Since its initial broadcast on September 7, 1979, 
ESPN has grown “from a curiosity to the level of Kleenex, Coke or Band-Aids—brand 
names signifying products…. ESPN has changed how people receive sports.”1 Before 
ESPN began televising, viewers relied on the three broadcast networks and their affiliates 
to receive sports coverage. Except for major events like the Olympics, sports were 
televised primarily on weekends. The television sportscast landscape changed drastically 
as ESPN’s nightly sportscast grew from fifteen minutes to thirty minutes to sixty 
minutes.2 Occupying a ubiquitous place in our culture in reaching eighty-two percent of 
the one hundred and eight million homes in the United States, ESPN estimates that an 
average of ninety-four million Americans spend fifty minutes per day or almost six hours 
per week engaged with ESPN media.3 
In addition to coverage of live sporting events, however, ESPN drastically altered 
the landscape of television sports news with the program that launched the cable network, 
SportsCenter, which the Times’ Richard Sandomir described as the heart of ESPN, “a 
news show with a hummable theme song, enormous breadth and creativity, stars like 
[Dan] Patrick and [Bob] Ley (backed by lesser-knowns plucked from stations nationwide 
or raised on a highlight-rich regimen on the ESPNEWS ranch), and others who believe a 
sports report cannot be justified without attempting a joke or snide allusion every 30 









SportsCenter the premiere nationally televised sportscast.  
The “hummable” theme song was composed by Annie Roboff for the Satellite 
News Channel, which quickly went out of business and sold the theme to ESPN. In an 
interview, Roboff explained, “I love that so many guys know that theme...I never saw a 
penny from the everyday play, because it had been sold to the Satellite News Service as a 
buyout (it was the very early days of cable when no 'rules' had been established).”5 The 
theme became so well known to viewers and athletes that the final two bars—da-da-da 
da-da-da—have become synonymous with highlights, so that having made a great play 
and knowing the play will make that night’s SportsCenter, players hum the final two bars 
in a process of unabashed co-promotion. 
SportsCenter’s breadth and creativity are both a blessing and a curse. Having 
broadcast its 30,000th program on February 11, 2007, passing the CBS Evening News for 
most broadcasts, SportsCenter has provided the breadth of coverage that no three- to five-
minute local sportscast can duplicate. Not only did it spawn the network fictional series 
Sports Night, but it also engendered clones on other networks, including most notably 
CNN/SI’s Sports Tonight (1980-2001). SportsCenter also gave birth to eleven nation-
specific namesakes that belong to its ESPN International division, including  
SportsCenter Asia, SportsCenter Brasil, and SportsCentre, the Canadian version of the 
program.6 Each of these originates in the country it serves except for the one that is 
available on pay television in Australia and other Pacific Rim countries. That particular 
SportsCenter is produced and anchored by Australian journalists and personalities at 









production facilities and a ready-made staff of editors, technicians and other experts.”7 In 
addition to the nation-specific SportsCenters, the program served as the template for 
spin-offs like SportsNight, which debuted on ESPN2 in 1993; X Center, a news program 
specifically created to accompany X Games broadcasts; SportsCenterU, which provides 
news and highlights from men’s and women’s intercollegiate athletics; and BassCenter, 
which aired on Saturday mornings from 2003-2006 within ESPN2’s “Outdoors” lineup.  
SportsCenter’s most defining characteristic has been its personality, brought to 
life by its anchors. As Ted Miller notes, “You’ve given personality to sports reporting. 
And you’ve given too much personality to sports reporting.”8 The long line of anchors—
George Grande, Chris Berman, Tom Mees, Dan Patrick, Keith Olbermann, Kenny 
Mayne, Linda Cohn and Stuart Scott—changed the dynamics of how sports news was 
delivered. As Grant Farred posits, SportsCenter changed the discourse of sportscasts 
from one that focused on “the drama of statistics…the qualitatively banal…an emaciated 
discourse, too preoccupied with numbers and a commitment to fair reporting” to one in 
which the anchors “borrow intelligently and innovatively from literature, politics, and 
most important, popular culture, with a special predilection toward the world of hip-
hop.”9 Farred argues that the anchors’ discourse has reshaped SportsCenter into “a new 
kind of TV sports news show…. It is not the fragment dedicated to sport on the local 
11:00 o’clock news; sport is at the center of the show. SportsCenter is both a substance 
(sport is the only focus) and a style (a carefully developed repertoire of 
representations).”10 That repertoire included specific catchphrases that each anchor used 









patented and claimed their expressions, they also distanced themselves from these 
articulations, “making them part of the public domain and, in so doing, making 
themselves omnipresent.”11 So prevalent has the SportsCenter discourse become that 
many fan Web sites are devoted to the program. One, the “SportsCenter Altar,” was 
created with the expressed goal “to catalog and index all the popular catch phrases uttered 
by the sports anchors and trace them back to their origins.”12  
Although the hip catchphrases, banter, and self-referential exchanges that 
characterize the anchors’ performance have certainly contributed to setting SportsCenter 
apart from all other sportscasts, the use of highlights serves as the program’s single most 
important element. As noted in the preceding chapter, it was not until ESPN secured 
access to the networks’ highlights that SportsCenter became a viable entity. In fact, the 
very first SportsCenter included no highlights since the first half-hour show of highlights 
was called Sports Recap and aired at 11:30 p.m. By the time ESPN began broadcasting 
twenty-four hours a day in 1980, SportsCenter had become the most important vehicle of 
the cable network’s sports news programming, thanks in large part to having begged 
(ABC), bartered (NBC) and stolen (CBS) from the networks to secure access to their 
highlights. As Chris Berman explained in the introduction to the Ultimate Highlight Reel, 
“The presentation of highlights has been the backbone of ESPN from our very start in 
1979.”13 
Significantly, with the publication of ESPN Ultimate Highlight Reel in November 
2006 through ESPN Books, the self-proclaimed “worldwide leader in sports” has 









morphing of a highlight reel into a book purports to present “The 365 Wildest, Weirdest, 
Most Unforgettable SportsCenter Moments of All Time” by selecting each calendar 
day’s most spectacular highlight over the first twenty-five years of SportsCenter. The 
book also marked ESPN’s second publishing venture devoted to its presentation of 
highlights, following the 2004 publication of ESPN25: 25 Mind-Bending, Eye-Popping, 
Culture-Morphing Years of Highlights by Charles Hirshberg. In his book, Hirshberg 
asserts that ESPN impacted the television sports landscape “by adopting, and perfecting, 
an underutilized, unappreciated method of communication: the sports highlight…. ESPN 
has made highlights the primary means by which the patterns and stories of sports are 
revealed. It’s a perfect medium for modern America…”14 While these books are clearly 
promotional vehicles for SportsCenter, they also establish the program’s use of highlights 
as the primary form of sports journalistic discourse. These books capitalize on one’s 
familiarity with the ESPN brand and style of commentary to at once dissolve the 
boundary of one medium (television screen) and invoke participation through another 
medium (book) in creating a canon of “the all-time favorite highlights.”15 Moreover, 
ESPN’s attempt to stamp its imprimatur on sportscast highlights raises basic questions 
about how culture becomes commodified, produced and reproduced under transnational 
corporatized modes of acculturation.16  
This chapter traces ESPN’s appropriation and commodification of the highlight 
form as SportsCenter became the network’s flagship program. While SportsCenter 
doubtlessly made the highlight form its primary means of communication, the Hirshberg 









impact the spectacularization of sport has had on viewers, anchors and athletes within a 
late-capitalist economy, what values are being promoted through the highlight form, and 
whose stories are being told. This chapter explicates SportCenter’s ubiquitous place in 
American sports journalism by considering its formation and development, its 
constitutive elements, and its offshoots, namely the “This is SportsCenter” advertising 
campaign and reality show, Dream Job.  
Lastly, ESPN’s distinct position among the producers of mediated sport is 
predicated on the fact that SportsCenter develops content within a cultural economy in 
which information, images and ideas are exchanged. Because audiences often know the 
outcome of games before they watch SportsCenter, they must be maintained as an 
audience.17 As a result, both event coverage and the news programs have changed from 
being primarily information-oriented to being primarily entertainment-oriented by 
producing increasingly affective highlights and witty commentary. Hirshberg contends, 
“A good highlight is at once a poetic distillation of athleticism and a carnival barker’s 
holler for your attention, a shameless effort to keep you from pressing that damned 
remote.”18 In turn, this “shameless effort” to maintain the audience dictates both 
quantitatively and qualitatively which highlights are presented and how commodification 
is achieved. It is within this sphere that “the key economic processes of production, 
distribution and exchange take place.”19 Producers of mediated sports texts have the 
capacity to shape social value and culture since, as Stuart Hall has noted, value lies in the 
immaterial nature of symbolic goods. In this sense, value is manifested in the design and 









processes. Sportscast highlights, with their high levels of sign-value, “are almost perfect 
prototypes of signs in circulation, heavily loaded with symbolic value.”20  
 The entertainment ethos has only increased as media sport producers such as 
ESPN attempt to recoup the money spent on rights fees and production costs. Those costs 
have motivated producers to not only “develop video and audio technologies to nuance 
their coverage in ways that maintain viewer attention,”21 but also to make sure that the 
production is fully sponsored and corporatized. No longer is it sufficient to broadcast 
game highlights that convey information about who won, who lost and what star led the 
way to victory. In today’s highlight culture, almost every segment of ESPN’s 
SportsCenter is invested with corporate sponsorship that results in considerable profits 
for the cable network and is used to seduce and fascinate viewers “by merging 
ideological codes and affective investments within the proliferating system of hyperreal 
commodity-signs.”22  
SportsCenter’s use of the highlight form, which serves as the vehicle for an 
unending stream of encoded texts that emphasize the spectacle and the star, has enabled it 
to emerge as the dominant purveyor of cultural expression. As Sandomir explains, 
nobody knew in 1979 that ESPN would become a “wide world all its own with a manifest 
destiny to devour all sports and all manner of media. ESPN has become Microsoft, Wal-
Mart and Audrey II—the carnivorous plant of ‘Little Shop of Horrors’”—demanding all 
to ‘Watch me.’”23  
A Menu without a Main Course 









1983 when for a brief time after the departure of Chet Simmons SportsCenter was cut 
from thirty minutes to fifteen. Additionally, on March 1, 1983, the network began 
offering a two-hour program on weekday mornings between 6 and 8 a.m., Business 
Times, hoping, as Frank J. Prial of the New York Times reported, to “attract former 
viewers who have drifted to the networks rather than watch reruns of old football 
games.”24 The addition of a non-sports program was precipitated by intense competition, 
lagging advertising sales, escalating rights fees and increased production costs. William 
Grimes, who succeeded Simmons upon his departure for the USFL, told the Times that 
while the network was committed to sports in prime time, “we have to look at daytime 
more closely. We have to look for opportunities to get more female-oriented 
advertising.”25 The article reported that ESPN’s advertising was thirty percent behind 
projections for the year. Several fitness and exercise shows were already scheduled 
during early morning hours, but Grimes intimated that more would be needed. “Women 
between the ages of 18 and 49 are the advertisers’ favorite target, and they are not known 
to be a large part of ESPN’s audience.”26  
 Reaction to the cutting of SportsCenter by half was swift and decisive. Viewers 
were not alone in criticizing the move, as media critics joined in the chorus of 
complaints. As Michael Freeman notes, “George Grande, over breakfast with Grimes and 
[Stuart] Evey in Manhattan, pleaded for reinstating the thirty-minute time slot.”27 The 
executive agreed and a month later, SportsCenter was back to a thirty-minute schedule. 
Having lost $20 million in 1982 and expecting $10 million more in losses the following 









charge cable operators ten cents per subscriber instead of four cents as a means of making 
up for lagging advertising revenues.28 However, cutting a studio show that offered exactly 
what viewers could not get on over-the-air and other cable networks was not the right 
direction to take. The decision to return SportsCenter to its regular thirty minutes and 
even lengthen it during special events proved to be decisive in ESPN’s ascension as the 
most available and reliable source for sports news.  
 Expanding SportsCenter’s schedule was attempted the following summer during 
the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games. Despite the limitations imposed by the 
International Olympic Committee (IOC) of no more than three minutes of highlights 
three times a day after ABC completed its coverage at 2 a.m., ESPN increased the early 
evening SportsCenter to a full hour. Unable to show highlights, the network hired 
Olympic cinematographer Bud Greenspan to offer expert commentary for a feature series 
during SportsCenter, titled “Olympic Digest,” that offered “profiles of the best-known 
athletes on the days they are competing.”29 In creatively overcoming the limitation of not 
being able to show Olympics highlights, ESPN enhanced the program to which viewers 
came for news by offering someone with Olympic credentials to narrate its profiles. 
 The following summer ESPN televised Major League Baseball’s Hall of Fame 
induction ceremony at Cooperstown, New York, providing three hours of live coverage. 
Even though the acceptance speeches of inductees did not, as Michael Katz noted, 
necessarily make for compelling television, the cable network’s coverage “was a public 
service, something ESPN does best. No major network was about to devote three hours to 









on horse racing, Down the Stretch, as well as its host Sharon Smith. Katz explained, 
“Those are the kinds of programs ESPN should concentrate on, rather than filling its 
considerable time with replays ad nauseum of three-hour events it has already telecast.”31 
Those single-sport weekly wrap-ups on auto racing, baseball, basketball, hockey and 
eventually professional and college football became some of the network’s most popular 
programs, natural extensions of what it was beginning to do on SportsCenter.     
ESPN showed exactly how far it could stretch its creative programming even 
when it did not have the rights to an event when it broadcast over fifteen hours of 
football-related programs before Super Bowl XX in January 1986. As Steven Schneider 
reported, “Faced with having a menu without a main course, the sports channel has 
chosen to address this shortcoming with an avalanche of supportive programming…”32 
The menu began at 2:30 a.m. with a special SportsCenter devoted primarily to last-
minute developments related to the Super Bowl, followed by a team-by-team review of 
the 1985 season, then highlights from NFL Films of the first seventeen Super Bowls 
before a noon broadcast of SportsCenter with live reports from New Orleans, the site of 
the game. While NBC aired its telecast, beginning at 3 p.m., ESPN offered counter-
programming that featured “nontraditional sports.”33 At 9 p.m. it televised “the second 
theatrical offering it has ever presented,”34 titled Lombardi—I Am Not a Legend, a ninety-
minute drama that had been staged in several Canadian cities and at the Edinburgh 
Festival in Scotland. After another round of NFL Films’ football follies, the menu 
concluded with another SportsCenter, including live cut-ins from New Orleans, as well as 









menu sated viewers was not as important as its creation, and within a few years, even the 
networks began offering their own day-long Super Bowl smorgasbords, gradually 
increasing pre-game shows from three to six hours. 
Seminal Seventeen 
 By the late 1980s SportsCenter had established itself as the ESPN’s most popular 
programs and as ratings grew, more resources and personnel were devoted to its 
production. Athletes joined the audience as regular viewers of the program. Not only 
could they hum the final bars to the program’s theme song, but as Freeman noted, they 
“began to tune in to see themselves on the extensive highlight packages or to watch their 
interviews.”35 Even though the program was increasing in popularity with viewers, it was 
the hiring of John Walsh as executive editor that turned SportsCenter into “an electronic 
version of a newspaper’s sports section.”36 Walsh, who had honed his journalistic skills at 
magazines like Inside Sports and Rolling Stone, demanded and received more resources, 
reshaping SportsCenter around the belief that viewers could never get enough highlights, 
statistics and inside information.  
Before Walsh’s arrival, SportsCenter typically began with a report on the day’s 
big game, followed by all the scores and highlights from that same sport, in the process 
burying stories with greater news value. Walsh jettisoned that singular approach, making 
sure that stories with the greatest news values led the broadcast and lobbying to push 
commercials even later into the show. Wanting to give the program more punch, Walsh 
overhauled graphics and increased the length and number of highlights. In addition to 









more extensive research, a tighter format and better organization in all aspects of 
production. Those changes extended beyond SportsCenter into the single-sport wrap-ups 
as well. As Freeman explained, a show like NFL Primetime increased its highlight 
packages from fifteen minutes to more than thirty minutes.37 Not surprisingly, ratings 
increased dramatically. 
In the early 1990s, the codification of highlights began at ESPN when highlight 
coordinator Dan Steir created a list of the various ways game highlights could be 
packaged to tell a story. Steir’s list, which Hirshberg in his book referred to as “The 
Seminal Seventeen,”38 became one of teaching tools used by Barry Sacks to instruct 
production assistants on the art of story-telling. While admitting that an infinite number 
of ways to report these stories existed, Steir estimated that ninety percent of the 
highlights seen on ESPN fell into one of these categories. These seventeen categories 
range from narrative-based like “The ‘Who Won’ Highlight” and “The Turning Point 
Highlight” to non-action-based like “The Cutaway Highlight,” which focuses “on fans or 
mascots, or something in between like Hogettes” when the game “is just plain boring or 
bad.”39 
In effect, everything directly or indirectly related to an actual sporting event has 
the potential to be (re)presented as a highlight, and this condition produces a mediascape 
in which, as Debord suggests, “all of life presents itself as an intense accumulation of 
spectacles. Everything that was directly lived has moved away into a representation.”40 
Instead of sports news as part of a larger meta-narrative ground in reality, ESPN presents 









materially invaded by the contemplation of the spectacle while simultaneously absorbing 
the spectacle order.”41 Significantly, the highlight as spectacle becomes a space of 
meaning generation and communication that “fuses the objective forms of commodified 
activity and the subjective content of individual consciousness into a reified and 
collective culture.”42 Rather than interpreting messages according to the viewer’s own 
code and end, the viewer is positioned within a model that does not allow for 
communication43 and in which the viewer can only consume or reject the sport spectacle. 
With its discourse of straightforward news reporting, irreverent commentary, frat-house 
gags, trivia and nostalgia,44 ESPN’s SportsCenter has turned the highlight form into a 
cultural commodity. 
SportsCenter Set, Format and Video Conventions 
 The SportsCenter set and format have changed over the years to reflect advances 
in technology, as well as changes in management and ownership. Typically, during the 
week, the program airs for sixty minutes at various times in the morning and evening and 
for ninety minutes on Sunday evenings and Monday mornings. Designed by Walt Disney 
Imagineering, the current set was first used on June 7, 2004, the date SportsCenter first 
broadcast in High Definition. Shows typically begin with a graphic, showing the 
following: "Available on ESPNHD” (this animation precedes all high-definition 
broadcasts of ESPN or ESPN2). This is followed by a short SportsCenter animation 
before the screen comes alive with a montage of highlights accompanied with canned 
music, not necessarily specific to that show’s news. As soon as the anchors are shown, 









listing the stories in the order they will be presented, and the “BottomLine" ticker begins 
its crawl at the bottom of the screen. At other times, after the introductory graphics and 
animation, the show begins with a shot of one anchor standing in the studio. The 
program’s anchor typically introduces the top story, as a loop of video clips (with canned 
music) matching the script is played on screen. This is followed by another montage of 
video clips without commentary but with the SportsCenter theme, and then another 
SportsCenter animation loop. 
 Following this, a medium shot of the two anchors is presented, and an on-screen 
graphic displays the anchors’ names. The anchors introduce themselves, and one will 
begin the top story. In most cases, the broadcast begins with the most important (NCAA 
men’s basketball), most unusual (NAIA quadruple overtime), or most celebrity-infused 
(Kobe Bryant or Lebron James) game recap of the day. Before going to commercial 
break, the anchor provides voice over for a montage of highlights (e.g., “Still to Come”) 
that will follow the advertisements. Another montage of unaccompanied highlights leads 
into an animation that ends the sequence, and cuts to the commercial break.  
Following the break, a graphic with the brand name and logo of a specific sponsor 
leads into the next (sponsored) segment. On-screen graphics flash the brand name and 
logo as the camera pans across the studio in the background. Halfway through the show, 
the anchors reprise or reset the day's top stories in a segment titled either "SportsCenter 
Reset" or "SportsCenter Xpress." There is no noticeable difference in the format of either 
of these segments, other than the names and graphics. 









through Thursday) or “Top Ten ‘Brilliant’ Plays” (when Guinness was the sponsor), 
“Top Ten Plays of the Week” (on Sunday), or “Hardly the Usual Top Ten” (Friday) 
segment is introduced by an anchor. Each play is separated by an animation graphic of 
the play's respective number in the ranking. The anchors alternate plays, with each anchor 
providing commentary, which typically includes one or more of their pet phrases, (e.g., 
“Cool as the other side of the pillow,” “Representin’,” etc.). Otherwise, the final segment 
of the show, “What 2 Watch 4,” promotes broadcasts of games or events either later in 
the day or in the coming days on the ESPN and ABC networks. 
The show ends with a final shot of the anchors at the desk, who typically sign off 
by reminding viewers that “ESPNEWS is always on.” If there is extra time, the anchors 
fill the time with improvised attempts at humorous banter. This time can range from 
twenty seconds to more than a minute. 
Segments 
SportsCenter segments refer to titled, often sponsored, parts of a SportsCenter 
broadcast that flesh out each story of the “Rundown.” A segment usually lasts from one 
to several minutes; several segments are usually included in a given sequence of six to 
eight minutes before another sequence begins or the program breaks for a commercial ad. 
While every SportsCenter program is unique and includes different segments, some 
segments have become regular features of the broadcast and can be classified into at least 
three primary groups—those sponsored by corporate entities, those featuring expert 
analysts, and those featuring specialty highlights. For example, corporate-sponsored 









discussion of day’s top story; “Budweiser Hot Seat,” in which a personality (sports or 
non-sports) will be asked to take sides on issues, teams, etc.; and “Coors Light Cold Hard 
Facts,” in which a six-pack of questions about a certain sport is directed to an analyst.  
Expert analysts factor into many SportsCenter segments, depending on the 
season. For example, “Barry’s Best” features NHL analyst Barry Melrose, who figured 
prominently as the primary analyst for NHL 2Night on ESPN2 when ESPN had the rights 
to the NHL. In this segment, Melrose picks his top hockey highlights of the night, which 
are divided into the top goals, saves, and hits. “Fact or Fiction,” asks an analyst(s) to 
debate whether or not something is likely to happen (e.g., will the Boston Red Sox repeat 
as World Champions, or will the University of Tennessee women’s basketball team 
repeat as NCAA champions). “On the Clock” is part of ESPN’s never-ending NFL news 
programming in which every team’s strengths and weaknesses are explored to frame the 
team’s needs in anticipation of the late-April NFL draft. The segment features NFL draft 
expert Mel Kiper, analysts Ron Jaworski and Chris Mortenson, and host Mike Tirico. To 
a large extent, ESPN’s SportsCenter has become the most highly rated national sports 
news program because of its ability to hire and feature the leading experts of the major 
professional and collegiate sports. 
While the individual stories, game summaries, previews or profiles that comprise 
a SportsCenter broadcast each utilize a highlight package, an audio component and a 
graphics component, the program also includes segments that feature specialty highlights. 
These segments typically serve as teasers (e.g., “Still to Come” and “Inside 









packed montages string together a sampling of the best highlights (e.g., home runs, 
touchdowns, knockouts, dunks and goals) to follow by showing only the most intense 
images to produce affect. Montages are unquestionably the most frequently used editing 
technique to lead into and out of commercial breaks. Another specialty highlight used on 
SportsCenter combines a visual highlight clip with the radio broadcast of that particular 
play. “Pump Up the Volume” brings together the drama and narrativity of radio 
announcing with the affect and immediacy of video. Most often, the radio portion is 
gleaned from the broadcast of the team that scored and won the game since the segment’s 
goal is to ratchet up the intensity. Interestingly, this conjunction of two different media 
characterized some of the first live televised sports broadcasts by the BBC in 1938, often 
with disastrous results. Steven Barnett explains, “During coverage of the first FA Cup 
Final in April 1938, the radio commentary, which the BBC was carrying, failed for the 
first half-hour. By 1939, the Boat Race and Cup Final had their own television 
commentary, as Wimbledon had had since 1937.”45 The BBC discontinued the pairing of 
a radio broadcast with television coverage because it quickly realized the effect produced 
was overkill, the very effect SportsCenter seeks to achieve with this particular segment.  
One segment that has garnered considerable criticism from bloggers and media 
critics is called “The Ultimate Highlight,” shown during the 11 p.m. SportsCenter on 
Sunday evenings. Sponsored by Gatorade, the segment sets a week’s worth of highlights 
into a music video format, featuring popular music artists that clearly appeal to younger 
viewers. As a postmodernist text, the music video de-centers the viewer by presenting a 









present. E. Ann Kaplan explains that the postmodernist music video operates without 
signifiers and signified: 
What characterizes the postmodernist video is its refusal to take a clear position 
vis-à-vis its images, its habit of hedging along the line of not communicating a 
clear signified. In postmodernist videos, as not in the other specific types, each 
element of a text is undercut by others: narrative is undercut by pastiche; 
signifying is undercut by images that do not line up in a coherent chain; the text is 
flattened out, creating a two-dimensional effect and the refusal of a clear position 
for the spectator within the filmic world.46  
Kaplan contends that the music video’s constantly changing texts provide only “the 
promise of a plenitude forever deferred.”47 This idea of the music video’s barrage of 
imagery leaving the viewer decentered and fixated but most likely unsatisfied echoes 
Geneviève Rail’s concept of the sport of desire, in which there is “a constant and growing 
desire for new products, sensations and emotions—a desire fed but never fulfilled by the 
media, by the images.”48 Both argue that highlights concentrate events that are diffuse in 
time, leading to the effacing of history.  
The idea that highlights efface history is counterintuitive to an appreciation of 
sport based on knowing and understanding its history. In fact, an understanding of sports 
within an historical context is one of sport historian Allen Guttmann’s primary tenets that 
characterize modern sports. The “Ultimate Highlight” has elicited considerable criticism 
from bloggers and media critics, many of whom decry it as pandering to young viewers. 









 “Top 10 Plays” has remained one of SportsCenter’s most popular segments. 
During the week, the top plays will be counted down in one segment. On the Sunday 
evening program, the segment is cut into two parts, the first counting down the top plays 
from ten through six and the second part presenting plays five through one. “Top 10 
Plays” does on a daily basis what the Ultimate Highlight Reel book did for highlights as 
they happened across a calendar year and what other special highlight programs like “100 
Greatest SportsCenter Moments,” “100 Greatest (North American) Athletes of the 20th 
Century,” and “Greatest Games of the 20th Century” have done to establish an ESPN 
canon of the most important games, athletes and highlights for ESPN viewers. In 
establishing these lists, comprised of syntagmatic and paradigmatic sports moments, 
ESPN uses its gate-keeping function to codify what historic achievements, displays of 
brilliance and athletic renown are worthy of consideration when in reality no objective 
means of comparison is readily available. However, as Chris Berman explained in the 
introduction to the Ultimate Highlight Reel, “It’s our job to show you the who, the what, 
and the why of the wins and losses that make your world—and ours—go around.”50 
Berman’s contention that ESPN’s job is to show viewers which highlights are the 
“Top 10 Plays” of the day, the year, or the century establishes the preferred position 
assumed by the media giant. Although Berman admits that everyone has their own 
favorites, he can safely bet “some of them will turn up in the pages of the book you’re 
holding right now”51 because codification works by reducing personal preference to a list 
with which one can either only agree or disagree. For example, John Bloom argues that 









journalists, celebrity sportscasters, and newspaper columnists, groups who play an 
integral role in publicizing athletic events within the commercial media structure, it is 
likely that status, connotations and cultural ideals played a role in the selection criteria. 
Bloom explains: 
… media organizations like ESPN and ABC, in attempting to avoid controversy 
and provide a positive image with which advertisers could associate their 
products, tend to consider ideology as much as quantified performance when 
promoting particular athletes as representative of a particular time or place.52 
During the summer of 2004, ESPN counted down the top “100 SportsCenter Moments” 
of the previous twenty-five years, which of course coincided with its broadcast history, 
1979-2004. Hosted by David Overton Wilson III, “ESPN25” consisted of thirty-second 
segments shown during the 6 p.m. SportsCenter each day from May 31, 2004, until it 
reached the ultimate moment on September 7, 2004. That moment featured the U. S. 
victory in men’s hockey over the Soviet Union in the semifinals of the 1980 Lake Placid 
Olympics. When ESPN created its own fan-based tournament of the “100 Greatest 
Highlights,” that very same event was selected by the fans. Arguably, this is not 
coincidence. 
Audio Conventions 
 That audio conventions, especially the prominence of anchor catchphrases, 
constitute a key component of SportsCenter production values was evidenced in a brief 
story in the March 18, 1997, issue of Sports Business Daily that reported ESPN had 









The line of outerwear, polo shirts, T-shirts, knits, sweatshirts and fleece items were to 
feature ESPN and ESPN2 logos, as well as clothing “incorporating ad slogans and 
signature catch-phrases used by ESPN sportscasters.”53 In a memo addressed to ESPN, 
ESPN2 and ESPNEWS On-Air Staff, SportsCenter anchor Keith Olbermann expressed 
concern about “whether we have any voice in how our own words are used” and “that 
many of the catchphrases in question could hardly be considered either our individual, or 
ESPN’s, intellectual property.”54 Olbermann encouraged other on-air staff to seek legal 
protection since “the company’s haste to slap our work on the back of a Pro Player shirt 
might put us at individual legal risk somewhere down the line.”55 Although nothing more 
came of the appropriation of anchor catchphrases, the incident illustrates the importance 
of anchor catchphrases to the production of SportsCenter highlight packages. 
 Anchor commentary within the newscast ranges from explicit news reading to 
implicit ideological values. Explicit on-camera commentary is used to frame specific 
events being covered, introduce segments, and provide context and continuity for the 
highlight and graphics packages that convey both information and affect. Having 
provided the narrative framework to set up the highlight, the anchor can then more 
creatively add voice-over to the visual components. It is within this aspect that 
SportsCenter anchors have created their own stylistic and linguistic flourishes. As Farred 
explains, an anchor’s identity is contained in the catchphrases and “by (repeatedly) 
quoting themselves, they are performing several narrative functions simultaneously, some 
of which contradict each other.”56 On the one hand, the catchphrases draw attention to 









other hand, the SportsCenter anchor’s use of catchphrases “is unrecognizable to sports 
talk because it has completely changed the format, style, array of cultural influences, and 
discourse of the genre.”57 That dynamic relationship between the familiar and unfamiliar, 
Farred argues, is how SportsCenter “transforms the culturally alien into the indigenous 
through dissemination.”58 As a result of its ubiquity, SportsCenter’s glib, witty 
catchphrases leak into the larger, non-sport lexicon. 
 Another important SportsCenter audio convention is the interview, conducted 
either in-studio with the anchor, from another off-site studio with the anchor, or with a 
reporter from the site of event. As already noted, interviews can also be formatted into 
specific segments like the “Budweiser Hot Seat.” Getting interviews is predicated upon 
access, and access to players in locker rooms and on the playing fields is crucial to 
personalizing an athlete’s performance. Viewers want more than scores and statistics 
because the practice of sports journalism has always been to frame narrative around 
combatants—winner and losers, favorites and underdogs, heroes and villains. Because 
ESPN is the largest sports news organization, it enjoys considerable leverage in getting 
interviews with the players because players understand that in talking with ESPN 
reporters, they get greater exposure. Leonard Shapiro, who covers golf for the 
Washington Post, expressed frustration in not being able to get an interview with Tiger 
Woods because Woods’ handlers deny him access. Shapiro explained, “Then I pick up 
ESPN The Magazine and this SportsCenter anchor has a one-on-one Q & A with him that 
runs for six pages.”59 Gaining exclusive one-on-one interviews with athletes like Tiger 









ESPN because they are familiar with, and often fans of, the network.”60       
  In addition to anchor commentary and interviews, SportsCenter utilizes a full 
range of expert analysts, including former players, coaches and practicing journalists. 
SportsCenter’s use of expert opinion, or punditry, can be structured in different ways. 
One involves a single analyst providing commentary over a highlight or statistical 
graphic or in split-screen shot with the visual component. A second option involves a pre-
recorded segment in which two analysts face off and make predictions or play “Fact or 
Fiction.” Lastly, several analysts can be brought together for a panel discussion in studio 
or at a remote site. The rise of expert opinions, as Raymond Boyle notes, “has become an 
established part of the wider television news landscape, in part as a response to the rise in 
rolling news channels.”61 Expert opinions only have relevance when based on insider 
information that beat reporters can not acquire, so again, as with interviews, ESPN’s 
experts enjoy a distinct advantage of having sources that are willing to provide the kind 
of information that allows ESPN to break stories. Few question or complain when sports 
experts offer insider information from unnamed or anonymous sources. Providing 
information that experts glean from insider sources enhances ESPN’s standing with 
viewers because it fosters the perception that the network has a better grasp of what is 
going on than other sportscasts. Moreover, as Klatell and Marcus explain, thanks in part 
to expert opinions, television newscasts can more easily “control the agenda for 
discussion, and can withhold praise and criticism with relative impunity.”62   
Audio conventions constitute an important part of the discourse presented on 









that can “tell us about events in the sports world in the most original or derivative or 
parodic form. Talk itself not only is the focus but constitutes the very essence of 
SportsCenter.”63 If highlights form the backbone of SportsCenter, then catchphrases are 
its lifeblood. 
This Is SportsCenter? 
 ESPN leveraged the popularity of SportsCenter by promoting it in an advertising 
campaign titled “This Is SportsCenter.” Originally a thirty-spot campaign created by 
Wieden & Kennedy of Portland, Oregon, the campaign revolves around what happens 
behind the scenes of the program. In an early review, Advertising Age praised the 
campaign’s spots that “vividly capture the network’s unique combination of relentless 
dedication to, and irreverence about, the wide world of sports.”64 The reviewer noted that 
the campaign works in large part because of its “tongue-in-cheek…straight-faced parody 
of behind-the-scenes looks—but the insight is nonetheless there.”65  
 Written by Hank Perlman and directed by the team of Bryan Buckley and Frank 
Todaro of Radical Media, the campaign incorporates “off the wall situations, absurd 
comic asides, hysterical cameos of athletes and team mascots…”66 Anthony Vagnoni 
reported that Buckley and Todaro referred to the style of the shoot “as strictly run and 
gun,”67 which itself utilizes a sports simile associated with an up-tempo basketball 
offense. Vagnoni explained that while some spots were tightly scripted, others worked 
from a one-line idea, often related to the anchors’ work ethic, their relationship with each 
other and the athletes, and the dynamics of the SportsCenter newsroom. For example, one 









ad takes the viewer into an editing room where anchor Kenny Mayne tries out various 
catchphrases that he is known for—“I am the most popular player in the land!” 
“Yahtzee!” “That must be a Homer, Simpson, cuz the pitcher just said, ‘D’oh!’” to 
accompany a highlight of Ken Griffey hitting a home run.68 The spot and the catchphrase 
both play on the viewer’s knowledge of sports and popular culture—in another spot 
anchor Charley Steiner is “traded” to Melrose Place in exchange for Andrew Shue—
while also debunking the notion that being a SportsCenter anchor involves creativity and 
spontaneity, which, in reality, are required. 
 The “This Is SportsCenter” campaign was judged Advertising Age’s Best of Show 
for television spots in 1995. The campaign garnered not only industry awards, but also 
earned for the network “continuous ratings growth, unprecedented brand recall and…a 
positive buzz among sports’ elite,” according to Allan Broce, ESPN ad director. 
Additionally, the campaign was adapted for print, and ran during late night sports and 
entertainment programming on both broadcast and cable.69 Judy Fearing, senior vice 
president of consumer marketing at ESPN, explained that the campaign was designed to 
solidify the ESPN brand image “as not just a TV network but as a huge sports fan 
itself.”70 The campaign’s success was certainly related to its ability to naturalize the 
perception that ESPN is a huge fan of sports just as the athletes that the network covers 
are equally loyal fans of SportsCenter. Garfield reported that after the campaign began 
athletes like Dennis Rodman called SportsCenter anchor Dan Patrick to offer several 
suggestions for “This is SportsCenter” spots.  









presence has come under criticism from journalistic scholars and media critics who 
question how ESPN can run “delightful commercials praising ESPN that feature the very 
star athletes that ESPN covers.”71 ESPN managing editor Bob Eaton responded to those 
criticisms by pointing out that the athletes are not paid for their appearance. “We don’t 
pay them and we don’t give them any special treatment.”72 Al Thompkins, who teaches 
broadcast news ethics at The Poynter Institute, asked, “How would it be if you appear in 
a promo with an athlete, and then the next day you have to do a difficult story about their 
cocaine use? It would be difficult.”73  
Other spots involving athletes tend to downplay their athletic abilities, perhaps to 
blunt criticism. One features NBA star Grant Hill’s piano-playing ability to soothe anchor 
Dan Patrick’s bruised ego after a difficult show by playing the chords for the “Charge!” 
riff that ballpark organists often play to rally a team. When ESPN conducted a poll at its 
SportsNation Web site to select the fans’ favorite “This is SportsCenter” commercial, it 
offered this tongue-in-cheek introduction: “Here at ESPN, we don't just cover athletes—
we employ them, often in thankless and low-paying tasks. We figure, hey, we give them 
enough recognition on the field. It's about time they contribute off of [sic] it, as well.”74 
One of the most successful spots capitalized on the fame of Tiger Woods, who is shown 
strolling through the SportsCenter newsroom when he encounters Stuart Scott, who asks 
about meeting for lunch. The punch line is visual, for as Woods walks away, he is 
followed by a gallery, similar to those that follow him on the golf course.  
The ESPN-as-fan-of-sports-and-athletes-as-fans-of-ESPN concept was utilized in 









ESPN Classic, formerly the Classic Sports Network, which ESPN acquired in October 
1997. The “Old School” campaign employed the use of young celebrities to pay homage 
to athletes of years past, putting “a contemporary spin on a network that telecasts old 
sporting events.”75 For example, in one spot Chamique Holdsclaw celebrates basketball 
star Julius Erving, and in another actor Michael Rappaport waxes nostalgic about tennis 
champion John McEnroe. In 2001, ESPN launched the “Which SportsCenter do you 
watch?” campaign, featuring sports stars out of uniform and watching the network’s 
premiere news program. The ads for this campaign were augmented with a ticker 
streaming scores and news that had been recently introduced on various programs. Also 
in 2001, ESPN launched campaigns with displays that featured the ticker—one on New 
York City taxis and another on phone kiosks. David Goetzl reported that the “displays are 
less about providing up-to-the-minute scores and more about serving as a marketing 
vehicle to impress fans with shock value and the network’s commitment to reach them in 
innovative ways.”76  
The “This is SportsCenter” campaign was lauded as one of the most influential 
campaigns of the 1990s and credited with triggering a wave of “mockumentary”-style 
copycats. Despite the proliferation of imitators, Wieden & Kennedy and ESPN have 
continued to use the behind-the-scenes format in updated versions of the campaign 
developed over the past several years. Walter Berger reported in Advertising Age’s 
Creativity that the campaign has been updated “by introducing more topicality.”77 That 
has allowed ESPN to capitalize on specific events, like Mark McGwire hitting a then 









Definition (HD). While that means the spots may not have a long shelf life and may 
require frequent productions, Fearing noted that “as long as we touch on what’s topical in 
the world of sports and do it in unexpected ways, then I think this campaign can evolve 
for years.”78             
Significantly, the “This is SportsCenter” campaign reflects a subtle but important 
shift in ESPN’s overall mission. According to Lee Ann Daly, executive vice president of 
marketing, the company’s mission statement, written in 1993, was about risk taking, 
creativity and integrity in being the self-proclaimed “worldwide leader in sports.” Daly 
noted:  
But our brand positioning was that we’re not an entertainment company, we’re 
the world’s biggest sports fan. And that’s really driven where we’ve extended the 
brand over time. We chose that position because a human position is more 
accessible than the “worldwide leader in sports.” We wanted a conversational role 
with the fans.79  
Part of the “This is SportCenter” campaign’s success was predicated on the eccentricities, 
quirks and foibles of SportsCenter anchors and anchor wannabes. None of the spots uses 
the “worldwide leader of sports” claim, although it continues to be used to introduce live 
event coverage and other promotional spots. For example, in one spot Dan Patrick and 
Keith Olbermann are shown applying make-up while discussing the violence in hockey, 
revealing that even though they deal with the tougher side of sports, they retain an 
effeminate side concerned with rouge and foundation. 









SportsCenter has become a cultural icon for sports news broadcasting that spawned a 
network television series, Sports Night, which aired on ABC for two seasons beginning in 
1998. Lastly, one spot played on the idea of a young anchor, who, like his athlete 
counterparts, comes to the “big leagues” too early and can not quite handle the pressure 
of being a SportsCenter anchor. Interestingly, that spot suggested that becoming an 
anchor, like becoming a professional athlete, requires more than a love of sports. 
Nonetheless, ESPN spun that spot’s premise into a reality series in 2004 that was 
anything but a laughing matter, especially to some of those occupying the SportsCenter 
anchor desk.   
Dream Job 
 Prompted by its mission statement to be the world’s biggest sports fan, ESPN 
literally offered one sports fan the opportunity to become an anchor on its most popular 
and prestigious program, SportsCenter. Titled Dream Job, the program marked ESPN’s 
second attempt at a reality series, following Beg, Borrow & Deal, which featured two 
teams of four racing against each other to get a specified destination by performing sports 
related tasks, a format similar to CBS’s Emmy Award-winning reality show, The 
Amazing Race. 
ESPN aired Dream Job on Sunday evenings starting in February 2004. One 
significant difference that separated Dream Job from other reality shows was that the 
winner was offered a one-year contract to work for ESPN, sitting at the SportsCenter 
anchor desk. Like other reality shows, Dream Job had no difficulty attracting applicants, 









own sponsor in Labatt’s Beer.83 From the auditions, ten contestants and one alternate won 
invitations to vie for the Dream Job, and a Wendy’s promotion involving soda cups at 
franchises provided the twelfth candidate, called the “wild card” like the NFL and MLB 
teams that qualify for the playoffs despite not having won division races.81 Shortly before 
the series aired, producers allowed the alternate to become the twelfth contestant.  
The first season’s contestants ranged in age from twenty-one to forty, and came 
from diverse occupational backgrounds, including several college students, a computer 
programmer, a retail manager, an attorney, an executive recruiter, an auto parts salesman, 
a comedian and an actor/singer. Both finalists were college students who had had some 
broadcasting experience. As Wade Paulsen noted, “Their biggest edge, though, was being 
very young on a network trying to maintain its cachet with youth so that it can continue 
to raise its sky-high subscriber rates to cable systems (currently $2.61 per subscriber per 
month just for basic ESPN).”82 In the show’s final hour, viewers selected Aaron Levine to 
be cut, leaving Mike Hall as the first Dream Job winner. In addition to winning a new 
Mazda-3 and a one-year ESPN contract, Hall appeared on SportsCenter later that night to 
take a sports quiz in which each correct answer added $5,000 to the value of his contract. 
Before officially joining SportsCenter, Hall was to be given on-air work for ESPNEWS.   
The program garnered respectable cable ratings that averaged slightly more than 
one million households, triple the number from the previous year’s ratings for NHL 
games that ran in the 10 p.m. time slot on comparable Sundays. Sandomir explained that 
the show capitalized “on the worship of wisecracking anchors and highlights massaged 









nightmare for others, including anchor Dan Patrick, who expressed incredulity on his 
radio show that the winner was being hired to serve as a SportsCenter anchor, asking, 
“Would you give the punt, pass and kick winner a contract to punt for the Bengals?”84 
Patrick’s rhetorical question brings into focus the mission statement and brand 
positioning that ESPN is the world’s biggest sports fan and that all sports fans share 
equally in its gestalt. As Sandomir pointed out in a review of the program, “It 
[SportsCenter] is a mystical place for fans, an Emerald City where the Wizard of Oz is 
Dan Patrick; it is a comfort zone where an hour’s worth of news, highlights and Top 10’s 
fulfills a craving that regenerates nightly.”85 Pointing out that live television combined 
with on-air inexperience hardly made for compelling viewing, Sandomir also explained 
that Dream Job at least dispelled the notion that anchoring SportsCenter could be 
mastered by wannabes without “skills and personas honed delivering three-and-a-half-
minute nightly reports in smaller markets.”86  
After briefly sharing the anchor desk with Linda Cohn in July 2004, Hall was 
assigned to ESPNEWS. The following year Hall became, according to Burke Magnus, 
ESPN vice president, “the guy, the face and voice of ESPNU,”87 the ESPN network 
devoted to college sports that was launched in March 2005. Given the long-term planning 
that invariably went into the decision to launch ESPNU, it is reasonable to conjecture that 
finding a young talent to host ESPNU was the ultimate, though unstated, goal of Dream 
Job.    
Conclusion      









forms of production, including sportscast highlights, are impacted by the presence of 
spectacle. This has occurred, paradoxically, out of “the attempt to set up a separate sphere 
of leisure uncontaminated by the world of work and politics.”88 One reason why mediated 
sport has been unable to resist the encroachment of a political economy lies in 
SportCenter’s proven capacity to attract and deliver the most attractive consumer 
demographic to the marketplace in volume with regularity. The male demographic of 
eighteen to thirty-four-year-olds has been shown to have an insatiable appetite for not 
only mediated sports texts, but also for the consumer products that are advertised on 
those programs. David Rowe explains:  
Media sports texts are perhaps, then, at the leading edge of this “culturalization” 
of economics: they cannot be eaten or worn yet billions of people desire them in a 
bewildering variety of types, and media corporations are willing to expend 
billions of units of currency to supply them, often ‘free of charge’, to the user.89 
ESPN has certainly assumed a leading position in this process of culturalization of 
economics, having become ABC’s de facto sports division and in the process having 
raised its own profile, as well as the profiles of ABC’s other properties. 
The success of ESPN’s SportsCenter within the political and cultural economy 
stems from its ability to harness power by controlling the production, distribution and 
consumption of mediated sport resources. Because political economy tends to concentrate 
on a specific set of social relations organized around the power to control other people, 
processes and objects, ESPN must continually create circuits of communication products 









purchases, rentals and attention are fed back into new processes of production. What 
becomes critical for this circuit, as Timothy Luke notes, is “control of the code, rather 
than of the means of production.”90 In the transmission of these codes, all types of 
consumer products and services from sports equipment to alcohol to travel destinations 
are associated with mediated sport events or serve as sponsors for specific SportsCenter 
segments (“Budweiser Hot Seat,” “Gatorade Ultimate Highlight,” “Top Ten ‘Brilliant’ 
Plays). Luke argues that [Georg] Lukác’s insights into the cycles of commodification 
remain sound.     
In this new world, however, the electronic media—as the most expressive 
articulation of commodification under these economic, political and social 
conditions—are basic geocosmic forces that form both the molten core of today’s 
second nature and the hard crust of its image-driven phantom objectivity. Their 
broadcast transmissions bubble up in an electronic primordial soup that 
continuously swirls around the processes of everyday life.91  
Luke argues that through this electronic primordial soup, corporate growth and 
production are designed to produce both the needs and need satisfaction for viewers. 
Viewers of ESPN’s SportsCenter are promised the exhilaration of athletic achievement 
and seduced into completing their part as consumers in a reproductive social order. Both 
producers and consumers, those behind and in front of the screen, are involved in a 
continuous (co)production of what Lawrence Wernick calls the promotional culture.92  
The self-proclaimed mantle of “Worldwide Leader in Sports,” with all the brand 









competitive advantage in the sport-media-commercial-complex. Arguably, the power 
employed to captivate and move consumers through SportsCenter’s constellation of signs 
and images resides in the highlight form. Luke explains:  
Power here is essentially seductive, motivating its subjects with images to 
collaborate in reproducing or completing the codes’ logic or sequence at their 
screens. Individuals recreate themselves continuously in the permissive coding of 
individual self-management.93  
Luke points out that television personalities and sport stars serve as surrogate friends and 
neighbors for viewers in an electronic simulation of friends and community. As the 
distinction between simulation and the real disappears, “the forms of individual 
subjectivity and social consciousness are themselves manufactured to sustain 
consumption.”94 Ultimately, sustaining consumption is predicated on a flow of sport 
highlights that produce both needs and need satisfaction for viewers. 
SportsCenter segments are branded, so that a constant stream of product names 
and icons act as lead-ins before the viewer gets to the actual highlight, commentary or 
interview. Arguably, these segments can be seen as examples of postmodern art that 
bring together advertisement imagery, ideological codes and symbols of consumer 
capitalism.95 Viewers are implicated in consumerism based on affect. Rather than 
allowing people to satisfy real human needs, the market culture constrains individuals “to 
realize their needs in mass-produced material packages and professionally approved 
behavioral scripts.”96  









viewers watch its “Top 10 Plays,” its “Ultimate Highlight Reel,” its “100 Greatest 
Athletes of the 20th Century,” its “This is SportsCenter” commercials. In doing so, it has 
codified a form and selected which sports moments, achievements, and athletes deserve 
to be in the canon. In this Disney-owned company’s culture of promotion, all signifying 
gestures are swallowed up, continually proffered and deferred, creating a maze “in which 
there is no final destination, no final reward, and where the walls are pictures (and 
pictures of pictures) of ever-multiplying varieties of cheese.”97  
Notes 
 
1 Rudy Martzke and Reid Cherner, “Channeling How to View Sports,” USA Today, 
August 17, 2004, D2. 
2 Michael Freeman, ESPN: The Uncensored History (Dallas: Taylor Publishing, 2000), 
93. ESPN’s first SportsCenter program did not use a single highlight clip. Highlights 
were shown at 11:30 p.m. on a show called “Sports Recap.” One of the problems ESPN 
faced was securing highlights from the networks. NBC and ABC readily agreed to open 
their video archives because they did not view ESPN as competition. When CBS refused, 
ESPN began taking them without permission until the older network relented (pp. 105-
106).  
3 Rudy Martzke and Reid Cherner, “Channeling How to View Sports,” USA Today, 
August 17, 2004, D2. That figure goes beyond watching sportscasts, however; it includes 
all ESPN programming on its numerous television channels—ESPN, ESPN2, ESPNU, 
ESPN Classic, ESPNEWS, ESPN Radio, ESPN.com and ESPN Deportes. 
4 Richard Sandomir, “At ESPN, the Revolution Was Televised,” New York Times, 
September 7, 1999, D1. 
5 “Annie Roboff Web Site Interview.” http://www.geocities.com/aroboff/interview2.html 




8 Ted Miller, “Happy 30,000th, ESPN; now cool it.” Retrieved 
http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/miller/303426_miller13.html 
9 Grant Farred, “Cool as the Other Side of the Pillow: How ESPN’s SportsCenter Has 
Changed Television Sports Talk,” Journal of Sport & Social Issues, 24.2 (May 2000): 99-
100. 
10 Ibid., 100. 
11 Ibid., 112. 
12 Chris Harris, “Welcome to the SportsCenter Altar.” http://www.sportscenteraltar.com. 









Highlight Reel: The 365 Wildest, Weirdest, Most Unforgettable SportsCenter Moments of 
All Time (New York: ESPN Books, 2006), i. 
 14 Charles Hirshberg, ESPN25: 25 Mind-Bending, Eye-Popping, Culture-Morphing 
Years of Highlights (New York: Hyperion Books, 2004),12. 
15 Berman, “Picture,” ii. 
16 Timothy W. Luke, Screens of Power: Ideology, Domination, and Resistance in 
Information Society (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1989), 34. 
17 Robert Stam, “Television News and Its Spectator,” In Regarding Television: Critical 
Approaches—An Anthology, ed., E.Ann Kaplan (Los Angeles: University Publications of 
America, Inc., 1983), 23-43. 
 18 Hirshberg, ESPN25, 12. 
19 David Rowe, Sport, Culture and the Media: The Unruly Trinity (Buckingham: Open 
University Press, 1999), 65. 
20 Ibid., 68. 
21 David B. Sullivan, “Broadcast Television and the Game of Packaging Sports,” In 
Handbook of Sports and Media, ed., A. A. Raney and J. Bryant, (Mahway, N.J.: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2006), 135. 
22 David L. Andrews, “Excavating Michael Jordan: Notes on a Critical Pedagogy of 
Sporting Representation,” in Sport and Postmodern Times, ed., Geneviève Rail, (Albany, 
N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1998), 195. 
23 Richard Sandomir, “At ESPN After 25 Years, Happy Birthday to Us,” New York 
Times, September 7, 2004, D1. 




27 Freeman, ESPN, 120. 
28 Peter Alfano, “ESPN Struggling, but Making an Impact,” New York Times, May 24, 
1983, B12. 
29 Steve Knoll, “More Coverage for Olympics Fans,” New York Times, July 22, 1984, 
H22. 
30 Michael Katz, “ESPN’s Public Service at Cooperstown,” New York Times, July 30, 
1985, B6. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Steve Schneider, “Everything about the Game—Except the Game,” New York Times, 
January 26, 1986, H32. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Freeman, ESPN., 133. 
36 Ibid., 148. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Hirshberg, ESPN25, 89. 
39 Ibid., 90. 
40 Guy Debord, Society of the Spectacle (Detroit: Black and Red, 1966), no. 1. 









42 Luke, Screens, 28. 
43 Geneviève Rail, “Seismography of the Postmodern Condition: Three Theses on the 
Implosion of Sport,” In Sport and Postmodern Times, ed., G. Rail (Albany, NY: State 
University of New York Press, 1998), 151. 
44 Qtd. in Farred, 100. 
45 Steven Barnett, Games and Sets: The Changing Face of Sport on Television (London: 
British Film Institute, 1990), 8. 
46 E. Ann Kaplan, Rocking Around the Clock: Music Television, Postmodernism & 
Consumer Culture (New York: Methuen, 1987), 63. 
47 Ibid., 50. 
48 Rail, “Postmodern,” 151. 
49 Ted Miller, “Happy 30,000th, ESPN; now cool it.” 
http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/miller/303426_miller13.html 
50 Berman, “Introduction,” ii. 
51 Ibid.  
52 John Bloom, “No fall from Grace: Grace Thorpe’s ‘Athlete of the Century’ Campaign for her 
Tather.” In Native Athletes in Sport & Society: A Reader, ed., C. R. King (Lincoln, NE: 
University of Nebraska Press, 2005), 234. 
53 Qtd. in Freeman, 2. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Farred, “Cool,” 112. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Jim Shea, “The King: How ESPN Changes Everything,” Columbia Journalism Review, 
January/February, 2000. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Raymond Boyle, Sports Journalism: Context and Issues (London: Sage, 2006), 74. 
62 David A. Klatell and Norman Marcus, Sports for Sale: Television, Money, and the Fans (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 219. 
63 Farred, “Cool,” 114. 
 64 “ESPN Sports Attitude Mixing Dedication and Irreverence,” Advertising Age, October 23, 
1995, 3. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Anthony Vagnoni, “Jock Yocks: A New Promo Campaign For ESPN Gives Fun-Loving 
Sports Stars a ‘Spinal Tap,’” Advertising Age’s Creativity, November 1, 1995, 15. 
67 Ibid. 
68 
ESPN25 DVD that accompanied the book, ESPN25: 25 Mind-Bending, Eye-Popping, Culture-
Morphing Years of Highlights, New York: Hyperion Books, 2004.  
69 Bob Garfield, “The Best Awards; ESPN Scores Best in Show,” Advertising Age, May 27, 
1996, S1. 
70 Jon Rappoport, “The Marketing 100; ESPN Judy Fearing,” Advertising Age, June 24, 1996, 
S3. 











74 “Vote: which commercial is your favorite?” 
http://proxy.espn.go.com/chat/sportsnation/polling?event_id=3266. 
75 Wayne Friedman, “Young Stars Give Fresh Spin to ESPN Classic Programs: Ads Feature 
Contemporary Celebs Touting Heroes of Past,” Advertising Age, May 31, 1999, 75. 
76 David Goetzl, “ESPN Ad Effort Hails a Cab; Adapt Media’s Pilot Program Driving in NYC,” 
Advertising Age, May 28, 2001, 8. 
77 Warren Berger, “Equal Sequals,” Creativity, May 1, 1999, 30. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Melanie Shortman, “ESPN: Know Thyself (And Thine Audience),” Creativity, October 1, 
2005, 57. 
80 Richard Linnett, “The Buzz; What We’re Talking About,” Advertising Age, January 19, 2004, 
33. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Wade Paulsen, “Mike Hall Wins ESPN’s ‘Dream Job.’” 
http://www.realitytvworld.com/news/mike-hall-wins-espn-dream-job-2421.php 
83 Richard Sandomir, “At ESPN, the Revolution Was Televised,” New York Times, September 7, 
1999, D1. 
84 Ted McCartan, “ESPN ‘Dream Job’ Contestants Remain Only Amateurs,” The Daily Iowan, 
March 30, 2004, 4. “Punt, Pass & Kick” (PPK) is a competition sponsored by the NFL and Pepsi 
for youngsters aged 8-15. 
85 Richard Sandomir, “‘Dream Job,’ the Nightmare, Showing Now on ESPN,” New York Times, 
March 6, 2004, D4. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Alexander Marciniak, “‘Dream Job’ Winner Gets Prime Spot with New ESPNU.” 
http://media.www.theeastcarolinian.com/media/storage/paper915/news/2005/02/01/UndefinedSe
ction/dream.Job.Winner.Gets.Prime.Spot.With.New.Espnu-2209902.shtml 
88 Christopher Lasch. The Culture of Narcissism: American life in an Age of Diminishing 
Expectations (New York: Norton, 1979), 216. 
89 Rowe, Media, 92. 
90 Luke, Screens, 36. 
91 Ibid., 21. 
92 Andrew Wernick, Promotional Culture: Advertising, Ideology and Symbolic 
Expression (London: Sage, 1991). 
93 Luke, Screens, 48. 
94 Ibid., 34. 
95 Geneviève Rail, “Introduction,” in Sport and Postmodern Times, ed., G. Rail (Albany, 
NY: State University of New York Press, 1998).  
96 Luke, Screens, 34. 











CHAPTER 8: THE REAL VIRTUALITY FOR AN AUDIENCE OF ONE 
Introduction 
 
This chapter explicates the developments in new media that reshaped the sports 
mediascape by providing new technological means of deploying the sportscast highlight 
form. Over the past two decades, sports broadcasters, fans, athletes and the leagues have 
all been impacted by the changes, especially those precipitated by developments in 
delivery systems (e.g., World Wide Web and mobile devices). However, because the 
integration of new media with coverage of major sporting events involved not only 
changes in technology, but also social and cultural practices, it is important not to fall 
prey to what Henry Jenkins calls “the Black Box Fallacy.”1 This fallacy, Jenkins argues, 
reduces “media change to technological change and strips aside the cultural levels…. 
Media convergence is more than simply a technological shift. Convergence alters the 
relationship between existing technologies, industries, markets, genres, and audiences.”2 
The relationships between existing media and markets, genres and audiences 
underwent considerable change as a result of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 
which called for all restrictions on cable rates to be lifted in March 1999. The prospect of 
complete deregulation of cable rates that were already growing at a pace four times that 
of overall consumer prices raised concerns among consumer groups and members of 
Congress.3 Despite new types of direct-broadcast satellite service (e.g., DirectTV and 
Primestar), cable still controlled eighty-seven percent of the market share. Increases in 
subscription prices were as constant as the changes in basic packages as cable systems 









speed Internet connections, video on demand, and residential phone service.4 The 
Telecommunications Act also called for a change in the broadcasting standard from 
analog to digital, ensuring that programming, whether standard or high definition 
(HDTV), would be “picture perfect, free of ghosts and snow.”5  
In addition to these changes, new media created even more delivery systems, 
genres and audiences, further complicating the sports media market. On the one hand, as 
delivery systems changed rapidly in the 1990s, their utilization was anything but smooth, 
as evidenced by International Business Machines’ (IBM) “extreme disaster”6 with its 
computer network for the 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games. Only two years later, however, 
the Internet provided football (soccer) fans of World Cup ’98 not only highlights of all 
the tournament’s goals but live broadcast of matches, as well as updates, complete 
rosters, schedules and souvenirs.7 On the other hand, cultural protocols and practices 
related to media were dynamic for both producers and consumers. To comprehend the 
dynamics of the new sports media landscape, it is necessary to consider the changed 
context of sportscasting and the changed model of consumer behavior, what Jenkins calls 
“affective economics, [a model] which seeks to understand the emotional underpinnings 
of consumer decision-making as a driving force behind viewing and purchasing 
decisions.”8    
Before the end of the twentieth century a media giant like CBS found itself in 
competition with Internet media companies to provide the latest sports news and 
highlights. Not surprisingly, in March 1997, CBS announced that it had acquired a 









sports information to various Web sites, as “a vital first step” in the network’s Internet 
strategy.9 At almost the same time, ABC News began its venture online jointly with 
Starwave Corporation, “a 300-person collection of software programmers and journalists 
behind a series of popular Web sites, led by ESPNet Sportszone, an on-line sports 
service.”10 At the time, Sportszone was the most heavily trafficked new-media service on 
the Internet apart from the major search engines like Yahoo and computer sites like Cnet 
and ZD Net.  
Professional sports leagues and organizations also embraced the new technology. 
By 2001, the National Football League (NFL), which had the most valuable television 
contract in sports, signed the largest league Internet rights package worth in cash and 
non-cash value more than $300 million with a consortium of America On Line (AOL) 
Time Warner, Sportsline.com and Viacom, which had purchased CBS in September 
1999.11 Although the NFL had an $18 billion reason why its Web site should not draw 
viewers away from the coverage of football telecasts, the league quickly learned how to 
make its Web site and online shop “the parking lot after the game, where the fans can get 
close to the players as they make their way out of the stadium.”12 That included sales of 
NFL team apparel and merchandise.  
If the Internet was helping to create new alliances in the dissemination of 
sportscasts, then so too was it changing the way consumers accessed sportscasts and 
sports news. Television may have spawned the “Couch Potato,” but he was eventually 
joined by his online counterpart, the “Web Potato.”13 Even though data showed that for 









employing software programs (e.g., Little Brother) to rein in employees’ “digital 
dalliances,”15 television traditionalists at the 1999 National Association of Television 
Executives’ NAPTE convention predicted that people would never use their computers to 
watch their favorite television programs. 
This chapter considers the contexts within which new media, despite enhancing 
access to the coverage of sportscasts, only further fragmented the audience for mediated 
sports, saturated an already soggy sports market and guaranteed staggering losses for the 
television and cable networks that continued to pay exorbitant rights fees that even 
Rupert Murdoch believed “have gone beyond an economic level.”16 Unfortunately for the 
networks, the difficulty of attracting a mass audience for sports telecasts drove the cost of 
securing the rights for premium events upward. Although no one was quite certain why, 
television ratings for the major sports continued a decade-long decline. During that time, 
sports ratings had been eroded by cable television, home video and satellite dishes, a 
trend that continued with the Internet, TiVo and DVDs. Most importantly, for a 
generation nurtured on highlights, instant replays, and more cable versions of ESPN than 
there were broadcast networks for the generation that preceded it, sports were watched in 
a far different way than they had been during the three-network era.17 As Richard 
Sandomir explained, “The bonds of loyalty to a nationally televised sport can be broken 
more easily because there is so much else to do and perhaps less patience.”18 Viewers 
constantly searching for marquee match-ups more readily passed over games and events 
in which star attractions were not competing.   









wireless mobile phone providers helped to build a new fan base for sports by offering 
Internet pay packages, enhancing production values for live coverage of major events, 
and providing more infotainment, especially highlights. As broadband connections 
became more available, sports programming providers offered more online pay packages. 
For example, Major League Baseball (MLB) teamed up with Sun Microsystems to create 
MLB Advanced Media (MLBAM) in 2000. Through its Web site, MLB.com, the league 
began offering pay-packages that enabled visitors to “listen to and watch live games and 
highlights, check scores, buy game tickets, purchase team merchandise and even manage 
a virtual team.”19 With an average of six million visitors daily, ten million page views per 
day and no application downtime in the latest two years of operation, MLB.com became 
the Internet’s most successful broadband Web portal devoted to professional sports.20 In 
2005, ESPN introduced viewers to ESPN 360 and its “Full Circle” coverage for the 
presentation of a men’s college basketball game, in which each of its networks presented 
a different angle of the game being broadcast. Wireless companies like Verizon utilized 
second- and third-generation systems like VCAST, which included more than three 
hundred daily video clips from channels and shows like CNN, NBC Sports and ESPN.  
Lastly, at the same time the professional leagues were offering coverage of their 
games, highlights and previews to consumers willing to subscribe to pay packages, they 
were also seeking to expand control of their intellectual property rights. This desire to 
expand control of intellectual property rights pitted the professional leagues against the 
First Amendment rights of the news media, especially traditional print media and 









domain.”21 While the root of the issue can be traced back to the International Olympic 
Committee’s creation of Rule 49 to its Charter in 1956, which set strict limitations on 
news media coverage of the events, the newest battle was spawned by the creation of the 
Internet and alternate ways of distributing news.  
Technology’s False Start 
The strategy for the 21st century sports mediascape was established before the end 
of the 20th century: In order to maintain and add to its customer base, entities like the 
International Olympic Committee and NBC wanted the consumer’s attention, as well as 
the consumer’s time and money, at every possible moment. Harnessing and utilizing the 
technology proved to be far more difficult in practice than it was in theory. In 1996, 
organizers for Atlanta’s Olympic Games promised “the most technologically 
sophisticated Games ever.”22 However, by the second day, IBM’s $80 million 
information system, “Info 96,” was missing “large blocks of data, including any warnings 
about the continuing troubles to the Olympic transportation systems.”23 Although IBM’s 
goal was to provide results in real time from the twenty-nine venues to its mainframe 
computers and then on to the rest of the world, Olympic technology officials were 
reduced to “a manual results system that the ancient Greeks could appreciate.”24 In fact, 
results were transmitted by facsimile machines from the outlying venues to a central 
office and distributed by runners. News agencies, promised an electronic results system 
fed directly from Olympic computers, were reduced to having employees “watch the 
competitions on television and then type results into their systems.”25  









Games were indeed the first Olympics that offered access through the Internet. Promises 
exceeded what was delivered, especially at the two largest sites, both of which were 
collaborative efforts—the IBM-Atlanta Committee for the Olympic Games site and the 
NBC-IOC sites. Arguably, the best way to get information about specific sports was to 
access sport-specific sites like Velonews Interactive. For example, Ken Brown of the 
New York Times reported that although the IBM site promised “a continuous flow of 
digital images from nearly every venue,” what they got were delays and “relentless 
commercialism; the home page is like an infomercial for Olympic junk.”26 Similarly, 
NBC planned to integrate its television broadcasts with its Web pages. However, Brown 
explained that NBC’s plan to use new Intercast technology developed by Intel was 
mostly for show because “few computers have the equipment to use Intercast technology. 
Maybe next time.”27  
With a little more digging at sport-specific sites, however, users of sites such as 
Velonews Interactive were provided “details only a fanatic could love, including pictures 
of Super Bike 2, which American riders will use in the Olympics…[and] expanded pages 
that show even the smallest details of a competition, noting that the winner of the 3-meter 
springboard diving competition nailed a forward 1½ somersault in pike position on his 
fourth dive.”28 Rather than enduring NBC’s 171.5 hours of coverage primarily devoted to 
the most popular events and name athletes, serious fans of a less popular sport no longer 
had to waste hours “wearing a hole in the living room carpet waiting for a fleeting 
glimpse of a triumph or failure.”29 Even those opposed to Olympism found information. 









about how the Olympic Games were displacing Atlanta’s homeless. Brown added, “The 
highlight here is Spoilsport, the anti-mascot of the Olympics.”30  
 By the time of the next major world sporting event, World Cup ’98 held in 
France, many of technological problems plaguing the integration of new and old media 
during the Atlanta Olympic Games had been solved. Not only were all sixty-four games 
of World Cup being broadcast live in the United States by ABC, ESPN, ESPN2 and 
Univision, the Spanish-language network, but a plethora of Web sites were available “to 
slake the thirst of even the most avid fans.”31 Because of the six-hour difference between 
France and the Eastern time zone of the United States, live coverage ended before most 
people had completed work. Nonetheless, several Internet sites offered live broadcast of 
the matches, including one that offered highlights of every goal scored during the 
tournament. One magazine’s Web site featured the work of thirty-five photographers 
stationed in twenty-two countries around the globe “to chronicle how the world watches 
and reacts to the World Cup.”32 Matchday.com still operates and provides links to many 
other sites, including Rugby USA and Team USA. 
 Time difference also proved to be a major handicap for NBC’s coverage of the 
2000 Sydney Olympic Games, resulting in ratings that were “the worst in television 
history for the event.”33 The precipitous ratings drop was directly attributable to not only 
NBC’s decision to delay broadcasting events in the United States until many hours after 
they had been contested in Australia, but also to “a flood of information about the 
Games…on the Internet and on sports cable channels and sports talk radio stations, some 









were scheduled in late September, NBC’s broadcasts faced competition from the other 
networks’ coverage of National Football League games, pennant races of Major League 
Baseball, and college football games. Having invested more than $3 billion in rights fees 
for the next five Olympics, NBC sought to “improve on ways it can keep viewers 
informed about Olympic athletes between the Games.”35 The most important way, 
according to NBC president Bob Wright, was the Internet, and at its Web site NBC 
offered features especially directed toward young fans. Bonnie Rothman Morris of the 
New York Times noted that most of the educational content for children on the NBC site 
was provided by Scholastic, as well as plenty of interactive games that came courtesy of 
sponsors, such as the IBM Basketball One on One game, the Visa Long Jump game and 
the Budweiser Boxing Battle.36 Not surprisingly, NBC was criticized for its overt 
commercialism during its coverage of the 2000 Sydney Olympic Games, just as it was for 
its patriotic jingoism during the 2002 Salt Lake City Olympic Games, despite claims that 
it would not overemphasize patriotic elements in the wake of September 11, 2001, when 
it promised to carry “celebrations by Americans and athletes and fans from other 
countries.”37  
Niche Players 
 Given the ability to promote their Web sites with almost limitless amounts of 
television advertising, the major television networks were presumed to have distinct 
advantages in attracting traffic to their sites. Despite brand depth and consumer loyalty to 
their television offerings, as well as millions of dollars in promotion, according to one 









mighty media monoliths than niche players scrounging for audiences,” experienced “a 
humbling comedown” in competing with the major portals like Yahoo, American Online 
and Microsoft’s MSN.38 In part, the networks’ problems stemmed from an overestimation 
their own strengths. Although promotions helped attract users to their sites, a lack of 
depth and sophisticated features at the sites failed to turn the curious into steady visitors. 
As Hansell explained, once they waded in, the networks “soon found themselves up to 
their knees in a swamp of tedious portal necessities like building business directories and 
creating retail transaction services that have little to do with the media companies’ 
expertise.”39  
 One area of expertise that the networks transferred to their Internet sites was in 
providing sports news. When CBS acquired a stake in Sportsline, a leading Internet 
sports service, it used the partnership to gain a foothold online to disseminate its sports 
content. The $100 million deal, which included an option to increase ownership to thirty-
three percent in the following five years, was part of an overall strategy predicated on 
backing independent, specialized Web services like Sportsline and MarketWatch rather 
than trying to create a network-scale portal.40 Successful integration occurred when CBS 
Sports used its sports broadcasts to encourage viewers to visit CBS Sportsline.com for 
updates and highlights of ongoing events (e.g., Masters golf, U. S. Open tennis) in the 
same way CBS News cited financial reports on CBS MarketWatch.com. CBS maintained 
the relationship with Sportsline for more than a decade. Finally, in August 2007, CBS 
SportsLine.com renamed the site CBSSports.com to unify the CBS Sports brand across 









 Unlike Disney’s launch of Go.com, which failed to muster much of a challenge to 
the major search engines, ABC found a measure of success for its Internet venture by also 
collaborating with an innovative new-media company. In Starwave Corporation, ABC 
aligned itself with Paul Allen, co-founder of Microsoft Corporation, as well as a team of 
programmers and journalists who had already succeeded in developing a series of popular 
Web sites, including ESPNet Sportszone. By the time the Walt Disney Company 
purchased Starwave, the ESPNet Sportszone had already established itself as the most 
successful Internet site focused on a mainstream topic, namely, sports.41 In 1997, the 
Sportszone, heavily promoted during ABC and ESPN sportscasts, received six-hundred 
thousand visitors and almost seven million page views daily, and brought in roughly $7 
million a year in advertising revenues.42 Additional revenues came from the sixty-
thousand subscribers who paid a monthly fee for premium services, called ESPN Insider, 
including special columns and fantasy baseball games. In 1999, Disney named Steve 
Bornstein, former head of ESPN, as president of the Web portal Go.com. Michael Eisner, 
Disney’s chairman, pointed out that Bornstein, who joined ESPN “when cable was a 
nascent industry—much like the Internet today—was instrumental in building ESPN into 
the undisputed market leader.”43 While ESPN maintained its position as market leader in 
delivering online sports information, Disney pulled back from the portal business in 2000 
under Bornstein’s direction and focused on its mainstays—travel and entertainment.  
 While the networks struggled to find their niche on the Internet, the transition was 
considerably easier for the professional sports leagues, despite the seasonal nature of their 









collaborative effort to host and produce their Web sites. For example, in 1998, the NFL 
signed a $10 million, three-year deal with ESPN.com for its Web site, NFL.com; and 
Venator Inc., which owned the Foot Locker and Champs’s sporting goods chains; for 
NFLShop section of its Web site and catalog operations.44 At that time, the site offered 
scores of games in progress, text-based play-by-play descriptions and post-game articles. 
Even though it attracted an average of almost half a million individual visitors to its site, 
its vice president for broadcasting, Dennis Lewin, downplayed the site’s significance. 
“We don’t believe anybody really wants to sit at their computers and watch a game in 
text.”45 Lewin’s comment is understandably understated in light of the $18 billion 
television rights package the league had signed with the networks in January 1997, and 
he added that the NFL Web site would not be enhanced “in any way, shape or form that 
will ultimately draw people away from the game,”46 by which he doubtlessly meant away 
from watching the game on television. 
 Two years later, the NFL.com Web site surpassed CBS Sportsline.com with 6.1 
million users and moved behind only ESPN.com, still the most visited sports site on the 
Web. Its users spent almost $40 million at the Web site, representing approximately one-
third of the roughly $125 million in yearly revenues generated through licensing 
agreements with makers of team apparel and merchandise.47 Give its ubiquitous brand, 
more than six hundred free advertisements for NFL.com and NFLShop on network 
television broadcasts and CBS/WestwoodOne radio network broadcasts, and the minor 
role online commerce played in the NFL’s business, the Web site was a guaranteed 









younger fans. “If you look at it in terms of who’s using the Internet now, it’s the 
technology optimists, the young people. And we do want to connect them to the game.”48 
 Internet analysts were not at all surprised when the NFL signed a new five-year 
deal worth $110 million in cash and at least $200 million in non-cash value with a 
consortium of AOL Time Warner, Sportsline.com and Viacom in July 2001.49 
Sportsline.com replaced ESPN.com as the host of NFL.com, and AOL coordinated the 
site’s marketing, cross-promoted it with programming on Viacom networks (i.e., CBS, 
MTV and Nickelodeon), and offered a limited number of NFL video highlights. This last 
point had been the deal-breaker for ESPN.com, which was in the process of expanding its 
own NFL-only site and wanted more video rights than the NFL was offering.50 
Significantly, as the number of visitors to its Web site increased, the NFL became 
increasingly vigilant in controlling the dissemination of video highlights, not posting 
them to NFL.com until after the ESPN Sunday night game. Why the NFL only posted 
game highlights after Sunday’s final game is not completely clear, since this enabled 
local television stations to use the highlights in their late night sportscasts before they 
became available at NFL.com. Perhaps not posting game highlights on its Web site 
earlier was a concession to the networks. This self-imposed embargo on its own site was 
not the last time the NFL imposed limitations on the use of highlights.   
An Electronic Routine 
If the networks were not quite certain how to use the Internet as a delivery system, 
few knew how consumers would use the Internet. Even though the expression “surfing 









of opportunity did not necessarily translate into a democracy of equal outcomes. In fact, 
as more people spent more time online, they did so at a smaller number of sites.51 As the 
New York Times’ Amy Harmon posited, “That America’s infatuation with the Web as a 
haven for cybersurfing adventures has morphed into a more mundane fondness for a 
useful information tool is in many ways testament to how quickly it has become a part of 
everyday life for so many.”52 A Jupiter Media Matrix study showed that in 2000 about 
sixty percent of Internet users visited more than twenty Web sites in a month, but by the 
following year the proportion had been halved, even though the study revealed that the 
time spent online was rising.53  
This concentration of longer visits at fewer sites arguably shed light on the 
public’s lack of interest in cultural diversity, but it was also attributed to strategies 
employed by the site developers. For example, in 1998 ESPN launched an advertising 
campaign for its ESPN SportsZone built around Netboy, “a sports-crazed, cyber-savvy 
twentysomething, interacting with athletes and ESPN on-air talent.”54 The ads sought to 
legitimize ESPN’s online service with the television network’s credibility in the same 
self-deprecating tone used in the “This is SportsCenter” campaign. Significantly, the ads 
positioned visiting the SportsZone Web site “as an everyday ritual.”55 Not only did 
Netboy become such an iconic figure that he was employed in promotions for upcoming 
television programming, but SportsCenter also ran segments that directed viewers to 
learn more about a story at the SportsZone. Additionally, SportsZone visitors were 
encouraged to find “Insider” information by subscribing to the site’s ESPN Insider 









sports only site was not surprising given the marketing and advertising budgets for 
campaigns on ESPN-owned television, print and radio to drive consumers to its site. As 
Bernardo Huberman, author of Laws of the Web, noted, “At the beginning it [Web] was 
like a beautiful, fertile ground where all sorts of organizations could theoretically survive. 
But the selection process has been incredibly fast.”57 Large sites like ESPN.com and 
Yahoo quickly learned how to utilize features like Yahoo’s “Buzz Index,” which listed 
the most-searched stories and photos of the day, “build[ing] on themselves in a sort of 
self-fulfilling prophecy.”58   
Only national, international and business news ranked higher than sports news 
among those who used the Internet as their primary source of news, a 1998 study 
revealed. These news consumers, who regularly signed on at work where connections 
tended to be faster, did not take the time to go “through the cumbersome business of 
calling up and playing video clips of news events.”59 This may have been attributable to 
the employers’ attempts “to rein in such digital dalliances” by utilizing software 
programs like “Little Brother” that allowed managers to track which sites employees 
visited on the Web.60 Of course, such measures gave rise to countermeasures like “Stealth 
Surfing,” software designed to avoid management computer monitoring. If employees 
were engaged in cyber-surfing, their digital dalliance stemmed, in part, from the 
proliferation of sports webcasts that were readily available from ESPN SportsZone, CBS 
Sportsline and “a handful of smaller operations that seek to simulate games as they 
happen, using animation or text updates fed from the sidelines.”61    









baseball coverage while CBS Sportsline was in its second, both having also provided 
Webcasts of football games the previous fall. As Matt Richtel noted in a 1998 New York 
Times article, “Baseball Live” was CBS Sportsline’s most popular online offering, 
attracting “hundreds of thousands of viewers each game.”62 Although the experience of a 
Webcast, Richtel noted, “was not even a distant cousin of television,”63 it did allow 
displaced fans to remain loyal and follow their favorite teams via the Internet. Richtel 
also explained that Webcasts were a harbinger of “what is called convergence, the 
melding of television hardware and content with home computer hardware and 
content.”64 This form of convergence allowed visitors to the site to use a single screen to 
access the broadcasts, as well as all available statistics. Interestingly, these simulated 
Webcasts harkened back to the first decades of the twentieth century when baseball 
games were “shown” on large display boards that recreated the action forwarded over 
telegraph wires. Just as radio rendered these crude animations obsolete, so, too, would 
Webcasts eventually give way to newer technology. Audio-Net, a Dallas-based Internet 
broadcaster, was already offering play-by-play “for contests broadcast exclusively for the 
Internet, like events at some small universities.”65 Although CBS Sportsline’s executive 
producer predicted that Web simulcasts would begin incorporating “not just audio but 
also video streaming and still shots to create a much richer experience,”66 video streaming 
of live sporting events did not occur for several more years. Before Web simulcasts were 
made available, licensing issues related to rights fees had to be sorted out. A necessary 










At the 1999 television trade show, called NAPTE, sponsored by the National 
Association of Television Executives, the importance of streaming audio and video was 
preached by, among others, Mark Cuban, co-founder and president of Broadcast.com 
Incorporated, who told a ballroom full of television executives “that any day now people 
will use their computers to watch television, buy merchandise from their favorite shows 
and even send feedback to producers or advertisers.”67 That Cuban had accurately 
envisioned consumers’ changing computer protocols and practices was evidenced not 
only in the fortune his company made, but also in the increasing number of people who 
used their computers to date, shop and watch sports. Whereas a seminar about how to sell 
advertising on a Web site had drawn ten people at the previous year’s NAPTE, that year 
it drew over one hundred, and more than a third of all the seminars were devoted to new 
media issues.68 Despite the growing importance of streaming audio and video, one 
television executive boldly predicted that “people will never use a computer to watch 
‘E.R.’ or ‘Everybody Loves Raymond,’ or any other hit show, movie, or sports event, for 
that matter.”69     
Motion Sickness 
Such a prediction defied logic given the assortment of technological gadgetry 
already available to consumers. For example, exercising was enhanced with the first 
virtual-reality bike, the Tectrix VR bike, “which takes them [users] through simulated 
adventures projected by a CD-Rom on a computer screen.”70 Golf and ski enthusiasts 
used multimedia technology to take video tours of courses or ski areas, get instructions or 









at GolfWeb.71 While the golf and ski sites presented photographs of scenic vistas and 
perilous plunges, they often lacked much objective content. As the New York Times’ 
Verne Kopytoff noted, “On many sites, feature stories, especially about ski resorts, read 
as if they had been written by a publicist.”72 For hard news, there were sites like the 
Professional Golfers Association (PGA) Tour site, which offered live, hole-by-hole 
scoring updates during its events, as well as links to other tours (e.g., Senior, European 
and Nationwide).73  
All sports seemingly utilized the Web to attract fans. With the development of 
Virtual Spectator, yachting enthusiasts enjoyed coverage of the 1999 and 2003 America’s 
Cup races online. Thanks to telemetry data emitted directly from each race boat, 
subscribers to the service followed the competing boats’ positions on the course “marked 
with an illustrated ‘snail trail.’”74 That new technology was employed to bring America’s 
Cup races to sports fans in general—an occurrence that also occurred in 1897 with film, 
1930 with newsreels, and 1983 with cable television—attests to the importance of 
aesthetics in the appreciation of a sporting event, especially one so visually compelling. 
The point has added significance when cast in the light of the sport’s purported elitist 
appeal.  
Those more interested in playing video games had several choices from ESPN 
Digital Games from which to choose: National Hockey Night, NBA Tonight and X-
Games Pro Boarder. Not only did these games play like other video games for the 
personal computer Xbox, or Playstation, but they also included features similar to an 









announcers, and “instant replays from multiple points of view to cap the moment. On the 
PC version, you can see those replays on the Jumbotron…”75 After playing for a week, 
the computer created “a 30-second ‘Plays of the Week’ segment, a cross-section of 
highlights from the league, including a few of your most spectacular plays.”76 That a 
television segment featuring top plays and a montage of highlights was adapted and 
incorporated into a sports video game provides compelling evidence of the highlight 
form’s importance. Additionally, the intertextuality between a game and a real television 
program (i.e., SportsCenter) illustrated the ESPN/Disney reliance on synergy and cross-
promotion.      
ESPN was also quick to enhance its use of video highlights at its Web site with a 
technology called ESPN Motion. While most Web sites were offering video clips of news 
segments, sports highlights or music videos, the clips appeared in a separate window 
apart from the main body of the site.77 ESPN’s approach involved a program that 
activated the graphic box in the center of the ESPN.com home page to play a video clip 
of game highlights associated with its lead story. The program “allows the video to start 
faster and be of higher quality than so-called streaming video, which downloads only 
when users initiate it.”78 Additionally, the video remained an integral part of the home 
page rather than an appendage. Even though users had to download the ESPN Motion 
program and watch the ads that accompanied the video highlights, the technology marked 
for G. M. O’Connell, chairman of Modem Media, a significant “tour de force” for users 
and for the marketing community “it’s a kind of tour de interesting possibility.”79 









the Web was predicated on “enhancing the utility of the Internet, not duplicating what 
television and personal video recorders like TiVo already do better.”80 The ESPN viewer 
performed well enough that ESPN began selling it regularly to its television advertisers, 
signing Gatorade and Lexus, among others. ESPN charged advertisers up to $25 per 
thousand people who watched its Web commercials, CNET reported. While some 
criticized ESPN for shifting its focus from sports information to cross-marketing their 
television shows, magazine and the ESPN brand, ESPN Motion was only the first of 
several advancements in new media developed by the Disney-owned company. These 
included ESPN 360, the short-lived ESPN Mobile, and ESPN High Definition (HD) and 
ESPN2 HD. All of these delivery systems were developed to accomplish the network’s 
goal of shaping its brand reputation as the worldwide leader in sports or the world’s 
biggest sports fan, as Jenkins explained, “not through an individual transaction but 
through the sum total of interactions with the customer—an ongoing process that 
increasingly occurs across a range of different media ‘touch points.’”81  
A Soggy Market 
By 2001, the $250-billion-a-year sports industry stood at a crossroads. Broadcast 
television ratings for the four major men’s professional sports—baseball, basketball, 
football and hockey—were mired in a decade-long decline.82 Faced with competition 
from sport-specific channels (e.g., The Golf Channel, The Tennis Channel), women’s 
professional leagues (e.g., basketball, softball and soccer), extreme sports, and the 
growing popularity of stock car racing, figure skating, and gymnastics, the audience for 









way Americans experienced sports had changed dramatically as a result of the 
proliferation of sports sites on the Internet, regional cable sports networks and satellite 
packages offering many more sports channels.83  
The numbers testified to the alarming dilution of broadcast networks’ television 
ratings. Ratings for two of the past three World Series hit a record low and average 
attendance for MLB games was a thousand fewer than before the 1994 players’ strike. 
The 2001 NBA Finals sank to its third lowest rated, and ratings for regular-season games 
dropped forty percent from the 1995-1996 season. The NHL earned such low ratings that 
it would be abandoned by the networks, even though revenues were up and average 
attendance had increased slightly from where it had been five years ago. Although the 
NFL continued to set attendance records, even its television ratings hit a low in 2000.84 
The ratings decline was partly attributable to an increased number of sporting events on 
the broadcast networks—from 1,572 hours in 1990 to 2,453 in 2000.85 While some of this 
increase stemmed from the addition of Rupert Murdoch’s FOX Network, the average 
increased from 524 to 613 hours per network. Although the average television audience 
shrank from 8.7 million to 6.8 million, representing a twenty-two percent decline, that 
was less than the thirty percent decline of overall network viewing since the mid-1980s.86 
Yet, despite a 2002 Morgan Stanley report that predicted ABC, CBS and FOX would 
each lose up to $1.3 billion on sports rights over the next four years and $2.5 billion over 
the life of their $18.3 billion NFL rights contract, the networks remained optimistic, CBS 
claiming that it was not losing money from sports.87  









becomes to attract a broad audience in these fragmented times, the more attractive major 
sporting events become to networks and corporate sponsors.”88 Spending on athletic 
sponsorship rights by corporations grew by almost $1 billion between 1999 and 2000 
alone. For example, Pepsi-Cola Company paid MLB to let it sponsor the first pitch of 
each World Series game, which was in addition to the $50 million, five-year deal it paid 
in 1997 to become a national sponsor.89 To get the NFL’s telecommunications 
sponsorship, the Sprint Corporation paid a $24 million annual licensing fee, which did 
not include spending on media, promotions or marketing campaigns.90 For advertisers, 
sports programming remained the strongest avenue to reach men aged 18-34, “a 
demographic group that is still forming its brand loyalties and is especially valuable to 
companies marketing themselves to sports viewers.”91 Unfortunately for the networks, 
this demographic continued to abandon television for the Internet, and by 2004 
constituted the largest male group on the Internet.92 
The networks also recognized that sports programming, especially football, 
attracted a larger male audience to primetime programs. In 1999, CBS cited twelve 
programs that attracted a larger male audience than the shows that were in the same time 
slots the previous year. The new line-up, including Everybody Loves Raymond, King of 
Queens, Becker and JAG, was heavily promoted during CBS’s NFL telecasts.93 When 
CBS lost its right to broadcast the NFL in 1995, the loss had a “profound effect” on the 
entire network.94 A similar situation occurred when NBC gave up its NFL rights after its 
telecast of Super Bowl XXXII on January 25, 1998; it returned with its Sunday Night 









Beyond the numbers, the most significant factor contributing to the soggy sports 
market was a thirst for a different sporting experience, one not as remote, structured, 
expensive, or spectacular. As professional players, coaches and teams moved with 
regularity, as athletes’ salaries skyrocketed, and as ticket prices passed beyond the reach 
of many, a dislocation between fans and traditional sports occurred. According to ESPN, 
between 1997 and 2002, each of the major sports lost more than seven percent of its fan 
base earning $30,000 or less while the number of fans earning at least $100,000 was up at 
least thirty percent.95 As professional sports stadiums catered to affluent fans and 
corporate entities that could afford to pay exorbitant prices for luxury boxes, many fans 
gravitated toward minor league baseball parks, thanks to their intimate, family-oriented 
atmosphere and inexpensive tickets.96 Additionally, children’s habits changed 
significantly. As Jere Longman noted, “Team sports have become so structured that 
individual sports like skateboarding and inline skating have become popular alternatives, 
a form of rebellion from strict youth sports organizations and overbearing parents.”97 
Young people were not alone in desiring a different experience. In 1999, more that seven 
million American adults finished a road race, more than double the number in 1985. The 
chief executive officer of the track and field federation added, “I think people want to 
participate or attend where they feel like they have some connection. Participation in 
running and golf have [sic] gone up. Look at minor league sports…. You can take your 
family and get near the athletes…”98 Others, particularly young males, simply preferred 










 Even though a segment of the 18 to 34 male demographic abandoned 
“appointment television”99 for the Internet, the group did not completely forsake 
sportscasts. In fact, sports sites ranked third among the Internet content sites with the 
highest concentration of male visitors, trailing only pornographic and music sites.100 
According to figures from comScore Media Metrix, young men tend to gravitate toward 
sites frequented by other young men. For example they were thirty-six percent more 
likely to spend time at Web sites devoted to computer games than the general Internet 
population, and nearly fifty percent more likely to visit sport sites.101 While many enjoyed 
playing sports video games, others paid for a subscription to stream audio and video 
sports Webcasts. In 2002, more than 200,000 people paid $14.95 for the complete season 
to listen to online radio broadcasts of baseball game and watch video of game highlights, 
“making baseball the most popular paid Webcasting service.”102 The following year, 
baseball became the first major league sport to broadcast live video feeds online for a 
major portion of its games.  
As new computers were loaded with the latest software and connected to high-
speed broadband, the quality of video clips improved considerably. The use of free 
basketball highlights on NBA.com increased 500 percent in the 2002-2003 season, 
prompting the league to offer game highlights and other programming from its new NBA 
television network as part of a $9.95 monthly service.103 The major sports were not alone 
in offering subscription packages. RealNetworks offered “Surfing Live,” a service that 
showed classic surfing videos and live Webcasts of the waves at Banzai Pipeline and 









NASCAR’s “TrackPass” offered a service through RealNetworks that provided 
subscribers with instrument readings and radio transmissions between a driver and crew 
chief, and its “PitCommand” used Global Positioning System to follow cars on the 
track.105   
In April 2004, EarthLink, a leading Internet Service Provider, launched its 
EarthLink Premium Sports package, the most comprehensive sports premium  
product offered on the Internet. The new service bundled sports video and  
audio, including content from NASCAR, MLB, the NHL and college sports, along with 
fantasy sports games and information. Powered by Synacor’s existing relationships with  
a variety of popular fee-based online services, the Synacor platform enabled all the 
content that made up EarthLink Premium Sports to be fully integrated and available 
through a single sign-in and interface.106 Among the bundled content was “NHL 
Highlight Machine,” which allowed subscribers to create their own video portfolio of 
players to track, create and store their own “ultimate highlight reel” and keep track of 
fantasy teams by watching them in action and tracking their statistics.107 
MLB Advanced Media, the interactive media and Internet company of MLB, was 
established in 2000 through a strategic technology alliance with Sun Microsystems. At 
MLB.com, visitors were offered more than one billion minutes of streaming media and 
over 2,430 full-length games per season to over one billion visitors.108 By providing every 
out-of-market game live, as well as game highlights, previews, scores and statistics, 
MLB’s site became “the Internet’s most successful broadband Web portal devoted to 









page views, with a record-breaking ninety million views delivered during Game Seven of 
the 2004 American League Championship Series between the New York Yankees and 
Boston Red Sox.110 While most of the other major leagues offered streaming video 
highlights and live coverage of games with streaming audio, MLB’s video pay packages 
set the standard in terms of accessibility.  
ESPN began offering online Webcasts of sporting events as premium Internet 
programming in January 2005 with an all-access weekend for the Winter X Games. ESPN 
360 was marketed as “an always-on application that provides sports content directly to 
your computer, including live sportscasts, on-demand video, interactive games, event 
coverage, news analysis and more.”111 Rather than offering it directly to consumers, 
however, ESPN offered it through Internet providers, who had to pay special fees for the 
right to carry it in the same way that cable operators pay the Disney company to carry 
ESPN’s various television channels (e.g., ESPN, ESPN2, ESPNEWS, ESPN Classic). 
Consumer groups expressed concern that the adoption of a cable television model, which 
forced Internet providers to pay for the service, would lead to higher prices for 
consumers, who invariably pay for premium services they do not necessarily want.112  
In March 2005, ESPN 360 broadcast twenty-two live events over a twenty-two-
day span, including college basketball games, college hockey games, two wrestling 
matches, plus a dual-screen presentation of an IndyCar Series race, taken from ESPN’s 
linear networks, and a SuperCross event. The veritable blitz came at the exact time when 
operators were “in a dog fight with digital subscriber line providers for high-speed 









rights. Securing those rights engendered reasons for creating new and different 
advertising models, including the use of hot spots inside video wherein consumers could 
click on that hot spot and connect to that product at the advertiser’s site.114  
By April 2006, ESPN 360 was available in eight million homes and had already 
built up a library of 5,000 videos. It was incorporated into what ESPN called its “full 
circle” coverage of certain sportscasts. First employed for the Duke-North Carolina 
men’s basketball game in March and again for the first game of the 2006 NBA playoff 
series between the Miami Heat and the Chicago Bulls, “full circle coverage” involved 
traditional cable television coverage with live commentators on ESPN. ESPN2 carried 
the same game from an above-the-rim perspective with commentary provided by ESPN’s 
NBA analysts in a New York studio. ESPN 360 provided a live stream of ESPN’s 
coverage, and ESPN Radio and ESPNEWS offered frequent updates.115 Such overkill for 
a first-round playoff game between a 2-seed and a 7-seed served as an indication of what 
ESPN was planning for its coverage of Monday Night Football later that fall. John 
Skipper, head of content, said at a presentation that ESPN “will take over the host city. 
We want fans to think about [the game] all day across all of our platforms.”116 
Wireless 
 Wireless cell phone companies began providing sports content in 2002 when 
Verizon and FOXSports.com joined with ActiveSky to “present live sports events and 
sports news to Internet-enabled cell phones for a monthly fee.”117 ActiveSky created the 
program that integrated visual action, sound, text and low-tech graphics in a facsimile of 









tiny icons move around a color diamond while a box score and running text provide real-
time updates on the game.”118 The service, available to Verizon’s “Get It Now” customers 
for $3.99 a month, also provided gamecasts of football and basketball games, as well as 
text updates for NASCAR races. As the New York Times’ Marc Weingarten noted, 
“While the service may be useful only to full-fledged sports fanatics, it’s at least a baby 
step toward the integration of wireless technology with entertainment content.”119  
 The full integration of wireless technology with entertainment content was 
realized with the development of so-called third generation, or 3G, networks that doubled 
the capacity from 150 kilobits to 300 kilobits of data per second.120 Handsets had to have 
an add-on called EV-DO to run the service, which Verizon called VCAST, that included 
“more than 300 daily video clips from channels and shows like CNN, NBC, ESPN and 
Sesame Street.”121 Carriers like Verizon, Cingular, and Sprint also offered pay-packages 
which allowed subscribers to receive music, television and mobile Web access. Verizon 
VCAST included the ESPN MVP service, which provided live gamecasts, the latest 
highlights on demand, real-time game updates, fantasy team updates and exclusive ESPN 
programming, including programming like SportsCenter, Pardon the Interruption, and 
Around the Horn.122  
Verizon also offered premium sports programming from Setanta Sports North 
America, the only dedicated European sports and rugby channel in North America. In 
2007, Verizon and Setanta offered a pay-package of the Rugby World Cup highlight clip 
footage to VCAST video customers. Even though live gamecasts were not available, 









hardest hits and final scores,”123 as well as pre-show video clips that highlighted classic 
matches from the tournament’s inception to the latest championship. Additionally, in 
November 2007, Verizon and the NHL announced the launch of NHL game video alerts, 
“enabling hockey fans to receive video messages of game highlights on their mobile 
phones, moments after they happen on the ice.”124 In what was marketed as “a first for all 
professional sports leagues,”125 the NHL teamed with Verizon to capitalize on the concept 
of immediacy by providing subscribers to the $2.99 per month/per team package with the 
latest scores and highlights, totally by-passing news organizations. Spokespersons for 
both Verizon and the NHL emphasized immediacy in the news release announcing the 
deal. The president of the NHL Interactive CyberEnterprises said, “The immediacy with 
which we receive information has grown significantly thanks in part to the introduction 
of mobile phones and the Internet.”126 “The immediacy of mobile makes it a perfect 
partner for sporting events like NHL games,” said the vice president of Verizon’s digital 
media programming.127 Significantly, these deals clearly illustrated the altered 
mediascape in which providers of sports content attempted to reach fans whenever they 
could and wherever the fans happened to be. Only by offering customers sports 
gamecasts and highlight packages on every device could they compete in the 
marketplace. 
High Definition 
Although the professional sports leagues diversified their delivery systems, they 
were still largely dependent on the rights fees from broadcast and cable networks as their 









that in turn attracted the most lucrative advertisers and sponsors. That reality forced the 
networks to enhance production values of sports programming coverage in an attempt to 
forestall dwindling ratings. Some refined existing technologies; others added to the 
production repertoire. For example, in 1998 ESPN debuted Sportsvision Incorporated’s 
yellow electronic first-down line on its Sunday Night Football telecasts, and each of the 
networks offered it or a similar but different technology the following year.128  
Such an innovation pales in comparison to the network’s deployment of high 
definition television (HDTV). Since the technology’s introduction in 2003, ESPN HD 
and ESPN2 HD certainly became the crown jewels of ESPN’s technological initiatives. 
Although some analysts forecast that HDTV would be a terribly expensive flop, those 
predictions echoed similar warnings before radio boomed in the 1920s and television 
took hold in the 1940s. As Brad Schultz notes, “In both instances, sports programming 
helped the struggling media grow from infancy to established power. It seems sports 
programming has the potential to do the same thing in the electronic age.”129 Arguably, 
the primary reason revolved around the fact that sports action was perfectly suited for 
what digital does best: namely, provide video and audio that together offer a sharper, 
clearer and larger than life quality. The Consumer Electronics Association accurately 
predicted that the number of high definition television sets sold in 2006 would match or 
exceed that of standard definition television sets, clearly indicating that HDTV had been 
accepted by the public.   
ESPN built its HD repertoire around a triad of programming—most notably, a 









Baseball telecast. The numbers grew steadily from one hundred and forty-four events in 
the first twelve months to one hundred and eighty-four events in 2004 to over four 
hundred events plus more than two thousand programs representing more than six 
thousand hours in 2005, bolstered by the addition of ESPN 2 HD, which broadcast its 
first program on January 5, 2005.130 The second component of ESPN’s triad evolved 
from studio programming at its Digital Center in Bristol, Connecticut. This state-of-the-
art facility opened June 7, 2004, with the first telecast of SportsCenter in HD. With over 
six million feet of cable and three HDTV studios totaling seventeen thousand square feet, 
the Digital Center has facilitated the network’s transition of its most popular programs to 
high definition, including NFL Countdown, NFL Primetime, Baseball Tonight and NFL 
Live as well as the news and information programming built around game coverage. 
Programs from ESPN Original Entertainment (EOE) such as Playmakers and TILT 
constituted the third tributary to the flow of HD programs. These offerings have 
spearheaded ESPN’s initiative to become the self-proclaimed Worldwide Leader in 
HDTV.131  
The Digital Center was designed to provide employees across all ESPN entities 
access to footage from any company computer in the world. This tapeless concept 
provided the ability to select and edit high or standard definition video, eliminating the 
time-consuming process of searching for tapes. As noted at its Web site, “For the first 
time in ESPN’s history, events can be simultaneously recorded while at the same time the 
content can be annotated, edited and taken to air without handling video tape.”132 ESPN’s 









broadcast in HD. With five times more detail than analog and with a film-like 16:9 ratio 
perspective instead of 4:3 of standard definition and with six-channel surround sound, 
HD not only eliminated ghosts, static, snow and poor quality video, but it was perfectly 
suited to the wide-angle perspective of most field sports.133 Given the propensity of its 
news shows for showing game highlights, ESPN has already begun the process of 
embossing its imprimatur on what the HD sportscast is supposed to look and sound like.  
ESPN was not alone in enhancing production values. CBS’s telecast of the 2001 
Super Bowl introduced EyeVision, a new instant-replay technology developed by the 
Robotics Institute at Carnegie Mellon University that utilized thirty-three robotic 
cameras, DVD technical backup and 90,000 feet of fiber-optic cable “to see rotating 270-
degree views of players with stop-action shots from simultaneous angles.”134 A camera 
operator panned and focused the cameras at the same point on the field to produce 
rotating three-dimensional-like pictures that offered conclusive evidence about on-field 
decisions. Although CBS planned to lease the robotics replay system to other networks 
for $50,000-$75,000 an event, the technology proved too expensive for regular use.135 
The networks’ continued reliance on action replays was evidenced in coverage of NFL 
playoff games, which in 2004 were used for almost seventy percent of the plays (i.e., 161 
plays, 111 replays), a figure which does not include lead-in and cut-away montages or 
promotional messages.136 In a New York Times article about the actual amount of action 
during the telecast of a football game, Richard Sandomir noted, “One could argue that 
replays constitute an alternate form of action because they show what you just saw but 









takes 5 seconds, the amount of action in Indianapolis’s triumph would soar by 11 
minutes.”137    
Control 
In attempting to maintain control of sports content, the professional sports leagues 
enacted a series of legal barriers impeding the transmission and use of play-by-play 
coverage of games, as well as the use of still and moving images. In 1997, a federal 
appeals court ruled “that the National Basketball Association could not block Motorola 
and a paging company from sending real-time scores and plays to subscribers.”138 In 
2001, MLB attempted to impose restrictions on the number of pictures that sports 
journalists sent out “while the game was in progress and how those photographs can be 
used after the initial news coverage.”139 Those restrictions were contained in the 
credentials reporters and photographers signed and carried to get access to ballparks. 
When several newspapers balked at the restrictions, preferring to “leave the games 
uncovered [rather] than accept all the proposed restrictions,”140 MLB backed off on the 
restrictions by allowing reporters to transmit “historic” information, meaning “the 
progress of a quest for a significant record”141 as it happened. In addition, news 
organizations were allowed to post up to seven photographs on their Web sites while a 
game was in progress.  
More significantly, in 2006 the NFL banned local television cameras from 
sidelines during games in order “to protect one of the leagues’ greatest assets—highlights 
of game action.”142 The NFL claimed that the policy was consistent with what other 









would not impact viewers because the stations retained access to all footage shot by the 
national network telecasting the game. The stations countered that the ban limited their 
ability to capture “the local flavor of games, such as low-level camera shots, isolated film 
on players for feature stories, or pictures of the crowd.”143 One journalism scholar 
explained the issue in terms of economics: “What you can prevent people from having, 
you can sell them. This is one more reminder that professional sports is [sic] first and 
foremost a business, and one more reminder that the NFL is protecting its people and 
marketing its teams, and they’ll control that however it is in their best interests.”144 
Directly related to the issue was the tremendous economic potential of video highlights as 
content for the Web and mobile devices. After considerable criticism, the NFL relented 
and allowed coverage by one “pool” crew, and the following year, the NFL changed the 
policy so that up to five local camera crews from each team’s market were granted 
sideline access.145   
That video highlights constituted content with direct economic value became 
evident the following year when the NFL imposed a restriction of forty-five seconds of 
video and audio clips per day of team personnel at team facilities on Web sites of news 
organizations not affiliated with the NFL. Having seized control of its Web site from 
CBS Sportsline in 2006, the NFL re-launched the site offering the one thing that other 
websites could not: “highlights from games that can be tailored to focus on each fan’s 
favorite players and teams.”146 As USA TODAY’s Michael McCarthy reported, before the 
restriction of forty-five seconds websites were free to post a reasonable amount of video 









change in policy reflected the NFL’s belief that the presence of NFL video highlights was 
a way to attract advertisers to a website. Organizations like the American Society of 
Newspaper Editors (ASNE) and the Radio-Television News Directors Association 
decried the restriction as a way of diverting people from their Web sites to NFL.com. 
They argued that press restrictions were part of an overall strategy by the NFL to control 
its image by controlling the media’s access.  
The strategy has also been employed by individual teams like the Washington 
Redskins, whose owner Daniel Snyder has created “his own news coverage of the 
Redskins and team-produced programming,”148 which are sold to local television stations. 
The team has also denied local newspapers such as the Washington Post the right to run 
online video clips. By creating their own broadcasting and Webcasting entities (NFL 
Network, NBA TV, MLB Channel), professional sports leagues have entered into direct 
competition with the media for advertising revenue. The leagues’ media push also raises 
important questions about unbiased coverage. As McCarthy noted, “Such league-owned 
outlets can give fans access to players and teams that traditional media aren’t granted—
while casting news, and controversies, on the league’s terms.”149     
  Conclusion 
“Any pipe. Any device.”150 That was the mantra voiced by ESPN and ABC Sports 
president George Bodenheimer when discussing the network’s philosophy about the 
development of new media technologies. Speaking at the UBS Global Media Conference, 
Bodenheimer articulated what has become clear to industry insiders, media critics and 









networks nor the cable networks can afford to operate solely in the medium of television. 
Any network involved in sportscasting necessarily must present itself as a total sports 
media entity, which includes utilizing radio, television, game players, Internet and mobile 
phone technologies to send out both the accounts and descriptions of live event coverage 
and infotainment packages that include scores, highlights, interviews and other features 
related to actual and fantasy sports teams and leagues.  
Recent initiatives by broadcasters, mobile phone companies and the professional 
sports leagues certainly bear this out. For example, in January 2008, Advertising Age 
reported that on several days in the fall of 2007 ESPN “had more visits to the NFL 
content on its mobile-phone website than it did to the same area on its PC [personal 
computer] website.”151 The same trend was documented in Europe by M:Metrics, a 
mobile-measurement firm, that conducted a study over the previous two years showing 
“the mobile audience looking up sports information on mobile devices increased 
significantly around major events,”152 the most significant of which was England’s 
Football Association (FA) Premier League.  
The only way to do that was, in sports parlance, through a “Full Court” press, 
which, coincidentally, happened to be the name of an early ESPN pay-per-view 
packages. By providing content on home television, on the radio, on the computer, on 
mobile phones, on video game players, and even at their own restaurants, networks like 
ESPN have created a type of sport multiphrenia, which Kenneth J. Gergen describes as 
“generally referring to the splitting of the individual into a multiplicity of self-









increasingly employs the technologies for self-expression; yet, as the technologies are 
further utilized, so do they add in the repertoire of potential.”153 While Gergen points out 
that it would be a mistake to view multiphrenia as an illness, he also notes that while the 
technology of social saturation removes the impediments of space and time, this same 
freeing “ironically leads to a form of enslavement.”154  
Accessing ESPN, FOX, CBS or the NFL anytime and anywhere has provided the 
sports fan with an ever-expanding potential for self-expression and an increasing 
repertoire of sports discourse, yet total saturation in attending to sports leads to total 
desire. As Gergen posits, “to desire is simultaneously to become a slave of the desirable. 
To ‘want’ reduces one’s choice to ‘want not.’”155 ESPN’s foray into new delivery 
systems led Fortune senior writer Marc Gunther to conjecture that soon to come will be 
“a tiny ESPN alarm clock, to be implanted in a fan’s ear, so that he or she can be 
awakened each morning with scores and highlights of late games from the night 
before.”156 
Perhaps total saturation is not as far away as one would think. Despite the growth 
of broadband connections in homes, usage still spikes during the workday, or, put another 
way, as soon as the diehard sport fan leaves the television and can get to a computer.157 
What new and traditional media have created with the technological innovations and new 
consumer protocols is a communication system that generates what Manual Castells calls 
the culture of “real virtuality.”158 Castells defines that system as one in which “all 
messages of all kinds become enclosed in the medium, because the medium has become 









text the whole of human experience, past, present, and future.”159 One of the features of 
this multimedia culture is that the communication of all kinds of messages in the same 
system “induces an integration of all messages in a common cognitive pattern…. From 
the perspective of the user (both as receiver and sender, in an interactive system), the 
choice of various messages under the same communication mode, with easy switching 
from one to the other, reduces the mental distance between various sources of cognitive 
and sensorial involvement.”160 Today’s communication system captures, in this case, 
sport reality in its entirety so that the user, an audience of one, becomes fully immersed in 
a virtual image setting in which “appearances are not just on the screen through which 
experience is communicated, but they become the experience.”161  
Notes 
 
1 Henry Jenkins, Convergence Culture: Where Old and New Media Collide (New York: 
New York University Press, 2006), 13. 
2 Ibid., 15. 
3 Seth Schiesel, “Cable TV Lacks Competition, FCC Notes,” New York Times, January 
14, 1998, D6. 
4 Linda Saslow, “New Channels and New Costs for Cable TV,” New York Times, April 6, 
1997, L11. 
5 Eric A. Taub, “The Big Picture on Digital TV: It’s Still Fuzzy,” New York Times, 
September 12, 2002, G1. 
6 Jerry Schwartz, “Olympics Stung by Technology’s False Starts,” New York Times, July 
22, 1996, D1. 
7 “Live From France on World Wide Web,” New York Times, June 9, 1998, C4. 
8 Jenkins, Convergence, 61-62. 
9 “CBS to Acquire 22% of Sportsline USA,” New York Times, March 6, 1997, D10. 
10 Steve Lohr, “Joing the New Media: ABC News Begins and On-Line Service,” New 
York Times, May 12, 1997, D9. 
11 Richard Sandomir,” NFL’s Internet Deal Will Be Largest Ever,” New York Times, July 
11, 2001, D2. 
12 Bob Tedeschi, “NFL’s Site Gets Hits, as Well as Blocks and Tackles,” New York 
Times, December 13, 2000, H12. 
13 Matt Richtel, “For Fanatics, Sports Webcasts,” New York Times, March 19, 1998, G9. 
14 Amy Harmon, “Exploration of World Wide Web Tilts From Eclectic to Mundane,” 









15 Amy Harmon, “On the Office PC, Bosses Opt For All Work, and No Play,” New York 
Times, September 22, 1997, A1. 
16 John D. Solomon, “The Sports Market Is Looking Soggy,” New York Times, April 21, 
2002, B1. 
17 Jere Longman, “Pro Leagues’ Ratings Drop; Nobody Is Quite Sure Why,” New York 
Times, July 29, 2001, SP1. 
18 Richard Sandomir, “The Decline and Fall of Sports Ratings,” New York Times, 
September 10, 2003, D1. 
19 “Customer Snapshot: Media, Entertainment & Internet Services.” 
http://www.sun.com/customers/service/mlbam.xml. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Felicity Barringer, “Baseball Is Trying to Limit How New Coverage Is Used,” New 
York Times, March 31, 2001, D6. 
22 Jerry Schwartz, “Olympics Stung by Technology’s False Starts,” New York Times, July 









31 “Live From France on World Wide Web,” New York Times, June 9, 1998, C4. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Bill Carter with Richard Sandomir, “NBC’s Ratings For Olympics Are Worst Ever,” 
New York Times, September 20, 2000, A1. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Bill Carter, “Chief Lauds NBC Olympic Performance,” New York Times, September 
28, 2000, S2.  
36 Bonnie Rothman Morris, “Making Room Online for Young Olympic Fans,” New York 
Times, September 21, 2000, G6. 
37 Carter and Sandomir, “Big Ratings,” G1. 




41 Lohr, “Joining,” D9. 
42 Ibid. 
43 “Disney Names Head of Internet Group,” New York Times, September 9, 1999, C6. 
44 Tedeschi, “NFL’s Site,” H12. 
45 “NFL Says Fans Like Internet Site,” New York Times, November 12, 1998, G3. 
46 Ibid. 










49 Sandomir, “NFL’s Internet Deal,” D2. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Harmon, “Exploration,” 1. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 




57 Harmon, “Exploration,” 1. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Felicity Barringer, “Internet News Fanatics Prefer Television Sites,” New York Times, 
November 30, 1998, C9. 
60 Harmon, “On the Office PC,” A1. 






67 Lawrie Mifflin, “Watch the Tube or Watch the Computer?” New York Times, February 
1, 1999, C8. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Judith Zimmer, “Exercise Meets Entertainment on a Virtual-Reality Bike,” New York 
Times, August 21, 1996, C3. 
71 Verne G. Kopytoff, “Hitting the Virtual Slopes All Year Round,” New York Times, 
November 26, 1998, G10. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Sreenath Sreenivasan, “From Masters to Duffers, There’s Golf on the Web,” New York 
Times, April 7, 1997, D8. 
74 Barbara Lloyd, “Putting the America’s Cup at One’s Fingertips,” New York Times, 
August 8, 1999, SP12. 
75 J. C. Herz, “It’s a Video Game, It’s TV, and You’re the Star,” New York Times, July 2, 
1998, G4. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Saul Hansell, “ESPN Brings Video Clips To High-Speed Net Users,” New York Times, 
October 14, 2002, C2. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Nat Ives, “At ESPN.com, New Technology Comes With Commercials,” New York 
Times, February 21, 2003, C5. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Jenkins, Convergence, 63. 













87 Solomon, “Market,” B1. 
88 Longman, “Ratings,” SP1.  
89 Sandomir, “Pepsi,” D6. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Sandomir, “The Decline,” D1. 
92 Schwartz, “Leisure,” C1. 
93 Bill Carter, “Where The Boys Are,” New York Times, January 31, 1999, BU1. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Solomon, “Market,” B1. 
96 Longman, “Ratings,” SP1. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Jenkins, Convergence, 280. 
100 Schwartz, “Leisure,” C1. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Saul Hansell, “Baseball Test May Soon Show If Time Is Right For Web Video,” New 
York Times, January 27, 2003, C1. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Ibid. 
105 “EarthLink Bundles Subscription-Only Sports Features From Popular Web Sites,” 
New York Times, April 12, 2004, C6. 
106 “Earthlink Partners With Synacor To Launch Earthlink Premium Sports.” 
http://www.synacor.com/entries/view/earthlink_partners_with_synacor_to_launch_earthli
nk_premium_sports. 
107 Ibid. The term is the same used by SportsCenter for its music video segment, as well 
as the title of a book published by ESPN Books in 2006. 




111 Hiawatha Bray, “ESPN Selling Premium Content to Net Providers,” The Boston 
Globe, June 15, 2006, D1. 
112 Ibid. 




115 Barry Jackson, “ESPN Gives Heat-Bulls Opener ‘Full Circle’ Coverage.” The Miami 
Herald. http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/sports/14392805.htm  












117 Marc Weingarten, “A Live Ballgame Unfolds On a Cellphone Screen,” New York 
Times, October 24, 2002, G3. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Ibid. 
120 Seth Schiebel, “For Wireless, The Beginnings of a Breakout,” New York Times, 
January 13, 2005, G1. 
121 Ibid. 
122 “VCAST VPak—Free Offer.” 
http://products.vzw.com/index.aspx?id=fnd_toolsApps_vpak 
123 “Setanta Sports North America Offers Rugby World Cup 2007 on V CAST Video 
From Verizon Wireless.” http://news.vzw.com/news/2007/09/pr2007-09-06f.html 





128 Richard Sandomir, “NCAA Is Pursuing An Increase in Billions,” New York Times, 
September 10, 1999, D4. 
129 Brad Schultz, Sports Broadcasting (Boston: Focal Press, 2002), 231. 




134 Rudy Martzke, “Instant Replay Gets ‘Matrix’-like View of Key Plays,” USA TODAY, 
January 23, 2001, D2. 
135 Ibid. 
136 Richard Sandomir, “By the Numbers, the College Bowl Games Have Less Action,” 
New York Times, January 7, 2004, D2. 
137 Ibid. 
138 Felecity Barringer, “Baseball Is Trying to Limit How News Coverage Is Used,” New 
York Times, March 31, 2001, D6. 
139 Ibid. 
140 Ibid. 
141 Felecity Barringer, “Baseball and Editors’ Group Compromise to End Dispute,” New 
York Times, April 14, 2001, D2. 




145 Michael McCarthy, “NFL Taking Bold Steps to Control What Fans See,” USA 













150 “ESPN Looks to Score iTunes Deal.” http://news.zdnet.com2102-1035_22-
5982937.html 
151 Alice Z. Cuneo, “More Football Fans Hit ESPN’s Mobile Site Than Its PC Pages,” 
Advertising Age, January 7, 2008, 17. 
152 Ibid. 
153 Kenneth J. Gergen, The Saturated Self: Dilemmas of Identity in Contemporary Life. 
(New York: Basic Books, 1991), 73-74. 
154 Ibid., 74. 
155 Ibid. 
156 Marc Gunther, “ESPN’s Playbook,” Fortune. 
http://money.cnn.com/2005/12/06/news/fortune500/espn_fortune 
157 Ibid. 
158 Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society. (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell 
Publishers, 1996), 373. 
159 Ibid. 
160 Ibid., 371. 






























CHAPTER 9: SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS 
 
Introduction 
This research project has presented an evolutionary history of the sportscast 
highlight form as it took shape in the early days of film, became standardized in 
newsreels, then commodified on network and cable television and deployed ubiquitously 
across new delivery systems. While the delivery systems have changed, the utilization of 
the highlight form in both live sports coverage and news programming followed key 
principles that merit a final summary. The sportscast highlight form has been utilized for 
over a century now, yet little scholarship has been devoted to it. This study has attempted 
to show how, in its ability to distill, commodify and essentialize sporting events, the 
sportscast highlight form has served to popularize and nationalize sports and their stars, 
providing mini-narratives that brought the drama and spectacle of sport into the everyday 
lives of the nation. As such, the sportscast highlight as an aesthetic form has bridged the 
modern and postmodern, illustrating the concepts of contextualization and convergence. 
It has also illuminated important issues related to culture and media, such as hegemony, 
standardization, commodification, codification and viewer protocols. 
Synecdoche 
 The highlight became the most important electronic sports journalism form 
because capturing a part of an event and presenting it as a representation of the whole 
allowed broadcasters the most efficient means available to communicate the story. Even 
before sportscasts, the companies selling the fight sequences staged in Edison’s Black 









surprisingly the knockout round was the most profitable because customers often skipped 
the first five rounds, wanting to watch only the round with the knockout. Rather than pay 
sixty cents to see an entire fight, customers paid ten cents to watch only the knockout 
round. Packaging and viewer preference determined the direction for the highlight form 
followed. 
 Equally important to the development of the highlight form was the formula 
Edison’s cameramen used to capture an event—whether the event’s duration lasted two 
minutes (e.g., horse race) or four to five hours (e.g., America’s Cup race)—in fifty or 
one-hundred and fifty feet of film. In coverage of the 1897 Suburban Handicap and the 
1899 America’s Cup races, Edison’s cameramen captured key moments of these two 
distinctly different races. In the former, the shots included the parade, the start and the 
finish. In the latter, which included several races, Edison’s titles provide the key 
components, including “Shamrock” and “Columbia” Jockeying for a Start, “Shamrock” 
and “Columbia” Rounding the Outer Stake Boat, and “Columbia” Winning the Cup. Not 
only do the titles serve as indexical markers for the larger event, but these films also 
capture the essential action that conveys meaning. In sports, essential action is 
communicated in the outcome—what is of most interest to most people is who won. Even 
though results are not the only stories that comprise a sportscast or a newspaper sports 
section, they are the lead stories or the front page stories above the fold. Significantly, 
this concept of essential action changed as production values were enhanced by 
technology—who won became subsumed within spectacular feats by star athletes.  









production convention. Faced with economic, technical and time limitations, newsreel 
cameramen developed the sequencing of shots that served to capture any and all sporting 
events. The highlight was comprised of an establishing shot (i.e., place and time), 
followed by a field-level shot, then by a crowd shot (e.g. cheering), a moment-of-truth 
shot (e.g. touchdown), a close-up of the victor, and the celebration shot.  
To give the newsreel a sense of historical continuity, the event was condensed 
into a few shots that displaced actual time and space considerations in order to create a 
self-contained narrative. As this point in time, capturing a highlight was still very 
dependent upon the artistry of the cameraman. Because newsreel sports segments were 
composed of representations of multiple events, the production of a highlight reel 
gradually became more dependent on the artistry of the editor. Ultimately, production 
became so formulaic that newsreel sports segments did not change significantly from 
1927, when sound was first introduced, until 1967, when the last newsreels were shown. 
In those forty years, the newsreels captured the pageantry and spectacle of major sporting 
events.   
 The introduction of videotape in 1956 allowed television, and later cable, 
networks far greater flexibility in recontextualizing the synecdochic part of the whole 
sporting event for maximum affective impact. The role of announcers in guiding viewers 
to a correct interpretation of the displaced images in their new context changed after the 
introduction of instant replay from one that added “color commentary” to one that 
provided detailed analysis of why plays worked and how athletes succeeded or failed. 









traded on both literary allusions and hip-hop vernacular. As this study has shown, it is not 
merely the synecdochic image that conveys the event’s meaning, but the combination of 
the decontextualized image with a narrative reconstruction of the meaning context. 
Limitations 
 Another key consideration in delineating the contributions of each medium to the 
evolution of the highlight form is related to the limitations governing the technology and 
economics. For example, early film was limited by the camera’s film storage capacity, 
which restricted sequences to fifty feet and one-hundred and fifty feet. Even after 
cameras were able to hold larger spools of film, the cost precluded shooting extended 
sequences. The early film’s sensitivity to light also restricted shooting to outdoor subject 
matter or well-lit interiors. Edison’s Black Maria studio utilized a type of retractable roof 
and was constructed on a track that rotated to maximize exposure to the sun. The 
development of indoor lighting allowed fights to be filmed indoors, although the heat had 
a debilitating effect on the boxers.  
 Early television cameras were limited in terms of what they captured. For this 
reason, television relied on coverage of boxing and wrestling because the participants 
remained close in proximity to each other, the ring’s space was easily framed, and the 
duration of a boxing round was fixed at three minutes. Early coverage of sports like 
baseball and hockey suffered because of the difficulty of tracking a fast-moving baseball 
or hockey puck. Only after producers utilized a number of cameras located in strategic 
positions did the quality of the pictures improve. It should also be noted that television set 









Other limitations were related to reception in that the broadcast signal was transmitted via 
a network of coaxial cable. Since the first coast-to-coast live broadcast did not occur until 
1951 and outlying areas were not connected to the network, many stations were limited to 
broadcasting kinescopes that were filmed off television screens. 
 Even new media delivery systems were limited in their capacity. Because modem 
connections were limited in their capacity to deliver quality video, early Webcasts relied 
on animation and streaming audio. Only after broadband increased storage and 
transmission capacities were Web sites able to utilize streaming video to attract visitors. 
Wireless mobile service technology followed a similar trajectory in that the first two 
generations delivered half of the amount of digital information (i.e., 150 kilobits) that the 
next generation was able to deliver, and only then were able to transmit high-resolution 
content. Significantly, discourse about technology is often couched around advancement, 
yet the technology’s limitations most often determine its utilization and deployment.           
Cultural Hegemony 
The proliferation of sportscast highlights led to a cultural hegemony that 
marginalized women and minority athletes. For example, in the 1904 St. Louis Olympic 
Games, George Poage, an African-American, won two bronze medals, one for the 200-
meter hurdle and the other for the 400-meter hurdle. However, an integrated audience 
was not allowed at either the Olympics or the World's Fair as the organizers had built 
segregated facilities for the spectators. As soon as Jack Johnson won the heavyweight 
championship in 1908, legislators and civic leaders attempted to ban the distribution of 









transportation of fight films for commercial exhibition. This legislative intervention was 
linked to a moral concern over the effect both of prizefights in general and the effect of 
images of Johnson's victories in particular. A racial ideology that demonized Johnson was 
draped in a discourse purporting to protect women and children. Later, newsreel and 
television presentations of America’s black and Indian athletes were characterized by a 
discourse that sought to avoid controversy by presenting their contributions in a factual 
manner, as in the 1932 Los Angeles Olympic Games in which Ralph Metcalf and Eddie 
Tolan won multiple gold medals in track and field. Those representations finally gave 
way after many years to reporting that often focused on race only with stories involving 
sensational, often criminal, activity (e.g., Daryl Strawberry’s drug use, Michael Vick’s 
dog fighting, and Ray Leonard’s spousal abuse).  
When the contributions of blacks and American Indians in Olympiads, for 
example, could not be avoided (e.g., Jim Thorpe in 1912, Jesse Owens in 1936), they 
were explained under the “melting pot” paradigm that celebrated these victories as 
evidence of the democratic ideal of inclusiveness. Often, the presentations employed a 
dialectic in which white athletic prowess was aligned from superior intellect, will power, 
and scientific training while black and Indian athletic prowess was aligned with natural 
ability, closeness to nature, and physical attributes peculiar to their race. The highlight 
form equipped the mainstream media with a vehicle to frame the achievements of black 
and Indian athletes without having to explain the total absence of minorities from 
national organizations and federations, as well as the absence of minority owners, 









The sportscasts highlight form was also used to marginalize the athletic 
achievements of women. Women’s sports were covered within a context of gendered 
power relationships, meaning women’s sports have been almost entirely produced by 
men and edited by men with commentary written and provided by male sports journalists. 
That images of women were almost entirely produced through the male gaze to 
accommodate male interests and desires was evidenced in the Pathé Weekly newsreel 
directive in the 1920s that cameramen should get shots of only the most beautiful women 
athletes. Newsreel and television coverage of women’s sports marginalized athletic 
achievement for a discourse that highlighted the athlete’s femininity and her role as wife 
or mother.  
Women’s sports have remained largely underrepresented in sportscasts, 
comprising no more than five to seven percent, according to recent studies of national 
media like CNN, USA TODAY and ESPN’s SportsCenter. Although in 1948 NBC 
broadcast a news program devoted to women, Sportswoman of the Week, it lasted less 
than four months. Even though more women than men have graduated from journalism 
schools ever since 1977, women sports journalists constituted less than fifteen percent of 
sports journalists, and an even smaller percentage of editors, managers and owners in that 
same period of time. Moreover, women sports journalists have faced considerable 
obstacles in gaining equal access to broadcast booths, press boxes, locker rooms and 
production facilities. Judicial intervention was needed before women sports journalists 
were granted equal access. Sports organizations attempted to use moral concerns and 









they were sexually harassed by athletes and co-workers, evidenced by the case of Lisa 
Olson of the Boston Herald and several ESPN employees like Katie Ross.  
Standardization 
Not only did the highlight form constitute the main technique used in the 
production of the newsreel and television sports segment, but it also became the primary 
element around which pre- and post-game programs were developed in the early 1950s 
and greatly refined with the addition of videotape. The fact that sports constituted their 
own segment, apart from news and weather, offers an important clue about our culture 
and a direct bearing on the relationship between sport, race, gender, ethnicity and national 
identity. This positioning of sports within electronic news media reflects the general 
place of sport in our culture as a well-defined enclave that Stuart Hall has posited bears 
little or no relation to the rest of the news.  
With the arrival of sports news programs like ESPN’s SportsCenter in 1979 and 
CNN’s Sports Tonight in 1980, televised sports journalism truly set itself apart from the 
rest of the news. These programs had an immediate impact on local stations and the way 
they covered sports, leading some stations to conclude that there would not be much of a 
future in local television sports. At that time, sports ranked at or near the bottom in most 
research polls of why people watch local television news. A 1998 poll conducted by the 
Radio and Television News Directors Foundation found that the percentage of people 
(two percent) who watched local news because of sports matched those that said they 
watched because there were no other choices on television.  









wrap-around programs to complement live coverage of sporting events. Pre-game shows, 
which used highlights gleaned from kinescopes, were introduced in 1950. Although 
existing technology did not allow the use of highlights during post-game shows until the 
1960s, the networks offered programs such as the Philco Touchdown show as early as 
1948, featuring kinescope films of the season’s outstanding collegiate football games. 
Pre- and post-game programs are still utilized in the production of local, regional and 
national sportscasts. ESPN has offered weekly sport-specific wrap-up shows like 
Baseball Tonight and NFL Live since the 1980s, and many of these programs are now 
offered nightly. Since the development of the Internet, the professional leagues have 
utilized their Web sites to offer previews and summaries of every league game, and 
highlights figure prominently in all of them. These pay packages have allowed fans who 
no longer reside in the vicinity of their favorite team to watch a Webcast of every game.  
Media organizations have contributed to and maintained the widely held belief 
that broadcast sports are entertainment, rather than news, programs, staged to attract an 
audience to whom sponsors and advertisers can sell their products and services. This 
belief has had lasting implications in terms of how sports journalism’s institutional values 
and practices were formed. As the costs to broadcast rights for sporting events have 
escalated, these privately controlled sports teams and leagues became immune to the 
usual intrusions of journalists into topics that surround sports other than what takes place 
on the playing field. 
Commodification  









attracting the largest audience to present to advertisers and sponsors. In order to attract 
the largest audience, broadcasters utilize production values that enhance an event’s 
pageantry and spectacle. Moreover, sport, television, and advertising work together to 
create a single promotional entity. The increased pressures to create ever more dramatic 
and entertaining forms of sport spectacles are the result of the appropriation by this sport-
media-commercial complex. The 1980s saw greater state support for economic 
development of sport facilities, international events, and the showcasing of world-class 
athletes.  
Mediated sport provides a point of convergence for two dominant models of 
coverage—news actuality and dramatic entertainment. However, mediated sport 
production, especially in omnibus-format programs like ABC’s Wide World of Sports, 
CBS’s Sport Spectacular, and NBC’s Sportsworld, often results in an alteration of the 
perception of time and space, giving emphasis to the creation of an entertaining narrative 
that retains its claims to actuality. Many supposed live broadcasts become live-to-tape re-
presentations or what are in actuality extended highlight packages produced as live 
broadcasts. In this sense, producers only pay lip service to news actuality coverage.  
Arguably, this entertainment model is largely anti-mediatory, wherein viewers are 
led to believe that what is presented to them constitutes the natural and universally 
accepted version of sport. Many enhanced production techniques—music amplification 
of noises on the sport field, collages, superimposed graphics, rapid cuts, computer 
simulations, color arrangements, shocking images—are used to capture and sustain the 









means to achieve the desired end of maintaining viewer interest. Additionally, the 
conventions of sports commentary that evolved since the 1897 fight between Corbett and 
Fitzsimmons have become the primary discourse for thinking, talking and writing about 
sport. The viewer’s participation is invoked through a familiarity with the form and style 
of commentary while emotional identification with specific players and teams dissolves 
the boundary of the television screen. So powerful has that dissolution become that many 
viewers believe with proper training and coaching, they could do as well as the athletes 
they are watching. In other words, the very scientificity that characterizes effects like 
slow-motion action replays can be employed to deny differences in ability and 
competence.  
As the links between sports and media outlets grew closer, a vested interest in 
promoting and presenting sport in a positive light becomes part of the sports journalist’s 
routine. The interdependency between broadcasters and advertisers has resulted in less 
criticism of contractual partners. Sports journalists increasingly report on events being 
covered by the television station. As the commercial dimension of the sports industry 
became more substantial, television’s view of sport has not significantly changed. 
Stations are dependent on the teams they cover for access to the games, coaches and 
players. Although never stated explicitly, sports journalists traditionally avoid 
controversy in their coverage of the local team and its players, perhaps fearing that to 
expose wrong-doing or ineptitude would result in a loss of the broadcasting rights, 
sponsorship support, and access to highlights. 









of almost every segment of a broadcast, but also in the tightening of control over the 
dissemination of highlights. That the professional leagues have imposed restrictions on 
the use of highlights and still images of a game in progress speaks to their value in 
attracting fans and viewers to media. 
Codification 
 Codification of what constitutes the most important sports highlights resulted 
from the continuity of the twenty-four-hour news cycle in 1980 and the desire of news 
organizations like ESPN to produce ever more affective highlights to satisfy the sports 
junkie. By the 1990s ESPN had developed its own typology of highlights, referred to as 
“The Seminal Seventeen,” which became a teaching tool for training production 
assistants. This formulaic approach to producing sports news mirrors that which governed 
the newsreels for forty years. Producing the “Top Ten Plays” on a nightly basis 
invariably leads to a constricting, so that only the most spectacular dunks, the most 
vicious hits, the most spectacular shots, saves, goals by the most recognizable athletes 
can make the list. In this way, only the superstars of the major sports come to be 
represented in the ranked order. Not surprisingly, the quest for the nightly “Top Ten” 
invariably spawns “Top Ten Plays of the Week,” which spawns a weekly version of “The 
Ultimate Highlight,” which spawned a book, The Ultimate Highlight Reel that presents a 
calendar of the greatest highlights that happened to occur on a given date. The process 
regenerates itself, providing an unending stream of only the spectacular, based on its 
ability to shock and awe.      









Highlights,” “Who’s Now,” “The 100 Greatest (North American) Athletes of the 
Twentieth Century,” “Greatest SportsCenter Moments,” “Top Ten Greatest Games,” and 
“Top Ten Greatest Coaches.” In creating a canon of what constitutes the “greatest,” 
ESPN appropriates athletic achievement in the service of brand recall and ratings, and 
enhances its aura of authoritativeness. As expressed in the introduction to The Ultimate 
Highlight Reel book, while everyone has his or her own favorite highlights, the 
“ultimate” decision of what highlights are selected for this book resides with ESPN. Of 
course, the first criterion is that they appeared on SportsCenter. The unfortunate side 
effect of such listings is the narrowing of sports discourse. One can agree or disagree with 
ESPN’s lists, but very few alternatives are produced, none that has the reach or marketing 
to create an impact. In this way, codification produces a canon of the “100 Greatest 
Highlights,” absent the contributions of most of the world’s athletes and most of the 
world’s sports. 
Viewer Protocols 
The protocols associated with viewing sportscast highlights have changed 
considerably. Viewing a kinescope through a peep show was largely a solitary 
experience, though other customers were doubtlessly in the same parlor at the same time. 
Nonetheless, until the development of projection, reception occurred one person at a 
time. With film projection, the experience became communal, and viewers interacted 
with the commentator, the figures represented on screen and each other. Cheers, boos, 
foot-stomping and wild cries of joy were observed in newsreel audiences, and the 










Before television sets became readily affordable in the early 1950s, sports fans 
often watched games from the bar or tavern rather than from the living room. Bar owners 
realized the opportunities that sportscasts afforded them and enacted rules to govern 
behaviors. Televised sports changed the social dynamic within the bar since people 
regularly came to the bar to watch television and not for the social drinking experience. 
Televised sportscasts impacted the social sphere of the bar as a venue for spectatorship 
and as a space of interpersonal communication.  
As home viewing became the norm, how sportscasts’ packaged reality impacted 
viewers became a concern of media scholars. Watching sportscasts was not only 
pleasurable, but an addiction that had to be continually fed. Terms such as “sports junkie” 
and “couch potato” were used to describe the excessive viewing habits. While cable acted 
like an electronic magazine rack providing programming for women, children and 
minorities, sportscast audiences remained largely male.  
While fundamental differences between the stadium experience and the television 
experience still exist, what unfolds on the field has been directly impacted by television. 
However, the addition of scoreboards with replay capabilities and enhanced audio 
technologies has significantly narrowed the differences between stadium and television 
experience. In fact, players and stadium fans routinely watch scoreboard replays, and 
their reactions are often picked up by the telecast. 
 Viewers of sportscast highlights come to the experience with specific affiliations 









outcome. As a result, they may come to the experience with a fixed emotional attitude. 
Another important consideration is that highlight segments most often feature opponents, 
whether in the form of teams or individuals. Viewers come to the viewing experience 
from a number of different perspectives—those who identify with team or individual A, 
those who identify with team or individual B, and those who have no particular vested 
interest in either team. Granted, the strength of a viewer’s identification will vary along 
an emotional spectrum from strong to weak, as it will for those viewers who are without a 
vested interest in either team since few viewers are so completely neutral that the 
highlight will arouse no emotional stimulation about either A or B. Similarly, the way a 
highlight and its commentary are structured relative to the teams and individuals affect 
how viewers will be positioned to the highlight. 
By ESPN’s own admission, SportsCenter highlights do not all focus on a game’s 
narrativity. These are the paradigmatic images, decontextualized highlights that do not 
recount a specific game or event. Removed from the context of the actual events, these 
highlight montages are relatively open, fractal texts that engender what Roland Barthes 
associated with an annulment of the subject. Typically these highlights serve as 
promotional vehicles to generate enthusiasm for ongoing events, to remind viewers “This 
is SportsCenter,” and to serve as lead-ins for upcoming segments or commercial breaks. 
For the viewer, these highlights do not focus on specific games and teams but depend on 
a rapid-fire display of athleticism. Having no game context and no team identification, 
the viewer can only watch this overproduction of images or semiotic excess. “The 









resentfulness, emptiness, and loss. 
    Paradigmatic imagery can also transform signification into significance, which 
can be defined as meaning that is sensually produced. These highlights are designed to 
engage the viewer on a very visceral level. Often they showcase a series of games or a 
series of plays, as in SportsCenter’s “Top Ten Plays,” “Web Gems,” “Buzzer Beaters,” 
and “Jack U Up.” Their significance emerges by escaping from context and producing its 
own effect. Viewers actively (co)produce their pleasure by providing the meaning, which 
lies beyond any final signified. What is disseminated is pure spectacle whereby the 
viewer experiences a transgressive pleasure, a momentary loss of self, a conjunction of 
text and self that seeks to escape social control but ultimately cannot elude the ideological 
underpinnings that ESPN’s SportsCenter invariably attaches to the images.     
For the past two decades, new delivery systems have provided individuals 
considerably more access to sportscast content. Ironically, these delivery systems, 
especially computers and wireless mobile devices, reached an audience of one, bringing 
the viewing experience full circle to the days of peep shows. That more sports fans are 
using devices like mobile cell phones to access sportscast highlights was evidenced in a 
report by the mobile-marketing industry that showed on at least three different occasions 
in the fall of 2007 more people accessed ESPN’s NFL highlights with their phones than 
with personal computers. Additionally, in March 2008 CBS presented every game of the 
NCAA men’s basketball championships on the Web for free, marking the first time a 
major U. S. sporting event has been made available online for free. Significantly, 









advertising for each of its almost five million online viewers compared with $4.12 in 
advertising for each of its 132 million television viewers. As more people consume 
sportscasts online, generating more advertising revenue, the protocols for watching 
sportscasts will continue to evolve. 
Conclusion 
Even though this study traced the evolution and deployment of the sportscast 
highlight form over more than a century, it is necessarily limited. Future research might 
employ production ethnography to explain the processes involved in selecting, editing 
and scripting techniques sportscast highlights. The decisions that go into such processes 
would help to understand the way sportscasts have been, and continue to be, deployed to 
shape cultural values. In turn, this would help educators to prepare a curriculum for future 
sports broadcasters. Additionally, audience ethnography would help to explain how 
audiences make meaning of the sportscast highlights and what values they find in 
sportscast highlights.    
This study has shown that economic, social, legal and technological developments 
in film, newsreels, television and new media contributed to the evolution of the sportscast 
highlight form by providing the means to enhance and refine video and audio techniques. 
The sportscast highlight form evolved out of the operational aesthetics of each medium’s 
particular style, mode of production and intertextualities that attracted audiences. As the 
rights fees for broadcasting the major sporting events increased, network and cable 
broadcasters increasingly made their broadcasts more appealing by focusing on the 









NCAA of their control over broadcast rights, facilitating a saturation of the market place 
that eventually led to lower television ratings and an increasingly commercial 
presentation.  
Sportscasts, arguably one of the most important culture industries, have 
progressed through pre-commercial and commercial phases to their current iteration in 
which all aspects of the sport sector (i.e., goods, services, and experiences) are now 
transformed into commodities to be hawked within the commercial marketplace. As a 
result, virtually all aspects of the global sport infrastructure—governing bodies, leagues, 
events, teams, and individual athletes—are now driven and defined by the inter-related 
processes of: commercialization (the exploitation of an object or practice for capital 
gain); corporatization (the rational structuring and management of sporting entities 
according to profit motives); and, spectacularization (the production of entertainment-
driven experiences). Contemporary sport has become subject to the logics of a society, 
and indeed a high-technology capitalist economy, propelled by commercially mediated 
spectacles and circuitry.  
The commercial entertainment ethos has only increased as networks like ESPN 
attempt to recoup the money spent on rights fees and production costs. These costs have 
motivated broadcasters to not only develop video and audio technologies to nuance their 
coverage in ways that maintain viewer attention, but also to make sure that the production 
is fully commodified. No longer is it sufficient to broadcast game highlights that convey 
information about who led the way to victory and how that victory was secured. In 









with corporate sponsorship that results in considerable profits for the cable network and 
is used to seduce and fascinate viewers. SportsCenter segments are branded, so that a 
constant stream of product names and icons act as lead-ins before the viewer gets to the 
actual highlights, commentary or interview. Arguably, these segments can be seen as 
examples of postmodern art that brings together advertisement imagery, ideological 
codes and symbols of consumer capitalism. Not surprisingly, ESPN has accomplished 
with sportscasts what MTV did with popular music. 
 The sportscast highlight form has facilitated an overproduction of images that are 
recontextualized by media to serve their own and their sponsors’ interests. This 
proliferation of information has led to a decrease in meaning, which is literally imploded 
when decontextualized and then reformulated by the media to produce affect. Affective 
economics anchor people in particular experiences, identities, and pleasures that 
invariably promote and consensualize the dominant ideology’s view of reality. Such 
power is essentially seductive in motivating viewers to not only consume the images, but 
also to manifest their emotional needs in conspicuous consumption. As Roland Barthes 
has noted, it is not when ideology hovers close to the surface and is easily recognizable 
that it is most powerful, but when it is strongly present but apparently absent, allowing 
myths to do their work on the emotions.  
Rapid cuts, music, superimposed graphics, and computer simulations contribute to 
capture and sustain viewer attention and interest. Slow-motion instant replays and edited 
highlight packages, which are based on the principles of film montage, manipulate and 









contextualizing sporting events by offering analysis and critical insight, sportscasters 
have deployed the sportscast highlight form to intervene in events, recasting them as 
something devoid of their original meaning and adding to the effacing of history and 
reality. By the time actual sporting events are reproduced as highlight images, the 
principal values associated with the nature and purpose of competition—such as hard 
work, innovation, cooperation and teamwork, self-determination, self-sacrifice and an 
emphasis on sportsmanship—become distorted in the pastiche of imagery and discourses 
that have no meta-narrative or unified theory. Removed from the context of the actual 
sporting event, spectacular dunks, towering home runs and jarring tackles become the 
means to instant gratification, transferring the excitement from the athletic contests into a 
continual, concentrated sense of exhilaration meant to maintain only that which is of 
commercial value. As this study has shown, we delude ourselves if we believe that sports 
and politics are not conjoined in a society of late capitalism 

























































Illustration 2.4 Newspaper illustration that appeared in the New York Sun on April 22, 




































Illustration 2.5: American Mutoscope and Biograph Company ad placed in the New York 
Clipper on November 18, 1899, challenging the Edison and Lubin companies to prove 













Illustration 3.1: Display ad that appeared in the New York Times in the days leading up to 




























Illustration 3.2: A national sporting culture was constructed on the idea of the melting 
pot, although often that culture contained conflicting messages, as evidenced in a 
photograph that appeared in the July 26, 1908, issue of the New York Times. The 
photograph shows Lewis Tewanima, Carlisle Indian Industrial School student and 
member of the Hopi Nation, leading a “War Dance” on board the ship carrying American 


































































Illustration 4.3: Display ad that appeared in the New York Times on June 23, 1948, for 





















































Illustration 4.5: A television map of the United States that appeared in the New York 








































































Illustration 5.1: The Ampex Mark IV Prototype Video Tape Recorder that was 

























Illustration 5.2: The first commercially available videotape was sold by 3M beginning in 


























Illustration 5.3: Schematic drawing of Syncom III’s synchronous orbit that appeared in 














Illustration 6.1: (Above) Map of the United States showing the position of earth stations. 
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